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Abstract
My dissertation deals with metaontology or metametaphysics. This is the
subdiscipline of philosophy that is concerned with the investigation of meta-
physical concepts, statements, theories and problems on the metalevel. It
analyses the meaning of metaphysical statements and theories and discusses
how they are to be justied. The name "metaontology" is recently coined,
but the task of metaontology is the same as Immanuel Kant already dealt
with in his Critique of Pure Reason. As methods I use both historical re-
search and logical (or rather semantical) analysis. In order to understand
clearly what metaphysical terms or theories mean or should mean we must
both look at how they have been characterized in the course of the history of
philosophy and then analyse the meanings that have historically been given
to them with the methods of modern formal semantics. Metaontological
research would be worthless if it could not in the end be applied to solving
some substantive ontological questions. In the end of my dissertation, there-
fore, I give arguments for a solution to the substantively ontological problem
of universals, a form of realism about universals called promiscuous realism.
To prepare the way for that argument, I argue that the metaontological
considerations most relevant to the problem of universals are considerations
concerning ontological commitment, as the American philosophers Quine
and van Inwagen have argued, not those concerning truthmakers as such
philosophers as the Australian realist D. M. Armstrong have argued or those
concerning verication conditions as such philosophers as Michael Dummett
have argued. To justify this conclusion, I go rst through well-known ob-
jections to vericationism, and show that they apply also to current veri-
cationist theories such as Dummett's theory and Field's deationist theory
of truth. In the process I also respond to opponents of metaphysics who try
to show with the aid of vericationism or structuralism that metaphysical
questions would be meaningless or illegitimate in some other way. Having
justied the central role of ontological commitment, I try to develop a de-
tailed theory of it. The core of my work is a rigorous formal development
of a theory of ontological commitment. I construct it by combining Alonzo
Church's theory of ontological commitment with Tarski's theory of truth.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What are Metaontology and Metametaphysics
and why are they needed?
This dissertation is concerned with metaontological or metametaphysical
questions relating to the Problem of Universals. Metaontology or metameta-
physics is the subdiscipline of philosophy that is concerned with the inves-
tigation of metaphysical statements on the metalevel, with analysing the
meaning of metaphysical statements and terms and discussing how meta-
physical statements and theories are to be justied. In this it is similar
to the somewhat better known and more popular discipline of metaethics,
which is concerned with analysing the meaning of ethical statements and
discussing the ways in which they can possibly be justied. We can call
both metaethics and metaontology parts of metaphilosophy.
The name "meta-ontology" or "metaontology" (both spellings are used
in the literature) is the common name of the discipline1. The word "meta-
1The origins of this common name are a bit obscure; as is suggested by C. Daniel
Dolson in [Dol06, page 13], it may have been rst introduced by Jack Guendling in the
rather curious article [Gue53] which Guendling himself according to Dolson later described
as whimsical. Guendling denes meta-ontology in [Gue53, page 219] as
that empirical branch of semiotic which studies symbols which, as related
in the construction of theoretical systematics of objective relations among
things, are completely general
The denition is a bit obscure and has objectionable features. It should not be part of
the denition of meta-ontology that it is empirical, for it is a dicult question which
methods are to be used in meta-ontology and rationalistic theories of meta-ontology are
certainly possible. It is surely plausible that if any statements at all are analytic, then
some statements of meta-ontology are, and traditional analytic philosophy would therefore
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ontology" was memorably used and popularized in its modern sense by Peter
van Inwagen in [vI98]. Inwagen calls the question "what are we asking when
we ask what is there?" the meta-ontological question and any answer to it a
meta-ontology2. It is natural to expand the term "meta-ontology" also to the
discipline that seeks such answers (especially since the word "ontology" has
already earlier been used both of theories and a discipline in a similar way).
The word "metametaphysics" is also occasionally used in the literature,
though it is very ugly; a whole book with this as its title, namely [CMW09],
has recently appeared. Unfortunately, most articles in this book concentrate
on discussing the possibility of metaphysics rather than actually seeking to
constructively provide methods for metaphysical research3.
Since an adequate treatment of metaontology requires a lot of time and
care, I must devote most of this dissertation to considering metaontological
questions. However, metaontological research would be worthless if it could
not in the end be applied to solving some substantive ontological questions
(in the possibly weak sense of the word in which a typical ontological ques-
tion can be substantive). At the end, therefore, I will give a preliminary
argument for a solution to the substantively ontological problem of univer-
sals, a form of realism about universals called promiscuous realism. It seems
to me that the argument I will give will lend very strong support for the
claim that some kind of realism concerning universals is true. If properly
understood, this claim will turn out to be almost obviously correct.
While the problem of universals is not metaontological but substantive, it
is one of the least substantive problems of substantive metaphysics. While it
is then not wholly trivial, it is more trivial than other metaphysical problems.
proclaim them a priori. However, the emphasis on complete generality is surely on the
right track, as we will see later in Section 5.6 of this work.
2This denition of the term is simpler and more comprehensible than Guendling's,
though it may be a bit too narrow, as it concentrates on the meaning of ontological
questions and neglects the question of how they are justied, which can also be called
metaontological.
3The words "ontology" and "metaphysics" are usually employed as synonyms, and
therefore the words "metaontology" and "metametaphysics" are naturally also used as
synonyms. However, I will show later in Section 2 that a dierence is yet often made
between the two words "ontology" and "metaphysics", so that the former is a part of the
later or a more fundamental discipline on which the later is based. This might make it
advisable to also make a dierence between "metaontology" and "metametaphysics", so
that the former would be a part of the later or a more fundamental discipline on which the
latter would be founded. However, the distinction between the two disciplines would in any
case be rather small, so this is a subtlety that may not be of much practical importance.
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I think that it is also independent of other, more substantive problems. I will
argue that the realism concerning universals I will defend can be combined
equally well with dierent solutions to other metaphysical problems, such
as the problem of the relation of mind and matter, which is perhaps the
most substantive (and most dicult) of all metaphysical problems. I will
argue that realism concerning universals can be combined equally well with
physicalism, dualism, idealism and neutral monism.
I think that attacking ontological questions directly, in a naive way, is not
the most promising way of trying to make real progress on them. Ever since
Immanuel Kant introduced what he called critical philosophy - and even
earlier, when Rene Descartes raised the cogito, an epistemological princi-
ple as the starting point of philosophy - such a naive way of proceeding in
ontology has been held in suspicion. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason can
be held to have been an early work of metametaphysics (though it con-
centrated exclusively on the epistemological question of the justication of
metaphysical statements, assuming uncritically that the meaning of such
statements was suciently clear). Kant addressed the same theme more
succinctly in Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to
Come Forward As Science (translated into English in [Kan85]). Metaontol-
ogy or metametaphysics can be said to be a prolegomenon to metaphysics
in Kant's sense. Metametaphysics is thus far from a completely novel disci-
pline, though it has had few practitioners until recently. Most proponents
of modern analytical philosophy share this old suspicion. However, several
current ontologists, especially outside and on the peripheries o analytical
philosophy, have deed this general opinion and continued trying to attack
ontological questions directly. I do not think that they give good enough ar-
guments for reverting to such an antiquated procedure. They are with good
reason disgusted by the extreme subjectivism into which the critical method
has often led; however, there is no reason to think that a critical method
would necessarily lead to subjectivism- Such modern meta-ontologists as van
Inwagen have not been led to any subjectivist or sceptical conclusions about
ontology. We can suspect that only a bad use of the method does so. On the
other hand the naive approach to ontological questions has led to unsolvable
disagreements. Therefore I will develop my ontological theory with the aid
of preliminary metaontological or metametaphysical considerations.
In reaction to the negative attitude towards ontology and metaphysics
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that has prevailed in analytical philosophy, many ontologists have gone to
the other extreme and defended the primacy of metaphysics or ontology
(which is sometimes - e. g. by C. B. Martin in [MH99] and John Heil
- called the ontological turn or sometimes the speculative turn). Some of
them, such as Michael Devitt who speaks about the priority of metaphysics e.
g. in [Dev01a], are naturalistic metaphysicians; however, many of them (e. g.
Barry Smith in [Smi] or Tuomas E. Tahko in [Tah08]) are Neo-Aristotelians4
and think that they are returning to the Aristotelian approach. Tahko says
in the abstract of his thesis:
The metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian as
opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the rst philosophy and the
basis of all other philosophical and scientic inquiry.
Neo-Aristotelians often say that when Descartes placed epistemology in the
center of philosophy instead of ontology, things started going downhill; Barry
Smith's video lecture available on the Internet [Smi] is a very good example
of this very widespread attitude. However, there are reasons to think that
such Neo-Aristotelians have partly misunderstood the approach of Aristotle
or are at least unclear about in what sense metaphysics can be primary.
Aristotle distinguished two kinds of priority in Posterior Analytics (72a);
he said that there is a dierence between what is prior and better known (or
intelligible) in the order of being and what is prior and better known (intel-
ligible) to man. The former kind of priority might be called metaphysical
or ontological priority5, while the later might be called epistemic or episte-
mological priority. A discipline can be said to be prior to another in one of
4These classes are not mutually exclusive; some Neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians are
also naturalistic metaphysicians. However, this is not always the case. There exist both
more empiristic and more rationalistic interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy, and both
more materialistic and more dualistic interpretations of it. While the more empiristic and
materialistic interpretations of Aristotelianism are clearly compatible with naturalism,
the more rationalistic and dualistic interpretations are not. E. g. Smith's and Tahko's
interpretation of Aristotelianism is so rationalistic that it is incompatible with the kinds of
naturalism professed by Devitt or Ladyman, which combine physicalism with empiricism.
Some who defend the primacy of ontology are Heideggerians, with a very idiosyncratic
conception of what ontology is, a conception that Heidegger indeed pretended to base
loosely on Aristotle's conception, but developed in a way very dierent from that in which
most Neo-Aristotelians (or analytical metaphysicians) develop it.
5Exactly how this notion of metaphysical priority is to be understood is a dicult
question, and what entities (if any) are metaphysically prior to others, i. e. fundamental
is already a very substantive metaphysical question. I will touch these questions briey
later in many sections of this dissertation, mostly in Section 2.1.4.
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these senses if the truths it tries to nd out are prior to the truths the other
seeks in that sense. I think that more subtle philosophical analysis must
actually distinguish several dierent kinds of epistemological priority and
several dierent kinds of metaphysical priority; however, at this point the
distinction between these two broad kinds of priority is enough. I am afraid
that philosophers who speak of the primacy of metaphysics or ontology often
confuse even these two kinds of priority.
How are these priorities related? Aristotle tells us inMetaphysics (1029b3-
5) (see [Ari33, pages 318,319]) that
. . . learning is always acquired in this way, by advancing through
what is less intelligible by nature to what is more so.
This makes quite clear at least that what is ontologically primary cannot in
all cases be the same as what is epistemologically primary, since we need to
advance through one to the other. It also suggests that these two kinds of
priority are reverses of each other. However, this seems to be too simple;
other sayings of Aristotle imply they cannot be so in all cases; for instance,
Aristotle suggests in Metaphysics 1028a that substance is primary in all
senses, both by denition and in knowledge. Many later metaphysicians,
not just Aristotelians but also rationalists, have followed him in this and
interpreted it so that substances are both metaphysically and epistemologi-
cally primary.
It seems to me that the truths of metaphysics are indeed according to
the Aristotelian view prior and better known in the order of being than the
truths of other disciplines, but they are generally very far from being prior
and better known to man. A discipline can be said to prior and better known
in one sense if and only if its truths are prior and better known in that
sense. Therefore metaphysics would (unsurprisingly!) be metaphysically
prior to other sciences; however, in this case it could not be prior to them
epistemically. In this case it cannot be the basis of philosophical inquiry as
Tahko claims, at least if this expression is understood in the most natural
sense, since the basis of inquiry is most naturally understood as that from
which the inquirer starts, i. e. that from which he advances6. This seems
to me to be an intuitively plausible view about the relationship of these
6Metaphysics can indeed be the basis of inquiry in the sense that the holding (not the
knowledge) of its truths makes inquiry possible in the rst place, but this would be a
rather unnatural way to use the expression.
9
disciplines; it is also supported by naturalistic metaphysics, since in special
sciences also two kinds of priority can be distinguished. We can speak about
an entity having a more fundamental role in a scientic theory than another,
and a naturalistic metaphysician would naturally take metaphysical priority
to be some kind of generalization of this kind of primacy in a scientic
theory. While middle-sized physical objects are epistemologically prior, yet
science takes microscopic particles which we cannot directly observe to play
a more fundamental role in a scientic theory.
Willem de Jong has in many articles, e. g. in [dJB10] and in [Jon95],
discussed the Classical Model of Science that derives from Aristotle's Pos-
terior Analytics aka Analytica Posteriora. Descartes was according to de
Jong [dJB10, page 187] also a follower of this tradition and the second mile-
stone of this tradition after Aristotle's Posterior Analytics was the Logic of
Port-Royal (translated in [ArnCL]) written mainly by the Cartersian An-
toine Arnauld and relying in many respects on Pascal and Descartes7. Jong
has stressed the importance of this distinction, which earlier commentators
on Aristotle's methodology such as Heinrich Scholz and Evert W. Beth in
his view [dJB10, page 197] missed, leading them to a too harsh criticism of
the model (which however is still outdated in many ways, as its claim that
the principles of science must be known infallibly is just not sustainable.).
As de Jong shows, this distinction corresponds to a distinction between two
correlative methods, the method of synthesis and the method of analysis.
There is some dispute among historians of philosophy about the origin
and meaning of the very word "metaphysics". Many (perhaps the most) say
that the etymology of the word has nothing to do with its meaning and that
it originated just because Aristotle's book Metaphysics dealing with the dis-
cipline was placed after the book Physics in the edition of Aristotle's works
(perhaps by Andronicus of Rhodes, who according to some not too reliable
sources named it on this basis). However, some say that it was intended
to signify that metaphysics comes after physics when studying philosophy
(which then meant the sciences in general). On the other hand, Aristotle
also calls metaphysics rst philosophy (! oo in Greek, prima
philosophia in Latin), which suggests that it is prior to physics and other
7Arnauld gives Descartes's proof for the immortality of the soul as one example of
analysis; see [ArnCL, page 307]. This argument of course begins from Descartes's notorious
attempt to doubt everything that can be doubted, which Barry Smith thinks leads to
scepticism.
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special sciences. However, even if we think that the name "metaphysics"
did connote the supposed place of metaphysics as a discipline in the system
of sciences, these two views about the relationship of metaphysics to physics
and other special sciences can be reconciled if we distinguish the two kinds
of priority. We can then say that metaphysical truths are prior and better
known in the order of nature than the truths of special sciences like physics,
and therefore metaphysics is rst philosophy in the order of being, but the
truths of special sciences like physics are prior and better known to man,
and therefore metaphysics comes after physics when studying the sciences8.
Nevertheless, even the truths of special sciences are not best known to
man, but better know to man than them is the pre-scientic (often common-
sensical) knowledge that precedes all of them. Before having any knowledge
of electrons or black holes, we have pre-scientic knowledge of men and rocks
and trees. Even prior to this we can argue (as I will later in this work argue)
to be the experiences of individual persons, including at least their percep-
tion of material objects and probably far more, such as inner perception
and methematical intuition. Therefore we cannot start from metaphysics or
8When Quine famously objected to rst philosophy in the name of naturalism, he was
not attacking rst philosophy in the order of being but rst philosophy in the order of
knowledge. In other words, it was traditional foundationalist epistemology that he was
attacking, not metaphysics or ontology as he is sometimes misunderstood to have done.
Even so, the theory Quine himself presented in e. g. [Qui93] seems to be foundationalist
in a weak sense, as Quine accepts the existence of observation sentences as expressing
the foundations of science. Therefore Quine must either be acknowledged to be incon-
sistent or he must be interpreted so that it was only some specic powerful forms of
foundationalism that he was attacking. In [Qui90], Quine admitted in response to the
article [Haa90] by Susan Haack that his theory is foundationalist, though it combines
foundationalist elements with coherentist ones; Quine even said that his theory might be
called foundherentist, if the word coined by Haack were not so ugly. Donald Davidson
described Quine's (as well as Dummett's) view as foundationalist in [Dav86, page 312] and
attacked it from a coherentist point of view, claiming that it led to skepticism. Davidson
held in [Dav86, page 313] that we should give up the distinction between observation sen-
tences and other sentences, and this seems to me to be indeed a consequence of complete
anti-foundationalism. Davidson indeed does not distinguish vericationism clearly from
weaker forms of foundationalism. Yet it seems that what the later Quine mostly objected
to is the kind of foundationalism according to which the foundations of knowledge are not
intersubjective, such as the theory that claims the foundations of knowledge to concern
sense-data; he is at least sometimes implicitly willing to accept the kind of foundationalism
according to which the foundations of knowledge concern physical objects. When Devitt,
who follows Quine, attacks rst philosophy (e. g. in [DS87, page 225-226]), it seems that
he is primarily thinking of rationalistic foundationalism as his foe, as he contrasts rst
philosophy with philosophy naturalized, which according to him says that philosophy is
not an a priori discipline. Devitt's attack on rst philosophy is then consistent with the
acceptance of empiricist foundationalism. I will discuss dierent kinds of foundationalism
and their dierences at more length later in Section 3.1.1 of this work.
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even from physics, but we have to start from the pre-scientic knowledge
or from experiences preceding even it and proceed from this by the method
of analysis9 or resolution or inquiry (zetesis) to the truths and concepts
that are better known in the order of being, and then use these principles
to derive the truths of the special sciences and semantics and logic them-
selves by the method of synthesis or composition. This will conrm that
our analysis has been successful and also provide us with more truths of
the lower level sciences. In fact the principles of logic, semantics, episte-
mology and methodology, which Aristotle treats of in his Organon10 govern
the whole processes of analysis and synthesis and are therefore in one way
prior to and better known to man than all the truths that are known with
the aid of these methods. Unfortunately, Aristotle himself did not develop
the methodological disciplines of analysis (with the exception of logic) very
thoroughly, but skipped swiftly to the later stage of synthesis, which may
account for the errors that have later been discovered in his theories. The
later development of science has shown that many of Aristotle's doctrines
that Aristotle himself thought to be certainly known, such as his physical
doctrines of the four elements or of the heavenly spheres, were in fact false,
so the processes of analysis and synthesis could not provide such infallible
knowledge as Aristotle thought. Even Aristotle's logic, though it remained
unsurpassed for much longer than his physics, has been found defective by
9The method of analysis as the phrase is here used must not be confused with analytical
knowledge nor the method of composition with synthetic knowledge, as these words are
commonly used in modern philosophy. There are indeed interesting (although obscure and
controversial) connections between these two notions, especially in Kant's thought as de
Jong shows in [Jon95]. However, all the same the method of analysis may led to synthetic
knowledge as well as analytic, since it may start from truths known (at least relatively)
immediately on the basis of experience, in which case it will lead to synthetic knowledge,
or it may start by examining only the concepts abstracted from experience, in which case
it will lead to knowledge of conceptual relationships, which is commonly called analytical
knowledge.
10Aristotle did not yet have any names for semantics or epistemology but at least his
work De Interpretatione treats of subjects that we would today consider as semantical and
his work Posterior Analytics treats of subjects that we would today call epistemological
and methodological, while Prior Analytics treats of logic. As for Categories, it is contro-
versial whether it treats of ontology, semantics or even grammar. If Aristotle's philosophy
was better than earlier and competing ones, this is to a great extent due to the fact that
he had a better organon than others, including the rst highly developed theory of logic
in the theory of syllogistic inference in Prior Analytics. However, this is not generally
true of present day Neo-Aristotelians. Neo-Aristotelians who talk about the primacy of
metaphysics often either use Aristotle's outdated organon or do not have any organon at
all, which leaves their metaphysics built on a foundation of sand.
12
modern logicians like Frege, Russell and Whitehead, even though some Neo-
Scholastics (such as Henry Babcock Veatch with his intentional logic) have
still during the past century tried to defend it against modern logic. There is
surely no reason to suppose that Aristotle's more purely philosophical doc-
trines such as his metaphysical doctrines would be any more generally true
than his physical doctrines, as some of the more extreme Neo-Aristotelians
(especially Neo-Scholastics, though even secular Neo-Aristotelians are occa-
sionally guilty) do. This is especially so since many if not most metaphysical
principles are posterior to and less well known to man than physical ones,
and therefore the falsity of Aristotelian physics implies that any metaphysi-
cal conclusions based on that physics are utterly unjustied once the falsity
of Aristotle's physics is recognized. As an especially egregious instance, it
is obvious that Aristotle's argument for the existence of God as the Prime
Mover (or probably rather of several gods as prime movers) in Book XII of
Metaphysics (1073b-1074a) was based on the current physical theory of the
motion of the stars (and the spheres which he thought to carry them) devel-
oped by such astronomers as Eudoxus and more generally on his dynamics
(which Galileo showed to be false) and is hence pretty much worthless today
(though it it can of course not be ruled out before detailed investigations
in the philosophy of religion that it might be possible to develop variations
of it that might be based on or at least compatible with modern physics).
However, the same considerations are likely to extend far wider to Aristotle's
metaphysical principles.
Nevertheless, they do not apply to all of Aristotle's metaphysical claims;
as I will later show in more detail in this work (in Subsection 2.1), Aristotle
thought that the principle of non-contradiction (formulated in one way) was
a metaphysical statement, and it is not at all plausible to claim that our
knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction would depend on physics or
other special sciences11. It may not be at rst sight plausible to claim that
11This is not wholly uncontroversial. As I will discuss in more detail later in Section 2.2.1
of this work, extreme empiricists would no doubt be willing to make even this claim.
Holistic empiricists such as Quine or Devitt would claim that even such logical laws as
the principle of non-contradiction would be in principle revisable in the light of physical
knowledge; however, most even of them would think that the development of physics
has in actuality given no reason to revise it. Some dialetheists like Routley would claim
that the principle should be revised, and would appeal to empiricism in favour of its
revisability. However, it seems to me that the real main reasons why they want to revise
it are not based on empirical sciences, but derive from such reasons as set-theoretical and
semantical paradoxes, which in their view are best solved by accepting that they validly
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the principle of non-contradiction would be epistemically primary either,
at least not in all senses of that expression; even being able to state that
principle requires the possession of concepts that are acquired only with
diculty in a high state of civilization. However, it can be argued that once
a person is capable of clearly formulating and understanding the principle,
its truth is immediately obvious to him, so in another, more important
sense it can be claimed to be epistemically primary. If this is correct, it
is a plausible example of a rare principle that is both ontologically and
epistemically primary. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that very much of
Aristotle's metaphysics is in this way independent from his science. Also the
fact that Aristotle's metaphysics contains so very dierent kinds of claims
raises doubts whether it is really a unitary discipline, or whether it should
be divided into subdisciplines as we will later see Christian Wol proposed
should be done.
In this circumstance a sharper scrutiny of the methods of analysis and a
concentration on epistemology and methodology is surely called for. Descartes's
epistemological theorising was in fact motivated by the desire to recover the
method of analysis used by ancients such as Aristotle and to develop it
further; Descartes's revolt against the medieval interpretations of Aristotle
was one of the many causes that led to the rise of modern science. There
is certainly much room for disagreement about how well he succeeded in
his task and about the ultimate correctness of his positive epistemological
theories, especially with regard to his representationalism about perception.
However, the epistemological problems (such as the problems posed by illu-
sions and hallucinations) he posed are logical developments of the problems
already present in ancient philosophy (e. g. in the thought of the Sceptics)
and no serious philosopher today can avoid engagement with them. Modern
analytical philosophy, as can be seen in its very name, can also be under-
stood as an attempt to understand the process of analysis better12. We
imply contradictions. However, the paradoxes are surely not in any signicant way based
on special sciences. However, Aristotle would also have thought that the Principle of
Excluded Middle was part of metaphysics, and it has often been claimed that discoveries
in physics aect that principle; e. g. Putnam has claimed in [Put68] that Quantum
Mechanics bids us to reject that principle. However, given that there are many competing
interpretations of quantum mechanics, an interpretation that demands us to modify logical
principles is surely one of the least attractive.
12Of course, conceptual analysis in the sense of the word used in analytical philosophy
is only a small though extremely important part of the method of analysis in the broadest
sense, which also includes such methods as deduction, induction and abduction (if abduc-
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must then apply the knowledge gained in these disciplines to metaphysical
questions, and doing this is the task of metaontology or metametaphysics.
1.2 A Roadmap of the Argument
Metaontological theories can be divided into semantical and epistemological
ones. It is very important to distinguish these kinds of problems from each
other; as I will argue, many inuential philosophers such as logical positivists
have confused them, and this has led them to confusions which still persist
in today's philosophy. In this dissertation I concentrate on the semantical
side of metaontology. I will often refer to epistemological problems, but will
not take any position with regard to most of them. However, I must take
a position in the basic epistemological debate between foundationalism and
coherentism. I will argue that coherentism is utterly untenable and there-
fore we should either accept foundationalism (though a very weak version
of foundationalism is sucient) or (if possible) seek out a third option, such
as e. g. Susan Haack's foundherentism is supposed to be. Nevertheless, my
arguments are designed so that they will work equally well in very dierent
epistemological frameworks, between which I do not at least yet have rea-
sons to decide; for example, they are designed to be compatible both with
(at least many kinds of) representationalism and direct realism, with both
more empiricistic and more rationalistic theories, and with externalism as
well as internalism. I will not be able to even discuss the debate between
internalists and externalists. However, I have to discuss the debate between
extreme empiricists and their opponents, since realism about universals has
traditionally been associated with rationalism and this debate has therefore
been connected with the Problem of Universals. I do so in Section 2.2.1
of this work, but only to show that it is so dicult that we should not at
present rely too much on any conclusions with regard to it in metaontology,
and is not as closely connected with the Problem of Universals as is often
supposed.
I will consider the meaning of ontological claims and the epistemological
tion is a valid and independent method at all, which as I will show is much disputed) and
possibly much more. A large part of this dissertation will be devoted to examining whether
the Problem of Universals is to be ultimately solved by means of conceptual analysis or
by means of abduction as is often thought today. Both alternatives, however, are part of
the method of analysis in the sense of the Classical Model of Science.
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value of dierent ways of supporting or attacking such claims before trying
to actually justify any substantive ontological claim. Many metaontological
considerations are common to several ontological problems; for instance such
commonly used ontological concepts as ontological commitment, truthmak-
ing, reduction, supervenience, ontological dependence etc. can (if they are
meaningful and non-trivially applicable to anything, which can of course in
many cases be questioned, as I will show in the case of truthmaking) be ap-
plied to many, perhaps any substantive ontological problems. Therefore the
theories of such concepts are independent of any specic ontological prob-
lem. However, there are also those metaontological considerations that are
specic to some single problem of substantive ontology. Since the ultimate
aim of this dissertation is nding an (at least preliminary) solution to the
problem of universals I will discuss mostly the metaontological problems
associated with the problem of universals13. I will attack the problem of
universals indirectly by discussing what the problem is and how it could be
solved. This involves studying how such general metaontological concepts
as verication, ontological commitment and truthmaking can be applied to
the special problem of universals. I will argue in Chapter 6 that - contrary
to what has been often claimed recently - the metaontological considera-
tions most relevant to the problem of universals (a substantive problem of
ontology) are considerations concerning ontological commitment, not those
concerning verication conditions or those concerning truth-makers. To jus-
tify this conclusion, I go rst in Chapter 3 through well-known objections
to vericationism, and show that they apply also to current vericationist
theories such as Dummett's theory and Field's deationist theory of truth.
In the process I also respond to opponents of metaphysics who try to show
with the aid of vericationism or structuralism that metaphysical questions
would be meaningless or illegitimate in some other way. I then discuss in
Chapter 4 the reasons for thinking that truths in general have truthmakers.
I will come to the conclusion that the reasons generally given for these sup-
positions are insucient, so that while I do not have any conclusive evidence
13Another very central, perhaps even the most central, metaphysical problem is that
of the relation of mind and matter. I will not try to give any, even preliminary, solution
to it in this dissertation. However, I must occasionally refer to it as it is closely tied up
with the most fundamental epistemological and semantical questions. I will also use it as
an example of a metaphysical theory, since it rather uncontroversially is one, and discuss
what it is that makes it a metaphysical theory.
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that axioms such as the truthmaker axiom are false, yet we should suspend
judgement on them unless or until better reasons for them are found. Nat-
urally this has implications for metaontology and ontology and metaphysics
as a whole; I will argue that ontology and metaphysics are not wholly ex-
planatory disciplines but in large part (though not wholly) descriptive.
I will argue for the inseparability of systematic and historical research in
many subdivisions of philosophy, at least at the current state of its develop-
ment. Analytic philosophers have often been accused of a lack of historical
awareness, and this accusation is often justied. However, there have also
been many analytical philosophers who have fruitfully combined historical
research with logical analysis, such as for example Wolfgang Kunne, Nino
P. Cocchiarella and Paulo Crivelli. I will base my work partly on their
research and develop it further. The importance of historical research in
philosophy has been stressed by such philosophers of science as Thomas
Kuhn in [Kuh70]; however, accepting the importance of historical research
by no means requires the adoption of such a relativistic standpoint as Kuhn
arrived at.
A historical perspective is especially important for metametaphysics, for
metametaphysics tries to clarify what the problems of metaphysics are, and
this requires knowledge of their historical development. Lack of historical
knowledge of how the problems that are currently discussed have developed
often leads to a misunderstanding of the nature of such problems. I will
argue that such philosophers as Patterson misunderstand what the corre-
spondence theory of truth is and such philosophers as Gonzalo Rodriguez-
Pereyra misunderstand what the problem of universals is because they are
not suciently aware of the history of these theories and problems.
More generally, many current analytical philosophers remain inuenced
by doctrines of logical positivism such as vericationism, often without being
aware of this, though such doctrines have long been refuted or strongly
disconrmed. I will argue that Field's deationary theory of truth is vitiated
because it is to a great extent motivated by vericationism.
On the other hand there has also been overreaction to positivistic tenden-
cies, such as the claims about the primacy of ontology I already mentioned.
Another possible instance of such overreaction is the overemphasis on ex-
planation. Such philosophers as Pierre Duhem (see [Duh91]) had thought
that natural science did not explain, but only metaphysics did. Logical posi-
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tivists had accepted Duhem's view on science, but thought that metaphysics
was impossible, which resulted in a view that had no place for explanation.
Probably because of overreaction to this very implausible view, many cur-
rent philosophers seem to nd explanation central in both natural science
and philosophy. My scientic realists hold inference to the best explana-
tion or abduction to be central to natural science, as it gives us knowledge
of theoretical entities. In philosophy it is held to be essential to the cor-
respondence theory of truth that truth is explanatory. Many problems of
philosophy such as the problem of universals are held to be problems of how
to explain something.
I would rather say that what is central to natural science is extrapola-
tion rather than explanation. I will argue that it is induction rather than
abduction that gives us knowledge of theoretical entities. What makes nat-
ural science practically important is that it can help us to predict the future
and prepare for it, though for theoretical purposes other kinds of extrapola-
tion such as retrodiction are equally important. I do not deny that natural
science also helps us to explain why many things are as they are, but I
would view this as rather a byproduct of extrapolation rather than central
to natural science. Philosophy, however, seldom explains anything in the
way natural science does. I will argue as an instance of this in Chapter 4
that explanation is not essential to the correspondence theory of truth and
in Chapter 6 that it is not central to the problem of universals either.
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Chapter 2
History of the Concept of
Ontology
2.1 History of Metaphysics from Aristotle to Wol
In order to know what can be and should be meant by the words "meta-
physics" and "ontology" we must look at how they have been used during
the history of philosophy. I must therefore provide a history of the notions
associated with these words. It will only be a history of the very notions
of the disciplines and their denitions, not of substantive metaphysical and
ontological theories. Indeed, it would be impossible in the bounds of this
work to give any kind of general history of ontology that would not be so
simplied as to be misleading; libraries are full of short sketches of the his-
tory of metaphysics that are so truncated as to be all but useless. However,
it is possible to give a sketch of the very notions of metaphysics and ontology
that is comprehensive enough for my purposes.
Ontology and metaphysics are often taken to be identical, and even when
this is not the case they are taken to be closely related1, so we must begin
with the concept of metaphysics, since it is historically older and the concept
of ontology has developed from it.
1Many philosophers assume that there must be some dierence between them, but
since they often are ignorant of the history of the development of those words and the
associated concepts, they seem to just choose the dierentiating factor arbitrarily, often
arriving at weird distinctions which have nothing to do with the history of these concepts.
All too often the resulting distinction between ontology and metaphysics is a distinction
without dierence, so that the resulting two concepts turn out to be equivalent.
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2.1.1 Aristotle's dierent Denitions of Wisdom
One of Aristotle's denitions of metaphysics (which Aristotle called Wis-
dom2 or rst philosophy - o) in book   of Metaphysics (1003a) was
that it is the science of being as being (o  o), i. e. the only science
that dealt with all that is or exists, i. e. deals with what is common to all
existing entities. The truths of metaphysics are then truths that are more
general than the truths of any other sciences, absolutely general. I will later
in Section 5.6 examine more thoroughly what this means and whether there
can be such truths. Metaphysics is therefore the only science that had to
take account in some sense of everything that there is. Obviously if its aims
are to be realistically attainable this must be in some rather weak sense,
rather in the sense of providing room for everything in its theory - e. g.
giving for every entity a category under it falls (and then studying the in-
terconnections of these categories) - than in the sense of deriving all entities
and all of the laws governing them from some rst principles.
The denition of metaphysics as the science of being as being is closely
connected to the later (post-Aristotelian) denition of metaphysics as the
science concerned with the world as a whole, i. e. the denition of meta-
physics as cosmology - in a sense dierent from physical cosmology, which is
a part of physics. This denition of metaphysics has been common among
analytical philosophers. E. g. Bertrand Russell characterized metaphysics
in [Rus18b, page 1] as the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means
of thought. Similarly Moore characterized the main problem of Metaphysics
in [Moo53, page 25] as the general description of the Universe. The deni-
tions are close since the world or universe (in the widest senses of the words,
as distinct from the sense in which they have stood for a planet or a galaxy)
is supposed to be a being which contains all beings (with the possible ex-
ception that theistic metaphysicians often want the world to only contain
all created beings). Therefore the denitions are equivalent if such a being
exists. However, if metaphysics is dened as the science of being as being
2Though it serves to muddle matters further, we must note in the interest of historical
accuracy that Aristotle seems to have used the word "wisdom" sometimes for philosophy
as a doctrine (the outcome of philosophical reection, as is indeed etymologically natural)
as a whole and sometimes for metaphysics as a proper part of philosophy. Indeed Aristotle,
and many of the later philosophers that followed him, including his commentators, seem
sometimes to have used the word "philosophy" to stand for metaphysics alone and at
other times to stand for the sum of all sciences or scholarly disciplines.
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this denition does not presuppose that a complex entity such as the world
exists (though it allows it to exist), so Aristotle's older denition is better
since it has fewer presuppositions3.
Matters are complicated by the fact that Aristotle gave other deni-
tions or characterizations for wisdom. Aristotle also characterized it in
Metaphysics (see [Ari33, 932 a, page 9]) as concerned with the primary
(prota) causes (aitia) and principles (arkhas) (a characterization of meta-
physics which Giovanni Reale in [RC80] calls aetiology4; this must of course
be distinguished from the more common use of the word in medicine to refer
to the study of the causes of diseases.).
Aristotle also characterized metaphysics (in 1064a 34-35; see [Ari35,
pages 86-87]) as the science which deals with that which exists separately
(!o) and is immovable (o). Exactly what Aristotle means
by separation (or separability, as Donald Morrison has in [Mor85] shown
it might also be translated) is highly obscure and controversial5. In any
3Wol already distinguished cosmology, which he held (e. g. in [Wol40, x77, page 35])
to be part of physics, and can be seen as a primitive version of physical cosmology, from
general cosmology (see [Wol40, x78, page 36]), which he held (e. g. in [Wol40, x79, page
36]) to be a part of metaphysics.
4Reale also distinguishes a denition of metaphysics as ousiology, i. e. theory of sub-
stances; however, this is rather one way of understanding the denition of metaphysics as
ontology rather than an apparent rival to it. Even if it were decided that ontology is a the-
ory concerning being as being, that still leaves open the question whether metaphysics is
only a theory of entities that exist in the sense that substances do, or also of entities which
exist in the sense that entities from other categories do. Of course, here we suppose that
this classication of entities into categories is correct and that entities of these categories
exist in a dierent sense, which of course a modern philosopher must question when he is
doing metaphysics and not just history of metaphysics. A denition of metaphysics cannot
exclude process metaphysics, according to which substances either do not exist at all or
at least are not fundamental, as a metaphysical theory. E.g. Whitehead's process philo-
sophical theory would be commonly called a metaphysical theory. Admittedly Marxists
do often say such things as that metaphysics is a way of thinking which thinks of things
in abstraction from their change and development; however, this way of understanding
metaphysics does not correspond to the way the word has been used almost anywhere
outside Marxism. Indeed Marxists contrast metaphysics with dialectical thinking, which
they have taken from Hegel, whose system of dialectics is generally taken to be an extreme
example of metaphysics at its very worst.
5This is not an unimportant issue. Since Aristotle in arguing against Plato's meta-
physics constantly opposes Plato's view that the Ideas exist separately, this notion is vital
to the understanding of the dierence between Aristotle and Plato and of Aristotle's the-
ory of universals. The notion is also important for Aristotle's theory of the agent intellect
in his De Anima, which is described as separate, and therefore for the controversy about
how naturalistic his philosophy of mind was. However, modern commentators have not
been able to come to any sort of agreement or clarity about exactly what this separation
means; the notion of separation might be understood in terms of independence (i. e. illu-
minated with the aid of modal concepts) or in mereological terms or simply as numerical
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case it is rather clear that separation means separation from matter, so this
denition implies that metaphysics is a science which deals with substances
which are in some sense immaterial. Aristotle himself immediately goes on
to say that if there exists something which is separate and immovable, it
is divine (o, theion), so Aristotle understood metaphysics on the basis
of this characterization also as theology; however, since it is unclear what
separateness means it is also unclear why Aristotle thought that something
separate would have to be divine.
It is obscure and controversial how these other denitions or character-
izations are related to the denition of metaphysics as the science of being
qua being and how far they agree with it. Dierent (groups of) commen-
tators and followers of Aristotle have stressed dierent denitions through
the ages. The ancient Greek commentators mostly viewed metaphysics as
theology, the study of the highest, immaterial substances; of the Arabic
commentators Ibn Sina aka Avicenna stressed the denition of metaphysics
as the science of being qua being6, while Ibn Rushd aka Averroes stressed
the denition of metaphysics as theology; the medieval Scholastic commen-
tators mostly stressed the denition of metaphysics as the science of being
as being. It must be noted that there is good textual evidence that Kant
himself understood the dogmatic metaphysics he criticized as natural theol-
ogy; he characterizes metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason (B7 A3)
as the science that, with all its preliminaries, has for it especial object the
solution of problems of pure reasons God, freedom of the will and immor-
tality. What Kant thinks to be mere premiminaries to genuine metaphysics
would by Wol have been understood as an independent discipline of ontol-
ogy, a subdiscipline of metaphysics. This gives us reasons to suspect that
Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics is just irrelevant against those
distinctness. See [Mor85] for a discussion of the issue.
6This can be seen from an English translation of one of his works on meta-
physics [Avi05]; in [Avi05, page 3] Avicenna argues that God's existence cannot be the
subject matter of metaphysics, though it is one of the things investigated by this science.
In [Avi05, page 9] Avicenna summarizes his discussion by saying that
the existent inasmuch as it is an existent is something common in all these
things and that it must be made the subject matter of this art for the reasons
we have stated.
The phrase "this art" refers to metaphysics, as is clear from the preceding context. In-
terestingly, Avicenna anticipated Wol in saying (see [Avi05, page 11]) that the science
of metaphysics is necessarily divided into parts, something that most exponents of the
theological interpretation of metaphysics would deny.
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traditional metaphysicians (and their modern successors) that understood
their discipline as the science of being as being. The German Neo-Kantian
philosopher Paul Natorp was perhaps the rst at least in the modern age to
see how problematic the diversity of Aristotle's denitions was7. Not only
the various denitions Aristotle gives, but the actual discussions in dier-
ent parts of Aristotle's work seem to be concerned with dierent subjects;
7The existence of these dierent conceptions has often been explained with the aid
of dierent far-going historical hypotheses. Natorp thought that the denition of meta-
physics as theology was a later Platonic interpolation. While this hypothesis has later
been generally abandoned, the diversity has often been accounted for with the aid of de-
velopmental hypotheses concerning Aristotle's thought. Werner Jaeger was the rst to
suppose (e. g. in [Jae12] and in [Jae34, page 218]) that the dierent denitions derive
from dierent periods in Aristotle's philosophical development; the conception of meta-
physics as theology from the time when he was yet a faithful Platonist and the denition
of metaphysics as the science of being qua being from a later time when he rebelled against
Plato's ideas. Such developmental hypotheses have been much criticized (see [RC80] for
a discussion). It is not needful for my purposes in this work to discuss in detail whether
such hypotheses are correct or not. This is fortunate, since the task might be impossi-
ble; it is likely that not enough data survives to reliably reconstruct the development of
Aristotle's thought. I will mention that the many apparent contradictions between many
of Aristotle's statements do strongly suggest that they derive from dierent periods of
his thinking, but it is probably impossible to say which are earlier and which later; how-
ever, we certainly should not assume that the later views are necessarily better, so the
relative chronology of the dierent views does not matter much. Fervent opponents of
developmentalism like Wehrle in [Weh00, page 1] say that the developmentalists' version
of Aristotle at best strikes one as being a bit of a bungler and at worst a confused dab-
bler, changing his mind as regularly as Bertrand Russell but without the ability to keep
straight just what he had thrown out and what he retained. However, just changing his
mind surely does not make Aristotle a bungler (nor does it make Russell a bungler); all
philosophers who keep working on their problems conscientiously eventually change their
mind on important issues. Developmental hypotheses have been suggested for the work
of almost all great philosophers. It can be proposed that it was the editors of Aristotle's
writings - Eudemus or Andronicus of Rhodes etc. - rather than Aristotle himself who
could not keep straight what he had thrown out and what he had retained. In any case,
other great philosophers have been accused of a similar inability even when it is known
that they themselves have put their work together - e. g. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
has been considered as a patchwork. Even current philosophers, who unlike Aristotle have
computers and printers to help them, have great diculty in keeping straight what they
throw out and what they retain. So it is not on the face of it unlikely that Aristotle
would have shared this inability. We certainly should not idolatrously view Aristotle as
a superman who unlike all other philosophers never made a mistake and never had to
revise his views. Nevertheless when it comes to the specic question of the denition of
metaphysics and the division of the parts of philosophy, it may be possible to reconcile
the dierent denitions without the hypothesis of a change of theory on Aristotle's part,
just given some background assumptions. However, while this may be interesting from
a purely historical point of view, it is of no help for a contemporary metaphysician or
ontologist who is trying to nd out the boundaries of his discipline. Such assumptions
are highly doubtful from a contemporary point of view, and surely cannot be taken for
granted and therefore cannot be presupposed as part of the very denition of metaphysics,
so a modern metaphysician must choose between the dierent denitions.
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while Aristotle's discussions of actuality and potentiality, form and matter,
etc. are indeed relevant to his proof of the existence of God or Gods, yet
they are independent of them in the sense that they could be accepted by
persons that do not think the proof to be valid, and Aristotle himself uses
the concepts developed in them outside theology, for instance in his physics.
It is easy to fail to see how profound the diculty of interpreting Aristotle
here is. It can indeed be argued quite plausibly, as it has often been argued8,
that the other denitions of metaphysics imply the denition of metaphysics
as the science of being as being given some assumptions Aristotle made. It
can be argued quite plausibly that in speaking about the most primary
causes and principles of we are also speaking (even if only implicitly) about
everything, for if say the Prime Mover is a cause (or even just the mover) of
everything, then it is true of everything that it is caused (or moved) by the
Prime mover. However, the denitions would only be equivalent if not only
the other denitions implied this denition, but also this denition implied
them. However, it is very hard indeed to argue with any plausibility that it
would do so.
This can be claried by noting that a discipline is individuated by the
questions it examines, and a question can be understood as the set of its
answers - as is frequently done in the logic of questions - i. e. the propositions
or sentences or other truth-bearers whose truth it examines. Therefore two
denitions identify the same discipline only if every proposition answering
a question examined by the discipline identied by one of them answers
a question examined by the other. All that the kind of argument we are
examining would show is that any proposition answering a question asked
by metaphysics as aetiology or theology also answers a question asked by
metaphysics as the science of being as being; it does not show that any
proposition answering a question asked by metaphysics as the science of
being as being would answer a question asked by aetiology or theology.
Therefore this line of argument would only show at most that metaphysics
as aetiology or theology is a part of metaphysics as the science of being as
8E. g. Merlan argues in [Mer68, page 173]:
This uppermost sphere of being somehow "causes" all the other spheres
and its elements are the elements of everything. Therefore, the true philoso-
pher . . . deals with the elements of this uppermost sphere and thus with
being. By implication, he therefore deals with being as it is present every-
where.
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being, not that the disciplines identied by the denitions would be identical.
One could surely claim for example that every entity as such is a sub-
stance or an accident (which is a proposition whose truth is examined by
ontology i. e. general metaphysics, whether a true proposition - as Aristotle
assumed - or false - as process metaphysics assumes) without considering
whether such propositions as that the Prime Mover exists (a proposition
examined by aetiology and theology) are true even if it were true that ev-
ery entity is caused by the Prime Mover. Of course if the rst proposition
were true then the Prime Mover would also be a substance or an accident.
However, a physical being would equally well have to be a substance or an
accident. Nevertheless, the applicability of the metaphysical principle to
physical objects would not according to the Aristotelian conception of the
division of sciences imply that metaphysics as the science of being as being
would be part of physics. An Aristotelian would rather say that physics pre-
supposes that principle but does not itself examine whether it is true (while
a modern naturalistic metaphysician would rather say that physics implies
that principle). Therefore neither would the applicability of the principle to
the Prime Mover imply that metaphysics as the science of being as being
would be a part of aetiology or theology. Rather it would, analogously to
the case of physics, follow from this applicability and the way Aristotelians
divide sciences that aetiology and theology would presuppose such principles
of general metaphysics without examining their truth.
2.1.2 The Division of Metaphysics and Birth of Ontology in
the Beginning of the Modern Age
Later, in the beginning of the modern age, when metaphysics was thought to
extend beyond the limits of this denition of it as being qua being, ontology
was dened as the most fundamental part of metaphysics, while the study
of immaterial substances was delegated to the less fundamental science of
natural theology or (if all immaterial substances were not thought to be
divine) pneumatology, which was dened as the general science of spirits i.
e. immaterial substances. Thus ontology came to correspond to metaphysics
in the sense of the science of being qua being.
Most of the the rst philosophers who referred to their work as "ontol-
ogy" dened ontology very similarly to Aristotle's denition of metaphysics
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as the science of being as being9 Indeed, the very word "ontology" comes
from the Greek word for being (as did equivalents such as "ontosophy"),
so the meaning of the word "ontology" is clearly bound up with the no-
tion of being even more than the word "metaphysics". However, Leibniz's10
9The history of the origin of ontology as a new science is quite complex. Finding out
the origin of the word "ontology" has turned out to be a work requiring lots of painstaking
detection among historians of philosophy and historians of ideas, and may not be at an
end. I will briey describe this history and detection for the interested on the basis of the
work of Raul Corazzon in [Cor11] at http://www.ontology.co/pdf/history.pdf and Leo
Freuler and Jose Ferrater Mora in [Mor63], which I have checked from primary sources and
emended so far as I have been able to expending a reasonable amount of work. It is not
necessary to follow the following excursus carefully to understand the main points of this
chapter, but those who want to assure themselves of the historical soundness of my view of
ontology rather have to go into the details and if they do not truth my presentation check
it themselves in Corazzon's and Freuler's and Mora's works and in the (usually Latin)
primary sources which they can nd. It was long believed that the rst use of the Latin
form of the word, "ontologia", was in the Cartesian Scholastic Johannes Clauberg (1622-
1665), then it was thought that it was found in Rudolf Gockel's (aka Rudolf Goclenius's,
1547-1628) Lexicon Philosophicum from 1613, where Goclenius in a marginal note denes
ontology (written in Greek) as "philosophia de ente", philosophy concerning being (or
beings). However, still newer research indicates that the origin of the word is in a book by
Jacob Lorhard (aka Lorhardus); this was rst thought to be his Theatrum Philosophicum
from 1613, but it was later discovered that Lorhard had earlier used the word in an
earlier version of the same book, Ogdoas Scholastica, from 1606 (which again was based
on an earlier work, Clemens Timpler's Metaphysicae Systema Methodicum, where however
the new word does not yet appear). After this such philosophers as Johannes Clauberg
used the word "ontologia", together with an alternative, "ontosophia" i.e. "ontosophy" -
wisdom concerning being rather than doctrine concerning being. This was a time when
many new terms for scholarly disciplines were coined, of which some came later into
general use while others (noology, angelography, etc.) have been utterly forgotten; even
the word "psychology" dates from this time. However, the coining of a new word and the
discovery of a new discipline are not at all the same thing, and the earliest uses of the word
"ontology" are philosophically quite uninteresting, even if they must be mentioned for the
sake of historical accuracy. The rst philosophers who used the word did not usually say
much about what they considered ontology to be and when they said something they
often identied ontology with metaphysics, as is generally done today, but nevertheless
gave dierent denitions to the two words so that even if they thought them to denote the
same science they yet diered in meaning, ontology being the science of being as being.
However, soon a dierence was made between the disciplines denoted by the two terms,
though of course even then all who used the two words did not distinguish their meanings
in the same way. The same distinction had of course already been done (e. g. by the Jesuit
Benito Pereira (1535-1610), who spoke of metaphysics as a general science and natural
theology as a special science) without using these exact terms - instead of ontology and
metaphysics philosophers spoke of general metaphysics and special metaphysics, etc.
10Leibniz himself apparently followed Aristotle in using all of his denitions and taking
them to be equivalent, at least if we can trust the interpretation of Ross in [Ros88]; Leibniz
apparently characterized metaphysics both as the discipline concerned with those things
that are common to every genus of beings - i. e. as the science of being qua being -
and as the science of immaterial reality. While Wol is often though to be little more
than a pedantic systematizer and popularizer of Leibniz, this shows that he yet had some
originality in his division of the philosophical disciplines and other such methodological
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follower and popularizer Christian Wol was the most famous of the early
philosophers to use the word. In [Wol30, x1] (see [Wol05, pages 8-19] for a
modern German translation) he denes ontology as the science of Being in
general or of Being as Being (scientia entis in genere, seu quatenus ens est).
This change is obviously connected with the secularization of meta-
physics. If all three Aristotelian denitions of metaphysics are assumed
to be equivalent (or indeed even if just one-way implication is assumed
between them), this implies assuming that a materialistic world-view is nec-
essarily false, since it implies that the same science deals with the most
fundamental entities and immaterial entities, and therefore that the most
fundamental entities are immaterial. However, the mere assumption that
metaphysics deals with separated i. e. immaterial substances already con-
tains very strong religious assumptions. The immaterial substances (such as
Aristotle's Intelligences or prime movers) have usually and naturally been
understood as religiously signicant entities, either gods (in polytheistic re-
ligions such as the Greek religion probably presupposed by Aristotle and his
followers) or the one God or (if God is understood as being so high that he
cannot even belong to any genus, as was commonly the case in philosophies
aected by Neoplatonism) as angels (in monotheistic religions as in Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, to which medieval and many later Aristotelians be-
longed). Therefore if reference to separate entities is taken to be part of the
very denition of metaphysics then the existence of gods is presupposed by
the possibility of metaphysics, and therefore religious presuppositions are
connected with the very notion of ontology.
Of course, the denition can be weakened so that such presuppositions
are eliminated, and metaphysics would be taken to deal with the question of
whether separate entities exist and if so what they are. However, while such a
weakened denition would avoid controversial presuppositions, it would yet
not apply to all enquiry that has been commonly thought of as metaphysical
in later philosophy; even philosophers who are atheists and materialists can
disagree sharply about many questions which would commonly be taken to
be metaphysical (e. g. are the fundamental entities material substances or
material processes, etc.).
However, the denition of metaphysics or ontology as the science of being
as being does not have any such obvious religious presuppositions. There has
points; and as we shall see, these original ideas of Wol proved inuential and fruitful.
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indeed been one way to interpret that denition that would cause it to have
such presuppositions. Neoplatonistic philosophers reied being into Being
Itself and went on to deify it. This kind of interpretation can be found
for example in the commentary of the late pagan Neoplatonist Syrianus
on Aristotle's metaphysics, as seen for example in the following quotation
(typically sublime or pompous - according to your taste - in its style) from
its translation in [Syr08, page 90]:
For either there is is something which is, and is nothing else
(such as intellect, or soul, or the heavens, or the world), uniquely
existing as what is, as Being itself (autoon), clearly more worthy
than all else, itself not needing to be a world, or the heavens, or
soul, whereas all the rest receive their being from it.
While this is presented as a disjunction, it is clear from the context that
Syrianus accepted the rst disjunct (and in fact probably both disjuncts).
Syrianus understood this Being Itself as a god, though not the highest god
in his complicated system, since Unity itself or the One (identied by him
with the Good) was higher than even it. Most medieval scholastics, though
Aristotelians rather than Platonists, such as Thomists, yet followed Neo-
platonists in this, since they had to accept as authoritative the writings
of church fathers (like Augustine) who were Christian Neo-Platonists and
were inuenced by pagan Neo-Platonists; they of course had to identify this
Being itself with the highest since the sole God of their theology. Martin
Heidegger, the founder of existentialism, followed this line of thought in his
most famous work, translated in [Hei62], as he also held that ontology had
to consider Being (Sein) itself and not beings, though he opposed what he
called ontotheology and so was not willing to identify this Being itself with
any god as the Neo-Platonists and scholastics did (though the way in which
Heidegger speaks of Being has a very mystical and reverent sound, such
as is typically associated with talk regarding something divine, even if not
always personal). There are some modern interpreters who think that this
interpretation or a very similar one is correct; e. g. Philip Merlan in [Mer68].
However, this theory is on the face of it highly counterintuitive and
was partly made just so that the two notions of metaphysics would coin-
cide. Furthermore, the theory is more likely to come from Platonism and
Pythagoreanism (as Syrianus partly admits) than to have been part of Aris-
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totle's original intentions, even though medieval Aristotelians who mixed
Neoplatonic ideas with Aristotelian ideas adopted it. Indeed, in Metaphysics
1060a38-1060b6 (see [Ari35, pages 60-63]) Aristotle seems to have explicitly
argued against this kind of theory, arguing that Being itself or Unity itself
cannot be principles (as Syrianus later supposed). Of course, this does not
imply that the Neoplatonic theory of Being itself and Unity itself would not
be metaphysical theory, as it clearly is a metaphysical theory, though not
an Aristotelian metaphysical theory. However, it indicates that unless Aris-
totle was blatantly inconsistent, he cannot have intended that his denition
of metaphysics as the science of being qua being would be read so that it
would have implies such a theory since he himself rejected it. Therefore such
a theory cannot belong to metaphysics on the basis of its denition.
This kind of interpretation seems to me to misunderstand how the ex-
pressions "being qua being" or "being as being" and indeed how expressions
like "qua" and "so far as" are used. I think S. Marc Cohen puts the error
in the Neo-Platonic interpretation well in [Coh12] :
So Aristotle's study does not concern some recondite subject
matter known as being qua being. Rather it is a study of being,
or better, of beings - of things that can be said to be - that
studies them in a particular way: as beings, in so far as they are
beings.
In any case, whatever Aristotle himself may have thought, this charac-
terization is surely not a promising formulation for a modern metaphysician
to start from; while both nominalists and sparse realists like Armstrong
would reject the existence of Being itself outright, even promiscuous realists
who might accept that such an entity exists are not likely to be favourable
to Syrianus's view that Being itself would be more worthy than anything
else. Surely not only good things but also worthless and evil things exist;
suering and malevolence and other such things also exist i e. have being,
and it is surely worse that such things are than that they would not be,
so being is by no means good as such. Also even Syrianus goes on to re-
mark (see [Syr08, page 92]) that metaphysics considers (besides this Being
itself) all beings, calling metaphysics a "science of all beings". Surely even
a philosopher who does not think that this Being itself exists, or that there
is much to say about it, can still consider all beings as beings.
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It follows that metaphysics or ontology in the sense of the science (or
discipline) concerned with being as being may be possible even if there are
no separate substances and no gods or angels. Therefore even atheists and
agnostics can accept that ontology in this sense is possible even if they do
not accept the possibility of natural theology. Of course someone who ac-
cepts this denition can still accept natural theology and even view it as
closely connected to ontology (as Wol himself obviously did); the point
is that this denition of ontology is neutral between religious and irreli-
gious philosophies. It is no wonder then that many, perhaps most religious
philosophers such as neo-scholastics (e. g. Etienne Gilson, Joseph Owens
and Philip Merlan in [Mer53]) typically oppose the separation of ontology
and natural theology, viewing it as a corruption of Aristotle's original no-
tion of metaphysics (though it is rather curious that in this they oppose
the medievals, who otherwise are their models). For instance, Owens says
in [Owe63, page 25] that
in Aristotle an ontology is impossible. "Ontology" is here under-
stood in its historically authentic meaning of a general science of
Being qua Being that is in some way, at least partially, distinct
from a philosophical theology.
However, this opposition is not universal even among neo-scholastics; Jozef
M. Bochenski thought contrary to them in [Boc74, page 284] that Wol's
conception of ontology was quite in the Aristotelian spirit.11 However, there
is no historical reason to deny that this separation is at least as natural a
development of Aristotle's conceptions as their own. Moreover, if religious
philosophers want to have a metaphysical debate with irreligious ones, then
they must be willing to accept a neutral starting point such as the denition
of ontology as a science of being as being oers. We may even suspect that if
ontology is to prosper (instead of being conned to a small stiing ghetto of
true religious believers) or perhaps even survive in the multicultural, liberal
culture hopefully coming into being today, then such secularization may be
necessary.
11Bochenski was also a neo-scholastic, but more logically oriented, being part of the
Cracow Circle that tried to combine Neo-Thomism with modern logic. This Cracow Circle
was in combining modern analytical philosophy with Aristotelianism an often neglected
precursor of the Neo-Aristotelian current in modern analytical metaphysics, though of
course most modern Neo-Aristotelians do not share their commitment to Catholic religion
and base their Aristotelianism directly on Aristotle rather than on Thomas Aquinas.
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There may of course be signicant dierences between Aristotle's under-
standing of the task of wisdom and Wol's conception of the task of ontol-
ogy. To take perhaps the most important and famous example, it seems that
Wol understood ontology's task as primarily the study of possible being
(inspired by Leibniz's use of the conception of possible worlds derived from
the Scotist tradition) while Aristotle probably understood it as primarily
the study of actual being (though this is also very debatable, and depends
on how his obscure doctrine of potentiality is interpreted). "Being," Wol
says in [Wol30, x134, page 115], "is what can exist and, consequently, that
with which existence is not incompatible":
Ens dicitur quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non
repugnat.
This makes Wol's ontology in some respects a precursor of such modern
possibilist metaphysical schemes as David Lewis's; however, Wol of course
does not propound anything like Lewis's indexical analysis of actuality, so
his possibilism may have been less extreme than Lewis's.
Later ontologists have often gone so far as to take this concern with
possibility as a dening characteristic of ontology. This includes both early
successors of Wol such as Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) in [Cru66]
and also relatively recent ontologists.
2.1.3 Recent History of the Concepts of Metaphysics and
Ontology; Heinrich Scholz and the Phenomenological
Tradition
One of the most important though undeservedly little known metaphysicians
in the early 20th century was Heinrich Scholz (1884-1956), founder of what
is called the Munster Group. He belongs to those who took the concern
with possibility as a dening characteristic of ontology. After distinguishing
ontology as a type of metaphysics from theology and cosmology (here uncon-
sciously following Wol) in opposition to Kant Scholz says in [Sch41, pages
13-14] that metaphysics is ontology in the sense of the theory which con-
tains all truths concerning entities which can meaningfully be understood as
individuals which can be formulated in the language he was using that are
not restricted to any domain of individuals or world, but are of unrestricted
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validity, i. e. hold in every non-empty domain of individuals and in this
well-determined sense hold in every possible world12.
Scholz thought that modern logic can be taken as an ontology in this
sense; he develops the theory of identity (what would be considered today
as a part of predicate logic or its metalogic) as an example of a metaphysical
theory. This may sound strange, as logic and ontology are usually sharply
separated today; however, it has historical precedents. As Scholz himself re-
marked in [Sch41, page 146], Aristotle already thought that many subjects
that we would today call logical (or possibly metalogical or part of the phi-
losophy of logic) are part of the subject matter of metaphysics. For instance,
he thought in Metaphysics 1005a19-1005b18 that metaphysics studies such
axioms as the Principle of Non-Contradiction (also called the Law of Con-
tradiction) or the principle of the excluded middle and tries to justify them
so far as and in the way that so fundamental principles can at all be jus-
12Scholz denies that metaphysics is the science of being as being, though his notion of
unrestricted validity seems to be a possible way to interpret that very notion of concerning
being as such. Scholz says in [Sch41, pages 142-145] that his conception of metaphysics
is a Leibnizian one, though he admits in [Sch41, page 143] that Leibniz combined it with
an entirely dierent, theological metaphysics. However, Scholz denies in [Sch41, pages
149-150] most similarities between his theory and Wol's, though for rather unconvincing
reasons; he admits some similarities to Wol's philosophical cosmology, not to Wol's
ontology as would be more natural.
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tied13. This passage is very hard to reconcile with an interpretation that
would restrict Aristotelian metaphysics to theology, for it is hard to see how
the Principle of Non-Contradiction would be any more relevant to theology
than to special sciences like physics14. It is also hard to reconcile even with
13It is signicant to notice the way that Aristole formulates the principle of non-
contradiction. He says (in Tredennick's translation) that
It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong
to the same thing and in the same relation.
Today many logicians would rather formulate the principle so that it would say that the
same sentence cannot be both true and false. These dierent formulations of the principle
appear to aect to what science or discipline the principle seems to belong. One can
argue that these dierent formulations are not really formulations of the same principle
but dierent principles; the later principle is a semantical principle and not an explicitly
ontological principle, and it is of course also possible to formulate the principle in ways that
make it seem syntactic, as is commonly done in logic (though this threatens to trivialize
the principle completely). Aristotle's formulation, however, makes the principle a principle
concerning entities in general, so that it does not speak explicitly of sentences or other
linguistic or psychological objects at all. Aristotle's formulation may seem to be too narrow
(as it e. g. does not seem to cover the claim that the same polyadic relation cannot hold
between the same entities in the same respect, which is naturally held to be a consequences
of the Principle of Non-Contradiction), but the more general formulation that says that a
proposition (in a non-linguistic sense as the content of sentences and judgments) cannot
be both true and false can also be held to be a metaphysical and especially ontological
principle. It might then be possible to try to separate metaphysics and logic by trying to
claim that only the semantical principles are logical. However, this proposal faces many
very serious diculties. There is little agreement among logicians and semanticists about
whether logical laws can be understood as semantical ones. Carnap famously claimed that
logic was a part of semantics in [Car48, x14, page 60]. However, the founder of modern
semantics, Alfred Tarski, on whose work Carnap based his own theory, said in [Tar44,
page 354] that the semantical laws of contradiction and excluded middle should not be
identied with the logical laws of contradiction and excluded middle. Clearly if this is
correct, the same can be generalised to all logical laws. I tend to believe Tarski in this
matter rather than Carnap. According to Tarski the logical laws belong to the sentential
calculus, the most elementary part of logic. Tarski's mention of the sentential calculus
might be taken to suggest that the logical laws could be identied with syntactical laws
and this would also make it possible to distinguish them from the metaphysical laws of
contradiction and excluded middle that Aristotle talks about; however, that the logical
laws would be purely syntactic does not seem plausible to me either. Furthermore, there
are deeper diculties. Though there probably are dierent principles of non-contradiction,
they are obviously very intimately connected. The explicitly ontological formulation can
be derived from the semantical formulation by just applying Tarski's T-schema (together
with some elementary applications of propositional logic and predicate logic) and from the
syntactic formulation by giving all signs occurring in them their ordinary interpretations.
Other logical principles such as the Law of Excluded Middle are also formulated in these
dierent ways, and the same seems to hold of most if not all logical principles. I think
that this shows a very intimate connection between the sciences or disciplines of ontology
(and hence metaphysics) and logic.
14Merlan has in [Mer53, pages xii, 138-140] a theory about how the principle of non-
contradiction could be especially relevant to theology, but this theory is rather radical
and weird. Merlan claims that according to Aristotle the principle of non-contradiction
only applies fully to the supreme sphere. This implies that the same attribute could both
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an interpretation that would restrict Aristotle's metaphysics to aetiology (as
for example Wehrle's interpretation would do) for it is hard to see how the
principle of non-contradiction would explain anything in the world or give
the causes of anything (even in the rather broad sense in which Aristotle
uses the word  aitia, cause). Of course, the principle must hold of the
primary causes and principles, but no more than of all other entities. Rather
this passage in Aristotle gives support for the metametaphysical thesis of
mild deationism; however, ultimately it only gives support that the thesis
applies only to some metaphysical claims (as I held in the introduction),
since as we have seen, other claims made by Aristotle (such as the claim of
the existence of immaterial intelligences) cannot plausibly be treated in this
way. However, if the principle of non-contradiction is taken to be metaphysi-
cally signicant, then there is no reason not to take syllogistics, which would
today be called predicate logic, to also possess the same kind of metaphysical
signicance if appropriately formulated, and since the theory of identity is
taken by today's logicians to belong to predicate logic (unlike Aristotelians,
who would not have included it in syllogistics) it is naturally taken to have
the same kind of metaphysical signicance, which of course leads straight to
Scholz's position.
Most medieval logicians diered from their master Aristotle in constantly
distinguishing logic sharply from metaphysics. However, Wol followed Aris-
totle (even if unintentionally) in connecting principles today's scholars would
call logical with metaphysics, taking the discussion of the principle of non-
contradiction as a part of ontology, and indeed beginning the actual de-
velopment of his ontological system, after the prologomena, with a lengthy
belong and fail to belong to the same sensible (physical) thing in the same respect. This
interpretation would make Aristotle anticipate dialetheism. It must be admitted that this
view has antecedents in Plato's thought, as Plato apparently held that sensible reality was
contradictory, and Merlan stresses the similarities between Plato and the early Platonists
of the Old Academy and Aristotle rather than their dierences. However, this seems to me
rather implausible even as a purely historical interpretation of Aristotle's theory, and even
more implausible as a basis for modern metaphysics. Merlan's theory is an example of a
rather extreme version of a developmental hypothesis, taking Aristotle's early philosophy
to be a predecessor of Neoplatonism, such as few current historians of philosophy would
accept. Merlan suggests that modern philosophers would only nd his interpretation
strange because they are generally nominalists or semi-nominalists; however, while I defend
a rather strong form of realism in this work, and am indeed attracted to a view that
Merlan would label excessive realism, I yet nd very strange and unacceptable the view
that the principle of non-contradiction would not hold for (statements concerning) sensible
particulars.
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discussion of this principle, as seen in [Wol30, x27-x55]. Wol's denition of
logic is a dierent matter, as it would clearly distinguish what Wol thinks
logic to be from metaphysics. In [Wol40, x61, page 30] (see [Wol06, x61, page
40] for a German translation) Wol denes logic as the part of philosophy
that concerns the use of the cognitive faculty in the knowledge of truth and
the avoidance of error. However, such a denition of logic would today be
taken to apply to epistemology or heuristics rather than logic or at least
pure logic (as was of course also the case with regard to most denitions
of logic in later times until Frege transformed the dominant conception of
logic). Many of the subjects Wol actually discusses in his logic, such as
the dierent operations of the mind he discusses in the very beginning of
his logic proper in [Wol40, x30 - x58, pages 125-142], would also be today
counted as part of epistemology or heuristics, and still others ascribed to a
third discipline, such as the interpretation of sacred scriptures (discussed by
him in [Wol40, x968 - x981, pages 692- 706]) to hermeneutics or the convinc-
ing of others (in [Wol40, x982- x1016, pages 706-733]) to rhetoric. Of course
many of them, such as the syllogisms he discusses there would also today
be counted as part of pure logic, so what we would today call logic was in
Wol divided between his ontology and what he called logic and mixed in
both with other kinds of material. Wol saw (see [Wol40, x89,x90, pages
39-40] and [Wol06, x89, page 52] for a modern German translation) logic as
borrowing its principles from ontology and also psychology (in hindsight un-
fortunately, as this helped to spread psychologism, though so far as Wol's
logic was really epistemology basing it partly on psychology may have been
quite justied, as many of today's epistemologists still think that epistemol-
ogy must be partly based on psychology). Bochenski has argued in [Boc74],
conformably to Scholz's view, that there are better reasons to link ontology
to modern logic than to medieval logic, since modern logic contains laws and
not only rules; more recently, Cocchiarella has defended the same view as
Bochenski in [Coc01].
Scholz divided philosophy in [Sch41, page 155-158] into transcendental
philosophy (using the word "transcendental" in a rather idiosyncratic sense,
which he carefully distinguishes from the Kantian sense) and real philoso-
phy, where transcendental philosophy is concerned with truths that hold in
all possible worlds while real philosophy is concerned with truths concern-
ing the actual world (and therefore cannot be as rigorous as transcendental
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philosophy). Scholz admitted that there are also types of metaphysics that
are a part of real philosophy and divides them in [Sch41, page 162] into
the metaphysics of nature (which oddly seems to be a part of natural sci-
ence rather than philosophy) and the metaphysics of human spirit; these
clearly correspond in Wol's division of philosophical disciplines to types of
metaphysics which lie outside ontology.
I must warn that I am not saying that Scholz's conception of metaphysics
would be acceptable as such. Unlike Scholz, I do not think that all state-
ments that hold of all possible entities are logical in the strict sense; as the
phenomenologists saw (see e.g. Husserl in [Hus70, Investigation II x11, pages
455-457]), we need not only formal ontology, which plausibly does coincide
with logic interpreted in one way, but also material ontologies. However,
I do think that logic and ontology are more closely connected than most
philosophers think today. Also, the restriction to truth concerning individu-
als seems arbitrary. Indeed Scholz himself admits in [Sch41, pages 135-137]
that his theory of identity could be generalized to a theory of identity also
concerning properties of individuals or relations between them or classes
(though he suggests in the spirit of extensionalism that we could speak of
classes instead of properties, here anticipating Quine's controversial views,
and suggesting an answer to the Problem of Universals that is called class
nominalism or the answer that is called class realism), and presumably such
a theory would still be metaphysical in his sense.
Another contentious part of Wol's conception of ontology is that ac-
cording to him it was a wholly demonstrative science; indeed, Wol argues
in [Wol30, x2, page 2] that every science is demonstrative, so metaphysics is
also demonstrative as it is a science15. Aristotle did not yet have any clear
distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative inference, so it is
contentious how far Wol was here following Aristotle. However, Wol's
conception of sciences as demonstrative is clearly similar to the conception
of science (as designated by the Greek word "" i. e. "episteme",
with which the Latin "scientia" is often synonymous) presented in Aristo-
tle's Posterior Analytics16 and accepted by most Aristotelians as well as to
15However, there is some textual evidence that Wol does not think that ontology or
philosophy as a whole would have to be completely a priori, as Kant held the dogmatic
metaphysics he criticized to be, as I will show later when discussing Kant's theory.
16As we have already seen, Willem de Jong calls this conception deriving from Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics the Classical Model of Science in [dJB10], and he also counts Wol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the rationalist idea (seen famously in Spinoza) of metaphysics as proved
ordine geometrico, in geometrical order17. However, such dierences of de-
tail, important as they are, do not undermine the near synonymy of the
fundamental denitions of the disciplines in question in Aristotle and Wol.
Furthermore, all features of Wol's conception of ontology do not follow
from the denition he gave to it, so a modern ontologist can still follow ba-
sically the Wolan denition of ontology even if he disagrees with Wol's
possibilism or extreme rationalism.
Later in the phenomenological tradition ontology and metaphysics were
distinguished from each other in a slightly dierent way; instead of ontol-
ogy being a part (the most fundamental part) of metaphysics it was taken
to be a more fundamental discipline on which metaphysics was founded.
Phenomenological ontologists took, following Wol and in harmony with
their contemporary Scholz (whether there was any inuence between Scholz
and the phenomenologists in either direction or not), ontology to be con-
cerned with truths concerning possible being which could be found out a
priori, while they took metaphysics to be truths concerning actual concrete
being whose discovery required some empirical evidence. This distinction
was made by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl himself, but
Husserl did not himself develop ontology or metaphysics very far; other
phenomenologists went deeper into metaphysics, with Roman Ingarden es-
pecially being the most thorough phenomenological ontologist. It seems to
me that this way of dividing ontology and metaphysics might still be useful
today for those philosophers who are not extreme empiricists and allow the
as a follower of this model. Willem de Jong characterizes the model as a system of
concepts (or terms) and propositions that satises certain conditions. Unfortunately, the
rst of these conditions is formulated too strongly, since it would exclude metaphysics
conceived as ontology (rather than theology) from being a science, but many adherents
of the Classical Conception of Science, such as Wol whom de Jong himself says to have
followed this conception of science (and arguably Aristotle himself at least at some period
of his development), thought ontology to satisfy this conception. Willem de Jong says
that all propositions and concepts (or terms) concern a specic set of objects or are about
a certain domain of beings. However, metaphysics conceived as ontology rather than
theology does not satisfy this condition since it is supposed to be about all objects and
metaphysical propositions are supposed to be applicable to all domains of beings.
17This was the part of Wol's ontology that Immanuel Kant memorably rebelled against.
However, Kant never questioned Wol's assumption that if any ontological question could
be answered at all it would have to be demonstratively, by means of pure reason, but tried
to show that many of the questions Wol had tried to answer could not be answered in this
way, and then drew from this on the basis of the assumption the unwarranted conclusion
that they could not be answered at all.
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notion of possibility to be meaningful, though it is cast in doubt by Kripke's
claim that necessary statements need not be a priori nor conversely, which
seems to suggest a fourfold rather than twofold division.
According to the standard view of modern logicians (developed on the
basis of such simple equivalences as I pointed to), the notion of being (in the
sense of existence) can be explicated with the aid of quantiers, which - as
I will show later in this dissertation - are standardly taken to be objectual
quantiers. Therefore if the standard view of modern logic is right in this,
this suggests that anything that is objectually quantied over is something
that metaphysics in the sense of the Aristotelian denition as the science of
being as being, and hence ontology, must take account of, so that whatever
one (objectually) quanties over he is ontologically committed to. Of course,
there are logicians (such as adherents of Meinongian logic) who reject the
standard view concerning the connection between existence and quantiers,
and whatever evidence there might be for their position would naturally
undermine my argument for a broadly Quinean theory of ontological com-
mitment. I cannot in this dissertation discuss such views at length, though
I certainly think they should be considered seriously despite their departure
from this majority view, but I will in Section 5.10 shortly show how one
important ostensible counterexample to the standard view can be handled.
2.1.4 Ontological Fundamentalness
Unlike the view that metaphysics is concerned with separate substances, the
proposal that metaphysics would be concerned with the study of ultimate
causes and principles, i. e. be aetiology, still has many defenders today,
even if it appears in a slightly generalized form. In order to see this, we
must notice that the concept of cause Aristotle made use of in the denition
of metaphysics as aetiology was very wide, wider than the concept of cause
used today (so much so, that the use of the word "cause" as a translation
of the word Aristotle uses (aitia) is somewhat misleading, though it is hard
to nd a better one; "explanatory factor" might work, but then the word
"explanatory" must be used in a wider sense than often today, e. g. in
the theory of abduction). Aristotelian causes included material and formal
causes, which were constituents of the entities whose causes they were. We
can naturally generalize this so that the ultimate causes for which meta-
physics as aetiology seeks include all ultimate constituents, not just prime
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matter and forms (which many current metaphysicians would not admit to
exist at all). Aristotle's word "principle" (, arkhe) has also a very wide
meaning, standing for what is rst in almost any kind of order, so entities
which are rst in the order of constituency, i. e. fundamental constituents,
can also be called principles.
It is easy to nd that many modern metaphysicians accept such a char-
acterization of their discipline. E. g. Keith Campbell says in [Cam90, page
1]:
Metaphysics is an ambitious subject; it aspires, among other
things, to give an account of the fundamental constituents of
any reality and an exposition of how these constituents mesh
to give us the reality in question . . . To oer a description of the
basic constituents in a real situation and of the relations between
them, is to furnish an ontological assay of this situation.
Many other ontologists of the past century such as Gustav Bergmann have
oered similar, though often slightly narrower, descriptions of the task of
ontology. Bergmann says in [Ber92, page 43]:
Ontology accounts for everything there is in terms of simples.
As I will show later in 3.3, even philosophers who explicitly denied the
possibility of metaphysics such as logical positivists also asked what is fun-
damental so they too engaged in metaphysics as aetiology without realizing
it themselves.
A big problem with the denition is its lack of clarity; it has seldom
been clear, what it means to say that something is ontologically ultimate
or fundamental or simple. The notion of ontological fundamentalness has
been explicated with the aid of such notions as supervenience, dependence,
reduction, parthood, etc. It is by no means obvious that all of these notions
of fundamentalness are equivalent.
Though it does not have as many presuppositions as the previous alter-
native denition this denition also contains a doubtful assumption, that
there are any ultimate causes and principles. However, it has never been
shown that there must be any absolutely fundamental or simple entities in
any natural sense of the word "fundamental". Indeed, some philosophers
such as Jonathan Schaer in [Sch03] and Ned Markosian in [Mar05] have
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explicitly argued that there are not any fundamental entities. Schaer ar-
gues that fundamentalism is neither logically or analytically necessary18 nor
does it have any empirical support; indeed, induction rather supports its
opposite, even if not very strongly. Entities such as atoms, which were rst
thought to be simple and therefore given the name "atom" (which meant
"indivisible" or "simple" in ancient Greek) have later been very frequently
discovered to have constituents, so we can infer inductively that it is likely
that this will continue happening.
The theory that there are absolutely fundamental entities has often (e.
g. by Uriah Kriegel who is for it in [Kri04] and by Jonathan Schaer who is
against it in [Sch03]) been called (metaphysical) fundamentalism. This must
of course be distinguished from other kinds of fundamentalism such as reli-
gious fundamentalism. It is also sometimes called ontological or metaphysi-
cal foundationalism; it must of course be distinguished from epistemological
foundationalism. The word "foundationalism" occurring alone is more often
used for an epistemological theory, epistemological foundationalism, so the
danger of confusion is great if it is used without a qualier and "fundamen-
talism" is a better word for the metaphysical theory. Actually Kriegel uses
the word for a still stronger theory, what might better be called monistic
fundamentalism, according to which not only are all entities reducible to
fundamental entities but all fundamental entities are of the same kind, of
one single category (in the case of Kriegel's theory, tropes, as in the theory
of Campbell). The opposite of the weaker doctrine, which Schaer argued
18This is not obvious; there are innite regress arguments that purport to prove that
denying fundamentalism leads to a vicious regress which Schaer did not address. How-
ever, I do not think the innite regress synechism entails is vicious. Innite regress argu-
ments for foundationalism in epistemology seem to be valid because the human mind is
nite, and cannot go through an innite number of premises to reach a conclusion. This
has indeed sometimes been denied: there is an anti-foundationalist epistemological thesis
called innitism which denies this, and the founder of pragmatism, Peirce may have rst
held it in [Pei68]. However, not many of the modern opponents of foundationalism are
innitists but far more often coherentists. In any case, whatever we hold about the possi-
bility of an innite regress in the case of justication, the case of ontological priority is not
analogous to it. Even a fundamentalist can hold the universe to be innite (as he can hold
it to be innitely big even if arguably not innitely divisible). Set-theory certainly implies
that the set-theoretic universe is innite, and since the set-theoretic universe is a part of
the universe in the wide sense in which metaphysics studies the universe in general, it
follows that if set-theory is interpreted realistically, the universe in the metaphysical sense
of the word must be taken to be innite. Whether the universe of physical particulars is
innite in any respect (e. g. innitely big or innitely divisible or innitely old) seems
to be an empirical question of cosmology, not an analytical question as such a regress
argument would presuppose.
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for, can perhaps following Peirce be called synechism, though that word is
also subject to dierent interpretations. I do not see that there are any very
good arguments for either doctrine, but there are also no strong arguments
against either. However, while pluralistic fundamentalism may be a viable
option, monistic fundamentalism seems to me to be a completely hopeless
doctrine.
There is a still stronger sense in which the word "fundamentalism" can
be used; fundamentalism can be understood so that it signies a theory
according to which not only there are absolutely ontologically fundamental
entities, but properly speaking there are no other entities. This view is
often formulated so that it presupposes existential pluralism or existential
multivocalism; fundamental entities exist in a dierent and more basic sense
of the word "exist" than all other entities. I will examine this kind of view
in 5.5. However, this view can also be formulated in a more radical (and
intuitively extremely implausible) form according to which it is just incorrect
to claim that anything non-fundamental exists. Stathis Psillos uses the
word in this sense in [Psi05] (for a theory that he opposes); a dierent and
stronger sense of the word than that according to which it claims that there
are fundamental entities. I will call fundamentalism in the sense in which
it claims that only fundamental entities exist (in the strict sense) strong
fundamentalism and the weaker kind of fundamentalism which only claims
that there are fundamental entities at the basis of all other entities weak
fundamentalism. Strong fundamentalism is also sometimes called sparse
realism in the broadest sense of that term, in which it is applicable to all
entities; the word "sparse realism" is often used so that it only refers to a
thesis concerning universals. I will argue against such a thesis concerning
universals in more detail later. The denial of fundamentalism or sparse
realism, for which I will be tentatively arguing, can be called promiscuous
realism in the broadest sense of that word.
Psillos emphasizes that fundamentalism in this strong sense does not
follow from scientic realism19. Many fundamentalists in the weaker sense
19Psillos distinguishes three doctrines, realism, naturalism and essentialism, where nat-
uralism implies strong fundamentalism, as it holds that physical entities are the only
fundamental entities and the only really real ones. Psillos argues that none of these doc-
trines follows from the others. He shows that dierent philosophers support dierent
combinations of these three doctrines and their opposites. According to Psillos while Ellis
is a realist, a naturalist and an essentialist, Quine is a naturalist and realist but anti-
esentialist, while Musgrave is realist, anti-naturalist and anti-essentialist. The position for
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such as Campbell are also fundamentalists in this stronger sense.
Many analytic philosophers, especially Bertrand Russell and Ludwig
Wittgenstein, supported an extreme pluralism called logical atomism. This
theory in many of its forms was a form of strong fundamentalism. Logical
atomism in its extreme form holds that all entities can be analysed into
simple entities, and that only simple entities are really real, really existing,
the rest being just logical constructions out of them. Thus it implies funda-
mentalism in the sense Schaer uses the word, and furthermore the stronger
kind of fundamentalism I have called strong fundamentalism.
Simplicity need not always be here understood in terms of the notion of
constituency, as one might at rst think, though it often is; Carnap at least
denied explicitly this interpretation in [Car67, S 36, pages 61-63], distin-
guishing what he called complexes (which is to be separated from Simons's
notion) from wholes. Logical atomists often understand simplicity instead
with the aid of some notion of reduction (as in Carnap), and sometimes also
with the aid of the notions of supervenience (as in Armstrong) or depen-
dence in some sense of these notions that we have seen to be very ambiguous;
an entity is simple i it is not reducible non-circularly to more fundamental
entities or does not supervene on such entities or is not dependent on such
entities. Logical atomism also holds that every simple entity is indepen-
dent of every other entity. Relations of dependence could according to it
only hold between complex entities that were in the nal analysis not real
anyway.
Wittgenstein seems to have accepted this kind of atomism in the sense of
strong fundamentalism in his earlier philosophy (though given his obscurity
one can never be certain), since he believed that all complex entities (com-
plexes) could be resolved into simple objects (Gegenstande) [Wit21, x2.02,
2.0201] and that all things are independent in so far as they can occur in all
possible situations (Sachlagen; see Tractatus x2.0122). However, it is not in
any way apparent from the exposition of Wittgenstein why he should believe
in these peculiar theses, and I do not have the space to review the immense
literature that tries to reconstruct his thought processes.
Russell did not go quite this far since he admitted that there might be no
simples and was not thus committed to fundamentalism. However, Russell
which I will be arguing in this dissertation is such that I am a realist and an essentialist,
but not a fundamentalist and therefore not a naturalist in Psillos's sense.
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came quite close to this extreme atomism, to strong fundamentalism. He
did assume that entities such as material bodies that would ordinarily be
thought to be real were logical constructions out of simpler entities, and that
therefore one did not have to suppose they really existed. Stathis Psillos
called this view fundamentalism in [Psi05]; this is clearly what I have called
strong fundamantalism, a dierent sense of the word than that according to
which there are simples.
However, if there are no simples as Russell allows may be the case then
Russell's assumption is cast in a weird light. Russell tries to have strong
fundamentalism without weak fundamentalism and it is easy to show that
this is not a coherent view. Let us suppose that instead of there being simples
entities of level 0 can be constructed out of entities of level -1, entities of
level -1 of entities of level -2, etc. In this case by Russell's principles we do
not have to suppose that there are any entities of level 0, since they are mere
constructions out of level -1. Nor do we have to suppose there are entities
of level -1, since they can be constructed out of entities of level -2, etc. In
short, we do not have to suppose there is anything at all! This is surely
absurd. Something has clearly gone wrong, and I suggest that what has
gone wrong is the assumption that we do not need to suppose that complex
entities really exist20.
Strangely enough Schaer in a later article [Sch09] has changed his opin-
ion (without explicitly acknowledging that he held a dierent view) and how
holds that there is a fundamental entity; in fact he tells in [Sch09, page 361]
that there is exactly one fundamental entity, the whole concrete cosmos21.
20Bergmann says in [Ber57, page 325] that philosophers who maintained that bodies
did not really exist (as Russell surely did) were either raving mad or were using the word
"exist" in a peculiar philosophical way. While it is surely legitimate to use words in
unusual technical senses in philosophy. I do not see any utility in using the word "exist"
is such a peculiar sense. If in saying that only simples really exist we use "exist" so that it
means "exist and are simple", the thesis becomes the truly trivial thesis that only simple
entities which exist exist and are simple. Nor do I see any real reason to deny that Russell
meant what he said.
21Schaer himself acknowledges that this is form of monism; however, he distinguishes
it as priority monism from the more common kind of existence monism, and argues that it
is more plausible than existence monism. I admit that priority monism is more plausible
than existence monism, but do not nd either kind of monism very plausible. While I think
that there probably are not any fundamental entities, yet if there were, I think that would
be far more plausible to hold that there are many fundamental entities than one single
fundamental entity. Schaer's arguments for priority monism seem rather weak to me; he
argues in [Sch09, page 378] for monism on the basis of the assumption that the grounding
relations are relations of abstraction. His argument for this is that the derivative entities,
43
However, it is not clear to me why Schaer changed his mind, and as far as I
can see he gives no good argument for his new view that there is a fundamen-
tal entity, or even any counter-arguments to his earlier arguments that there
are no fundamental entities. Schaer does refer to Aristotle's example, but
just appealing to Aristotle's authority is not a good argument. I am more
persuaded by his earlier argument against the view that so far as we can
know there would be fundamental entities. Schaer holds in [Sch09, page
376] that the relationship of ontological priority is unanalyzable; however,
this view is vulnerable to the suggestion of the opponent of metaphysics
that the notion would be meaningless. Schaer argues in [Sch08a] that pri-
ority seems no worse than notions such as parthood and causation; however,
there is a dierence. The notions of parthood and causation are frequently
used outside ontology; however, it is not clear whether the notion of onto-
logical priority is ever used outside of ontology. Because of this it can be
argued that the burden of proof is on one that claims that the notions of
parthood or causation are meaningless;the claim is implausible on the face
of it. However, it is more plausible to claim, as a positivist or other en-
emy of metaphysics is inclined to, that the notion of ontological priority is
meaningless.
Therefore the tasks of metaphysics or ontology described by Campbell
and Bergmann may not be attainable ones, not only because of any limits
to human epistemic capacities but because they are intrinsically impossible.
If all entities do not consist of absolutely fundamental entities you cannot
reduce them to such entities no matter how clever you are. Thus it may
be intrinsically impossible to furnish an ontological assay in Campbell's and
Bergmann's sense. Of course even if there were fundamental entities and
so the task was intrinsically possible, it might still be impossible for human
beings.
This conception of the task of metaphysics is apparently not equivalent
in order to be an ontological free lunch and count as no further addition ought to be already
latent within the substances (by which word Schaer just means the fundamental entities).
I nd plausible the premise that the derivative entities ought to be a free lunch (though
I do not nd it at all certain). However, it seems to me that (as many philosophers
such as Armstrong and Lewis have already argued) the derivative entities count as no
further addition also if the grounding relations are relations of composition; however, this
assumption rather suggests a plurality of fundamental entities. On these grounds at least
the monistic and pluralistic kinds of fundamentalism are equally plausible (though as I
have argued, I do not think there are very good arguments for either of them).
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with the proposal that ontology is the study of being as being, at least if the
idea that being is expressed by the particular i. e. existential quantier is
correct, since many beings that we quantify over existentially are surely not
ultimate causes or principles in any obvious sense. However, these proposals
might be equivalent if we postulate that we only ought to quantify over
fundamental entities. However, it is controversial, to say the least, whether
this postulation (which has been called fundamentalism in a strong sense of
that word) is correct or useful in any way. Schaer quite plausibly rejects
this view in both of the stages of his philosophical development.
However, it does not follow that there is nothing to the way Campbell
and Bergmann formulate the task of ontology. Even if there are no fun-
damental entities, we can yet ask, as Schaer in [Sch09, page 376] does,
what grounds what. It is quite plausible that this kind of question is one
of the basic kinds of questions in metaphysics or ontology; Schaer gives
rather persuasive arguments for the view that this kind of question belongs
to metaphysics. It does seem intuitive that ontology would be more inter-
ested in fundamental entities than supercial ones. Ontology does somehow
try to get below the surface of the world. Unlike what Quine's denition
might suggest at rst glance, ontological research does not of course consist
simply in listing entities or classes of entities at random like: there are cab-
bages, kings, turnips, ashtrays, suns, John Kerry, New York, blades of grass,
Quine, etc. Ontology tries to give a systematic answer to the question of
what there is. One way of doing this is of course classication; ontology tries
to nd out general classes or kinds of things such that all entities can be
assigned to them. The most general of these kinds or classes are often called
categories22. However, classication need not suce to make ontological
22Just how categories dier from other classes or kinds is very controversial. Classically
(e. g. by Aristotle) it has been thought that categories are the absolutely most general
kinds so that no category could be a subclass or subkind of any other class or kind.
However, it seems to me that this would make the notion of a category so narrow as to
be virtually useless. Even Aristotle, though he apparently thought there were only ten
categories, none of which overlapped another, made use in his theory of categories of the
notion of accidents. This raises the question why could not accident be a genus and a
category of which nine of the categories would be subclasses and hence subcategories?
However, surely metaphysics must distinguish between these subcategories if it is not to
be utterly trivial. Also in his metaphysics (1029a) Aristotle said that in one sense the
substance is matter, in another the form and in a third a combination of the two, and it
would seem that in a total Aristotelian system the categories of matter and substantial
form and the combination of both should be subcategories of the category of substance.
One answer, which is also based on the thought of Aristotle, is that categories represent
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enquiry suciently systematic. Two kinds of entity might be interestingly
related even though they are mutually exclusive; a man and his heart are
thus related, though no heart can be a man nor any man a heart. A man
has a heart as a part and is dependent on a heart so that he cannot sur-
vive without it. Any systematic theory of the world should take account of
such relations as parthood, dependence, supervenience, etc. Such relations,
however, can be used to divide the world into less fundamental and more
fundamental entities. Therefore telling what fundamental entities there are
and how the rest can be derived from them does at rst sight appear to be an
attractive way of performing the task of systematically describing the world.
However, it may not in the end be a feasible way of performing that task.
Yet perhaps it can be modied so that it becomes more certainly feasible.
We can formulate more modest versions of the ontological task. Even
if there are no absolutely fundamental or simple entities, there can be enti-
ties that are more fundamental or simpler than any other entities that are
known or knowable to us. As was already pointed out by Eugene Bronstein
in [Bro34], even if some things are simpler than others and can be used to
analyse the less simple things it does not follow that anything would be
absolutely simple. Even this assumption is unnecessarily strong, however.
Even if there are no such entities, there may yet be entities that are at least
as fundamental as any other entities known to us; i. e. all other entities
are reducible to them, though they themselves may be reducible to others.
Even when two kinds of entities are equally fundamental, we can arbitrarily
take one of them as basic in constructing an ontological theory. We can say
that the aim of ontology is to reduce all entities known to us to some set
(which should be as small as possible) of entities at least as fundamental as
any other entities known to us, even though the entities in such a set might
themselves be derivable from yet further entities not known to us and the
set might not be unique. Such a reduction helps us to answer the question
of what there is more systematically than a mere classication by means of
dierent modes of existence. The use of categories in this sense would presuppose a
theory called existential pluralism or existential multivocalism, which I will later argue
against in Section 5.5. The way to the correct answer seems to start from the idea that
that categories are more general than any class whose concept is specic to a science;
categories are kinds either used by all sciences or too general to be used by any discipline
other than metaphysics. This seems to allow a category to be a subcategory of another.
However, it is not yet clear whether such an explanation can establish any sharp boundary
between categories and other classes.
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categories. An account of such entities that are at least as fundamental as
any others may therefore be called an ontological assay in a weakened sense.
Schaer argues persuasively in [Sch09, page 354] that the target of meta-
physical inquiry should be an ordered rather than a at structure. Instead
of just nding a set or class or plurality or list of entities E, which Schaer
calls a at structure, we should in his view seek for a pair hF;Gi, consisting
of a set F of fundamental entities and a set or class G of grounding rela-
tions. Schaer argue quite plausibly that at structure is strictly weaker
than ordered structure23. If we reject the view that there are fundamental
entities, we cannot use this kind of ordered structure. However, this does
not mean that we would have to use a at structure. We could make use
of another kind of ordered structure. We could use a set hE;Gi consisting
of a set E of entities and a set G of grounding relations, even if E has no
minimal members, as we can have the set of negative and positive integers
ordered by the lesser than relation even though there is no rst negative
integer, as a pair hZ;<i24.
However, there is another reason for doubting that this will work, but
this has nothing to do with whether there are fundamental entities. There
are very strong arguments for the conclusion that there are too many entities
for them to form a set. In most set theories, including the standard Zermelo-
Fraenkel (ZF) theory, there cannot be a universal set, so if such set theories
are correct E cannot exist as a set in the rst place but must be a proper
class or not a class at all. In this case grounding relations cannot form
a set either and since a proper class cannot be a member of an ordered
pair in standard set theory, this gives us a reason to think that neither an
ordered structure such as hF;Gi nor an ordered structure such as hE;Gi
could exist, even if there were fundamental entities. Indeed, according to
23There is one weakness in Schaer's argumentation. He claims in [Sch09, page 355] that
given a list of entities, there is no guarantee that one can sort or order them. However,
in set theory there is an axiom called the Axiom of Choice, which asserts that any set
of entities can be ordered. Most mathematicians and logicians nd this axiom intuitively
plausible, which gives us a reason to think that the set of entities belonging to any list
can be ordered. Indeed, the use of the word "list" suggests that the entities are already
ordered in some way, as the word is commonly (especially in computer science) used for
ordered structures. However, all orderings are not equally good for cognitive purposes.
24In fact it is dubious whether the target of metaphysical inquiry is usefully conceived
as a set of entities at all. I would say that what metaphysics, or any scholarly discipline
strives to arrive at, is a set of propositions, or, since propositions have to be expressed in
sentences, a set of sentences, not a set of entities, ordered or unordered.
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set theories which not only do not allow a universal set but do not make any
distinction between sets and classes either even a set such as E itself could
not exist, so there are reasons to doubt whether E exists at all. However,
ordered structures such as hEi; Gii could exist where Ei are the sets of
entities belonging to some special suciently small category or class, and
Gi are the grounding relations restricted to this set; for example, Schaer's
concrete objects might be such a special category, and even if they are not
some subclass of that category surely would be. However, there probably
are too many of them so that there cannot be any set which would contain
all of them. Of course, if there were fundamental entities, then a structure
of the form hFi; Gii might also exist, where Fi is the set of fundamental
entities belonging to the suciently small subcategory Ei; however, since
no good reason has been given why there would be fundamental entities, it
is better to be more cautious and use structures of the form hEi; Gii.
2.2 Kant's Metametaphysical Attacks on (Tran-
scendent) Metaphysics
Unfortunately, metaontology has often been used and still is often used
purely negatively, to attack ontology (as also metaethics has been used to
attack normative ethics). I must stress that I do not want to use it in such
a way, but rather positively, to nd methods that can lead to more rigorous
research in ontology. Most of this dissertation will be dealing with this pos-
itive, constructive task. However, a metaphysician or an ontologist is not
justied in evading arguments that have been given against the possibility of
metaphysics, but must show that such arguments are unsuccessful. There-
fore I will in this and the following section deal briey with metaontological
questions regarding the very legitimacy of ontology or metaphysics. These
questions turn out to be entwined with questions of the correct method of
metaphysics, for many methogological principles, most prominently both
vericationism and structuralism, have been used by dierent philosophers
as on the one hand tools against the very possibility of metaphysics and
on the other hand as pointers to true methods or even true contents of
metaphysics.
I must stress that the adoption of a critical method does not imply the
adoption of any of Kant's very sceptical conclusions, such as the claim that
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we cannot have any knowledge (or even justied beliefs, since in Kant's view
justied belief had to be based on knowledge) about things in themselves.
In fact Kant's own reasons for his sceptical conclusions are no longer as such
relevant in today's philosophy, and have not been so for more than a century,
though there are lots of popularizers of philosophy who are out of date and
still assume that Kant has shown metaphysics in the traditional sense to
be impossible. Indeed, Kant is sometimes even thought to have shown all
metaphysics to be impossible.
In fact Kant did not even attempt to do that; while he argued that meta-
physics in the traditional sense, what is sometimes called transcendent or
speculative25 metaphysics was impossible, he thought that metaphysics in
another sense, what is sometimes called immanent metaphysics, as a gen-
eral doctrine concerning all possible (objects of) experience, was possible
and that he was contributing to it26; it is only what is often called transcen-
dent metaphysics, general doctrine concerning things in themselves, that he
objected to.
Kant based his metaontological conclusions upon such epistemological
claims as that metaphysics along with mathematics depends upon synthetic
a priori knowledge and we can have a priori synthetic knowledge only about
phenomena, since a priori synthetic knowledge is based on the forms of
perception and understanding and hence could only concern phenomena27.
25Anjan Chakravartty uses the phrase "speculative metaphysics in [Cha07, page 16] for
the kind of metaphysics that concerns unobservables. He distinguishes this speculative
metaphysics from metaphysics understood most broadly, as the study of being qua being
(for which he does not give any special name). I will discuss this distinction at length
later in Section 3.3. Chakravartty includes speculation about universals in speculative
metaphysics, but I will argue later that some universals (in the widest sense of the word)
are observable, so (the most basic part of) the theory of universals does not belong to
speculative or transcendent metaphysics.
26Sami Pihlstrom argues in [Pih09, page 3] on behalf of a modern version of such a
Kantian conception of metaphysics, metaphysics as a study of the basic features of a
humanly categorized reality. Pihlstrom says explicitly that more than anyone else it was
Kant who paved the way for this kind of rethinking, though he is also strongly inuenced
by American pragmatists (which is why he calls his theory pragmatist metaphysics) and by
Hilary Putnam among modern philosophers. I do not think that this is a good conception
of metaphysics (as I will partly argue later); nevertheless, it is important to notice that it
is a genuine conception of metaphysics, which supports the claim that metaphysics need
not be rejected even from a broadly Kantian perspective.
27Exactly what these forms of perception and understanding are and how Kant supposes
synthetic a priori truths to be based on them is perhaps the most obscure point in Kant's
philosophy and I do not want to delve into it at any great length. Fortunately it is not
necessary to consider them since as I will show there are many dubious points in those parts
of Kant's argument against the possibility of knowledge concerning things in themselves
49
From these claims it followed that all our knowledge, metaphysics included
(so far as it is at all possible), can only concern phenomena. However, these
Kantian epistemological doctrines are no longer viewed as plausible by many
philosophers. Philosophers today either think that synthetic a priori knowl-
edge is not possible (and that metaphysics can be based either on analytic
a priori knowledge or synthetic a posteriori knowledge or a combination of
both) or that it is possible but what makes it possible is something entirely
dierent than what Kant thought it was (which opens up the possibility
that such knowledge might concern things in themselves after all).
Matters are complicated by the fact that the notion of synthetic state-
ment and the notion of experience involved in the denition of a priori
knowledge can be (and have often been) argued to be unclear and ambigu-
ous and Kant's claims might be true in one sense but false in another, and
therefore their implications are not as clear as might have been thought.
While Kant's arguments were epistemological he also made use of notions
that would later have been classied as semantical, such as the notions of
analytic and synthetic, and it has been argued that he did not distinguish
these notions clearly enough. Kant's arguments depend on a specic view of
the interrelationships of these two kinds of notions, which has come under
attack in later philosophy. Synthetic knowledge a priori might be possible
in one sense but impossible in another, and if dierent statements that have
been proposed as ostensible examples of synthetic statements known to be
true a priori are synthetic and non-empirical in dierent senses, then the
reason for the possibility of knowing their truth might also be dierent. A
lot of discussion in analytical philosophy has concerned just these notions,
and it is obviously not possible to go at all deeply into these questions in
this work.
A statement may be said to be analytically true in the widest sense if
and only if it is true in virtue of the meanings of the terms it contains, but
it is far from sure that this is unambiguous ("meaning" being a notoriously
ambiguous term) and far from clear just what it involves. Kant tried to
dene the notion of analyticity more rigorously by saying (e. g. in Critique
of Pure Reason A6-7, B10-11) that a statement is analytical if and only if
its predicate concept is contained within its subject concept (and synthetic
otherwise). However, not only is it unclear what the concept of containment
that are slightly clearer.
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used here exactly means and therefore what it involves - and it has in fact
been argued (e. g. by Jerrold Katz) that there are dierent senses in which a
concept could be contained in another concept (and indeed dierent senses
of the very word "concept") - but modern logic has often been taken to
imply that all statements are not of a subject-predicate form. If this is
correct then this denition does not enable us to classify all statements
as analytic or synthetic as Kant thought. Frege said in [Fre84, x3, page 4]
(see [Fre50, x3, page 4] for an English translation) that if in nding the proof
of a proposition we come only on general logical laws and denitions, then
the truth is an analytic one. Frege said in [Fre84, x3, page 3] (see [Fre50,
x3, page 3] for an English translation) that he did not mean to assign a new
sense to these terms, but only to state accurately what earlier writers, Kant
in particular, had meant by them. This is generally taken as the de facto
denition of analyticity in modern analytic philosophy, though there have
been philosophers, such as Jerrold Katz, who have said (e. g. in [Kat72,
page 119]) that Frege's denition did not catch the way in which the term
had been used earlier, as Frege intended. It seems to me that since Kant's
formulations are likely to be ambiguous, there may be no unique way to state
what Kant had meant by them, but Frege's denition captures at least one
legitimate interpretation of them.
2.2.1 Four major Epistemological Positions and their metaon-
tological Consequences
Following Quine in [Qui53e] many philosophers have reacted to this unclarity
of the notion of analyticity by going so far as to reject the very notion of
analyticity. However, if the lack of a fully satisfactory denition of a concept
were a sucient reason to reject that concept we would be left with no
concepts to use. Quine tries eventually to explicate the notion of analyticity
by appealing to the notion of verication; however, as I will argue in the next
section, there is no reason to suppose that the notion of verication (and
the notion of experience in terms of which it is commonly dened) would be
any clearer than the notion of analyticity or of synonymy that Quine nds
problematic.
Many naturalistic philosophers (e. g. Devitt in [Dev13] or Putnam
in [Put68]) hold the radical empiricist view that no a priori knowledge (even
analytical) is possible but instead all knowledge, even knowledge of logical
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truths, is a posteriori - a view which had already been held by John Stuart
Mill in a cruder form in [Mil72]. Obviously if this is correct then Kant's
argument against the possibility of knowledge of things in themselves fails.
Philosophical views containing this thesis are often called naturalistic, in
one of the senses of that popular and annoyingly ambiguous term. While
many such naturalists are of course opposed to metaphysics, this does not
follow from naturalism as such and not all naturalists hold this view. Many
naturalists are naturalistic metaphysicians28 who think that metaphysical
truths are synthetic a posteriori like the natural sciences with which they
think metaphysics is continuous (unless they follow Quine in [Qui53e] in
denying the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements entirely,
in which case they merely think that metaphysical truths are a posteriori
like the truths of natural sciences). Some might even hold that they are
analytical truths a posteriori, something that both Kant and Frege agreed,
despite their enormous dierences, it was impossible any truth could be.
The phrase "naturalistic metaphysics" is seductively ambiguous, as Su-
san Haack has shown is the parallel phrase "naturalistic epistemology". Not
only can "naturalism" and "naturalistic" refer to either a metaphysical or an
epistemological view or characterization, but they remain ambiguous even
if taken to refer only to an epistemological view. Susan Haack has disam-
biguated the phrase "naturalistic epistemology" in chapter 6 of [Haa09], and
distinctions similar to the ones she makes can also be made with regard to re-
search programs and methodologies called naturalistic metaphysics. Haack
distinguishes from each other on the one hand reformist and revolutionary
naturalism and on the other hand aposteriorist and scientistic naturalism
and also broad and narrow varieties of all of these kinds of naturalism.
Haack's denitions can be applied to naturalistic metaphysics if her refer-
ence to cognitive science, which is obviously the branch of natural science
(if indeed it is a natural science) most relevant to epistemology, is changed
to a more broad reference to natural sciences more generally. While some
philosophers, such as Alvin Goldman in [Gol07], have suggested that cogni-
tive science is relevant not only to epistemology but also to metaphysics, it is
more common to claim that physics is relevant to at least the most general
28Sometimes naturalistic metaphysics is identied with analytical metaphysics or seen
as a subspecies of it, but some metaphysicians, at least quite clearly James Ladyman,
Don Ross and their colleagues in [LwDSC07], hold the two kinds of metaphysics to be
incompatible.
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and basic metaphysical problems. Aposteriorist metaphysical naturalism
would claim that traditional metaphysical problems can be resolved a pos-
teriori, with the aid of experience, while scientistic metaphysical naturalism
would claim that metaphysics is internal to the sciences. If this aposteriorism
is narrow, this applies only to some traditional metaphysical problems, while
if it is broad it applies to all traditional metaphysical problems. Reformist
naturalistic metaphysics would claim that the results of natural sciences,
especially physics, are relevant to traditional metaphysical problems while
revolutionary naturalistic metaphysics would claim that natural science can
by itself resolve traditional metaphysical problems. The word "scientism"
is generally used as a derogatory term, but at least James Ladyman has
proudly proclaimed himself (along with Don Ross and David Spurrett) a
defender of scientism in the rst chapter of [LwDSC07]. Ladyman and his
co-writers are as clear examples of what we would modifying Haack's de-
nition call revolutionary ontological naturalism as could be imagined. They
argue in [LwDSC07, page 1] that metaphysics should be motivated exclu-
sively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories which are taken seriously
by contemporary science. It is not wholly clear, however, what view they
would take of mathematics, e. g. whether they would accept Quine's view
of it29.
I will argue in favour of a modest naturalism in metaphysics, similar to
Haack's position in epistemology. I will argue that according to the tradi-
tional conception of metaphysics, some metaphysical statements are analytic
a priori while others are synthetic a posteriori. This implies that at least if
this traditional conception is coherent, and if Quine is not right in dismissing
29It is not clear if they would also reject pure mathematics, to which analytical meta-
physics is quite similar. Would they claim that mathematics should be motivated ex-
clusively by its applications in physics and other natural sciences? As we will see later,
Ladyman and Ross are structuralists. However, since (at least most) structuralists reduce
physical objects to mathematical, specically set-theoretical structures, they must admit
mathematics, specically set theory, to be very important for science. I will later show
that there are many problems in the epistemology of mathematics, and especially the
epistemology of set theory, which make it still quite doubtful whether empiricism can ac-
count for mathematical knowledge. However, if it cannot then it cannot account for all of
scientic knowledge either, as science requires mathematics (especially on a structuralist
account of it). If a priori reasoning is then valid in mathematics why might it not be in
analytic metaphysics (especially if, as I argue in this work, analytic metaphysics actually
overlaps with logic and mathematics)? This old argument against scientism is far from
conclusive, as it is yet far from certain that a holistic kind of empiricism cannot account
for mathematics, but it at least suces to show that scientism cannot yet be held to be
conclusively established either
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entirely the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, then nar-
row aposteriorist metaphysical naturalism is correct but broad aposteriorist
metaphysical naturalism is not. Hence scientistic metaphysical naturalism
is mistaken, though reformist metaphysical naturalism might be correct.
Kant's own reasons for thinking that metaphysics would have to be syn-
thetic a priori (as a whole) are not very impressive. In Prolegomena x1 A
23-24 (translated in [Kan85, x1, page 111]) Kant argued plausibly enough
that the peculiar features of a science may consist of a simple dierence of
object, or of the sources of cognition (Erkenntnisquelle), or of the kind of
cognition, or perhaps of all three conjointly. Kant went on to claim that as
regards the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that
they cannot be empirical. He claried this claim, telling that it implies the
following:
its principles (including not only its basic propositions but also
its basic concepts) must never be derived from experience.
This is a very strong claim, for it consists of two logically independent
claims (although this is not always seen). There are four logically consistent
views about the semantic and epistemological status of a discipline; it could
be held that both its basic concepts and propositions must be derived from
experience, it could be held that its basic concepts must be derived from ex-
perience but its basic propositions need not be30; it could be held that only
its basic propositions, not its basic concepts, would have to be derived from
experience and nally it could be held that neither have to be derived from
experience. These four views then range from the strongest version of em-
piricism concerning the objects of the discipline in question to the strongest
rationalism concerning these objects. Kant seems to have held that only the
rst and last of these four positions are coherent, though it is not clear why
he thought so; at face value all four positions are coherent (and may indeed
have been held by famous philosophers; as I show soon below there are good
reasons to suspect that Aristotle or at least some Aristotelians implicitly
held the second position with regard to some disciplines). Most later em-
piricists have also thought so; logical positivists in their vericationist phase
or mood (as distinct from their coherentist one) commonly held that the
rst view held of all disciplines consisting of synthetic truths.
30I mean by this that knowing them would not require any additional experience beyond
that involved in acquiring the concepts.
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Neither is it clear why Kant held the fourth view about metaphysics. It
seems to be connected with the way Kant distinguished metaphysics from
physics; Kant said immediately afterwards:
It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, i.e. knowl-
edge lying behind experience.
It is far from clear how Kant gets from the proposition that metaphysics
is not physical knowledge to the claim that it is knowledge lying behind
experience31. If Kant's claim that the very concept of metaphysics implies
that the sources of metaphysical cognition cannot empirical is to be usable
in the critique of metaphysics, then the concept of metaphysics he uses must
be one which proponents of metaphysical theories themselves used, or else
Kant commits a fallacy of equivocation and attacks a straw man. However,
proponents of metaphysical theories have naturally had many similar but not
identical concepts of metaphysics, so comparing Kant's concept to theirs is
not as simple as it seems. If Kant's critique were to be an adequate critique of
traditional metaphysics, as he claims, it would have to apply to all concepts
of metaphysics held by traditional metaphysicians. Finding out whether this
is the case would involve extensive historical research. However, one good
way to preliminarily test whether Kant was right in his claim about what
the very concept of metaphysics implies is to consider how the concept of
metaphysics was dened when it was rst introduced.
Unfortunately for Kant, such considerations make it highly likely that
Kant did in fact commit a fallacy of equivocation, that the concept of meta-
physics he used was not a traditional one. The concept of metaphysics was
rst introduced by Aristotle, though it was his editors, not he himself, who
gave it the name "metaphysics", while Aristotle himself used such names as
"wisdom" and "rst philosophy". This introduction can be held to have xed
the reference of the term "metaphysics". While some pre-Aristotelian theo-
ries, such as Plato's or Parmenides's theories, can retrospectively be counted
31Kant may have other reasons for claiming that metaphysical claims would have to be
a priori. Kant thought that such claims would have to be absolutely general and that this
implied that they had to be necessarily true. This association of metaphysics with necessity
is indeed in accordance with older metaphysicians, as we have seen in the case of Wol and
Crusius. Since Kant thought that only a priori claims could be necessary, this may have
led him to think that metaphysical claims would have to be known a priori. However, since
Kripke has famously argued in [Kri72] that there are necessary truths known a posteriori,
this reason is not very convincing for a modern analytical metaphysician.
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as metaphysical, yet Aristotle's theory is a paradigmatic metaphysical theory
because it was used to x the reference of the word "metaphysics". Therefore
any account of metaphysics that would not count Aristotle's metaphysics as
metaphysics would be absurd (though of course equally an account that
would only count Aristotle's theory as metaphysics, as some of the more
extreme Neo-Aristotelian accounts would do, would also be absurd). There-
fore we must look at how Aristotle introduces the concept of wisdom or rst
philosophy.
However, when we do so, we nd that the original concept of metaphysics
was not such as Kant claims. As we have seen in some detail in Section 2.1,
Aristotle, who rst explicitly introduced the science of metaphysics, dened
it with the aid of its object32. He was indeed not very clear in this, since as
we have seen he gave several dierent denitions or characterizations of what
the object of metaphysics was, which are not obviously equivalent, both that
it was the science of being as being (Metaphysics 1003a) and that it was the
science of primary causes and principles (Metaphysics 932a) and that it was
the science of immaterial entities. This allows a great degree of latitude
in the denition of metaphysics, as a modern metaphysician can choose
any of these three conceptions. However all of Aristotle's denitions or
characterizations of metaphysics concerned the object of the science, not the
source or kind of metaphysical cognition. Aristotle's denitions of physics
also were based on the object of it, so the dierence between physics and
metaphysics was according to him a dierence in their objects, whether it
was that physics dealt with material and metaphysics immaterial objects, or
that physics concerned only one domain of being (namely material objects)
while metaphysics was concerned with all domains of being as such. Since
Aristotle thought that metaphysics was distinguished from other sciences
by its object, this would even allow an Aristotelian to coherently claim that
dierent metaphysical claims derive from dierent sources of cognition and
involve dierent kinds of cognition. As I will show, there are reasons to
think that he actually at least implicitly did make this claim, and held some
32L. A. Paul also argues in [Pau12] similarly to me that metaphysics has a distinctive
subject matter, not a distinctive methodology, though Paul does not reach this conclusion
by a historical analysis such as I use to arrive at it. However, Paul's view is in other respects
dierent from mine. Paul holds in [Pau12, x2] that both scientic and metaphysical
theorizing can be understood in terms of constructing of models of the world. I will
instead argue that both scientic and metaphysical theorizing must make use of fully
interpreted languages, so both need something more than mere construction of models.
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metaphysical claims to be analytical a priori while others to be synthetic a
posteriori. This would make Aristotle's metaphysics an anticipation of the
theory Haack called narrow aposteriorist naturalistic metaphysics.
Aristotle could not have consistently held that metaphysical claims would
be a priori in the very strong sense of the expression in which Kant thought
them to be a priori. Indeed, Aristotle himself and faithful Aristotelians had
to think, contrary to Kant, that the basic concepts of metaphysics would
have to be derived from experience, since Aristotle famously thought (here
setting himself in opposition to the view of his mentor Plato) that all con-
cepts possessed by a human being had to be abstracted from experience33
(compare for example De Anima 428b10, where Aristotle says that imagina-
tion is impossible without sensation and 431b where he says that the faculty
of thinking thinks the forms in the images; combining these passages we
see clearly that according to Aristotle we can only think of forms - which
are what corresponds to concepts in Aristotle - if we have corresponding
sensations). It is indeed unclear whether Aristotle thought that the basic
propositions of metaphysics were derived from experience or not, as Aris-
totle himself never made this distinction explicitly, so his answer to this
question (if he had one at all) must be inferred from other claims he makes.
Unfortunately, any such inference is dicult due to the obscurity of many
features in Aristotle's theory, so that Aristotle's philosophy allows for both
more empiricist and more rationalistic interpretations34. However, whatever
Aristotle's own view (if he even had one) on this question might have been,
it was not part of the very concept of metaphysics that he formulated. In
fact, as I have already explained, Aristotle's metaphysical system included
claims based upon astronomy. Kant himself would have classed such claims
as synthetic a posteriori (and it seem unlikely on the face of it that Aristotle
would have held astronomy to be a priori, if he had formulated the ques-
tion). Therefore metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense includes a posteriori
33There are indeed many obscurities in Aristotle's doctrine of abstraction. These are
connected with the obscurities in his doctrine of forms, on which his doctrine of abstraction
is based. As I will show later, it is not clear for example whether forms were supposed to
be particulars or universals. Nevertheless, it is rather clear that Aristotle's doctrine was
a kind of concept-empiricism, and so incompatible with Kant's radical apriorism.
34Platonists notoriously had very rationalistic epistemological views, and most Aris-
totelians since late antiquity - medieval scholastics denitely included - were inuenced by
the Neo-Platonists' combination of Aristotelian and Platonic ideas. Therefore it is quite
likely that Aristotle and the earliest peripatetics were willing to let experience pay a far
larger role in metaphysics than most of the later Aristotelians.
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claims, whether it also includes synthetic claims a priori or not.
Kant's claim that the very concept of metaphysics implies that meta-
physical knowledge has to be a priori would then appear completely arbi-
trary and unjustied to someone who only looked at Aristotle's pioneering
denition of metaphysics. In fact it is of course not wholly arbitrary, as we
see when we look at the historical context in greater detail, but at least to
some extent based on the conception of metaphysics held by the rationalis-
tic Leibnizian philosophers like Christian Wol against whom Kant argued.
These Leibnizian philosophers generally held that a huge amount of meta-
physics was indeed a priori but also that it was analytic. They tended to
count as analytic many statements with regard to which today's philoso-
phers would nd it absurd to even consider that they might be analytic. So
for all I have said Kant's arguments might yet have been eective against
such rationalists35. However, the theory of a modern Neo-Aristotelian who
goes back to an Aristotelian conception of metaphysics or any modern meta-
physician whose concept of metaphysics is more similar to the Aristotelian
than the rationalistic one (including almost all naturalistic metaphysicians)
is quite unscathed by Kant's arguments. Therefore even if extreme empiri-
cism were true, this would not be a sucient reason to reject metaphysics
35In fact there are reasons to think that though Kant's conception of metaphysics may
have been closer to that of Leibnizian rationalists, even they did not generally accept
quite so rationalistic a conception of metaphysics as the one Kant argues against. Wol
allowed in [Wol30, x4, page 2] (see [Wol05, pages 20-23] for a modern German translation)
that ontological statements can depend on undoubted (or indubitable) experience and
in [Wol40, x34, page 15] (see [Wol06, x34, page 21] for a modern German translation) that
in philosophy principles must be derived from experience. Wol used the phrase "expe-
rientia indubitata", translated by Dirk Eertz as "unbezweifelte Erfahrung" in [Wol05,
pages 20-23], where the very word "Erfahrung" is the same as Kant uses. If ontological
statements can according to Wol depend on experience they are then not a priori accord-
ing to Kant's denition of a priority. In any case, Wol said in this place also that the
demonstrative method is to used also in physics, so the distinction between physics and
metaphysics cannot according to him depend on the demonstrative nature of metaphysics.
It is of course true that it is obvious today that there are many defects in Wol's concep-
tion of the methodology of metaphysics (as well as in his conception of the methodology
of physics); Wol did not see that it would be necessary to use inductive or abductive
reasoning in metaphysics (or that the experience on which metaphysics depends cannot
always be undoubted), which can only provide probably true results, as most modern
metaphysicians would think (e. g. Wol says in [Wol06, x33, page 21] that philosophy
must strive for full certainty). Wol was denitely a strong rather than a weak founda-
tionalist. Nevertheless, there is no dierence in this point between Wol and Kant, for
Kant was as far from fallibilism as Wol. It is then likely that the kind of metaphysicians
Kant argues against are just pure straw men, though since I cannot in this work examine
the complete history of rationalistic philosophy in Germany, I cannot prove it in this work;
Kant's conception of metaphysics might be found in some obscure minor Wolan.
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as impossible.
However, extreme empiricism, though fashionable, is far from universally
accepted. Perhaps most analytical philosophers think (in accordance with
most classical analytical philosophers, as indeed they have to think so that
they can appropriately call themselves "analytical" philosophers) that ana-
lytical a priori knowledge is possible, but that synthetic is not. This would
of course be of no use if if Kant's claim (e. g. in Prolegomena x4, A36, trans-
lated in [Kan85, page 16]) that metaphysical judgments properly (eigentlich)
so-called are all synthetic were correct; however, if we again look at how the
concept of metaphysics was introduced, Kant's claim appears quite implau-
sible. Aristotle himself had (in Metaphysics 1005a19-1005b18) counted the
principle of non-contradiction as a properly metaphysical principle, and this
principle is according to Kant (Prolegomena x2, A 25, translated in [Kan85,
page 12]) analytic, indeed the common principle of all analytic judgments.
Also Christian Wol, whose philosophy was Kant's primary target, held the
principle of contradiction to be an ontological and hence a metaphysical prin-
ciple. One of Kant's examples of synthetic judgments a priori (which were
meant to be relatively uncontroversial) were arithmetical judgments; how-
ever, most analytical philosophers have thought following Frege's logicism
that such judgements are reducible to logical statements and are hence36
analytical a priori37, and this is probably still the standard view, though
36There were some exceptions even among earliest analytical philosophers. One excep-
tion was Russell. He indeed agreed with Frege that arithmetical statements are logical
and did much to make this the common view. However, unlike Frege Russell held at least
initially in [Rus03, x434, page 457] that arithmetical truths are synthetic, here agreeing
with Kant instead of Frege. This was possible for Russell because he thought, here di-
verging from Kant even more than Frege had, that logical truths are synthetic. Russell
even hinted that all truths might be synthetic. Here Russell in a way anticipated Quine's
and Putnam's position (though Russell's point seems to have been not that the notion of
analytic truth would be obscure, as Quine held, but that its extension was empty). Also
the early Russell thought (see [Rus00, x12, page 24]) that though arithmetical truths are
not analytical, they are yet necessary, a view that Quine would not have liked.
37Another example used by Kant were of course geometrical statements. These are even
more controversial and dicult than arithmetical ones. Frege did not originally intend the
thesis of logicism to apply to geometrical statements - in [Fre84, x14] (see [Fre50, x14, page
20] for an English translation) he holds that they are not empirical yet still synthetic, from
which it follows that they must be synthetic a priori, just as Kant thought. However, later
analytical philosophers extended it to them. Usually this is done by distinguishing between
pure and applied geometry, where pure geometry is held to be analytical, while applied
geometry is held to be part of physics and hence synthetic a posteriori. However, it can
be argued that this kind of view suers from the fallacy of equivocation; pure geometry is
not geometry at all in the traditional sense, not what Euclid or any mathematician before
the 20th century would have understood to be geometry. I think that it would be more
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it is increasingly challenged by the radical empiricistic, "naturalistic" view
according to which they are synthetic a posteriori. If the dominant view
of analytical philosophers concerning arithmetic is correct, it shows at least
that analytical judgments can be less trivial than Kant thought, and there
are equally dicult epistemological questions concerning their possibility as
concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori truths. Furthermore, if the
view is correct this of course raises the suspicion that Kant is likely to have
been wrong about the source and kind of metaphysical cognition in the same
way as he was about the source and kind of arithmetical cognition. Also
modern philosophers hold some metaphysical principles to be analytical; for
instance, some mild deationists such as Bob Hale and Crispin Wright think
that some crucial metaphysical principles such as abstraction principles are
analytical a priori.
There is also a minority of philosophers, including for example realistic
phenomenologists such as Barry Smith in [Smi96], who still think that there
are synthetic a priori truths38 and many of them think that many meta-
physical truths are such; however, such philosophers commonly disagree
with Kant both about the extent and more importantly about the basis
for a priori knowledge. Husserl was convinced by Frege that arithmetical
knowledge was logical and hence analytic and realistic phenomenologists
generally follow him. Rather, they (and most discussion in today's philoso-
phy) would take such statements as "The same surface cannot be simulta-
defensible to just say that geometry (in the traditional sense) is synthetic a posteriori in
toto. Logicism might still be saved by claiming that geometry in the traditional sense is
not part of mathematics at all. However, it seems to me that if there are any synthetic
truths a priori, then it is still defensible to claim that some geometrical statements might
be such. The existence of such truths is generally opposed by pointing out that many
truths which were thought to such such as the Parallel postulate, were shown to be false.
However, a defender of synthetic a priori truths can be a fallibilist (as e. g. Barry Smith
is - see [Smi96]), and a fallibilist a priorist can argue that the fact that we can be severely
mistaken about what a priori statements are correct does not show that there are none
such.
38Matters are complicated by the fact that phenomenologists often claim that such
truths are based on experience in a wider sense, namely on a special kind of experience,
phenomenological experience or experience of essences, Husserl's Wesensschau, so in a
sense they are synthetic a posteriori. Also it is often claimed that such truths are analytical
in a wide sense, wider than the one captured by Frege's denition. Carnap's theory
of meaning postulates in [Car52] captures in a way both these truths and those which
are analytic according to Frege's denition. So the dierence between this view and
the rst and second views is not as great as it might at rst appear. I will later in
Section 6.4.1 present an epistemological theory of Reinhardt Grossmann which represents
a very interesting combination of the rst and the third view.
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neously both red all over and green all over." as relatively uncontroversial
(if not in themselves philosophically interesting) examples of synthetic a pri-
ori truths. As I will show in more detail later, phenomenologists generally
distinguish between ontology and metaphysics and think that ontological
knowledge is a priori while metaphysical knowledge is a posteriori, and they
also distinguish between formal ontology whose truths are analytical and
material ontologies whose truths are synthetic. More importantly, realistic
phenomenologists think that synthetic a priori truths are grounded in ob-
jective relations between essences (of which we can according to them have
intuitions, contrary to Kant's view) rather than in subjective forms of sen-
sibility and understanding as Kant thought. This view can be made more
plausible by considering the several problems that have been found in Kant's
transcendental theory of synthetic a priori knowledge. Of course, this view
requires realism concerning universals (as the essences of phenomenologists
are just what scholastics called universals) while Kant's view presupposes
nominalism. However, Kant never justied the nominalism he presupposed,
apparently thinking it obvious or already proved by others, while the mod-
ern realistic phenomenologists generally have arguments for their realism
and against nominalism (taking account of the modern arguments in favour
of nominalism by British empiricists and continental rationalists on which
Kant presumably relied) so this is scarcely a disadvantage for phenomenolo-
gists. Furthermore many of these arguments do not presuppose the existence
of synthetic a priori truths and are accepted also by philosophers who do not
accept the existence of synthetic truths a priori - e. g. Quine at one time
accepted the existence of universals though he rejected the whole distinction
between analytical and synthetic truths - so such reliance on universals is
not question-begging.
The second and third view have only rarely met in discussion. One
example of debate between them occurred when Husserl and Schlick had
a brief debate about a priori truths - Schlick criticized Husserl and other
phenomenologists such as Max Scheler in [Sch18, 120-121] and in [Sch32a]
(translated into English in' [Sch49a] and Husserl responded in the Logical
Investigations - but this debate ended in mutual misunderstandings. Many
modern commentators such as M. M. Van de Pitte (in [VdP84]), Jim Shelton,
Roberta Lanfredini and Paul Livingston (in [Liv02]) have discussed this
debate at length. This has as might be expected resulted in a prolongation
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of the debate, as the commentators do not agree even on the interpretation
of Schlick's or Husserl's theories or on the relations between them, much less
on whsoe arguments were more correct.
This debate strangely concentrated not on the existence of synthetic a
priori truths but on that of material a priori truths, which one would have
thought to be less controversial. It is generally thought today that if any
truths at all are analytical then formal truths are analytical, and indeed
the least controversial examples of analytical truths, but not all purportedly
analytical truths are formal (see e. g. [Car52, page 66]39. There have been
a few dissenters; Jerrold Katz thought (see e. g. [Kat72, page 119]) that
logical truths are not analytical truths in the narrow sense of analyticity
he distinguishes40. Even such utterly trivial and relatively uncontroversial
analytical truths as "Bachelors are unmarried." are in one obvious sense
material truths, since they depend on the interpretation of the non-logical
constants that occur in them. If you interpret "bachelor" as referring to
soldiers but continue to interpret "unmarried" in the ordinary way the sen-
tence does not continue to be true, and certainly if you reinterpret "green"
39Austin's English translation of Frege's denition, which directly led to the concept
of analyticity dominant in analytical philosophy, was a bit syntactically ambiguous on
this score, which may have sowed some confusion. When Frege said according to Austin
that a proposition is analytical if in following it right back to primitive truths we "come
only on general logical laws and denitions", it is not clear whether only the laws or also
the denitions are also supposed to be general and logical, i. e. to involve only logical
i. e. formal concepts. Apparently because of this ambiguity, Frege has been interpreted
(e. g. by Guillermo Haddock in [Had08, pages 132,133]) as holding that all analytical
truths would have to be formal. Haddock claims that unlike Carnap, Frege would not
have held such a statement as "All bachelors are unmarried." to be analytic. Frege's
following denition of syntheticity is also a bit obscure (and it is not clear that it is the
contradictory of analyticity) which adds to the confusion. However, the German original
of the denition of analyticity
nur auf die allgemeinen logischen Gezetze und auf denitionen
makes it clear that the qualications "general" ("allgemein") and "logical" ("logisch")
were meant to apply only to the laws, not to the denitions. Therefore the denitions
could contain non-logical concepts and so Frege probably meant his denition in the way
analyticity was usually later understood in analytical philosophy, so that he implicitly
agreed with Carnap that "All bachelors are unmarried." was analytic, contrary to Had-
dock.
40There are problems with Katz's arguments for his view. Katz appealed to Kant's
denition of analyticity (though this was not his only premise; he also appealed to linguistic
intuitions). It may be true that Kant's denition of analytical truths could be understood
so that logical truths would not be analytical. However, as we have seen, clearly Kant
himself thought that logical truths were analytical, so he did not intend his own denition
to be understood in the way Katz did. Therefore Katz's appeal to Kant does not really
support his theory.
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as referring to the property crimson or crimson things the sentence "The
same surface cannot be simultaneously both red all over and green all over."
does not continue to be true. However, Schlick apparently thought that not
only such truths but even the truths that the phenomenologists thought to
be synthetic a priori are not only analytic but even formal, saying in [Sch49a,
page 285]:
The error committed by the proponents of the factual a pri-
ori can be understood as arising from the fact that it was not
clearly realized that such concepts as those of colors have a for-
mal structure just as numbers do or spatial concepts, and that
this structure determines their meaning without remainder.
A charitable interpreter might suggest that Schlick was using the word "for-
mal" in a wider sense than we usually do today, though in this case it be-
comes rather unclear what the concept of formality he employed was. How-
ever, it is also possible that Schlick was just confusing the distinct notions
of formality and analyticity, and if this is correct then surely this invalidates
his criticism of Husserl. This of course does not imply that Husserl's theory
would be correct or even meaningful, for there are many serious obscurities
in Husserl's theory which cry out for a careful criticism by the methods of
analytical philosophy, but Schlick did not succeed in giving such a criticism.
It may then be that we are here dealing with dierent notions of form,
and indeed van de Pitte distinguishes three senses of the word "formal"
in [VdP84, page 201], distinguishing forms of experience in Kant's sense
from the standard sense in which only propositions of pure logic are formal
and from the sense of the word Schlick is using here. However, van de Pitte
muddles matters up further in [VdP84, page 202] by claiming that phenome-
nologists would have admitted what Schlick says they did not realize. van de
Pitte claims that nothing is more central to phenomenology than the insight
that every concept has a formal structure, and that when Husserl asserts
that some a priori propositions have material content he means that they
present a structural law. However, while the rst of van de Pitte's claims is
probably correct, the second is clearly false, so Schlick did not misrepresent
the relationship between his view and the view of the phenomenologists so
much as van de Pitte claims. Husserl did not employ the word "material"
so idiosyncratically that he would have meant something structural with it.
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Van de Pitte is correct that phenomenologists would have admitted that
such concepts as colours have a formal structure, but not that they would
have accepted that it would determine their meaning without remainder;
these are two entirely dierent claims to which they would in my view have
had dierent responses. Furthermore, the latter claim is extremely implau-
sible; it is based on Schlick's structuralism, which as I will show at detail
in Section 3.1.3 of this dissertation, has been decisively refuted by Newman
in [New28]. Because of this I think that even if the phenomenologists were
wrong, which seems quite possible though far from certain to me, their error
was not where Schlick thought it to be; the truths that they thought syn-
thetic a priori may be synthetic a posteriori or such analytical a priori truths
as are not logical in the narrows sense and hence material, but certainly not
formal or structural41
Since Quine's criticism of the distinction between analytic and synthetic
41At least some of Schlick's criticisms of phenomenologists are unfair. Schlick claims
(see [Sch49a, pages 277.278]) that the phenomenologists give a new meaning to the term
"experience", and so commit a fallacy of equivocation. It is indeed true that phenomenol-
ogists have a dierent conception of experience than e. g. Kant (whom they criticize) did,
but this need not imply that they use the word "experience" in a dierent sense. Of course,
early logical positivists like Schlick also had a very dierent conception of experience than
Kant, since they held (see e. g. [Sch36, page 359] and [Car67, x65, pages 103-106]) that
original experience is without a subject, while Kant would have thought it true, probably
even analytically true, that experience must have a subject who experiences (though this
becomes typically complicated with Kant, whose theory distinguishes dierent subjects,
both a phenomenal subject and a noumenal one, and according to some commentators
even a third transcendental subject). On the other hand, Otto Neurath named a perceiver
thrice in his peculiar formulation of protocol sentences (see [Neu32, page 207] and [Neu59,
page 202]). Since protocol sentences were supposed to be about the verifying experience
(as I will explain in more detail later), translating his view into the "material mode" we
see that Neurath thought that experience had a subject, even if he tried to physicalize
this subject which had earlier been viewed as immaterial. We then see that logical posi-
tivists were not unanimous about this view of experience. Logical positivists also generally
thought that original experience was not constituted by mental acts either, while earlier
analytical philosophers has thought that while such experience was without a primitive
subject it did contain primitive mental acts. Husserl's later concept of experience is in
this respect closer to Kant's, since he also held that experience had a subject (and indeed
distinguished several subjects as Kant did, though not exactly in the same way); however,
Husserl's view changed, and his earlier view which held the subject to be constituted
by mental acts was like that of earlier analytical philosophers and hence a bit closer to
Schlick's). Therefore Schlick also might be accused of giving a new meaning to the word
"experience". However, the word "experience" is so very indenite in meaning that both
can be held to just sharpen its ordinary meaning, although they do it in dierent ways.
However, since such philosophical explication of the concept of experience easily leads to
a conception of experience which diers from the ordinary one, it is by no means a trivial
question whether either Schlick's or Husserl's (or indeed Kant's) conception of experience
is even coherent.
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truths, analytic truths which are not logical have come to appear to many
philosophers who still call themselves analytic philosophers as problematic
as synthetic truths a priori were to the early analytic philosophers. This
narrows the gap between the second and third views, especially given the
fact that as I already argued, the notion of experience may be ambiguous and
hence the distinction between the second and third view is not as sharp as it
at rst seems. Quine himself did not nd the distinction between logical and
non-logical truths very problematic (though he did vacillate in his opinions
concerning this subject). However, many later analytic philosophers have
found it also dubious. The question of what truths are logical and what not
is not an easy one, and has been much discussed without much agreement
being reached (for a good treatment of the topic see John MacFarlane's
exposition in [Mac00]). Such philosophers as John Etchemendy indeed see
(e. g. in [Etc90]) this distinction as more problematic than the more general
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Such modern extreme
empiricists as Devitt do not nd the question of how we know logical truths
any easier to answer than the question of how we could know synthetic a
priori truths.
Lately most analytic philosophers have come to think that the logicist
project of Frege, Russell, Whitehead and Husserl has failed. The foundations
they sought in higher-order logic have instead in the view of many mathe-
maticians been found in set theory, but the epistemological and ontological
status of set theory is unclear. Because of this there is little unanimity or
clarity about what this would mean for general epistemology. Doubts re-
garding whether mathematical truths can be viewed as logical have led to
doubts regarding whether they can be analytical truths at all. This has of-
ten been taken to support extreme empiricism with regard to mathematics.
However, it could equally well be taken to suggest that we should re-evaluate
the rejection of synthetic a priori truths, not only in Husserl's sense but also
in Kant's sense (which of course would not imply that we should accept
Kant's explanation of our knowledge of synthetic a priori truths).
However, since as I showed there is no clarity or unanimity about where
the boundaries of logic lie or how to draw them, it cannot be taken as a set-
tled fact that logicism has failed. It cannot in my view even be taken as sure
that set theory is not part of logic42. Indeed not all analytical philosophers
42I will argue later that set-theoretic membership can be viewed as a kind of predication.
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agree that the failure of logicism would be settled; Nino B. Cocchiarella
protested against this view in [Coc87], and lately Bob Hale and Crispin
Wright have tried to defend a Neo-Fregean logicist program in [HW01];
other authors such as Richard G. Heck (see [Hec11]) and Charles Parsons
have also pointed out that at least parts of Frege's logicist program could be
salvaged. Therefore it would be premature to say that our epistemological
research would have to start from the failure of logicism as a settled fact.
Even this brief discussion ought to show that the issues at play in the
debate between the three epistemological positions are very complex and
dicult, so dicult that even characterizing the relations between the dif-
ferent positions accurately is hard, never mind deciding correctly between
them. Fortunately, we do not have to decide which of these three general
anti-Kantian epistemological positions is correct here, though addressing
them will become imperative in deeper metametaphysical investigations.
Metametaphysics should address general epistemological problems only so
far as they are relevant for metaphysics, and address them at each point of
its argumentation only so far as they are relevant at that point.
I will touch them briey later in this work, arguing that the most in-
uential arguments for the extreme empiricist view, Quine's arguments, are
bad because they are dependent on vericationism, which has been shown
to be very problematic, and their vericationist premises lead to semantic
holism, which has unacceptable consequences. I argue that gives us some
reasons to reject the extreme empiricist view, since Quine's arguments have
been most inuential in establishing it. However, these reasons are not yet
conclusive, since other less inuential arguments for this conclusion (e. g.
Devitt's arguments) may not share all of the defects of Quine's arguments
(though Devitt also appeals to Quine, so if I am right that the premises of
Quine's argument are indefensible, this also weakens the case of Devitt).
However, at this stage of the argument the vital point to note is that
Predication, however, is generally considered a logical concept, so this would indicate that
at least the basic concepts of set theory are logical. It is interesting to note that when we
delve into the origins of modern logic and mathematics, we see that Giuseppe Peano held
set-theoretical notions to be logical (see e. g. his listing of his signs in [Pea89, page vi]
where he divides all signs he uses into logical and arithmetical and counts all set-theoretic
signs as logical), though he was not himself a logicist. If Peano's understanding of what
notions are logical were combined with any of the now popular reductions of arithmetical
notions to set-theoretical ones, whether that of Zf or less standard ones like Quine's NF,
NFU and ML, we would get a new version of logicism.
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if any of these three general epistemological theories is correct then Kant's
premises for his view that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves
are incorrect. Therefore the fact that philosophers today generally hold
some one of them and have plausible arguments for it suces to make Kant's
original reasons for rejecting metaphysics in the traditional sense (what is
sometimes called transcendent or speculative metaphysics) irrelevant and
outdated43.
Because of this Kant's prolegomena do not work any more as prolegom-
ena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as a science;
indeed, they did not work very well as such prolegomena even in Kant's own
time, since as I have shown Kant misinterpreted the traditional metaphysics
he was criticizing. Nevertheless, as I have already argued Kant was right
in thinking that metaphysics needs prolegomena, so we need to nd new
prolegomena. Of course, such prolegomena are not entirely new today, since
later philosophers have supplied many promising candidates for at least the
beginning of such prolegomena, such as Quine's theory of ontological com-
mitment, at least as it is developed by Peter van Inwagen; I will consider
them in this dissertation and try to develop further.
43There are of course still some philosophers who cling to some of Kant's ideas. However,
most of them, such as internal realists of Hilary Putnam's kind or Pihlstrom's pragmatic
realism, which are often supposed to be analogous to Kant's empirical realism combined
with transcendental idealism, only take very general inspiration from Kant. They do not
generally take Kant's original problem, that of synthetic a priori judgments, as their main
point of departure. Therefore any arguments they would have against metaphysics or for
a specic kind of metaphysics should have to be examined on their own terms. In fact
their premises are closer to the vericationism of the logical positivists, which I will discuss
in the next section of this work, than to Kant's original premises, so that my criticism
of vericationism to some extent also applies to their arguments. In any case, Putnam
at least does not seem to completely reject metaphysics, but like Kant he rejects it in
some sense and accepts it in another, weaker sense, and Philstrom quite explicitly accepts
metaphysics.
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Chapter 3
Vericationism and Other
Metaontological Principles in
Logical Positivists
3.1 Dierent Elements in Logical Positivism: Em-
piricism, Structuralism, Foundationalism, Co-
herentism and Syntacticism
3.1.1 Empiricism and Vericationism in Logical Positivism
Of course, though modern philosophers do not usually accept Kant's premises
for the rejection of traditional metaphysics this is far from implying that
philosophers would generally admit the possibility of transcendent or even
of immanent metaphysics. There have been many other reasons (incompat-
ible with each other) why modern philosophers who make use of a critical
method hold as negative opinions about metaphysics as Kant did or even
more negative ones. While these later attacks reject most of Kant's premises,
Kant's misunderstanding of the genuine nature of metaphysical research con-
tinues to inuence them (as I will show); many later critics of metaphysics
assume uncritically on the basis of Kant's ideas that metaphysics would
have to be synthetic a priori, or at least that it would have to be synthetic,
and therefore that arguments against the possibility of synthetic knowledge
a priori would also be automatically arguments against the possibility of
metaphysics.
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Empiricism is perhaps most often presented as an obstacle to meta-
physics, even though the original inventor of metaphysics as a separate dis-
cipline, Aristotle, was, as we have seen, an empiricist (at least in a weak and
possibly even in a rather strong sense). This is perhaps partly because of the
continuing eect of Kant's misunderstanding of metaphysics as synthetic a
priori by denition, since empiricism is disdaining of any kind of a priori
knowledge and is blatantly incompatible with the existence of synthetic a
priori knowledge. However, it is also partly because empiricism has been
taken to radical extremes which might threaten even a conception of meta-
physics which does not take its claims to be synthetic and a priori. Such
extreme forms of empiricism are indeed obstacles to metaphysics but also
to a lot else that even opponents of metaphysics would price.
A rather extreme kind of empiricism (in some ways slightly less extreme
than the later kinds of empiricism of Quine or Devitt, but in other ways still
more extreme) represented by such philosophers as Auguste Comte (1798-
1857), Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), was
called positivism. In the beginning of the twentieth century this was com-
bined with the methods of modern logic resulting in a sophisticated version of
positivism called logical positivism or logical empiricism1. Logical positivism
was one form of analytical philosophy; sometimes the anti-metaphysical ori-
entation of logical positivism is ascribed to all analytical philosophy, but
this is utterly erroneous, since the earliest analytical philosophers were not
opposed to all metaphysics2. In fact the recent movement of analytical
1I will be mostly using the term "logical positivism" instead of "logical empiricism"
because I think that it is a better name for the movement in question. As I argued there
is nothing in the word "empiricism" to suggest opposition to metaphysics, while the word
"positivism" has always signied some kind of opposition to metaphysics (although the way
in which dierent positivistic theories are opposed to metaphysics has been very dierent),
which was a very prominent characteristic of the movement. Logical empiricism might
be understood so that it would be a broader movement than logical positivism, possibly
including for example middle-period and late Russell (who was not a logical positivist),
and if so I am not opposing logical empiricism (in such a broad sense) but only logical
positivism.
2Nino B. Cocchiarella distinguishes in [Coc87, pages 1-2] three stages in the develop-
ment of analytical philosophy, two metaphysical stages and one anti-metaphysical stage.
The two metaphysical stages are the stage of "extreme" realism and the stage of logical
atomism. Much of the new analytical metaphysics such as Armstrong's famous meta-
physics can be viewed as a return to the second metaphysical stage. As I have argued
in Section 2.1.4 that the fundamentalism which is part of logical atomism is not well jus-
tied, I think that we should rather return to the very rst stage, or try to nd some
intermediary position between the doctrines of the rst and second stage.
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metaphysics is a genuine continuation of the metaphysical trends of original
analytical philosophy. Indeed, all the founders of analytical philosophy were
arguably not empiricists at all - e. g. it is highly doubtful if Frege could
be called an empiricist in any non-vacuous sense, since as we have seen he
accepted not only a priori knowledge but even synthetic a priori knowledge
in the case of geometry - much less extreme empiricists of the kind logical
positivists were. Logical positivists mostly represented (along with most
other analytical philosophers) the second of the three anti-Kantian episte-
mological traditions I listed in the previous section of this work, though as
I will show they were often inconsistent with this. One of the most ex-
treme kinds of empiricism ever propounded was encapsulated in the famous
vericationist criterion or principle of the logical positivists. According to
a rather early and obscure but common formulation of the principle every
meaningful (synthetic) statement had to be veriable by means of experi-
ence and logical positivists thought that metaphysical statements were not
veriable (and were synthetic), so this gave them an apparent reason to
reject metaphysics.
This reason for rejecting metaphysics should be as outdated as Kant's
epistemology. For a long time it seemed that logical positivism had been
rejected by the philosophical community. John Arthur Passmore declared
already in 1967 in [Pas67] that logical positivism was as dead as a philosoph-
ical movement ever becomes. Unfortunately, that turned out to be not very
dead at all3. Huw Price has called metaphysics after Carnap the ghost who
walks, but I will argue that in truth is is the logical positivism, of which Car-
nap was the most prominent representatives, that is the ghost who walks. In
fact logical positivist conceptions lie hidden - whether implicitly armed or
equally implicitly denied - at the background of several modern discussions
about truth and about realism and anti-realism within analytical philoso-
phy, so that it is hardly possible to even properly understand the modern
debates without having some knowledge of the history of logical positivism.
Because of this I will have to spend some time on discussing logical
positivism, more than I spent discussing Kant's more severely outdated the-
3Passmore also said that logical positivism considered as a doctrine of a sect, has
disintegrated, and this may indeed remain true. However, it still lives, as I will show later
at more length, as a doctrine held by philosophers that do not belong to any common
sect. I will argue, however, that it should die also as a doctrine because of the many very
serious problems that have been repeatedly pointed out in it.
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ories. However, what I say in this section of my work will mostly not be
original, though going through it seems to me necessary so that I may dis-
miss considerations of veriability from my later work; I will gather from the
literature what seem to me the most important reasons because of which the
main doctrines of logical positivism are rejected by many philosophers today.
Those readers who are already fully convinced that logical positivism was
fundamentally mistaken might skip this whole chapter of my dissertation.
3.1.2 A Proposed Re-evaluation of Logical Positivism
Recently a new interpretation and evaluation of logical empiricism has be-
come popular, which sees it as derived from the Marburg school of Neo-
Kantian philosophy and Poincare's conventionalism (expressed in such sources
as Henri Poincare's [Poi05]) rather than empiricist sources. One source of
this new interpretation is in [Fri87], where Michael Friedman gives a new
interpretation of Carnap's Aufbau, and Friedman has gone on to extend
such an interpretation to all logical positivism in [Fri91] and expanded this
into book form in [Fri99]4. Other proponents of this kind of interpretation
are Alan W. Richardson (e. g. in [Ric90] and in [Ric97]) and Alberto Coa,
Thomas Ricketts etc. Bryan G. Norton also defended a similar view about
Carnap's philosophy earlier than either Friedman or Richardson in [Nor77].
Friedman de-emphasizes the importance of the verication principle in Car-
nap's philosophy and instead sees the structuralism and conventionalism
also presented in Aufbau as central.
While Friedman, Richardson and others are surely correct that there are
Kantian and structuralist and conventionalist elements in the thinking of
logical positivists, yet it is also quite clear that there are also elements of
extreme empiricism in them. Indeed, they never go so far as to explicitly
deny that those elements exist5, only downplay their importance. Friedman
4Friedman says in [Fri91, page 505] that no longer challenged by logical positivism as
a live philosophical option, we can consider it impartially from a historical point of view.
However, the main ideas of logical positivism are very much alive, as I will argue, so it
cannot yet be considered from a purely historical point of view, but must be treated as a
live philosophical option. Indeed, Friedman's suggestion ts badly with his own assertion
(in [Fri91, page 519]) of parallels between the positivists' situation and our own post-
positivist situation. We could only consider logical positivism impartially when (if ever)
our pilosophical situation diers entirely from the positivists' situation.
5Indeed, in [Fri87, page 536], Friedman admits that that there is no doubt at all that
the Aufbau does defend empiricism and phenomenalism.
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says in [Fri91, page 510] that the positivists' main philosophical concerns
did not rise within the empiricist tradition at all. Even if this were true,
it would allow that logical positivists were empiricists (and even that some
of their philosophical concerns rose from the empiricist tradition). So this
kind of interpretation seems to dier from the traditional one only in what
it emphasizes. Surely it does not suce for a genuine re-evaluation of a
thinker to just propose a new view of his concerns; the value of a thinker's
work is based on whether the assertions he makes are correct or justied
(and possess other values such as informativeness, fruitfulness, etc.). If a
philosopher makes a blatantly incorrect assertion, it is no defence that he
made it inadvertently.
However, it does not seem to be true. Friedman and Richardson contrast
Carnap and other logical positivists with Bertrand Russell, whose External
World program they take to represent a more traditional variety of empiri-
cism. However, nearly all the dissimilarities they point out between the
concerns of the logical positivists and Russell are based on either ignoring
or misrepresenting Russell's philosophical development.
Friedman says in [Fri91, page 150] that the initial impetus for the posi-
tivists' philosophizing came from late nineteenth-century work on the foun-
dations of geometry. However, if we look at Russell's earliest (theoretical
rather than political) book [Rus97], we see that at least part of Russell's
initial impetus for philosophizing also came from the very same work on
the foundations of geometry. Also Friedman admits that many of the very
geometers that gave the logical positivists their impetus held an empiricist
conception of geometry, which implies that they were inuenced by the em-
piricist tradition, so Friedman's attempt to separate the motivations of the
logical positivists from the empiricist tradition is futile.
Richardson sees in [Ric90, page 12] the dierence between Carnap and
Russell in the fact that the over-all program of the Aufbau is more clearly
directed toward Kantian issues and problems than those of traditional em-
piricism. Richardson thinks that Carnap was mostly interested in the objec-
tivity of science and sought to ground this objectivity in the structural prop-
erties of the objects of science. However, Russell himself had been strongly
inuenced by Kantian, namely Neo-Kantian (and even Hegelian) idealist
philosophy in his earliest philosophy (as can also be seen in the already
mentioned book [Rus97]). Kantian issues and problems surely remained im-
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portant for him also in his whole philosophical development, even if he later
sought solutions for those problems from more empiricist doctrines, hav-
ing grown dissatised with Kantian doctrines (as the logical positivists also
did). Nor does structuralism serve to establish any signicant dierence be-
tween Russell and the logical positivists; there were structuralist elements
also in the last stages of Russell's External World program, as famously
seen in [Rus27], and Russell also sought to ground the objectivity of science
in these structural properties. Therefore even if structuralism were more
defensible than empiricism, this would not give logical positivists any su-
periority over Russell. However, if a famous argument by Newman against
structuralism, which I will present in Section 3.1.3, is correct, then both
Carnap and Russell were speeding down a blind alley in their structuralism,
so that objectivity must be grounded otherwise if it can be grounded at all.
So Friedman's and Richardson's attempt to draw a major dierence between
Carnap's and Russell's concerns and issues just does not work.
While there are then no great dierences in Russell's and the logical
positivists' concerns, there were in their eventual theories. Friedman and
Richardson argue that the logical positivists were not naive empiricists. This
may be so; however, Russell surely was not a naive empiricist either; indeed,
it can be questioned in what sense he was an empiricist at all, as he seems
to have at least at some times admitted the existence of synthetic a priori
knowledge. However, I will show that Carnap and other logical positivists
committed themselves (at least in the early stages of their development) to
a far stronger form of empiricism than Russell ever did, namely to verica-
tionism. Surely then if such a stronger form of empiricism is less defensible
than Russell's weaker one (as I will argue it is), this is a reason to evaluate
them more negatively than Russell, even if empiricism were less important
for them than for Russell as Friedman and Richardson claim. Another clear
dierence is that Russell steered clear of the extreme conventionalism of
some logical positivists; however, I will argue that such extreme convention-
alism is quite indefensible, so this makes Russell's theory better.
In fact the presence of Kantian, structuralist, conventionalist and coher-
entist doctrines in logical positivists (and in Russell) gives us reasons for
evaluating that movement (and indeed Russell too, though in a lesser de-
gree) more negatively, rather than more positively, since not only are there
as strong arguments against those doctrines as against vericationism, but
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it also poses the risk of radical incoherence in logical positivism (though it
poses the risk of incoherence also in Russell's [Rus27]). Any kind of strong
structuralism or conventionalism or coherentism or Kantianism is arguably
incompatible with even kinds of empiricism far weaker than vericationism,
and logical positivists did generally formulate structuralism, conventional-
ism and coherentism in a very strong way. If consistently carried out, such a
strong structuralism or conventionalism or coherentism rejects entirely the
idea that rational beliefs or even concepts have to be somehow connected to
experience.
The relationship of logical positivists to empiricism was then very prob-
lematic from the rst and arguably blatantly inconsistent; an inconsistency
which I will argue remains in much of current philosophy inuenced by log-
ical positivists. Clearly if the epistemological doctrines championed by the
logical positivists which they took as premises in their critiques of meta-
physics are incompatible with each other, then the criticisms based on such
incompatible premises cannot all be correct. However, it is possible that
none of them is correct, and I will argue that this is in fact the case since
the premises of none of them are tenable if interpreted strongly enough that
they genuinely imply the illegitimacy of (even transcendent) metaphysics.
While Friedman does not explicitly deny that the logical positivists were
empiricists he does deny explicitly (e. g. in [Fri91, page 506]) that they
would have been foundationalists. This is an incoherent position, since
empiricism as well as rationalism in the ordinary senses of the words are
both foundationalistic theories, competing theories about the foundations of
knowledge which both assume knowledge must have. The rejection of foun-
dationalism would then require the rejection of both. However, Friedman
misunderstands what foundationalism is usually taken to be. He supposes
(in [Fri91, page 508]) that it would imply that philosophy as a discipline
is foundational with respect to the special sciences. Of course, this is not
what foundationalism in the usual sense of the word means or implies at all
(though some foundationalists have indeed held such a view, which is not
completely without reasons6). It is the experiences of scientists themselves
6In fact if we view scientic knowledge historically, as Kuhn and Friedman urge us
to do, then it is clear that philosophy has in fact inuenced the development of natural
science (as has pure mathematics). In fact the natural sciences have emerged from phi-
losophy. This gives us a reason to say that philosophy has been partially foundational to
natural science (though of course not that it would give natural science all of its principles,
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when performing their experiments that an empiricist foundationalist sup-
poses to be (at least a signicant part of) the foundation to the scientic
knowledge they produce. This is quite compatible with the claim Friedman
ascribes to the logical positivists that philosophy must follow the evolution
of special sciences so as to test itself7.
While Friedman, Richardson and others are correct that such doctrines
distinct from empiricism as structuralism, coherentism and conventional-
ism must be taken into account in presenting and evaluating the theory of
logical positivists, I will argue in the next subsections of this chapter that
including such elements does not improve the prospects of logical positivism
in the slightest. At most Friedman's and Richardson's arguments justify
a partial re-interpretation of logical positivism, but not a re-evaluation of
it. I will argue that even if we could just ignore the empiricist elements
in logical positivism, this would not give us any reason to evaluate logical
positivism any more favourably, for structuralism, coherentism and conven-
tionalism are faced with even more serious problems than vericationism.
as medieval Aristotelians thought). However, this is quite compatible (at least if we are
feeble foundationalists or foundherentists, as I will argue we should be) with the claim
that natural science has also been partially foundational for philosophy. If experience were
theory-laden, it would have to be in part philosophical theory with which it was laden.
It is only an ahistorical rational reconstruction of science such as Kuhn and Friedman
generally oppose which could claim that science could in principle have been developed
autonomously, independently of philosophy as well as of pure mathematics. In fact rela-
tivity theory was inuenced by Mach's philosophy, which the logical positivists well knew
and thought with good reason to give in its turn important support for positivism; how-
ever, it turned out that positivism did not t as well together with other parts of science,
such as atomic theory, which defeated this support.
7Some logical positivists, however, may have been guilty of the incoherent position
Friedman inadvertently ascribes to them, though denitely not all. Schlick was very clearly
a foundationalist (as seen in [Sch34]) - Friedman of course does not mention this article
in [Fri91], as it does not t at all to his view of logical positivism - and so was at least the
early Carnap. However, it can be argued that if the epistemology Otto Neurath developed
in [Neu32] (translated in [Neu59]) and in [Neu34] (and Hempel defended in [Hem00]) was
epistemologically coherentist, as Schlick argued in [Sch34, page 84] (translated in [Sch59,
page 214]) and as Betrand Russell already argued in [Rus40, page 140], it does not count
as a genuine version of empiricism at all (as Russell also concluded in [Rus40, page 148],
though Neurath himself frequently called himself an empiricist. However, as verication-
ism is a kind of empiricism, Neurath's theory would not count as genuinely vericationistic
either. However, Neurath's stressing of the importance of protocol sentences would seem
to indicate some remnants of empiristic foundationalism in his philosophy, since (as I
will show later) protocol sentences were conceived as as sentences speaking of experience.
A consistent and complete rejection of foundationalism would instead require that - as
Donald Davidson proposed in [Dav86, page 313] - we should give up the distinction be-
tween observation sentences and other sentences. These remnants of foundationalism in
Neurath's philosophy are all that prevented it from lapsing into a complete relativism.
75
These problems have all been pointed out before, yet philosophers are not
generally suciently aware of them, so I must discuss them here before mov-
ing on. Strangely Friedman himself has in other writings shown that he is
aware of these problems. If the arguments against structuralism, conven-
tionalism and coherentism I will present are valid, we cannot base any valid
argument against the possibility of metaphysics on structuralism, coheren-
tism or conventionalism. After discussing these three theories I will return
to vericationism, which presents a more serious menace for metaphysics.
3.1.3 Structuralism and Structural Realism in Logical Posi-
tivism and Outside It
Ironically, structuralism8 is often presented in current discussions in the
philosophy of science as a form of scientic realism, structural realism, as
was famously done by John Worrall in [Wor89] and by Grover Maxwell
in [Max70]. However, structuralism has also been connected with doctrines
which are as far as possible from realism. Though Barry Gower initially
in [Gow09, page 74] counts the Marburg Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer as a
structural realist, he later reveals in [Gow09, page 90] that Cassirer had in
fact viewed structuralism as connected with idealism. Logical empiricists de-
fending structuralism generally held - partly on its basis - the very notion of
realism (as well as idealism) to be meaningless9. The Neo-Kantians like Cas-
8In this section of my work I will be dealing with structuralism as a theory in gen-
eral philosophy of science. I will not be dealing with structuralism in the philosophy of
mathematics, which is a separate view. Structuralism as a view concerning mathematics
is on the face of it more plausible than concerning other sciences like physics, since math-
ematical objects can quite plausibly be argued to be structures (abstract structures in a
sense dened below). Nevertheless, even in their case we must distinguish between the
structures they are and the (higher order) structures they themselves have, a distinction
which mathematical structuralism often tends to blur.
9It is likely, however, that (as Gower argues in [Gow09]) Schlick at rst held a structural
realist position, but this was before he became a logical positivist (e. g. in [Sch18]). When
he converted to logical positivism (under Wittgenstein's inuence) he rejected structural
realism since he completely rejected realism, even restricted realism, as a metaphysical
thesis (as can be clearly seen in [Sch49b, page 107]), but he probably did not reject
structuralism (though [Sch49b, page 107] is not really with consistent with structuralism).
Some of Schlick's writings such as [Sch26] (translated in [Sch79a]) are transitional as
Schlick is already in them moving toward positivism, rejecting metaphysics strongly, but
yet clinging to structural realism, and strengthening his form of structuralism in a way
I will show is unfortunate. Though Gower is then correct in claiming that Schlick was a
scientic and structural realist, he seems to go astray in going on to claim (in [Gow09,
page 100]) that Schlick remained a scientic realist, though admittedly the claim may be
slightly ambiguous. Schlick did continue to call himself an empirical realist (as Kant had
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sirer and logical positivists can then more appropriately be called structural
anti-realists rather than structural realists. Also recently some anti-realist
philosophers such as van Fraassen have accepted a form of structuralism.
Such philosophers of science as Stathis Psillos have argued in articles such
as [Psi06] that structural realism is not the best form of scientic realism, if
it is a form of realism at all. While Psillos attacks structural realism from
the point of view of a stronger form of realism, Friedman himself is not
happy with the notion of structural realism for an opposite reason, since he
holds with the logical positivists that realism is a metaphysical theory and
that metaphysical theories are meaningless.
At least what is today called ontic structural realism, a position held such
philosophers as Steven French James Ladyman and Don Ross which holds
that all that exists are structures, i. e. mathematical entities, and that phys-
ical entities are identical with them or reducible to them, is nothing else than
Pythagoreanism in a modern guise. Rather than being an anti-metaphysical
theory, as logical positivists hoped their version of structuralism to be, is
a very extravagant metaphysical theory. James Ladyman and Don Ross at
least admit that metaphysics is meaningful and possible and that his ontic
structural realism is a metaphysical theory and that logical positivism was
in great part mistaken. Though their brand of rather extremely natural-
ized scientistic metaphysics as presented is very dierent methodologically
from traditional metaphysics, it yet clearly counts as metaphysics (and as
metaphysics in a strong sense, speculative metaphysics).
Worrall sought to nd a middle way between forms of anti-realism such as
phenomenalism and constructive empiricism and ordinary forms of scientic
realism, a kind of theory called restricted realism or selective realism. Wor-
rall thinks that we can know that the statements made by a scientic theory
about the structural i.e. formal properties of theoretical i. e. unobservable
entities are literally true but other statements made about theoretical en-
tities can not be known to be true. Worrall thinks that the 'no miracles'
argument is eective against anti-realism; if scientic theories were not lit-
erally true at least in their structure then their empirical success would be
called himself, though not in quite the same sense), but this is not the same thing as
scientic realism, which (as the word is generally used today) refers to the metaphysical
realism Schlick rejected. Schlick's empirical realism would not usually be taken as a form
of scientic realism, any more than Kant's empirical realism or Putnam's rather similar
internal realism.
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miraculous. However, Worrall cannot yet accept ordinary (unrestricted) sci-
entic realism because of another argument. Worrall's argument against a
form of scientic realism stronger than structural realism in [Wor89] is based
on pessimistic induction; many anti-realists (most famously Larry Laudan
in [Lau81], though Laudan did not yet use the phrase "pessimistic induc-
tion") have used such an argument against any form of scientic realism,
even restricted or selective realism. That the theoretical content of previous
theories has so often been shown to be false by later theories gives inductive
support to the claim that the theoretical content of any theory so far as it
goes beyond structural statements would be false.
However, it seems to me that pessimistic induction could just as well
be directed against the view that scientic theories are even empirically
adequate. Scientic theories that have been abandoned have usually had
empirical consequences that were false - after all, this is usually just why
they were abandoned. It must be remembered that the common notion of
empirical adequacy is rather strong. E. g. van Fraassen says in [vF80, page
12] that a theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the
observable things and events in the world is true. A theory need then not
be empirically adequate just if what is says about things that have in fact
already been observed is true. Worrall claims (see [Wor89, page 109]) that
the development of science is essentially cumulative at the observational
level but not at the theoretical level. However, we need to challenge the
assumption that the development would be essentially cumulative even at
the observational level. Worrall takes the change from Newton's theory to
Einstein's as an example of a change which is cumulative at the empirical
but not the theoretical level. He says:
But for a whole range of cases (those cases, of course, in which
the velocities involved are fairly small compared to the velocity
of light) the predications of the theories will be strictly dierent
but observationally indistinguishable.
However, this hardly suces for the claim that the development here would
be essentially cumulative. If the observer moves at velocities close to the
speed of light (which is not only logically but even nomologically possible; it
is not unlikely that future astronauts will do so), then the predictions of the
theories will be clearly observationally distinguishable. This already implies
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that Newton's theory is not even empirically adequate from the point of
view of Einstein's theory in the very strong sense of the phrase "empirically
adequate" used by van Fraassen (and many others). Of course Aristotle's
and Ptolemy's or Descartes's physical theories were not then empirically ad-
equate either. What pessimistic induction then shows, if it is at all a valid
form of inference10, is that (current and future) scientic theories are at most
only approximately empirically adequate. Worrall argues that there are dif-
culties in the concept of approximate truth; however, the anti-realist who is
not a complete sceptic (like a constructive empiricist such as van Fraassen)
must face the very same diculties. Therefore he should take seriously the
attempt of philosophers like Ilkka Niiniluoto in [Nii87] and Graham Oddie
in [Odd86] to develop detailed theories of approximate truth and truthlike-
ness. The technical diculties, which are indeed enormous (as the above
books reveal), are not signicantly easier if theories are restricted to theories
speaking solely about observable entities. If, however, these diculties can
be overcome, or the whole pessimistic induction argument is fallacious, then
there is no obstacle for claiming that we can have approximately true beliefs
also about the non-structural properties of unobservable entities. Because of
these reasons Worrall's argumentation against full-blown scientic realism
does not convince me.
The basic problem with structuralism was already noticed by M. H. A.
Newman in [New28], when critically examining Bertrand Russell's causal
theory of perception11. What is strange is that Friedman himself has ad-
mitted, in [DF89], an article written together with William Demopoulos,
that Newman's argument poses a very serious problem for structuralism,
and has also admitted (in [DF89, pages 195-197]) that it also applies to
the kind of structuralism held by Carnap in the Aufbau. Because of this
it is quite puzzling how Friedman can think that taking structuralism into
10This has of course been questioned by some philosophers, e. g. by Peter J. Lewis
in [Lew01], who thinks that it contains a base rate fallacy. On the other hand, the no
miracles argument has also been argued to contain a base rate fallacy. Therefore both of
the assumptions at the base of Worrall's argument for structural realism are dubious.
11Russell's causal theory of perception was dierent from current causal theories of per-
ception. Current causal theories of perception are typically associated with direct realism
about physical objects; however, Russell's causal theory of perception was associated with
representationalism. Russell held that the immediate objects of our perceptions were not
he physical objects that ultimately caused them but sense-data, from which we inferred
the existence of physical objects as their causes.
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account should lead us to evaluate logical positivism more favourably12.
To make this problem clear we have to explain what we mean by a struc-
ture and by structural properties. The problem with many of the newer
philosophers who call themselves structural realists, Worrall in [Wor89] in-
cluded, is that they do not make clear what they mean by a structure.
However, there is a very clear concept of structure that Russell and logical
positivists used, and which is commonly used in mathematics and logic. If
structuralism is based on this concept of structure, as Russell's, Carnap's
and Schlick's structuralist theories were, then Newman has shown as conclu-
sively as any philosophical theory can be shown to be false that structural-
ism, as the claim that we can only have knowledge of structures, is utterly
untenable.
Both Russell and Carnap begin their treatment of structures by consid-
ering relations. Russell says in [Rus27, page 249]:
Two relations P , Q are said to be similar if there is a one-one
relation between the terms of their elds, which is such that,
whenever two terms have the relation P , their correlates have
the relation Q, and vice versa.
Carnap says in [Car67, x11-12] that if two relations have the same arrow dia-
gram, they are structurally equivalent or isomorphic. Russell adds in [Rus27,
page 250]:
Two relations which are similar have the same "structure" or
"relation-number".
Newman on the other hand considers systems consisting of a set of objects
A together with a relation R dened on A i. e. holding between its members
(i. e. R  A  A) be given (see [New28, page 139]). Of course, in such
cases A is the eld of R, so this is equivalent with the case considered
by Russell and Carnap. Such systems (or just the relations contained in
12Friedman does claim in [Fri87, pages 354,355] that Wittgenstein's theory is not subject
to the same objections as Carnap's, which are of course the objections Newman presents.
As we will see, in order to counter Newman's argument one would have to abandon
standard set theory, and Friedman claims that Wittgenstein does just that. However, as
Friedman admits, one would have to pay a terrible price for this, namely the complete
emasculation of classical mathematics. It is not clear to me if Friedman is willing to pay
that price. However, I certainly do not think that it is a sucient defence of structuralism
that it would be saved by such drastic means; surely this is too high a price to pay for a
more favourable evaluation of logical positivism.
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them) are often (following M. I. G. Redhead) called concrete structures
today (see e. g. [Vot, pages 42-43]), though neither Russell nor Newman
yet used such terminology. The notion is very familiar for current logicians
and mathematicians from model theory; a model in one common sense of
the word consists of a concrete structure (often called a model structure)
together with an interpretation function. Two such systems are said to have
the same (abstract) structure13 - the only kind of structure of which Carnap,
Russell and Newman spoke, which Russell also called a relation-number - i
there exists a one-one correlation between them (i .e if they are isomorphic;
Russell used the word similar). In symbols if hA;Ri and hB;Si are concrete
structures, then they share the same abstract structure14 i there is such
a bijection f from A to B that for all x; y 2 A R(x; y) i S(f(x); f(y).
Quine calls in many writings (e. g. in [Qui68, page 205] and in [Qui08a,
page 404]) such functions f satisfying such a condition proxy functions.
Epistemic structuralism supposes that all we can know of systems consisting
of unobservable i. e. theoretical entities is what abstract structures they
have, and strong forms of it suppose that all we know of any entities, even
observable entities, is what abstract structures they have15.
13The notoriously ambiguous words "concrete" and "abstract" are used in a very special
sense in drawing this distinction. According to most more usual senses of the words both
kinds of structures would be abstract or both concrete. E.g. "concrete" often means
being spatio-temporal, and if the word is used like this then an immanent realist like
Armstrong would say that both kinds of structures are concrete, while a Platonist would
say that both are abstract. It would be more perspicuous to speak of (purely) formal
and (partly) material structures, but the use of the words "abstract" and "concrete" has
become established so I will use these words.
14No abstract structures themselves can be sets according to standard ZF set theory
-unlike Russell's type theory, where they could be sets but would be divided into innitely
many structures of dierent types - though they can be proper classes in set theories that
allow such entities and some of them can be sets in some non-standard set theories such
as Quine's NF and NFU. Similarly abstract structures cannot be properties or relations
in higher-order logics whose axioms are similar to those of ZF. If we relax the latter
restriction, then structures might be called higher-order properties or relations as they
often are (e. g. in [Cha07, page 37]). It is important to note, however, that contrary to
what many incautious exponents of structuralism often imply, all higher order properties
and relations are not abstract structures; higher-order properties and relations can be
non-structural i. e. material. It is only higher-order properties which are invariant under
isomorphisms which are purely structural. The claim that we could only know higher-
order properties of properties of theoretical objects would not be disproved by Newman's
argument, though I do not know if it could be motivated in any reasonable way.
15Epistemic structuralism has often, rst by Grover Maxwell in [Max70], been associ-
ated with the Ramsey sentence approach to theoretical terms. In the Ramsey sentence
approach the theoretical terms occurring in the conjunction of a theory's axioms are re-
placed with free variables and then bound by a quantier prexed to this conjunction.
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Newman pointed out (in [New28, pages 140,144]) that according to stan-
dard set theory (and most non-standard set-theories) or standard higher-
order logic (and most non-standard higher-order logics) any collection of
entities can be organised so that they form a system belonging to any ab-
stract structure if there are suciently many of these entities. In symbols if
hA;Ri is any system and B any other set whatever with the same cardinality
as A, then there is such a relation S dened on B and such a system hB;Si
that hA;Ri and hB;Si share the same abstract structure. Newman therefore
showed that epistemic structuralism implies together with standard set the-
ory that nothing can be known of theoretical entities except their number;
any scientic theories that postulate the same number of physical objects
would according to structuralism be equivalent (epistemically equivalent ac-
cording to epistemic structuralism and ontologically equivalent according to
ontic structuralism). Carnap had claimed in Aufbau (see [Car67, x15]) that
there could be purely structural denite descriptions of individual objects,
but Newman's result shows that this is impossible (in any universe with more
than one individual object, such as our universe obviously is). Nor can there
be purely structural denite descriptions of any qualitative properties or re-
lations or any classes other than structures either. Because of this, even if
Friedman and Richardson were right that structuralism was more central to
logical positivism than empiricism, this would not necessarily be any reason
However, it seems to me that the Ramsey sentence approach by no means implies struc-
turalism (and hence need not share all its problems, though it may have similar problems
of its own). It can be combined with stronger kinds of realism, as has been done e. g.
by David Lewis in [Lew70]. This depends partly on how observational terms are under-
stood; I will later divide them into weakly and strongly observational. If observational
predicates occurring in the theory are weakly observational in the sense that while some
of the entities belonging to its extension are observable, some are not, then the Ramsey
sentence of the theory can quantify over unobservable entities. In the case of some the-
ories, their Ramsey sentences can in this case carry ontological commitment not just to
abstract structures but also to unobservable particulars and their intrinsic properties and
qualitative relations. However, if the predicates are all strongly observational, then the
Ramsey sentence approach collapses into the view that all we can know of unobservable
entities is their number. Let me just give a ctional example. Let us suppose that a
theory consists just of the statement T (a)^ (8x)(T (x)! (R(x; b)^Q(x))), where b is the
name of a minimal observable particular and R(x; y) means that x is smaller than y and
Q is an arbitrary (weakly) observational predicate denoting an intrinsic property. In this
theory T and a are theoretical terms and Q and b and R are observational terms. The
Ramsey sentence of the theory is (9X)(9x)(X(x) ^ (8y)(X(y)  (R(y; b) ^ Q(y)))), and
this sentence carries ontological commitment (just like the original theory) to an unob-
servable particular x and to an unobservable yet non-structural property X, and actually
tells us that the unobservable particular has an intrinsic property.
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to re-evaluate logical positivism more positively.
In fact Newman's results imply even worse news for the structural anti-
realism of the early logical positivists than for Russell or modern structural
realists such as Worrall, for the early logical positivists were far more am-
bitious in their use of structuralism. Russell, Schlick (in the pre-positivistic
phase of his philosophical development in [Sch18]) and Worrall had thought
that we can have only structural knowledge of unobservable entities, but
had not limited our knowledge of observable or at least of observed entities
in this way. They had allowed that we could know (in Russell's case, of
course, by acquaintance) non-structural properties of observable entities16.
Newman's results then implied that all the knowledge of theoretical entities
their theory allowed was trivial, but they did not threaten their knowledge
about observable entities. It allowed that they could know more about what
they believed to be observable entities - sense-data in Russell's case and
macroscopic physical bodies in Worrall's case - than how many there were.
Carnap, however, had said in Aufbau (see [Car67, x16, pages 28-30]) that all
scientic statements are structure statements, and held that this was nec-
essary for the objectivity or intersubjectivity of science. As Friedman and
Demopoulos notice in [DF89, page 635], Carnap had attempted to go Russell
one better by turning all constant terms into variables by means of purely
structural descriptions. This implied that even statements about observable
entities were structure statements, so we could not say even about observ-
able entities anything except how many of them there were. Therefore if the
objectivity of science is to be saved, it must be done in an entirely dierent
way than Carnap tried to do. The same holds for the theory Schlick held
in [Sch26] (translated in [Sch79a]); Schlick held there that only structure is
communicable, but as we have seen, if that were all that was communica-
ble, we could communicate nothing besides purely mathematical knowledge
and how many concrete objects there are. Pointing to structuralism does
not then give any reasons at all for evaluating the early Vienna Circle more
positively than just attending to their empiricism, but rather far more nega-
tively; in fact Carnap's Aufbau becomes far more coherent if the structuralist
elements are just removed from it.
16This was yet rather bad for Russell, since he thought that all physical entities were
theoretical and only sense-data were observable. However, this conclusion would be less
disastrous for someone who held physical entities to be observable.
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Newman's results do not lead structural realism of the type that Russell,
the pre-positivistic Schlick and Worrall defended to so absurd conclusions as
they do the theory of Carnap in the Aufbau and Schlick (in his positivistic
phase), but such structural realism is yet in truly serious trouble17. If the
claims about the structure of theoretical entities are no more than trivial
cardinality claims, then structural realism just collapses into a non-realistic
theory such as phenomenalism or constructive empiricism, where only ob-
servable objects are known to exist. While Carnap may have welcomed such
an outcome, Worrall would not have, since it leaves structural realism no
advantage with respect to phenomenalism or constructive empiricism. The
mere fact that there is a certain number of theoretical entities of which
science can tell us nothing more cannot explain the empirical adequacy of
science, but leaves it just as miraculous as anti-realism does.
We must recognize the limits of Newman's argument; while it provides
a conclusive refutation of structuralism in the original sense of the word, it
of course does not refute every theory that has been called "structuralism".
Of course, since Worrall nowhere dened the notion of structure, he could
evade the argument by claiming that his notion of structure is quite dierent
from the common one used by Newman in his proof. However, in this case it
becomes quite obscure what is meant by structural realism. The same holds
of many other modern theories that are called structuralist18. However,
17This does not of course imply that all causal theories of perception would be in
serious trouble, for a causal theory of perception, even a representationalist one, need not
be combined with structuralism as Russell combined them. In fact a representationalist
causal theory of perception ts badly with structuralism, since it implies that the causal
relation has unobservable entities as its members, and the causal relation is not plausibly
understood as structural, so the representationalist causal theory of perception indicates
that we can know at least one structural relation. Russell's own theory could then be
modied so that it was freed from structuralism. Actually there are many parts of Russell's
theory in [Rus27] that are likely to be incompatible with structuralism. E.g. the neutral
monism he argues for in Chapter XXXVII of [Rus27], which claims that fundamental
entities are neither mental nor physical, is incompatible with structuralism, since mentality
and physicality are not purely structural properties, and therefore neither is the denial of
their disjunction; however, clearly at least some fundamental entities are unobservable in
Russell's theory.
18Ladyman, Ross and the others argue in [LwDSC07, page 128] that the Newman prob-
lem does not arise for ontic structural realism because it is not formulated in terms of
quanticational rst-order logic and in particular because they eschew an extensional un-
derstanding or relations without which the problem cannot in his view be formulated.
However, Newman rst proposed his argument against structuralism in connection with
Russell's theory which was not formulated in those terms. Russell's structuralism was
based on his and Whitehead's theory in Principia Mathematica, which was a higher-order
logic and was ultimately based on an intensional understanding of relations as proposi-
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some philosophers who call themselves structural realists have formulated
reasonably clear theories they hold to descend from structural realism which
may not be vulnerable to Newman's argument.
The crucial distinction here seems to be the one between concrete (or
formal) and abstract (or material) structures. Any version of structuralism
that admits that not only abstract structures, but also (at least some) con-
crete structures of unobservable entities - such as relations which are not
invariant under all isomorphisms - exist and are objective and intersubjec-
tively knowable, is immune to Newman's argument19. Such theories are still
versions of selective realism and dier from full-edged realism, as they deny
tional functions. This can be seen e.g. in [WR63, page xv], where they say that their
system begins with atomic propositions which contain relations in intension and in [WR63,
page 23] where they distinguish a propositional function from the class it determines. They
do say in [WR63, page 22] that mathematics is only concerned with extensions, so they
treat only extensional functions in [WR63]; however, this allows physics to be concerned
with intensional functions (including intensional relations). However, Russell's denition
of structures by means of isomorphisms in [Rus27] makes all structures extensional. There-
fore ontic structural realism cannot escape Newman's argument just because it is not a
rst-order or extensional theory. However, it is not wholly clear whether this ontic struc-
tural realism is at all a structuralist theory in the sense in which Newman argued against
structuralism, and if it is not, then Newman's argument is of course powerless against it.
Ladyman and his co-authors argue at length in chapter 3 of [LwDSC07] that there are
no self-subsistent individuals but relations are ontologically more fundamental than their
relata. This view, which seems to be most central for them does not yet imply structural-
ism in the sense of the word in which Carnap or Russell or Schlick were structuralists,
for these ontologically fundamental relations do not need to be purely structural relations
but can be qualitative. Ladyman and the others at least sometimes seem to mean with
relational structures only concrete structures, not abstract structures, and if this is in the
end correct then their theory is immune to Newman's argument. However, at other times
they do seem to make use of isomorphisms, and therefore of abstract structures, so parts
of their theory seem to be vulnerable to Newman's argument.
19E. g. it seems to me that Grover Maxwell in [Max70] included concrete structures
in structures. He said in [Max70, page 188] that structural characteristics can be taken
to be just those that are not intrinsic and can be described by means of logical terms
and observation terms. He added that not all structural properties are also purely for-
mal. An abstract structure, however, could be described with only logical terms and
would be purely formal. Also Maxwell nowhere made use in this article of the notion of
an isomorphism, which is essential to the denition of an abstract structure. Maxwell
though himself to be explicating Russell's concept of structure, but did not see that Rus-
sell's concept was that of an abstract structure. To give a more recent example, Anjam
Chakravartty has presented (e. g. in [Cha07, x2.3]) a theory he calls semirealism. He
calls relations between rst-order properties structures and admits that such relations can
be qualitative. Newman's argument against structuralism does not apply to semirealism
(though it can be doubted whether semirealism is any less vulnerable to pessimistic induc-
tion than full-edged scientic realism). However, since semirealism is explicitly presented
as a metaphysical theory, and a realistic one, I do not need to resist it for it has nothing
to do with logical positivists' arguments against realism on the basis of their very dierent
version of structuralism.
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that we can have knowledge of unobservable individuals (and perhaps even
of the qualitative intrinsic properties of unobservable entities). However,
such theories are so far from what was originally called structuralism that it
is rather misleading to apply the name to them. Such theories of course face
many objections, but these are not as obviously insuperable as the New-
man problem. I cannot here examine any further whether such theories are
justied or not.
There have, however, been relatively recent structuralists, whose the-
ory is clearly vulnerable to Newman's argument. Quine's structuralism
in [Qui08a] seems to me to be such, as it makes use of proxy functions
i. e. isomorphisms and therefore allows only knowledge of abstract struc-
tures. Furthermore, it seems to be vulnerable to Newman's argument in
the radical way in which Carnap's and Schlick's theories were rather than
the less radical way in which Russell's theory was, as it applies such iso-
morphisms not only to theoretical but also to observable entities (as I will
discuss in more detail later).
We have then seen that as Newman showed, if any non-trivial knowl-
edge is possible, it must be non-structural, and sciences must possess non-
structural knowledge, so even if metaphysics requires non-structural knowl-
edge, this is no reason to object to it.
3.1.4 Coherentist and Conventionalist Elements in Logical
Positivism
The coherentist and conventionalist elements of logical positivism are closely
associated with its structuralist elements. The reason for this is that the
coherence of a theory depends on its structure rather than its content, and
if we are to choose one of many equally coherent theories without any foun-
dations this can only happen by means of conventions. These three theories
together represent the anti-empiricist tendency in logical positivism.
The tension between the empiricist and non-empiricist elements of log-
ical positivism was to some extent addressed already within the movement
in a debate between Neurath and Schlick. Unfortunately, this debate was
plagued by serious confusions. The epistemological question whether knowl-
edge has foundations was regularly confused with semantical questions such
the denition of truth. Schlick defended both foundationalism and the corre-
spondence theory of truth already in his pre-positivistic period in an article
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originally published in 1910 and translated into English in [Sch79b] and later
as a full-edged positivist in [Sch34] (translated in [Sch59]). Neurath on the
other hand apparently defended both a coherence theory of justication and
a coherence theory of truth (e. g. in [Neu32] - translated in [Neu59] - and
in [Neu34]), though there is some dispute about the latter. Of course, these
views are not necessarily connected in any obvious way; it can be argued
that one can also consistently be a correspondence theorist about truth and
a coherentist about justication.
However, this confusion may not matter much, as coherentism is not a
plausible theory of either truth or justication; the claim that any arbitrary
coherent fairy tale is justied is not much more sensible than the claim that
any arbitrary coherent fairy tale is true. While the correspondence theory of
truth does not imply that we should be capable of comparing truthbearers
with reality, foundationalism does, and Schlick argues in my view quite
plausibly that we can in fact compare them with it. Another confusion is
more fatal.
Schlick and Neurath both presupposed that foundationalism led to the
view that absolutely certain knowledge was possible; they did not see that
a weak, fallibilistic foundationalism was possible. See e. g. [Haa09, page 54]
for a distinction between weak and strong foundationalism, where strong
foundationalism requires conclusive aka decisive justication, while weak
foundationalism requires only defeasible, prima facie justiation. Bertrand
Russell, who had began as a strong foundationalist, retreated in his later
philosophy to weak foundationalism (if indeed his theory remained founda-
tionalist at all and did not anticipate foundherentism) and defended it in
arguing against Neurath, saying in [Rus40, page 150] that
a non-inferential belief need not be either certain or indubitable.
Schlick begins [Sch34, page 79] (translated in [Sch59, page 209]) by ar-
guing that all the important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge
grow out of the problem concerning the certainty of human knowledge. How-
ever, the real problem Schlick eventually has with Neurath's view in [Sch34,
page 86] (translated in [Sch59, page 215]) is not that it does not guarantee
certainty but that it makes the choice of theories entirely arbitrary, so that
one would have to consider fairy stories to be as true as a historical report.
A weak foundationalism suces to make the choice of theories non-arbitrary
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and non-conventional although it does not oer incorrigibility. On the other
hand Neurath thought falsely that rejecting the arguably implausible posi-
tion that human knowledge could be incorrigible required the total rejection
of foundationalism20. There is then a third option besides the views of
Schlick and Neurath.
Extreme conventionalism has also serious problems, just like the coher-
entism with which it is often associated. Friedman sees in [Fri91, page 517]
it as a great achievement of Carnap that he extends Poincare's convention-
alism to logic itself. However, that very extension has been revealed to be
an especially problematic variation of conventionalism. While without that
extension conventionalism is just a corollary of coherentism, this extension
makes it a stronger and hence more absurd claim that coherentism. Quine
argued in [Qui76] that the view of many logical positivists that even logi-
cal truths were conventionally true leads to a vicious innite regress (even
though Quine was in that article willing to entertain the rather extreme view
that set theory was conventional). The basic argument against logical con-
ventionalism is quite simple. As logical truths are innite in number, they
cannot be stipulated one by one, but must be deduced from some general
conventions by means of some logical rules. However, in so doing we are
presupposing the very logical rules or truths we are trying to establish by
means of conventions21.
There is a still greater problem with logical conventionalism. If we as-
sume that the transformation rules (i .e inference rules) of a language can
be chosen quite arbitrarily, as Carnap does in formulating his Principle of
Tolerance according to in [Car37, page xv], we can (as Arthur Prior showed
20These confusions persist in commentators dealing with logical positivism. Coa still
thought in [Cof91, page 254, 363] that fallibilism was equivalent with the rejection of
foundationalism and (in [Cof91, page 374]) that accepting Tarski's theory of truth would
in some way count against a coherence theory of justication. Similarly, Misak says
in [Mis95, page 93] that the foundationalist is after a foundation of rock, not of shifting
sand. This, however, only holds of strong foundationalists, not of weak foundationalists.
Of course, everyone would prefer a foundation of rock. However, it may be that human
knowledge just cannot have such a foundation, and a foundation of shifting sand is better
than no foundation at all.
21This argument of Quine's is quite independent of the arguments in [Qui53e] that
Friedman saw as ending logical positivism; in [Qui76] Quine sees analytical statements
that are not logical as unproblematic, while in [Qui53e] he turns his attack on them.
Indeed, Quine's views in the two articles may not t very well together; the innite regress
argument against logical conventionalism is quite similar to an innite regress argument
other philosophers (e. g. Laurence BonJour in [Bon13, page 184]) have used against the
extreme empiricism Quine argued for in [Qui53e].
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in [Pri60]) introduce a connective tonk, such that by using the transforma-
tion rules of that connective we can deduce any sentence from any sentence
whatever. We can then admit any sentence whatever, no matter how much
it is in contradiction with experience. Here logical positivism collapses into
extreme relativism.
I will later return to the discussion of the conventionalist element in
logical positivism when discussing Neurath's version of vericationism; I
will show that in Neurath's treatment vericationism loses all its force and
collapses into conventionalism and hence into relativism.
3.1.5 Syntacticist attacks on Metaphysics
Many of the earliest logical positivists thought that philosophical problems
were linguistic problems and furthermore problems which concerned the
syntax of the language of science, not its semantics. This syntacticism can
be viewed as special case of structuralism, an especially narrow case, as it
allowed only syntactic structure, not semantic, to be relevant for philoso-
phy. It played the same role in their philosophy as psychologism played in
earlier philosophies, in British empiricism and German idealism: to avoid
traditional metaphysical problems suggested by a realistically interpreted
logic and mathematics. A special form of this syntacticism restricted to the
philosophy of mathematics and logic was formalism, famously defended by
David Hilbert, against which Frege already strongly protested, but which
nevertheless was embraced by many analytical philosophers though they
claimed to follow Frege. David Hilbert was associated with the Berlin Cir-
cle of logical positivists, so they were inuenced by Hilbert's ideas, which
they generalized. Wittgenstein's famous claim that philosophical problems
were grammatical problems was probably an obscure statement of a general-
ized and extreme form of this view. A generalized form of this point of view
was famously presented in a more exact form by Rudolf Carnap in [Car37].
Carnap claimed at the very foreword of this work [Car37, page xii] that
philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science and that the logic of sci-
ence is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science. Thus
logic need according to him have nothing to do with semantics and hence
need not concern itself with ontological issues either, and since philosophy is
nothing more than logic it need have nothing to do with ontology either22.
22Carnap distinguished in [Car37, x21, page 6-7] between pure and descriptive syntax,
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Carnap thought that this syntactic character was what distinguished philos-
ophy from the natural sciences, but as we have seen Neurath's coherentism
implied that even natural sciences could only make syntactic claims of what
statements followed from what theories by inference rules.
In applying syntacticism to traditional philosophical problems in [Car37,
x73, page 281], Carnap tried to show that many questions - those traditional
philosophical questions which were not really meaningless - which seemed to
concern non-linguistic objects were really only pseudo-object-questions. He
argued that these questions appear to refer to objects because of a mislead-
ing formulation but really only refer to linguistic expressions. The sentences
which are possible answers to those questions were then according to him
(see [Car37, x74, pages 284-287]) also pseudo-object sentences, which seemed
to talk about non-linguistic objects but really talked about language. They
must then be translated from the material mode of speech into the formal
mode of speech, i. e. into syntactic questions. This doctrine was later
changed by Quine to the more defensible if still controversial form of a doc-
trine of semantic ascent, where it was still held that philosophical sentences
often ought to be translated into linguistic questions to clarify them, but it
was no longer held that such translation resulted in syntactic sentences, but
instead semantic ones.
Of course if Carnap's view of the exclusive signicance of syntax were
true, it would have enabled analytical philosophers to study language with-
where pure syntax is wholly analytic while descriptive syntax is concerned with the syn-
tactical properties and relations of empirically given descriptions. Carnap's thesis that
philosophy is syntactical acquires even minimal plausibility only because he in practice
neglected this distinction of his own. It is indeed plausible (though already controversial)
that pure syntax would be a part of logic, though scarcely that it would be all of logic.
However, descriptive syntax cannot plausibly be regarded as belonging to logic at all.
Carnap said later in the concluding chapter of his book [Car37, x86, page 332]:
Our thesis that the logic of science is syntax must therefore not be mis-
understood to mean that the task of the logic of science could be carried
out independently of empirical science and without regard to its empirical
results. The syntactical description of a system which is already given is in-
deed a purely mathematical task. But the language of science is not given to
us in a syntactically established form; whoever desires to investigate it must
accordingly take into consideration the language which is used in practice in
the special sciences, and only lay down rules on the basis of this.
Here Carnap practically admitted that philosophy, even if limited to the philosophy of
science, must include not only pure but also descriptive syntax; if philosophers were con-
cerned only with pure syntax they would have no reason to take into consideration the
language used in the special sciences. However, since such descriptive syntax is not a part
of logic in a proper sense, neither is the philosophy of science.
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out considering its relationship to the rest of the world. However, things
changed when Godel proved his incompleteness theorems in [God31], which
showed the untenability of formalist views in mathematics and even more
when Tarski developed his theory of truth and his theory of logical conse-
quence, which made logical consequence a matter of semantics instead of
syntax. The falsity of the syntacticist view was then temporarily widely
recognized. Even Carnap altered his view because of Alfred Tarski's theory
of truth in 1942 in [Car48]. Carnap said now [Car48, x39, page 246] that
The eld of theoretical philosophy is no longer restricted to syn-
tax but is regarded as comprehending the whole analysis of lan-
guage, including syntax and semantics and perhaps also prag-
matics.
Carnap said also that the task of philosophy is semiotical analysis, where
semiotics contains besides syntax also semantics and pragmatics.
Carnap was unusually honest for a philosopher in admitting that he had
really changed his views; nevertheless even he did not quite admit the full
extent of the change. Carnap said that many of the earlier analyses are now
seen to be incomplete although correct. While this holds of many details,
which remain correct and even of permanent value, the general thesis of
the earlier work was surely completely abandoned; not merely modied but
replaced with its polar opposite. In fact Carnap's new view would have
compelled him to abandon positivism itself, to reject all the theses which
were distinctive of logical positivism, if he had been consistent.
Most analytic philosophers now allowed that semantics is possible and is
an indispensable part of the logical study of language. Since such Tarskian
semantics requires a consideration of the general relations between the struc-
tures of the language and the world, and thus a consideration of the general
structure of the world, i. e. of formal ontology, one would have thought
that this would have led to the restoration of ontology. However, many
philosophers still continue to assume uncritically that the study of language
and logic is somehow possible apart from the study of the world as a whole,
apart from ontology.
Carnap himself never abandoned his opposition to metaphysics, even
though all the reasons he had originally given for it were abandoned, which
shows that the opposition to metaphysics was an irrational part of Carnap's
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otherwise rational philosophy. He still tried in [Car48, page vii] to reassure
his fellow empiricists, who fear that a discussion of propositions as distin-
guished from sentences and of truth as distinguished from conrmation will
open the back door for speculative metaphysics, that he would not like to
help in reviving it. He said that the problems of philosophy concern not
the ultimate nature of being but the semiotical analysis of the language of
science.
However, all such reassurances were empty and unjustied. Carnap had
earlier distinguished metaphysical questions which he regarded as meaning-
less from the meaningful philosophical problems by the very feature that
meaningful philosophical problems were syntactical problems. Having re-
jected syntacticism, Carnap no longer had any way of distinguishing meta-
physical questions from what he thought were genuine philosophical prob-
lems in any principled way such as he once thought he had. He could scarcely
go back to vericationism since the new semantical statements he now re-
garded as meaningful were not always veriable. The new semantical theory
contained such claims as that predicates designate properties. This claim
clearly implies such a statement as that there are properties. This is surely
a claim about the ultimate nature of being.
Of Carnap's fellow positivists, Otto Neurath famously attacked (as Car-
nap tells in [Car63a]) Tarski's theory of truth and Carnap's defense of it (as
Bergmann in his positivistic period also did in [Ber44]) and claimed that the
semantical conception of truth was incompatible with the anti-metaphysical
view which was characteristic of positivism. If what I have argued so far
is correct, then Neurath was of course quite correct that there was such
an incompatibility. Carnap certainly did not succeed in showing that the
Tarskian theory would be compatible with positivism. However, an incom-
patibility between two theories can always be used against either of the
theories by those who believe in the other. Thus also in this case while
the incompatibility can be used against formal semantics as Neurath did, it
can also be equally well be used against the anti-metaphysical view. Since
Tarski's semantical theory has in the view of many philosophers proven itself
to be quite fruitful, while all the arguments the logical positivists had for the
impossibility of metaphysics have been shown to be based on incoherent or
dubious premises, many philosophers today would rather reject positivism
than formal semantics.
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Not only does the move to the semiotic theory deprive Carnap of any rea-
son to think metaphysics impossible; it actually drives him to investigations
which can themselves with good reason be held to be parts of metaphysics,
though he arbitrarily refused to count them as such. Carnap distinguishes
in [Car48, x17, page 88-95] absolute concepts from semantical concepts.
According to him for every semantical concept Ms attributed to n expres-
sions there is a corresponding concept Ma such that whenever Ms holds
for n expressions Ma holds for the designata of these expressions
23. These
absolute concepts are not semantical concepts although they are closely re-
lated to semantical concepts. They belong to the non-semiotical part of
the metalanguage. Such absolute concepts are thus clearly not linguistic
concepts at all, as they can be used without referring to any languages at
all, even though they are useful in linguistics. However, many absolute con-
cepts, especially those corresponding to what Carnap called pure semantics,
and especially those which Carnap uses in his exposition, are so general
that they cannot be concepts specic to any special science either. They
are thus clearly purely metaphysical concepts. It follows that statements
in which only such absolute concepts occur are purely metaphysical state-
ments and theories consisting entirely of such statements consisting solely
of absolute concepts are purely metaphysical theories. While the rest of
claims in Carnap's semantics are just implicitly metaphysical, those made
using such general absolute concepts are explicitly metaphysical. Carnap
denes a correspondence between semantical and absolute concepts; this is
in fact a correspondence between semantical and metaphysical concepts and
establishes also a correspondence between the statements of semantics and
metaphysics.
A metaphysics based only on the absolute concepts Carnap himself ex-
plicitly mentions would of course be far too thin and poor to count as a
serious metaphysical theory; however, the correspondence dened by Car-
nap can be applied to any semantical concepts to produce new absolute
23We can formalize this correspondence by the following formula: C(Ms;Ma) 
(8Ms)(9Ma)(8x1) : : : (8xn)(Ms(x1; : : : ; xn) ! Ma(D(x1); : : : ; D(xn))). Oddly enough
Carnap later formulates the correspondence in a dierent way which inverts the direc-
tion of implication: Carnap says that a term used for a radical semantical property of
expressions will be applied in an absolute way (i. e. without reference to a language
system) to an entity u if and only if every expression Ui which designates u in any seman-
tical system S has that semantical property in S. It seems to me that Carnap's earlier
denition of correspondence is denitely better.
93
concepts. If the semantical concept in question just is suciently general
(like most semantical concepts that are naturally introduced in the context
of semantical research), the corresponding absolute concept will be a meta-
physical concept. In this way a quite rich metaphysics can be constructed.
Since Carnap works mainly in type-theoretical languages, he does not take
the concepts of attribute and proposition themselves to be absolute con-
cepts. However, in a stronger language, such as Carnap called in [Car48,
x12, page 51] a language with transnite levels or a language system with-
out distinctions of types or levels, these concepts would also be absolute
concepts.
No matter how unwillingly, Carnap had ung the back door wide open
and questions of metaphysics must inevitably enter through it. However,
happily they may not turn out to be as unwelcome visitants as he thought,
but the new exact methods of semantics may help to make them every bit
as clear as the questions of natural science seemed to him24.
Similarly to Carnap, other philosophers have also tried to go around
the results of Godel and Tarski in some way, usually a quite obscure one.
Syntacticism has again become popular and the lessons of Tarski and Godel
have been forgotten. This attitude has been partly rationalized by develop-
ing Tarskian semantics in a less realistic direction. I will argue that mod-
ern model-theoretical semantics represents philosophically a retrograde step
from the insights of Tarski and Godel back towards the confusion of for-
24Michael Friedman, who as we have seen emphasized the structuralist elements in the
thought of Carnap and other logical positivists, sees the syntacticism of [Car37] as the
further development of such structuralism, as it too is committed to a formalistic and
holistic theory. Friedman concludes in [Fri87, page 540] that
the anti-metaphysical dream of Vienna nally stands of falls, therefore, not
with phenomenalism, but rather with the remarkable program of Logical
Syntax itself.
Since Carnap himself abandoned the program of Logical syntax in [Car48] as a result of
Tarski's results, we can surely say that in that case the dream denitely falls, with a
loud resounding thump. Many philosophers, however, for whom it was a nightmare rather
than a dream, will be glad for this. It is weird why Friedman and other proponents of
the new interpretation of Carnap and other positivists do not often discuss [Car48] at any
length; it is usually only briey mentioned and then ignored. Perhaps they just ignore
this work because it does not t their interpretation; most of the ideas presented in it are
not inspired by either empiricism or Neo-Kantianism and are in fact quite incompatible
with either. Nevertheless these ideas also may have a longer history behind them. They
seem to represent a third and wholly distinct tradition, perhaps one ultimately inspired
by Austrian and Czech metaphysical realists like Bolzano, as e. g. Jan Wolenski has
sometimes suggested.
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malism. While Tarski in his original theory of truth studied the absolute
denotation and truth of expressions, modern model-theoretical semantics al-
ways, even when there is no reason, relativizes their interpretation to mod-
els and thus sidesteps the most signicant ontological questions, questions
which the study of absolute denotation inevitably brings up. Of course,
the existence of models already has itself ontological consequences, so even
model-theoretical semantics does not completely avoid dealing with meta-
physical questions; however, verbal quibbling is used to obscure even these
remaining questions. Models consist of sets, and it is claimed that sets are
not a part of the world in an ontologically signicant sense, so that assuming
them to exist does not involve making any ontological commitments. When
dealing with the question of ontological commitment, I will argue that this
is an untenable view. If there are sets, then they are part of the world in
the wide sense in which the world is the object of ontology (if indeed there
is any world), for in this sense the world is just the totality of everything
there is. In any case, if we return to Tarskian semantics and seek for the ab-
solute interpretation of expressions, then many expressions intuitively have
as their semantic values entities which are not sets and in any case belong
to the world.
3.2 Logical Positivists' Arguments against Meta-
physics and Their Problems
Logical positivists usually did not familiarize themselves with the meta-
physical traditions that they criticized before criticizing them, so they did
not interpret the metaphysical methods or claims that they attacked cor-
rectly, which already renders most of their criticisms of these metaphysical
claims worthless. Positivists such as Carnap in [Car32b, page 229] often
used Martin Heidegger, specically Heidegger's [Hei43], as a representative
of metaphysical nonsense. However, Heidegger's philosophy was by no means
a representative example of traditional metaphysics, but there are reasons
to think that it was rather a protest against it almost as much as the phi-
losophy of logical positivists. Heidegger talked (e. g. in [Hei43, page 9])
about the overcoming of metaphysics (Uberwindung der metaphysik) just as
Carnap did in the very title of [Car32b], using the very same German word
"uberwindung". Heideger may indeed have used the word in a slightly dif-
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ferent sense and unlike Carnap he does not seem to have completely denied
the legitimacy of metaphysics. However, it is clear that Heidegger was also
highly critical with respect to metaphysics. Heidegger blamed metaphysics
for thinking only generally about beings and forgetting Being itself, the
Truth of Being and its essence (Wesen) which he said is distinct from meta-
physics itself. Heidegger's thinking tries to go back to the ground (Grund)
of metaphysics. It is then relatively clear that Heidegger was not himself
trying do metaphysics in any traditional sense in [Hei43], though it is far
from clear what he was trying to do instead. In this situation, even if Hei-
degger's sentences are nonsensical25, there is no reason to suppose that their
nonsensicality resulted from their being results of a metaphysical investiga-
tion pursued by a specic metaphysical methods, since Heidegger was not
trying to do metaphysics when enunciating them.26.
Because of this susceptibility of logical positivists to the charge of mis-
representing their target many metaphysicians would claim that even if an
acceptable version of the verication principle would be found, many meta-
physical claims (once their essential meaning has been freed by semantical
analysis from unnecessary traditional encumbrances) could survive a veri-
cationist test, especially once the verication principle has been weakened
enough by the lengthy process of constant criticism and reformulation.
A historically inuential example of logical positivists' attack on meta-
physics is the English logical positivist Alfred Jules Ayer's purported demon-
stration of the impossibility of metaphysics in [Aye34], a demonstration also
incorporated with revisions into Ayer's magnum opus, the English mani-
festo for logical positivism [Aye36a]. Ayer says that the views he expresses
are not original, but derived from such earlier positivists as Wittgenstein,
Schlick(in [Sch32b], translated as [Sch49b]) and Carnap (in [Car32b]. I will
25It is indeed quite plausible that many of Heidgger's formulations, such as the clas-
sic "Das Nichts nichtet" or "The Nothing nihilates." are meaningless. However, you do
not need vericationism to argue that they are meaningless. Even someone who thinks
that any grammatical sentences whose basic terms have ostensive denitions are mean-
ingful can agree that many of Heidegger's sentences are meaningless, as they are not even
grammatical, at least according to many syntactical theories.
26Recently many existentialists and deconstructionists have tried to develop an anti-
metaphysical philosophy on the basis of Heidegger's ideas. Of course, it can be argued
that behind the front of such a purportedly anti-metaphysical philosophy you can often
nd an implicit metaphysics which is usually bad just because it is only implicit, and with
many deconstructionists it is usually an obscure and outdated metaphysics, typically a
Hegelian metaphysics or some other metaphysics inspired by German Idealism.
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mainly concentrate on Ayer's version of the attack, but also refer to these
earlier continental sources of Ayer's argument.
Ayer dened a metaphysical enquiry as
an enquiry into the nature of a reality underlying or transcending
the phenomena which the special sciences are content to study
and said in [Aye34, page 339] that
it is the aim of metaphysics to describe a reality lying behind
experience.
The great problem with these denitions is that Ayer did not even refer
to any actual metaphysician who would have dened metaphysics in this
way, much less show that all philosophers who are generally accepted as
metaphysicians would have accepted such a denition. In fact all of Ayer's
scanty examples of metaphysical claims seem to derive (if only by hearsay)
from the tradition of post-Kantian German idealism. Ayer did not quote
any actual metaphysician in [Aye34], and in [Aye36a] he in his actual argu-
ment for the meaninglessness of metaphysics only cited Bradley, an extreme
representative of English Hegelianism, of a kind of monistic idealism often
called Absolute Idealism. Earlier analytical philosophers had of course also
criticized Bradley without attacking metaphysics as a whole, so Bradley was
an easy target. At least Bradley is clearly a genuine metaphysician, unlike
Heidegger, whom Carnap took as his example, though Bradley is scarcely
a typical metaphysician either. Ayer even claimed (in [Aye36a, page 38])
that George Berkeley was not a metaphysician, which makes his conception
of metaphysics appear very dierent indeed from any common one. There
then appears to be a danger that Ayer is just attacking straw men.
However, a little bit of historical research shows that some metaphysi-
cians would have accepted that metaphysics is such an enquiry as Ayer
describes. We must rst of all look at how Bradley, whom Ayer cites as
an example, denes metaphysics. Bradley follows Aristotle's bad example
by suggesting three dierent and by no means obviously equivalent deni-
tions or characterizations. These characterizations, however, are not the
same as Aristotle's characterizations, but introduce among them the kind
of denition referred to be Ayer. Bradley says in [Bra93, page 1]:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an at-
tempt to know reality as against mere phenomena, or the study
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of rst principles or ultimate truths, or again the eort to com-
prehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but
somehow as a whole.
The rst of these characterizations agrees rather well with the denition
given by Ayer, but only the rst. Therefore even if Ayer had succeeded in
showing that metaphysics in the sense of the rst denition was impossible,
this would not yet have amounted even to showing that all that Bradley
was trying to do was impossible.27. Even more importantly, even if the def-
inition partially ts Bradley's theory, there is no reason to think that the
denition would t in any way all theories that are commonly regarded as
metaphysical. While Ayer was not quite attacking a straw man, he came
close, for he attacked the weakest possible representative of metaphysics.
Earlier analytical philosophers had already attacked resoundingly the meta-
physical systems of Bradley and other absolute idealists without attacking
all metaphysics.
If we instead use the traditional denition of metaphysics as the science
of being qua being, which I have argued to be the most fundamental of
the original Aristotelian denitions of metaphysics, Ayer's demonstration
does not work, for metaphysics in this sense also deals with experienced
27A similar characterization can be found in earlier thinkers. Pierre Duhem's conception
of metaphysics and its relation to natural science in [Duh91, page 10] would seem to t
well with Ayer's denition. Duhem says:
Now these two questions - Does there exist a material reality distinct
from sensible appearances? and What is the nature of this reality? - do not
have their source in experimental method, which is acquainted only with
sensible appearances and can discover nothing beyond them. The resolution
of these questions transcends the methods used by physics; it is the object
of metaphysics.
However, Duhem did not actually dene metaphysics in such a way as Ayer did. In any
case, Duhem is scarcely a hard-core metaphysician, but has rather often been counted
among positivists; though he thought that metaphysical questions were meaningful he
was sceptical about the possibility of answering them. Therefore that Duhem accepted
this denition does nothing to show that it would characteristic of metaphysics in gen-
eral. Duhem did not take unveriable statements to be meaningless, but thought yet that
scientic statements had to be veriable. This is similar to Popper's later view of falsi-
ability; Popper took unfalsiable statements to be meaningful but not scientic, just as
Duhem thought unveriable ones to be such. While these views would seem to leave some
room for metaphysics, they yet erect an implausibly deep a gulf between natural science
and metaphysics; a naturalistic metaphysician who thinks metaphysics is continuous with
sciences could not accept such a gulf. Nor is there any reason to accept such a gulf since is
easy to argue (as I do in this section) that on the one hand natural sciences must already
often over-leap the bounds of veriability and falsiablity while on the other hand some
metaphysical statements are conclusively veriable or falsiable if any statements are.
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objects (or objects that are constituents of experience), since they also exist.
Since metaphysics in this sense must provide a category under which every
entity falls, it must also provide a category for every experienced entity,
with the possible exception of those that are purely hallucinated and do
not really exist. Therefore, unless we assume absurdly that all experience is
hallucinatory, metaphysics as the science of being qua being deals also with
experienced objects. Even more, as I will show soon, Ayer's theory implies
that only objects that can be contents of experience i. e. phenomena exist
(in the fundamental sense of the word "exist"), so a theory that dealt with
all phenomena would deal with all that there is, so Ayer's total theory does
not imply that any question of metaphysics as the science of being as being
would be meaningless or even unanswerable. Also if we use the denition
of metaphysics as the science of fundamental causes and principles i. e.
metaphysics as aetiology then, as I will show, not only is even the strong
form of vericationism consistent with the possibility of metaphysics in this
sense, but Ayer's own writings contained a metaphysical theory in this sense.
In fact the only one of Aristotle's denitions that might seem to speak
about the transcendent is the denition of metaphysics as the science which
deals with that which exists separately. A separate (or separable) entity
can indeed by said to be transcendent to those entities from which it is sep-
arate (or separable) (and indeed Plato's ideas, which Aristotle thought to
be separate or separable, have often been called transcendent by those who
accepted Aristotle's interpretation of Plato). However, even this denition
is probably not equivalent or coextensive with Bradley's and Ayer's deni-
tion, at least relative to Ayer's theory of experience, though the matter is
not wholly clear (and Bradley's and Ayer's denition might have evolved
historically out of this denition). Aristotle meant with separateness sepa-
rateness (or separability) from matter28, not separateness (or separability)
28The separateness Aristotle speaks of has also been characterized as separateness from
sensibles, which might be mistaken to be something similar to the sense contents of pos-
itivism. However, it is clear that Aristotelians meant with sensibles material bodies and
their properties, not sense contents in the sense of the word neutral monists like the early
Ayer used. The closest approximation to sense contents in the Aristotelian framework are
perhaps phantasmata; however, the study of phantasmata is according to Aristotle the
concern of psychology, not of all special sciences. Therefore metaphysics cannot according
to the Aristotelian view be dened by studying something separate from phantasmata, as
physics also deals with objects separate from phantasmata. However, this leaves open the
question whether Aristotle's denition might be co-extensive with Ayer's given the later
logical positivists' physicalistic theory of experience. The matter is not clear, but they
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from experience, so the objects of metaphysics were by him supposed to be
by denition transcendent to matter, not transcendent to experience. The
sense contents that Ayer takes as fundamental can in a sense be said to
immaterial (though hardly divine, as Aristotle supposed separate entities to
be!), and as we will also see Ayer thinks that they could exist even if ma-
terial objects did not. Ayer's theory might then be said to be metaphysical
even in this sense, to concern entities separable from matter.
Summing our results up, we have shown that it is very likely that none
of Aristotle's denitions of metaphysics, which rst marked out that dis-
cipline, agrees with Ayer's denition. Therefore even if the vericationist
principle showed that such an enquiry as Ayer dened would always result in
meaningless statements, this would not suce to show that all metaphysical
statements in the ordinary sense of the word were meaningless (though in
fact, as I will show, only a strong version of the vericationist principle, such
as Ayer himself eventually rejected, would have shown even this much).
Ayer completely ignored the long Aristotelian metaphysical tradition,
continental rationalism etc. One might try to defend Ayer by saying that
he thought them to be irrelevant to the philosophy of his day and attacked
the kind of metaphysics that was then relevant. However, this kind of de-
fence would not excuse the fact that Ayer ignored the way earlier analytical
philosophers had dened metaphysics. As we have seen, Bertrand Russell
dened metaphysics at the very beginning of [Rus18b, page 1] as the at-
tempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, not as an
enquiry into the nature of a reality underlying or transcending the phenom-
ena or experience. Therefore just like Kant's criticism Ayer's attack does
not even threaten to touch the work of those many modern metaphysicians
who are Neo-Aristotelians or of metaphysical naturalists or of analytical
metaphysicians. Ayer's denition really ts well only metaphysics derived
from post-Kantian German Idealism, though it also ts to some extent such
earlier traditions as Eleatic and Platonistic metaphysics (and Schlick does
indeed mention Plato and the Eleatics in [Sch32b]), which also viewed the
would probably not be. When Aristotelians called material bodies sensibles, this was only
because some of them were sensible, and did not imply that they would have denied the
existence of unobservable bodies. It can be argued that some bodies Aristotelians thought
existed such as the ether and crystalline spheres, were according to them unobservable,
though this is not wholly clear. At least such philosophers of science as Laudan and Wor-
rall (see [Wor89, pages 112,113]) have assumed that ether would have been unobservable,
though they have not given any historical evidence for such a view.
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sensible world as mere appearance; however, these philosophers could not
have taken this as a denition of metaphysics, as they did not (for all we
know) even have a notion of metaphysics as a separate discipline, since they
probably did not even have the idea of any separate scholarly disciplines at
all; for them there was yet only philosophy as an undierentiated whole.
In presupposing that special sciences are content to study phenomena Ayer
already smuggles in idealist metaphysical theories to his purportedly non-
metaphysical conception, since that view (if the word "phenomena" is used
with any exactness) derives from Kant and the German idealists (which is
of course no accident, since the German logical positivists Ayer follows were
originally Neo-Kantian). A more realistic interpretation of natural science,
such as would be connected with a realistic metaphysics, would say that the
special sciences already attempt to study things in themselves.
Curiously, one of Ayer's sources, Schlick, had earlier held this very view,
and indeed in a stronger form. In [Sch26, page 152], translated in [Sch79a,
page 105], Schlick actually says (in apparent complete contradiction to
Ayer's view) that if we dene metaphysics as the science of the transcen-
dent, it is not merely possible, but the easiest thing in the world, since
every proposition that we utter at all has a meaning that extends beyond
the immediately given or experienced29. Schlick's radical claim that we can
only know the transcendent does not seem any more plausible to me than
the view that we cannot know the transcendent at all, and I suspect it has
equally disastrous consequences, leading to a strong structuralism which is
not compatible with Schlick's own empiricism and which Newman has shown
to be untenable. However, what is more pertinent now is that Schlick saw
in 1926 that this denition of metaphysics used by Ayer was not a good
denition, since metaphysics was supposed to be a special science, dierent
from other sciences.
Schlick went on to claim that metaphysics has been used only for intu-
itive knowledge of the transcendent. This shows that Schlick followed Kant
in erroneously assuming that metaphysics was supposed to be separated
29The contradiction between Schlick and Ayer is perhaps not as strong as it seems at
rst sight, since Schlick in [Sch26, page 151] (see for a translation [Sch79a, page 104]) calls
non-experienced objects transcendent, regardless of whether they are viewed as logical
constructions or whether they are credited with independent reality. This seem an un-
usually weak denition of transcendence, and Ayer might have been employing a stronger
(and more natural) conception of transcendence, according to which logical constructions
out of experienced entities are not transcendent.
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from other sciences by a special mode of knowledge (intuition), not only by
its object. Schlick can easily show that such knowledge is impossible, if we
accept a conception of experience such as his, according to which something
of which we have intuitive knowledge must be a part of the very stream
of consciousness. However, if the act-object analysis of consciousness and
experience which Schlick rejects were instead adopted (as non-positivistic
analytical philosophers had adopted it), and it were thought that even in
the case of intuitions there is a distinction between the act and its object
(as these earlier analytical philosophers often thought), then even intuitive
cognition of the transcendent might also be called "the easiest thing in the
world". For example, G. E. Moore said in [Moo22c, page 27] that merely to
have a sensation is already to know something which is not a part of experi-
ence. Sensations in Moore's sense can be taken to be intuitions, since Moore
contrasts them in [Moo22c, page 7] with thinking, which is usually con-
trasted with intuitions. However, something that is not part of experience
is transcendent to experience in the sense in which early logical positivists
like Ayer used the word. The view that we can have intuitive knowledge of
the transcendent had then been held not only by wild speculative metaphysi-
cians such as Schopenhauer and Bergson but also by sober pre-positivistic
analytical philosophers such as Moore. Many modern post-positivistic ana-
lytical philosophers have also held this view, including metaphysicians like
Armstrong, who is a direct realist about physical objects30, holding that
they are objects of immediate perception (which has often been taken as
the denition of intuition). Many other philosophers, such as Edward Pols
in [Pol92], have also held such a view. If Moore was correct or if such
philosophers as Armstrong and Pols are correct31, then intuitive knowledge
30Armstrong says in [Arm61, page xi] that Representationalism and Phenomenalism
hold that the immediate object of awareness is a sense-impression or sense-datum and
that such an object, it is usually assumed, cannot exist independently of the awareness of
it. If this were correct, then representationalists and phenomenalists would not accept the
possiblity of an intuitive cognition of the transcendent. However, while Ayer did indeed
assume what Armstrong says of his sense-contents (and therefore is a phenomenalist of
the kind Armstrong refers to), Moore, who is one of the original discoverers or inventors
of the notion of sense-datum dis not. Though Moore was (at least at many phases of
his philosophical development) a representationalist in a sense, as he thought that the
knowledge of physical objects was indirect, he yet thought that sense-data could exist
independently of the awareness of them.
31A big part of why the early Schlick thought that intuitive knowledge of the transcen-
dent is impossible was that he thought it was not needed. This in its turn is because he
thought that our knowledge of the transcendent could be purely structural. However, as
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of the transcendent is indeed possible but is something that every discipline
contains, so Schlick's denition does not work to distinguish any separate
discipline either.
In any case, Schlick's denition of metaphysics seems to me just as ar-
bitrary as Ayer's denition; it has no historical justication. It does not
for example correspond to any of Aristotle's denitions, which say nothing
whatever of intuition. Aristotle probably indeed held that his primary prin-
ciples and causes are transcendent to experience, and it is highly plausible
even to most non-Aristotelian metaphysicians that metaphysics as aetiology
in fact deals with the transcendent. However, Aristotle's denitions of the
discipline allow also for metaphysical theories which take the fundamental
entities to be immanent, and indeed various kinds of subjective idealism and
neutral monism are such immanentist metaphysical theories. Even more im-
portantly, many entities which are not primary causes and principles (e. g.
molecules) are also naturally analysed as transcendent, and are not dealt
with by metaphysics but by the special sciences. It is unlikely that Aristotle
or original Aristotelians thought that humans could have intuitive knowl-
edge of the Intelligences or prime matter he posited, though Neo-platonists
and later Aristotelians inuenced by them thought that possible. Schlick
referred to Schopenhauer and Bergson, and it is indeed likely that they had
held metaphysics to be intuitive knowledge of the transcendent; however,
it is not sure that they would have accepted Schlick's conceptions of tran-
scendence and intuition, so it is not clear that what they tried to do was
impossible. In any case they are not typical of all metaphysicians any more
than Bradley, so even if intuitive knowledge of the transcendent were impos-
sible, it does not follow that all metaphysics in the more common senses of
the word would be impossible, but only that Schopenhauers's and Bergson's
specic metaphysical theories were incorrect. Schlick claimed that a histor-
ical survey shows that even the earliest thinkers, without explicitly stating
it, have still had exactly the same concept of metaphysical knowledge; how-
ever, Schlick did not provide such a survey or refer to one, so this was a
completely unsubstantiated claim32.
I show in Subsection 3.1.3 of this work, Newman has shown that our knowledge of the
transcendent even in the special sciences cannot be purely structural, so this undermines
part of Schlick's reasons of resisting the act-object analysis.
32What is extremely strange is that Schlick had previously, in the pre-positivistic phase
of his philosophy, known that this was wrong. He had said in an article translated
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As Ayer made clear (in [Aye34, page 386]), the attack of logical posi-
tivists on metaphysics was far more radical than that of Kant; logical pos-
itivists held metaphysical questions to be not only in principle beyond our
knowledge (as Kant did the questions of transcendent metaphysics) but ac-
tually meaningless. Nevertheless, the attack is a continuation and radical-
ization of Kant's attack, and perpetuates Kant's misunderstanding of the
nature of metaphysical enquiry.
Actually Ayer's attack turns out in the longer version to have other
premises than vericationism. Surprisingly, he added in [Aye36a, page 24]
that the fact that the utterances of the metaphysician are nonsensical does
not follow simply from the fact that they are devoid of factual content. He
said that it follows from that fact together with the fact that they are not
a priori propositions. This is very surprising, since Kant, to whom Ayer
so often refers, claimed that metaphysics was a priori according to its very
concept, and many metaphysicians of Ayer's time also thought metaphysics
to be a priori. Why did Ayer think that metaphysical statements are not
a priori propositions? The answer is surprisingly obscure. Ayer referred
to his arguments in [Aye36a, chapter 4] for the view that a priori propo-
sitions, including in his view all mathematical statements, are in his view
analytical, and this means that they are tautologies33. Ayer did not think
that analytical propositions would be meaningless and this was important
for him, since he thought that all correct philosophical statements, of course
including those that he himself made, are analytical.
Why then did Ayer think that metaphysical claims cannot be analytical?
Unfortunately, so far as I can nd out, Ayer never told us this. Because Ayer
did not demonstrate that metaphysical statements cannot ever be analyti-
cal, his demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics fails utterly. As
we have seen Aristotle, the very founder of metaphysics, thought that some
in [Sch79c, page 110] that the task of metaphysics is a matter of so fashioning and coordi-
nating the results of the special sciences as to produce from them a closed, harmoniously
complete world-view. This is quite close to the original Aristotelian and the Russellian def-
initions of metaphysics. Schlick had then explicitly denied that metaphysics would require
to employ other and more speculative methods than the rest of the sciences. Somehow
he had under the inuence of Wittgenstein and other logical positivists forgotten this.
However, it must be admitted that Schlick's earlier view of metaphysics was not based
on historical evidence any more than his later one, though as I have argued historical
evidence shows it to have been more correct.
33In [Aye87, page 32] Ayer gave up the view that these statements are tautologies, but
still held that all of them are analytical.
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metaphysical statements were such as Ayer would have thought analytical,
so the view that some metaphysical statements are analytical has strong
historical backing. It is indeed highly implausible on the face of it that all
metaphysical statements would be tautologies, but scarcely more implausi-
ble than Ayer's claim that all mathematical statements are tautologies, so
if Ayer could swallow the later claim, why not the former?34 Ayer seems to
accept blindly Kant's claim that metaphysics must be synthetic while reject-
ing Kant's claim that it must be a priori (or perhaps he just runs together
the concepts of empirical and synthetic since he thinks them to be coexten-
sive). This is made especially perplexing by the fact that several times in the
course of his exposition of analysis, Ayer said that many statements which
have been thought to be metaphysical (such as Berkeley's claims) are not
really metaphysical but are really analytical and hence tautologies. Could
he not just as well have said that they were really metaphysical, but many
metaphysical statements which had been thought to be synthetic were really
tautologies?
For example, Ayer argued quite plausibly in [Aye36a, pages 38-39] that
Berkeley's immaterialist theory resulted from his analysis of the notion of a
material thing (an analysis which Ayer himself actually held to be at least
partially correct). However, where Ayer inferred from this the absurd claim
that Berkeley's theory was not really metaphysical, he could as well have
inferred that Berkeley's metaphysical view resulted from Berkeley's employ-
ment of the method of analysis. This would imply that at least a vast part of
Berkeley's philosophy (roughly that which remains if Berkeley's theology is
removed from it) is an example of a metaphysical theory consisting of state-
ments that are analytically true or (as those who unlike Ayer disagree with
Berkeley's analysis must claim, if they accept the very notion of analyticity)
34There is a deep-going problem in the way Ayer (and most logical positivists) conceived
of analytical statements. Ayer held (see e. g. [Aye36a, page 71]) that all mathematical
truths were analytical, but Ayer also said in [Aye36a, page 128] that to assert that an
object exists is always to assert a synthetic proposition. However, mathematics most
certainly contains true existential assertions - e. g. the claim that there is a prime
number between six and nine. This produces a contradiction in Ayer's theory. This shows
that analytical statements cannot be as trivial as logical positivists thought them to be
and yet have so many uses as they thought them to have. This contradiction does not
occur in most of the theories of most earlier non-positivistic analytical philosophers; e.
g. Frege nowhere denied that analytical truths could be existential and though Russell
claimed that mathematics was reducible to logic (a question on which Ayer suspended
judgment), he claimed initially in [Rus03, x434, page 457], contrary not only to Ayer's but
to Kant's and even Frege's opinion, that logic is synthetic.
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analytically false.
In fact the general philosophical position Ayer arrives at by the method
of analysis contains many claims that are naturally counted as metaphysi-
cal. Ayer held (see [Aye36a, page 130]) - as also many other early logical
positivists (e. g. Schlick as seen in [Sch32b, page 5]) held - that both
material and mental entities could be analysed in terms of sense-contents
which were neither mental nor physical, more specically regarded as log-
ical constructions out of them (i e. dened implicitly by means of them).
This is a metaphysical doctrine that is known as neutral monism. Leopold
Stubenberg has given a good introduction to this theory and its history
in [Stu10]; according to him David Hume (and possibly Spinoza) can al-
ready be argued to have anticipated this theory, but it was rst explicitly
formulated by such positivists as Ernst Mach (in [Mac97], Richard Avenar-
ius and Joseph Petzoldt. It had also been held by earlier British analyti-
cal philosophers (who arguably were not positivists) like Bertrand Russell
in [Rus18a] and in [Rus18c]. Russell, however, explicitly described his the-
ory as metaphysical, saying in [Rus18a, page 125] that he wished to discuss
an ancient metaphysical query. Schlick actually referred to Avenarius and
Mach in [Sch32b, page 5] (which was a source of Ayer's view) and argued
that the view that sense-contents are neutral distinguishes positivism from
idealism (which held them to be mental or subjective) as well as realism,
and tried to argue on the basis of this that positivism is not a metaphysical
theory35. However, all that this argument could show would be that posi-
tivism is a third metaphysical theory beside realism and idealism, not that
it is not a metaphysical theory at all36. Leopold leaves no doubt that in his
35Schlick also argued that the founders of positivism certainly wanted something quite
dierent from a renewal of idealism, and hence an interpretation of positivism as idealis-
tic should be rejected as incompatible with the anti-metaphysical attitude of positivism.
However, that the founders desired something dierent form idealism certainly does not
suce to show that they succeeded in founding something dierent from idealism.
36Whether it shows even this is a controversial and dicult question. Neutral monism
was introduces as a third position between materialism and idealism, but realism is not
the same as materialism. However, it is controversial whether neutral monists managed
even to stake out a third position between idealism and materialism; it can be argued
that most early logical positivists were implicitly idealists, while later ones were implicitly
or even explicitly materialists. Many philosophers have argued that neutral monism is
idealistic, e. g. Lenin in [Len47]; however, Lenin was likely to label any theory other
than his own orthodox Marxism as idealistic, so his testimony must be treated with care.
Actually the very question is ambiguous and its answer depends partly on how the terms
occurring it are understood, i. e. on how realism, idealism and materialism are dened,
and partly on the kind of neutral monism in question. Ayer took idealism to hold that
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view this is a metaphysical doctrine; he says:
Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
reality is all of one kind.
It can be held to be an example of the kind of metaphysics that Kant thought
to be possible, immanent metaphysics, since it is a doctrine about what can
possibly be experienced.
Later logical positivists under the inuence of Otto Neurath37 often
everything that exists (in any sense of the word "exist", which Ayer took to have several
meanings) is mental (see e. g. [Aye36a, page 151], and if idealism is understood in this
strong sense then his view might indeed count as neither idealistic nor realistic. However,
idealism can also quite naturally be understood in a weaker sense so that not only a view
according to which everything is mental, but also a view according to which everything
ontologically fundamental is mental or depends on what is mental, so that for it to exist
is either to perceive or be perceived, counts as idealistic. Since Ayer said in [Aye36a,
page 153] following Berkeley that though sense contents (which as we have seen were
ontologically fundamental in his view) were not themselves mental, yet for sense contents
to be is to be perceived, this suces to class his view as denitely idealistic. Also since
in Ayer's view for sense-contents to be is for them to be perceived by individual human
consciousnesses, rather than some kind of cosmic consciousness, this seems to suce to
classify his view even as a representative of subjective idealism. However, since Russell
admitted in [Rus18c] that sensibilia could exist without being sensed, his view can be
considered realistic in a weak sense (though not materialistic). It certainly presents an
alternative to traditional kinds of materialism and idealism, but it denitely presents a
third metaphysical theory. Its view of a six-dimensional world, analogous (as Russell
admits in [Rus18c, page 158]) to Leibniz's monadology, is denitely a piece of speculative
metaphysics, though a quite well justied piece given the controversial theory of experience
on which it is based; however, of course if the sense-datum theory of experience on which it
is based is rejected, it must also be rejected. Therefore at least neither of these two kinds
of neutral monism constitutes a third option between realism and idealism understood in
the widest senses, though Russell's theory constitutes a novel variety of realism in that
wide sense. However, Carnap's theory in the Aufbau might constitute such a third option.
Carnap holds that not only are physical objects reducible to mental ones, but the reverse
is also the case (if epistemic considerations are excluded). This really implies that neither
physical objects nor mental ones are metaphysically primary, and this does seem to be
novel view (though not a very plausible one, as the justication of both reductions is highly
questionable; as I will show in Section 4.3.1 that the very conception of reduction on which
Carnap relies is dubious and thought to be incorrect by many philosophers today.).
37It is often said that Neurath supported physicalism because he was a Marxist. There
are indeed reasons to explain Neurath's motivations in this way. Other Marxists, such as
Lenin in [Len47] had already argued against neutral monism on the ground that it was
incompatible with Marxism. Lenin spoke of empiriocriticism, which was Avenarius's term
for the theory in question, as well as of Machism, and as we have already seen neutral
monism was rst explicitly formulated by Mach and Avenarius. There were many (today
mostly forgotten) Russian neutral monists such as Bazarov, Bogdanov (remembered as
the author of the rst Bolshevik Utopia Red Star and as a pioneer of blood transfusion),
Yushkevich, Valentinov, Chernov and others Lenin primarily argued against. However,
reference to Marxism does not explain Neurath's position completely. Neurath's physical-
ism was scarcely a version of dialectical materialism. It is uncertain if orthodox Marxists
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abandoned neutral monism in favour of physicalism38. Physicalism, how-
ever, is quite clearly an alternative metaphysical doctrine; it either says that
all entities are physical (and so is an instance of metaphysics as ontology)
or that fundamental entities are physical (and is an instance of metaphysics
as aetiology). Clearly this constituted a gigantic alteration of metaphysical
theory, though this of course took place without the positivists admitting
that they had changed metaphysical doctrines or even without them always
admitting that they had changed their opinions radically.
This later, physicalistic form of logical positivism is indeed unlike the
early neutral monistic form of it inconsistent with one of Aristotle's def-
initions of metaphysics, namely Aristotle's denition of it as the science
which deals with that which exists separately (from matter), as it holds
that nothing exists separately from matter. It would indeed be consistent
with metaphysics in that sense, if it were reformulated in a presupposition-
free form so that it asked whether there was anything separate from matter
and if so what, as I proposed earlier, for it would give an answer to that
question: no, there is not. However, even if this reformulation is taken as
too great a departure from Aristotle's original denition, even physicalistic
logical positivism is yet consistent with the legitimacy of metaphysics in all
the other traditional senses, as ontology and aetiology and ousiology, most
importantly with metaphysics as the science of being as being, which I have
argued to be the most fundamental sense of the word.
The same obviously holds generally, even beyond the limits of the prob-
lem of realism; questions about the metaphysical status of material things
such as Lenin would have admitted Neurath to be a materialist at all any more than than
they acknowledged Bazarov, Bogdanov and the rest as materialists. While Neurath's the-
ory may indeed be the better for abandoning the dialectical (in the peculiar Hegelian sense
of dialectics) elements of Lenin's materialism, yet there are elements in Lenin's theory be-
sides the dialectical woo-woo that may appear preferable to Neurath's to many of today's
scientic realists. Lenin's theory of reection was a form of correspondence theory - not
indeed explicitly of truth as such but of knowledge, but as knowledge is generally held to
involve truth it suggests a correspondence theory for truth also. Such a correspondence
theory is of course in radical conict with the coherentism Schlick ascribed - in my view
correctly - to Neurath. Neurath, on the other hand, would have accused Lenin's theory of
reection of being metaphysical - and quite correctly too, though Lenin might not have
agreed - so Marxism does not explain Neurath's position.
38This did not necessarily and perhaps not even usually imply acceptance of scientic
realism; physicalistic logical positivists held that middle-sized physical objects such as
rocks or trees (which would commonly be thought observable, though sense-data theorists
did not think them such) existed and were not mere logical constructions, but did not
generally hold the same view of unobservable physical entities such as quarks or electrons.
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and minds appear in logical positivism (and more generally in analytical
philosophy) as questions about the correct analysis of statements purport-
edly concerning material things and minds. Even more generally, questions
about the metaphysical status of any kind of entity appears as questions
about the correct analysis of statements apparently speaking about entities
of that kind. Metaphysical priority appears in logical positivism (and analyt-
ical philosophy generally) as analyzability (which is a form of reducibility).
Entities of one kind are according to them metaphysically prior to those of
another kind if and only if the entities of the later kind can be analysed
as either a subclass of entities of the former kind (if they can be dened
explicitly with the aid of them) or as logical constructions out of entities of
the former kind (if they can only be dened implicitly with their aid) but
not conversely.
It seems to me that this is a quite legitimate and important way of
showing that some entities are metaphysically prior to others; however, it
need not be the only legitimate way. While statements of metaphysical
priority can be analytic, they can yet also be synthetic a posteriori. A
philosopher who does not share Ayer's metaphilosophical opinion that all
philosophical statements are analytical can claim that another way to show
that entities of one kind are metaphysically prior to those of another and
those entities of the second kind are reducible to those of the rst kind is
to argue (inductively or abductively) that it is a posteriori necessary (in
the way that Kripke has argued in [Kri72] that many statements are) that
entities of the later kind are identical with entities of the former kind but
not conversely.
One of the logical positivists, Gustav Bergmann, already noticed that
the views of logical positivists (as well as those of earlier positivists) con-
tained a metaphysics, and wrote an article with the title "The Positivistic
Metaphysics of Consciousness" in [Ber45] and a whole book of his writings
had the title "The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism" in [Ber54]. Bergmann
explained in [Ber45, page 194] that by the choice of such a title he wanted to
emphasize the continuity between positivistic and non-positivistic thought.
The problem with this explanation, of course, is that logical positivists
claimed that their theory was radically dierent from earlier thought so
far as it was metaphysical, so if continuity between positivistic theories and
metaphysical ones existed to be emphasized, logical positivists were radi-
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cally wrong. Therefore instead of a mere dierence of emphasis, there was
implicit a radical substantive dierence of doctrine between Bergmann and
the rest of the logical positivists. Indeed, following his train of thought to
its logical conclusion Bergmann later rejected logical positivism altogether
(though he had been initially very positivistic indeed, criticizing Carnap for
not being positivistic enough in [Ber44]) and became one of the classical
20th century metaphysicians. Bergmann can be said to have overcome log-
ical positivism from within far more then Neurath, to whom Uebel ascribes
such a feat in [Ueb92]. However, there are many metaphysicians who think
that Bergmann was not suciently metaphysical but remained too much of
a linguistic philosopher.
One of the main contributions of Bergmann to the development of philos-
ophy was that he reminded philosophers that the articial language method
in philosophy was not inseparably connected to positivism (as current posi-
tivists such as Lutz39 still seem to think), but could be employed in meta-
physics. However, some of Bergmann's views about the use of articial
languages in metaphysics are curious and show that he had not completely
freed himself from the inuence of logical positivism (at least at the stage
of his philosophy during which he wrote [Ber54]) and might also have been
adversely inuenced by ordinary language philosophy. Bergmann described
in [Ber54, page 102] the dierence between himself and Quine so that Quine
wishes to reconstruct the old ontological assertions, or some reasonable
equivalent of them, in the ideal language, while Bergmann wishes to ex-
plicate them in informal discourse about the ideal language. Ontological
39Lutz claims in [Lut12] that the underlying methodology of articial language philos-
ophy or ideal language philosophy, the development of languages for specic purposes,
leads to a conventionalist view of languages in general. However, the expressions "arti-
cial language philosophy" and even more "ideal language philosophy" are best suited
to designate the whole long and big tradition which started in modern philosophy from
Frege (with antecedents in earlier thought in Leibniz, Wilkins and others), whose Begri-
sschrift was surely a paradigmatic articial language (in the philosophical sense, which
is very dierent from the sense in which such auxiliary languages as Esperanto or such
artistic languages as Quenya or Klingon are articial languages). However, this tradition
by no means leads necessarily to conventionalism. It is not essential to that approach
to philosophical questions that languages could be developed only for specic purposes,
but many of its proponents, including the father of the approach, Frege, believed in the
possibility of a universal ideal language in which all questions could be addressed. The
radical conventionalism into which one of the followers of the method, Carnap, arrived is
by no means essential to the method. Most of the exponents of the method not aected by
the positivist tradition would have rejected such conventionalism. Frege argued at length
against Hilbert's conventionalist theses.
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assertions are surely assertions about the world in general, about being as be-
ing, not about any language, and therefore the position Bergmann ascribed
to Quine seems to me far preferable to Bergmann's own position. I will
compare Bergmann's metaontological views further with Quine's in 5.2.1.
3.3 Problems with Vericationism in General
We have seen that even a strong version of the vericationist criterion would
not imply that metaphysics would be meaningless tout court, but at most
that metaphysics would be impossible in one derivative sense of the word,
namely in the sense of transcendent or speculative metaphysics, and that
in other senses of the word a certain kind of metaphysical theory, such
as subjective idealism or neutral monism, would be correct. Should we,
however, agree that metaphysics is impossible even in that one derivative
sense, as knowledge of the transcendent? Have we in responding to the
logical positivistic attack on metaphysics found a method of metaphysical
research, ending up with a constructive rather than a merely negative result?
Do we have any reason to think that the vericationist criterion gives us any
reason to think that such an anti-realistic metaphysical theory is true (and
that more realistic theories are not)?
In this subsection of my dissertation I will argue that the answers to these
questions are mostly negative, since the vericationist criterion itself faces
very serious problems. Because of them logical positivists did not succeed
in giving any good reasons to think that even metaphysics in the derivative
sense of knowledge of the transcendent, i. e. speculative metaphysics, would
be impossible. In responding to vericationist attacks on metaphysics we
may indeed have found one positive method. The method of conceptual or
meaning analysis may be a valid method of metaphysical research; however,
it is not a valid method if it is used in the way vericationists used it, but
only if it is used as non-positivistic analytical philosophers used it.
Because of the vericationist principle metaphysical priority was in Ayer
and the rest of the logical positivists equated with epistemological priority
(so that they ironically arrived in this question at a similar result as Neo-
Aristotelians like Simons or Tahko who in other ways oppose them). How-
ever, the method of analysis itself need not lead to this result if it is separated
from vericationism. If meaning consists (even partly) in verication con-
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ditions or assertibility conditions or conrmation conditions etc., as most
serious forms of vericationism claim, then meaning analysis will naturally
end in entities which (or the experience of which) would ultimately verify
sentences, and in the case of actually justied sentences entities (the expe-
riences of) which actually do ultimately verify them, i. e. epistemologically
primary entities. However, if meaning instead consists for example solely
in truth conditions, then meaning analysis need not end in anything episte-
mologically basic. The fully analysed statements containing only primitive
terms which are the ultimate results of meaning analysis do not in this case
have to speak about observable states of aairs. Even if the basic terms
that occur in them would have to denote observable properties or particu-
lars, as the empiricist Principle of Acquaintance implies, the properties and
particulars can in such fully analysed statements be combined into unob-
servable compounds. Moreover, the fully analysed statements can contain
existential generalizations such that the bound variables occurring in them
have as values unobservable entities40. Of course, it is highly controversial
whether Ayer's analysis of the notion of material objects is correct; most
philosophers today would think that it is not, and I am inclined to agree,
but the question is not as easy to answer as it is often supposed to be.
Those who reject vericationism are indeed far less likely to agree with such
an analysis than those who accept vericationism. However, I suppose it is
in principle possible to consistently accept such an analysis without accept-
ing vericationism; Russell accepted such an analysis in [Rus18c] without
accepting full-blown vericationism, though he accepted a similar maxim.
While the strong version of the vericationist criterion would not out-
law all metaphysics, it would outlaw many statements of natural sciences
which the logical positivists would not have wanted to abandon. It can be
argued that even forms of empiricism far weaker than vericationism are
not compatible with a scientic world-view based upon a correct interpre-
40This supposes, of course, that existential generalizations cannot be analysed as dis-
junctions of atomic statements, as e. g. Sellars proposed in [Sel49]. If such an analysis
were correct, then the Principle of Acquaintance would imply that meaning analysis would
have to end in epistemologically basic entities. Some logical atomists may have gone so
far as to accept such an analysis. However, most logicians today agree that such an equiv-
alence is not correct. Actually this kind of analysis would imply that all quantication
would be substitutional, so if objectual quantication is a logical notion, existential gen-
eralizations can concern unobservable entities. I will later in this work deal at length with
the distinction between substitutional and objectual quantication.
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tation of modern science, since mathematics is essential to modern science
and empiricism has always found it very hard to account for our knowledge
of mathematics. The most sustained attempt to deal with this problem
was logicism, which as we have already seen claimed that all mathemati-
cal statements were analytical and indeed logical; however, since logicism
has encountered severe diculties, this threatens the prospect of a recon-
ciliation between empiricism and mathematics. In any case, even if weaker
forms of empiricism could somehow surmount this problem (in one of the
innumerable ways empiricist philosophers have developed to deal with it),
vericationism poses new and far more dicult problems.
The greatest problem41 with logical positivism concerns the formulation
of the vericationist criterion. The vericationist criterion can be formu-
lated in dierent ways, in stronger and weaker versions. The lengthy debate
about the principle showed that stronger versions lead to absurd conclusions
which are incompatible with a scientic world-view42 and which therefore
41There is an even worse problem, but it seems to aict only some versions of logical
positivism. It has often been argued (e. g. by A. C. Ewing in [Ewi37]) that strong
formulations of the principle are self-defeating, since they imply that they themselves are
meaningless. It is not clear that this is a valid criticism of all logical positivistic theories.
At least those logical positivists who restricted the principle so that analytical statements
were not meaningless could argue that the principle itself was analytical, though it was
indeed unnatural to view it as a tautology. Most logical positivists did not regard analytical
statements as meaningless, though there were a few early incautious formulations that
might be taken to imply that they were such. E. g. Schlick claims in [Sch32b, page 21]
(translated in [Sch49b, pages 98-99]) that a proposition has meaning only if I can state the
conditions under which it would be true and the conditions under which it would be false.
Since for an analytical statement there are no conditions under which it would be false,
this formulation implies that all such statements, the vericationist principle included, are
meaningless. Such formulations of the principle are then rather obviously self-defeating. It
seems to me that Wittgenstein's formulation of a principle about what can be said (which
is similar to a principle about what is meaningful) in the Tractatus [Wit21] is almost
deantly self-defeating, as Wittgenstein himself outs it constantly, trying to cover up this
inconsistency with obscure metaphors about ladders. However, most formulations of the
principle are not like this. Indeed, the strong form of the vericationist principle actually
implied that it itself was analytically true, for if the meaning of every synthetic sentence is
the same as a method of verifying it, then it follows that a synthetic sentence which cannot
be veried cannot be meaningful. The strong form of the principle is then self-consistent,
though unacceptable for other reasons, for instance because of being inconsistent with the
scientic world-view it was supposed to be used in defending. However, it is not clear how
it could be shown that weaker versions of the principle, which may be consistent with a
scientic world-view, are analytic, so there is some reason to suspect that weaker forms of
the principle might be self-defeating; nevertheless, they are not obviously self-defeating,
so I will not rely on this argument.
42On the other hand, these results are not compatible with a religious world-view either.
While an objective idealism might be well suited for at least many kinds of religious world-
view, I have argued that the implicit metaphysics of early logical positivists like Ayer was
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the logical positivists themselves were not willing to admit, while the weaker
versions threaten to be completely vacuous, so that they cannot be used to
discredit metaphysics or indeed cannot be used for anything at all. The logi-
cal positivists themselves found that they had to constantly back away from
their initial position. It was shown that not even statements that positivists
thought fully legitimate and important full the vericationist criterion, at
least in its stronger, original form43.
Of course dierent logical positivists diered in what consequences of
strong forms of the principle they found unacceptable, but most found some
of them to be such. Most logical positivists had a rm condence in natural
sciences and many of them also trusted in in common sense, so they did not
want their attack on metaphysics to threaten them. However, they found
to their dismay that non-vacuous vericationism was just as opposed to
natural science (and less importantly common sense) as to traditional meta-
physics, implying that many statements of science and common sense were
meaningless. Such statements were statements of science concerning theo-
retical entities such as atoms or subatomic particles (which the old positivist
Mach had already famously attacked). Subatomic particles can already be
said to underlie and transcend phenomena in one rather strong sense, since
they cannot be directly observed (at least without the aid of instruments),
and it is not clear that most metaphysicians require entities that would be
transcendent to phenomena in any stronger sense. Another example were
statements concerning the past. Another little known but very striking ex-
ample are general laws such as laws of nature, including in the case of truly
strong forms of vericationism even general laws stated purely in observa-
a subjective idealism, and that kind of idealism does not jibe with a religious world-view.
Such a subjective idealism has no room for material bodies, which makes it a bad t for
a scientic world-view, but neither has it room for a transcendent God, which makes it
also a bad t for a religious world-view.
43The retreat of logical positivists from the strongest forms of the criterion was so swift
that there are few writings published by the logical positivists themselves in which these
strongest forms can be found; the very strongest expressions of vericationism have been
found by historians of philosophy in unpublished manuscripts (which have of course often
been published posthumously by such historians). Ayer told us in two footnotes in [Aye34,
page 23] that his views regarding the correct form of vericationism had altered between
the writing and publication of the article (which of course raises suspicions about the
consistency of the article together with its footnotes). From the view that all meaningful
sentences would have to be conclusively veriable he had shifted to the other extreme, now
claiming that no sentences are conclusively veriable. However, there are some published
examples of strong vericationism; Carnap in the second section of [Car32b, pages 221-224]
seems to have held a quite strong vericationism.
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tional terms. This consequence of very strong forms of verifcationism would
indeed be fatal to even immanent metaphysics, as generality is essential to
metaphysics. However, in denying the possibility of the absolute generality
required by metaphysics, strong vericationism also denies the possibility
of the restricted generality required by all science (see for example [Aye34,
page 340]).
Ayer originally tried in [Aye36a, page 20] to weaken the verication-
ist criterion so that a proposition (by which Ayer just meant a sentence)
is empirically meaningful if some experiential propositions can be deduced
from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible
from those premises alone. However, it was pointed out by Isaiah Berlin
in [Ber38] that this formulation allowed any sentence to be meaningful. If
S is any sentence that the logical positivists would not want to be mean-
ingful e. g. "The Absolute is perfect." and O any experiential sentence we
could just take O if S, S ! O as the other premise. Ayer then tried to
nd more complex formulations that would escape this trivialization, and
Carnap attempted the same in [Car56], but such authors as Alonzo Church
(in [Chu49]), David Kaplan, David Lewis (in [Lew88]) etc. have produced
arguments showing that these new formulations shared the same problem.
Authors such as Richard Creath (in [Cre76]) M. Przelecki, Sebastian Lutz
(in [Lut10])44, etc. have tried to reformulate the criterion so as to escape
these arguments.
However, Creath does not claim that his formulation of the criterion
44The crucial idea in Lutz's attempts to escape trivialization of the verication criterion
is that of honest sets of auxiliary sentences. A sentence is according to Lutz empirically
signicant when it implies observational sentences together with a honest set of auxiliary
sentences. A set of sentences is said to be honest (see [Lut10, Denition 37, page 40])
when every sentence in it is justied and for every sentence in it, the set also contains
every sentence on which its justication depends. If I have understood this denition
correctly, there are many problems in it. Dierent sentences are justied for dierent
persons and for the same person at dierent times, so a sentence could be empirically
meaningful for some persons and not for others. Certainly most scientic theories would
not be empirically signicant for most people, and quite likely many scientic theories
would not be empirically signicant for any people, though they might become signicant
in the future. These results seem absurd, and perhaps more tellingly, just as harmful
for science as the original formulations of the verication principle, for if an empirical
science ought to reject empirically non-signicant theories (since this is what the criterion
is meant for) then Lutz's denition would lead us to reject theories that would be shown
to be not only meaningful but even true in the future, as auxiliary statements needed to
make them meaningful would only become justied in the future). If on the other hand
talk of justication in this denition were replaced with talk about justiability, the threat
that the denition has become vacuous would surface once again.
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would provide a completely adequate criterion of empirical meaningfulness,
and gives as a reason in [Cre76, page 399] that the criterion presupposes
a classically sharp distinction between the observation and theoretical lan-
guages which Creath does not accept. It is essential to the originally in-
tended use of the criterion to declare some sentences meaningless that the
distinction between observation sentences and other sentences be sharp. E.
g. Schlick clearly said in [Sch32b, page 9] that the distinction between the
essential impossibility of verication and mere empirical impossibility was
supposed to be perfectly sharp (scharf), since it is a logical one and diers
from empirical not by degrees, but absolutely. If the distinction between ob-
servation language and theoretical language were not sharp, then obviously
the distinction between the essential impossibility and empirical impossibil-
ity of verication could not be sharp either.
If all observation were indeed theory-laden, as those who deny the sharp-
ness of the distinction usually think, then a proponent of a metaphysical
theory could just observe it to be true. For example, a Leibnizian would
see (with his eyes) physical objects as complexes of monads, since what he
sees would be inuenced by his beliefs, while a Spinozist would similarly see
Nature as God. This would suce to show that monads and God are ob-
servable and therefore that Leibniz's and Spinoza's theories are meaningful
and even justied. This is surely too easy a way to even show a metaphys-
ical theory to be meaningful, much less justied, even for one who believes
some metaphysical theories to be meaningful and justied. Since Creath
apparently denies the existence of a sharp distinction between observation
sentences and other sentences, this is already a reason to claim that his the-
ory gives no support to vericationism at all. However, I would not want to
rely on this to support the possibility of metaphysics, for I would myself be
very wary of denying a sharp distinction between observation sentences and
other sentences as Creath does, since such a distinction is essential not only
to vericationism but also to far weaker and more plausible kinds of em-
piricism. Lutz at least thinks (see [Lut10, page 5]) that a sharp distinction
between observation terms and theoretical terms can be established, even if
not in ordinary language then at least in articial languages, so his support
of vericationism (or at least of empiricism) is more full-hearted than that of
Creath. The existence of a sharp distinction between observation terms and
theoretical terms (or possibly of several sharp distinctions, if the word "ob-
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servation" is ambiguous) is then necessary for any non-trivial empiricism45;
however, as I will argue below, it is by no means obvious how and where
the distinction is to be drawn, and this is already a non-trivial problem in
epistemology.
There is one ambiguity in the distinction pointed out for example by
Hilary Putnam in [Put62] and by Frederick Suppe in [Sup89, pages 58-60]
which I must dwell on for a while because it will become useful later in
this dissertation. Is a property observable if its presence is sometimes as-
certainable by direct observation or only if it is always so ascertainable?
Analogously, to put the distinction in a way which even a nominalist who
rejects properties might accept, is a predicate term observational if some
of the atomic sentences whose predicate it is (and whose subject is an ob-
servational singular term) are observation sentences or only if all atomic
sentences whose predicate it is (and whose subject is observational) are ob-
servation sentences? The distinction between observational and theoretical
was originally a distinction between dierent sentences (or states of aairs or
propositions), namely between sentences which were implied by observation
sentences aka protocol sentences and other sentences which were not so im-
plied (or between observable states of aairs and other states of aairs), not
between dierent terms or entities in general. Therefore extending it into the
latter domain involves complications which were not always noticed. Rather
than a dichotomy between observable and non-observable properties, there
is a trichotomy; however, this does not imply that the distinctions between
the three classes, entities which are always, sometimes and never directly
observable, would not be sharp.
We could say that a predicate term which always applies to observable
entities is strongly observational, while a predicate term which sometimes
applies to observable entities is weakly observational. Similarly a predicate
can be said to be strongly theoretical if it is not weakly observational and
weakly theoretical if it is not strongly observational. However, the more im-
portant division seems to me to be between properties which are sometimes
and those which are never observable or between weakly observational and
45If perception, including observation, is held to be non-conceptual, as proposed by
Christopher Peacocke in [Pea01], then obviously it need not be theory-laden, However,
even if perception is held to have a conceptual content, it need not be held to be theory-
laden, for the most primitive kinds of concepts can be held to exist apart from written
language. I will deal with this debate at more length later.
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strongly theoretical predicates. It can be argued that there are no strongly
observational predicate terms (as Putnam did argue), in which case all pred-
icate terms would be weakly theoretical; however, even if Putnam is wrong,
as he seems to be, it seems clear that if there are strongly observational
terms, they are rare indeed46. Also a weakly observational term can be de-
ned ostensively, so what Schlick at least thought to be the ultimate purport
of the distinction is satised by a distinction between weakly observational
and strongly theoretical terms. Because of this these can be called observa-
tional and theoretical terms simpliciter. The fact that some properties are
sometimes but not always observable is indeed highly fortunate. This is the
only reason that enables us to bridge the gulf between observable and the-
oretical entities and have some knowledge of unobservable entities, whether
this is by dening theoretical terms by means of observational ones or using
induction to get from observation statements to theoretical ones, as I will
argue later in Section 6.1.
However, even if we set aside the problems concerning the distinction
between observational and theoretical, the vericationist criterion faces se-
rious problems. Responding in [Aye36b, page 199] to the critique of W. T.
Stace in [Sta35], Ayer said that he did not require of a meaningful statement
that it should be conclusively veriable, but only that some possible obser-
vations should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood.
Ayer called this veriability in a weak sense, but it might be less misleading
to call it a disjunction of defeasible conrmability and disconrmability. We
can call this view weak vericationism, while the view which requires con-
clusive veriability can be called strong vericationism47. Ayer still asserted
46If observational terms are taken to apply to physical objects as the later logical posi-
tivists did, rather than to sense-data, as in the earliest versions of the distinction, then it
is quite likely that there are no strongly observational terms in natural languages. Never-
theless, we can of course always articially manufacture strongly observational predicates
out of weakly observational ones by restricting their extension to observable particulars
(which shows Putnam to be wrong), though such a procedure has little point if we are not
vericationists or constructive empiricists.
47The distinction between weak vericationism and strong vericationism is obviously
parallel to that between weak foundationalism and strong foundationalism, as made by
e. g. Susan Haack in [Haa09, page 54], which we have already encountered. Weak veri-
cationism implies weak foundationalism but not conversely, and similarly strong verica-
tionism implies strong foundationalism but not conversely. Neither of weak vericationism
and strong foundationalism implies the other. While I will argue that weak verication-
alism as a criterion of meaningfulness collapses into triviality, the same does not hold of
weak foundationalism as a theory of justication.
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condently that this criterion denies meaningfulness to metaphysical state-
ments such as those which deny the reality of the sensible world or assert
the existence of things in themselves: however, there are good reasons to
think that this is not correct48.
In order to show what happens when the principle is weakened, we must
notice that Ayer did not apply the weakening of the criterion consistently
to all questions. He admitted that statements did not have to be equivalent
to statements about the evidence that might be presented for them in some
cases but not in all. He admitted that statements about past events were
not equivalent to statements about the present evidence from them, but
still assumed that statements about the mental states of other people were
equivalent to statements about the behavioural evidence for them (so com-
mitting himself to logical behaviourism) and that statements about physical
objects were equivalent to the statements about sense data that in his view
provided the evidence for them. However, all three cases are similar and
should be treated in the same way, at least unless some additional argument
is given for treating them dierently49. There might of course be such valid
48In [Aye67] and in [Aye87] Ayer at last relented to some degree of his opposition
to metaphysics; however, his admission of the legitimacy of metaphysics was very back-
handed. Ayer said in [Aye87, page 33] that he did not abide by his summary dismissal
of metaphysics because it had occurred to him that metaphysicians have suered from
the assumption that they literally meant what they said. Apparently Ayer still did not
admit that any statements of metaphysicians are to be considered seriously if they are
interpreted literally and not metaphorically. However, the reasons Ayer had for rejecting
metaphysics if interpreted literally were obviously now entirely dierent. Ayer claimed
in [Aye67, page 64] that it can hardly be disputed that metaphysics is nearly always in
conict with common sense. Now metaphysics could hardly be in conict with common
sense if it were meaningless; logical contradiction can only exist between meaningful sen-
tences. However, again Ayer did not give any argument based on references for his view
that metaphysics is nearly always in conict with common sense; it seems that he still
took such extreme idealists as Bradley as typical metaphysicians and ignored all the rest.
Indeed, the theory of logical positivists can be argued to be at least as much in conict
with common sense than most professedly metaphysical theories. It is hardly correct that
Aristotelian metaphysicians would be nearly always in conict with common sense. They
seem rather to me to suer from exactly the opposite fault; they try to stick to common
conceptions too far, even when they come into conict with natural science, which has
often made them an obstacle to the progress of science. Even modern metaphysicians
can hold like Peter Strawson in [Str59] that metaphysics is to be descriptive metaphysics,
which merely tries to explicate the implications and presuppositions of common sense.
However, even if metaphysics tries to go beyond common sense -as I think it must if it
is not become completely trivial - it need not yet get into contradictions with common
sense, as it can only try to give answers to questions with regard to which common sense
is neutral.
49Similarly to Ayer, Schlick said in [Sch36, page 345] that it is quite irrelevant whether
verication can take place in the future or in the present only. Why then is it relevant
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arguments, as many other philosophers have provided arguments trying to
show a relevant dierence between the cases. However, Ayer did not pro-
vide or even refer to any such argument and therefore even if some such
arguments would be valid, Ayer would not have been justied in treating
the three cases dierently. Intuitively, we might perhaps even say according
to common sense, the mental states of a person are causes of his behaviour
and therefore serve to explain his behaviour just as past events are causes
of present events and serve to explain them.
In [Aye87, page 31], Ayer nally admitted that his behaviourist treat-
ment of the mental states of others was not justied by the weaker version
of vericationism he adopted. Carnap likewise quite explicitly abandoned
behaviourism in [Car56, xXI, pages 69-75]. Also other philosophers within
or associated with the logical positivist movement proposed more plausible
forms of materialism than behaviourism, such as the identity theory intro-
duced within the movement by Herbert Feigl in [Fei58] and outside it by
U. T. Place (in [Pla56]) and J. J. C. Smart. Unfortunately, such admis-
sions have not been very inuential, and there have still been recently many
philosophers who try to justify behaviourism with appeal to some seldom
claried version of vericationism. This apparently includes even such inu-
ential philosophers as and Quine, whose argument for ontological relativity
in [Qui68] has behaviourism as an essential and indeed explicit premise, as
seen in [Qui68, page 186]. In my view this also includes Michael Dummett
and his followers, as I will argue later, though unlike Quine Dummett denied
in [Dum78, pages xxxii-xxxviii] that his theory, or the theory of Wittgen-
stein it is inspired by, is behaviourist50. In my view this already suces
to undermine both Dummett's justicationism and Quine's ontological rel-
whether it can take place in the experience of all subjects or in the experience of one
subject only? Why should the heteropsychological be any more problematic than the
heterotemporal? Indeed, if all that is required is the logical possibility of verication, as
Schlick claimed, then verication by means of telepathy surely suces for meaningfulness,
for telepathy is surely logically possible.
50Dummet dealt with he example of pain-ascriptions, which were used by Strawson as
arguments against him. Dummett holds that Wittgenstein's and his theory is neither
behaviourist nor realist, but it is not clear that there is a middle way here; even materi-
alist theories competing with behaviourism, such as the identity theory or functionalism,
already seem to be realist theories. In order to refute realism about pains Dummett ap-
peals dogmatically to Wittgenstein's private language argument, not even bothering to
repeat the argument, which is rather high-handed, since there is a lot of unclarity about
just what that argument is supposed to be and where its probative force is supposed to
consist.
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ativism.
It is indeed not wholly clear why Quine embraces behaviourism. Quine
seems to think that naturalism requires behaviourism; however, it is far from
clear just what Quine means by "naturalism" in this context. The word
"naturalism" is ambiguous in many ways, and can be taken either as an on-
tological or an epistemological (or methodological) theory (or some kind of
combination of both). If naturalism is taken as an ontological theory, then
the strongest form of naturalism is commonly taken to be physicalism (which
Quine indeed explicitly accepted in many of his later writings, as in [Qui93])
or physicalism together with nominalism (which Quine at rst defended but
later abandoned). However, even physicalism does not require behaviourism,
but is consistent with many dierent theories incompatible from it. It is
generally held to be consistent (though there is much dispute about all of
these examples) with identity theory (like Feigl's theory), functionalism (as
many philosophers have recently argued, e. g. Devitt in [Dev84, page 277]
arguing specically against Dummett), emergent materialism, anomalous
monism etc. While all of these theories have severe problems, all of them
are generally recognized to be better than behaviourism. Neither, however,
does moderate empiricism, which is often called epistemological naturalism,
lead to behaviourism. Therefore one must suspect that some kind of ver-
icationism or other kind of extreme empiricism (which would be extreme
epistemological naturalism) remains as a motive for Quine's behaviourism.
Since the ontological relativism at which Quine arrives as a result of his
argument based on behaviourism is scarcely consistent with any kind of
genuine physicalism or even weaker forms of naturalism (as a genuine phys-
icalist would say that physicalism is absolutely true, not just true relative
to some conceptual scheme, and similarly even a weaker kind of ontological
naturalist would say that naturalism is absolutely true) then if Quine's ar-
gument is valid, surely even a physicalist is best advised to steer clear from
behaviourism.
The situation with regard to physical objects is not quite the same as
with regard to the mental states of other people or the past, since it can
doubted whether the existence of sense-contents or sense-data is at all part
of common sense; however, other sense-data theorists had claimed that phys-
ical objects were causes of sense data but could not be analysed into them,
and Ayer did not really have any good arguments against this view. Ayer
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had admitted that statements about the behaviour of other people can be
relevant to the determination of the truth or falsehood of statements about
their mental states (without being conclusive evidence for such statements)
even if statements about mental states are not analysed in terms of such evi-
dence. Similarly statements about sense data (or about sensations) could be
relevant to the determination of the truth or falsehood of statements about
physical objects whether or not physical objects are reducible to sense data.
Or course it is only in the rst case that they might provide conclusive ver-
ication, and in the second case they can only provide conrmation, but
Ayer had admitted that conclusive verication is not needed. Therefore the
weakened vericationist principle does not by itself decide whether or not
physical objects are reducible to sense data, and therefore this remains a
genuine question, and it is clearly very closely connected with the tradi-
tional metaphysical question about the existence of the external world. A
representationalist could argue that the coherence of our sensations conrms
the hypothesis of an external world, since if such a world did not exist our
sensations would be unlikely to be organized in such systematic ways as they
actually are51.
However, it would not be fatal to the defender of metaphysics even if
the particular statements Ayer mentioned were not veriable even in the
weak sense in which he now understood veriability. In order for the prin-
ciple to show that all metaphysics is impossible, all metaphysical theories
would have to be such that no observations would be relevant to the de-
termination of its truth or falsehood, but this is clearly not the case. A
defender of metaphysics could easily accept that some metaphysical theo-
ries, such as some of the most extravagant specimens of German idealism
(like the statements of Bradley which Ayer quotes), were meaningless; he
has only to defend the thesis that some metaphysical theory (which is of
some interest) is meaningful. It is of course not implausible that some the-
ories which were not metaphysical had been misclassied as metaphysical;
however, the positivist enemy of metaphysics would have to show at least
that most statements that have been traditionally viewed as metaphysical
or all statements that satisfy a traditionally used denition of metaphysical
51Surely it is logically possible that our sensations would suddenly lose all their coherence
- that for example when we drew nearer to distant objects they would not seem larger but
smaller, that when we walked round an object it would turn out to have no back side, etc.
- and this would surely count against i. e. disconrm the reality of the sensible world.
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statements were meaningless. It is all too easy to just dene metaphysical
statements as meaningless ones, but if the positivist does this (as many have
been accused of doing) he commits the most egregious possible form of the
fallacy of attacking a straw man. If we look at one of the earliest highly
controversial metaphysical theories, Aristotle's theory of intelligences, we see
that surely some observations are relevant to its truth or falsehood. Since
the theory said that these intelligences move heavenly spheres and therefore
the planets attached to them in a perfectly spherical motion, astronomical
observations that indicated that the planets did not move in this way or
even that spheres did not exist would count against its truth52. Indeed, as
we know from the history of science such astronomical observations were
actually made by Copernicus and others and they led to the abandonment
of the Ptolemaic astronomy and also to the abandonment of this metaphys-
ical theory at least in its original form (though of course Neo-Aristotelians
sometimes try to defend radically modied forms of this theory). Aristotle's
Intelligences were therefore not transcendent to experience in any stronger
way than subatomic particles like electrons are.
The debate over the criterion has produced a long string of counter-
examples and attempted patches, and most philosophers have ultimately
lost interest, though the issue remains not fully decided and important.
There is in this situation reason to suspect that no formulation of the veri-
cation criterion will be both acceptable and inconsistent with metaphysics,
so that the obstacle to metaphysics that the criterion seemed to present was
just an illusory one. Since the debate has rather petered out than been
denitely resolved, it cannot be completely ruled out that some version of
the criterion might ultimately be salvaged, unlikely though that seems at
this point. Vericationism is not then quite as conclusively disproved as
structuralism (in its original form) was disproved by Newman's argument.
However, there is no reason to think that such a criterion, even if one were
found, would have the consequences logical positivists thought it would have,
and would declare all metaphysics (or even a signicant portion of contem-
porary metaphysics) meaningless. Besides, showing that the criterion could
be formulated in a way that was neither absurd nor vacuous would not do
52I am not claiming that Aristotle's arguments for the existence of the Intelligences
would have been valid even if Eudoxus's astronomy had been wholly correct; just how
the arguments are supposed to work is rather murky. However, the vital point is that
Aristotle did consider observations relevant to the adoption of his metaphysical theory.
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much to show that the criterion was true, for just showing that a state-
ment is not absurd certainly does not suce to justify that statement! The
defenders of the criterion have lost sight of this crucial additional task of
positively justifying the principle in the heat of responding to attacks on it.
Cheryl Misak says in [Mis95, page viii] that the thought at the heart of
the veriability principle is that a belief with no connection to experience
is spurious. If vericationism were understood this broadly, then its roots
would not only go as deep as Berkeley, as Misak says, but even Aristotle and
such Aristotelians as Thomas Aquinas would count as vericationists (and
probably even earlier philosophers, Democritus etc.). After all, Aristotle at
least admitted that all beliefs must ultimately consist of primitive concepts
derived from experience, which is a connection to experience, even if a rather
weak one. However, this is absurd; the word "vericationism" just cannot
be appropriately used as broadly as this.
Indeed, Misak soon begins to argue for a rather strong theory, similar
to the earlier version of vericationism that logical positivists themselves
eventually abandoned. She argues that vericationism is inconsistent with
realism, sliding soon from the claim that a belief must be connected to expe-
rience to the rather dierent claim that a belief cannot transcend experience,
so it is rather pointless to begin from so weak a claim, unless it is done in
order to mislead the reader53.
Apart from the question whether verication has to be conclusive or not,
there is another way in which formulations of vericationism can be ambigu-
ous, namely the interpretation of the concept of possibility used when we
speak of veriability, i. e. of what can be veried, i. e. what it is possible
to verify (or falsify or conrm or disconrm). Ayer in [Aye34] had only spo-
ken ambiguously of veriability in principle, and this could be interpreted
as either logical or nomological possibility of verication. Once logical pos-
itivists noticed the question, disagreements with regard to it arose among
them. Moritz Schlick had formulated vericationism in terms of mere logi-
53Yet in the end Misak's lengthy discussion of various forms of vericationism leaves
rather obscure just what kind of vericability Misak requires. In the end she calls her
view modest vericationism, and has such formulations as in [Mis95, page 201-202]
a statement lacks legitimacy or objectivity if there would be no evidence for
or against it
. This formulation does not even entail empiricism; even an extreme rationalist could
agree with it, just adding the gloss that evidence need not be empirical evidence. Only a
negative coherentist could disagree with it.
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cal possiblity of verication in 1936 in [Sch36]. On the other hand, Carnap
held later in [Car36, page 423]) that the possibility in question was phys-
ical i. e. nomological possibility. Schlick's view threatens to trivialize the
principle completely. Schlick's formulation of the principle was then in one
respect rather weak: however, in another respect it was still rather strong,
since Schlick still thought that it was the logical possibility of conclusive
verication that was required.
Schlick even went so far as to say in [Sch36, page 342] that in stating the
vericationist principle the positivist does no more than describe a situation
in which there is no way of understanding any meaning without ultimate
reference to ostensive denitions54. However, this is clearly false; even the
weaker form of vericationism goes far beyond the necessity of ostensive
denitions. Even Aristotle could have accepted that necesity, since as we
have seen he was a concept empiricist. The neccessity of ostensive denitions
was clearly expressed in Bertrand Russell's Principle of Acquaintance as
formulated e. g. in [Rus12b, page 91]:
Every proposition which we can understand must composed wholly
of constituents with which we are acquainted.
However, when Russell formulated the Principle of Acquaintance he yet ac-
cepted that we can have a lot of knowledge by description of entities with
which we are not acquainted55. Also the principle allows that there may be
54This view is of course utterly incompatible with the structuralism also frequently held
by logical positivists; e. g. with Carnap's view in [Car67, xII.A.16, page 29] that anything
that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive denition is subjective, and since scientic
statements are objective their meaning is independent of all ostensive denitions. Schlick
himself had subscribed to Carnap's view in [Sch26]. He seems then to have changed his
view radically in ten years, unless his view was radically inconsistent.
55We can here see an anticipation of Quine's views in early Russell, as Quine recog-
nized in [Qui53d, page 12]. Russell famously interpreted descriptions (both denite and
indenite) with the aid of quantiers; so in having knowledge of an entity by description
we are quantifying over it. i. e. the entity is a value of a bound variable, even though
no basic constant term denotes it. Quine emphasized that the only way we can involve
ourselves in ontological commitments is with the aid of variables. This is, however, very
controversial, for opponents of descriptivism who follow Saul Kripke's [Kri72] would say
that names cannot be reduced to descriptions as both Russell and Quine thought. How-
ever, it seems to me that a more important point about variables is that we can involve
ourselves with the aid of variables and descriptions in ontological commitments in which
we cannot involve ourselves with any other means. It seems to me that even opponents of
descriptivism ought to accept this very important fact. At least they ought to accept that
descriptions play an important role in xing the reference of names; by using descriptions
to x reference we can give references to names to which we could not otherwise have
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propositions whose constituents we are not acquainted with; we just cannot
understand such propositions. Russell thought at that time that we were
not acquainted with physical objects (or with minds) but only with sense-
data and mental acts (and their characteristics); however, he yet thought
that physical objects (and minds) existed and we had knowledge of them56.
The vericationist principle in its early, strong forms denied the possibil-
ity of this, since according to it a sentence containing as its grammatical
subject a denite description which purportedly denoted an entity which
was not observable was meaningless. However, nothing in Russell's the-
ory implied that such a sentence would be meaningless, so vericationism
is stronger than Russell's Principle of Acquaintance. It is then important
to distinguish these principles, especially since they have been commonly
confused57. Even if all our basic concepts and/or the semantic values of ba-
given it, even if the meaning of the description then falls away from the meaning of the
name, unlike what Russell thought.
56It is no part of the concept of acquaintance itself that we can only be acquainted with
sense-data, as it has often been misunderstood. Russell's view that we are not acquainted
with physical objects did not follow from the denition of acquaintance, but from the
Argument from Illusion, and philosophers who accept the Principle of Acquaintance can
yet disagree whether that argument is valid. The Principle of Acquaintance is compatible
with dierent phenomenological views about what we are acquainted with, and leaves room
for theories according to which we are acquainted with physical objects, so that even a
non-eliminativist physicalist might accept it. It seems very plausible to me that any theory
which can be properly called concept empiristic (as distinct from empiricism concerning
justication) must accept the Principle of Acquaintance if that principle is understood
in the weakest sense, separated from accidental accretions. Indeed, the principle has
sometimes also been called the Principle of Empiricism. The logical positivists's concept
of observation is historically derived from Russell's concept of acquaintance and is certainly
closely related to it if not the very same. However, while acceptance of the principle is
arguably necessary for concept empiricism, it may not be sucient; concept rationalists
could also accept it, for intellectual intuition would also count as a form of acquaintance.
An empiricist must suppose also that acquaintance happens in some way through the
senses.
57These principles seem to have been commonly confused in the ontological tradition
started by Gustav Bergmann. Bergman and his followers thought that we had to be
acquainted with the simples of ontological analysis. I suspect this view resulted (like
Ayer's similar view) from confusing epistemological and ontological priority; Russell's
original principle only says that we have to be acquainted with epistemologically primary
i e. epistemologically simple notions. E. g. Edwin B. Allaire appealed in [All63] to what
he called the principle of acquaintance, but was really vericationism; no wonder, since
he was a follower of Bergmann, who had been a logical empiricist and never really freed
himself from vericationism. Allaire argued in this paper in favour of bare particulars, and
assumed that the principle of acquaintance implied that one can only accept the existence
of bare particulars if one can show that he is acquainted with them. Allaire completely
ignored the possibility that we could know bare particulars by description. Kenneth C.
Clatterbaugh in [Cla65] and Herbert Hochberg in [Hoc65] and in [Hoc66] argued against
the Principle of Acquaintance misunderstood in such a vericationist sense. The debate
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sic terms are derived from experience, from sense-impressions or stimuli via
ostensive denitions, we can yet think and talk meaningfully about entities
of we which we cannot have experience58. All this requires is that we can
combine our basic concepts into complex concepts and judgments and/or
our basic terms into complex terms and sentences in such ways that the
corresponding impressions or stimuli cannot be combined in corresponding
ways in any sensations, and clearly most empiricists have believed this to
be possible. The reason why the sense-impressions or stimuli cannot be
combined in some way can plausibly be explained to in many cases be due
to the nature and constitution of our minds or (as a physicalist would do)
sense-organs or nervous systems, not to the nature of reality as a whole. In
this case the entities our basic concepts are about or our basic terms denote
can be related to entities we cannot in principle have experience of in ways
corresponding to the ways in which the basic concepts are related to the
complex concept and the basic terms are related to the complex term. E.
g. we can speak about the parts of a minimal observable object a by means
of the complex description "part of a", and the minimal observable entity
a can be related to its parts as the term "a" is related to the term "part of
centred on the question whether we are acquainted with bare particulars, as they were one
of the most controversial entities claimed to be objects of acquaintance. I will not deal
with the problem of individuation in this work and hence will not discuss bare particulars,
but I will return to the general debate later in 6.4.1. As I will later show, such modern
historians of philosophy as Cheryl Misak also confuse the principle of acquaintance and
vericationism, because they confuse views Russell held at dierent times.
58We can talk about such entities whether or not we can have propositional knowledge
or justied beliefs concerning them, which is a separate question. Russell already dis-
tinguished (e. g. in [Rus12b, page 72]) knowledge of things and knowledge of truths,
and his knowledge by description is according to him a form of the knowledge of things.
However, Russell yet thought that knowledge by description involved knowledge of truths;
in order to know an entity by description we had to know propositionally that the de-
scription was satised by something. We can, however, dene a more general concept of
knowledge by description or perhaps better expressed thought by description such that
when we use a denite description we think of the entity that satises it, even if we do
not know and even if we cannot know that anything is satised by the description. It
is possible to modify vericationism so that statements about unobservable entities are
meaningful (without being reducible to statements concerning observable entities) but no
such statement can be justied. This is basically the view of Bas van Fraassen's con-
structive empiricism in [vF80]. This view is in my view slightly more plausible than the
vericationism of logical positivists; however, it is also quite implausible at rst sight,
and as I will briey discuss later, van Fraassen's arguments scarcely suce in justifying
it in spite of its unintuitiveness. What Ladyman et al. call a non-positivistic form of
vericationism in [LwDSC07, page 29] - not hypothesis which the approximately consen-
sual current scientic picture declares beyond our capacity to investigate should be taken
seriously - is also similar, being a methodological rather than a semantic principle.
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a".
Ayer said in [Aye34, page 345] that if a philosopher maintains that his
criterion is too narrow and that metaphysical propositions are signicant,
it is up to him to put forward a more liberal criterion; one that allows the
signicance of metaphysical propositions yet is not so liberal as to allow
for the signicance of expressions such as "jealousy pronoun live" or "sie
hip brim". I can surely respond to this challenge by appealing to a view
of meaning that seems to follow from the systematic, recursive nature of
language, namely the view that a linguistic expression which is grammatical
(well-formed) and such that all of the (non-logical) basic terms occurring in
it or used to dene terms occurring in it have ostensive denitions is always
meaningful59. This view is still compatible with a weak concept empiricism
and far from trivial, for a strong rationalist such as a Platonist (in the exact
historical sense) might deny even it, holding that the concept serving as the
meaning of some expressions is known to us innately and perceptions only
serve to remind us of it. It seems to me that most of what is controversial
in vericationism is its rejection of this view, and that logical positivists
never gave sucient reasons to reject this view and hold that even such a
grammatical linguistic expression whose basic terms are dened in terms of
observables could be meaningless60.
59This view implies that semantically deviant sentences which might be held to contain
category mistakes, such as Chomsky's famous "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously", are
meaningful, which many think an unintuitive result. However, it seems to me that the
deviance of this sentence is best accounted for by the claim that it is necessarily false and
analytically false, but it is still meaningful (and we know that it is analytically false i. e.
false because of its meaning because we understand its meaning).
60Carl G. Hempel considered in [Hem65, pages 107-113] briey the possibility of charac-
terizing cognitively signicant sentences by demanding that the meaning of all extralogical
terms in a sentence be capable of explication by reference to observables. He eventually
rejects this possibility and instead went to the other extreme where the criterion of mean-
ingfulness is applied not to terms or sentences but only to entire theories. However,
Hempel did not give very good reasons for doing so. He noted that attempts to provide
denitions in terms of observables encounter diculties in the case of disposition terms.
However, he certainly did not show that such diculties would be insuperable. He said
in [Hem65, page 109] that a satisfactory denition would require a clarication of the
meaning and logic of counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals, which is a thorny prob-
lem. However, that it is thorny problem does not show that it cannot be done. In fact,
much work towards the solution of this problem has been done by such philosophers as
Lewis (e. g. in [Lew73]), Stalnaker, etc, and while diculties naturally remain, they are
surely not greater than those still facing attempts to clarify the vericationist criterion.
Unfortunately, much of the debate concerning such conditionals lately has turned to the
use of conditionals in natural languages, and the question of disposition terms in natural
science has been ignored. However, some philosophers, such as James Fetzer in [FN79],
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Part of what is controversial about vericationism is then its commit-
ment to a kind of weak semantic holism, a view according to which it is at
the level of sentences instead of terms that the connection between meanings
and experience is established. The earlier theories of analytical philosophers
such as Russell and probably even Aristotelian theories had been atomistic,
at least in comparison to vericationism. This holism, as we will see later
in Section 3.4 of this work, was later strengthened to an extreme holism
according to which the connection between experience and meaning oper-
ates at the level of whole theories, paradoxically when vericationism as a
whole was weakened so that verication was replaced by conrmation and
disconrmation.
In fact the consequences of any kind of empiricism, even a far weaker
one than vericationism, depend entirely on the theory or description of
experience formulated or presupposed by the empiricist. As one special case
of this, what problems the vericationist principle declares to be pseudo-
problems depends not only on how strong the formulation of the principle
itself is, but also on the theory or description of experience formulated or
presupposed by the vericationist. It can even be argued that words such
as "experience" or "observation" are ambiguous or vague as they are used
in natural languages, so that the very meaning of empiricism itself, and a
fortiori of the verication principle, is not clear until it is explained what
kind of concept of experience is employed in formulating it. If we are unsure
just what we can in principle experience or observe, then even if it were
correct that a meaningful sentence would have to be in principle veriable
by means of experience or observations, yet knowing this might not suce
have developed logics of conditionals explicitly for the purpose of clarifying the meaning
of disposition terms in science. Besides this, it is not clear that all disposition terms are
theoretical terms, so that a concept empiricist would even need to dene them. Since
Hempel had no systematic theory of experience, no systematic account of the distinction
between observational and theoretical terms, he had no rational reason to suppose that
disposition terms would have to be theoretical. Many theories of experience hold that
some dispositions can be perceived, so some disposition terms could already be observa-
tion terms. In this case the general concept of a disposition might be abstracted from the
observation of particular dispositions, and the rest of disposition terms might perhaps be
dened in terms of this general concept of a disposition. Indeed, even if a clarication of
the meaning of counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals proved impossible and a more
rigorous theory of observation statements showed that disposition terms were not obser-
vational, then even rejecting all disposition terms as meaningless would seem to me to be
preferable to the radical view that only complete theories are meaningful, unattractive as
such a rejection of disposition terms undoubtedly is; the logical positivists were willing to
reject far broader sets of terms as meaningless.
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to tell us which sentences are meaningful since we might not know (or even
be capable of knowing) which sentences are veriable in principle.
This description of experience can be called a phenomenology (or more
exactly a part of a phenomenology); of course, the positivists would not have
liked this word, because they did not like the most famous phenomenology
around, Hussserl's phenomenology (as we have already seen in the case of
Schlick) and liked even less later existentialist phenomenologies (as we have
seen Carnap condemned Heidegger's writings as nonsense). However, even if
their objections to Husserl's doctrines were valid, the notion of phenomenol-
ogy should not be tied to the doctrines of any particular philosopher. With
the logical positivists the problem of the description of experience took (be-
cause of the syntacticism I will examine in the next section of this work) the
curious form of the question regarding the form and content of what they
called protocol sentences or protocol statements or (more naturally) ob-
servation sentences or observation statements basic statements which were
supposed to describe the given, or what was observed or sensed. A sen-
tence was supposed by Carnap in [Car32b, page 222] to be veriable (and
hence meaningful) only if could be derived from protocol sentences. It is
by no means obvious or uncontroversial how experience, in which verica-
tion occurs, should be correctly described; the logical positivists themselves
disagreed vehemently among themselves about what the protocol sentences
were. The phenomenologists at least tried to approach this problem sys-
tematically and rigorously, whether they succeeded or not, but logical posi-
tivists such as Ayer did not always even acknowledge the problem. Carnap
attempted a systematic description of experience in his Aufbau and Nelson
Goodman in [Goo51], so the logical positivists had some systematic the-
ories at the back of their claims of meaninglessness. However, of course
these theories could be questioned on many points even by someone who
accepted vericationism, so the logical positivists had no right to speak as
if the meaninglessness of any particular claim were obvious.
The poorer one thinks experience is, the more sentences vericationism
declares meaningless, and conversely, the richer one thinks experience is,
the more sentences remain meaningful even according to a strong form of
vericationism. The logical positivists had often a very narrow, impover-
ished conception of experience, limiting it to sense perception. The views
of logical positivists that were most agrantly opposed to common sense
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followed usually from such arbitrary limitations on admissible experience.
The absurd view that statements concerning the past were meaningless or
really spoke about traces in the present followed only with the aid of a
view of experience that did not admit memory, even episodic memory, as a
form of experience additional to present perception. The logical positivists'
logical behaviourism depended to a great extent on the rejection of inner
perception and hence of introspection as a form of observation. Even the
classical British empiricists had admitted reection i. e. the perception of
inner mental states as a primitive form of experience61; phenomenologists
like Husserl had of course a very broad view of experience which included not
only such inner perception but the intuition of essences (and as we have seen
the debate of Husserl and Schlick turned partly on the correct conception of
experience). I will later return in more detail to the question of phenomenol-
ogy and protocol sentences with regard to the question of whether we have
experience of universals in Subsection 6.4.1 of this dissertation.
Also even the way in which the early logical positivists like Ayer (and
Schlick and to some extent Carnap - though Carnap's commitment to the
sense-datum theory was a bit more equivocal from the start) conceived sense
perception was by no means uncontroversial. In their case the phenomenol-
ogy presupposed was a form of the sense-datum theory, so that the protocol
sentences spoke about sense-data or more accurately sense-contents. How-
ever, for earlier sense-datum theorists as e. g. Moore in the papers collected
in [Moo22b] or Russell in [Rus12b] the distinction between acts of sensa-
tion and sense-data had been central. The early logical positivists denied
this distinction so that for them experience did not consist of mental acts
directed upon sense-data, but of sense-data or sense-contents themselves.
That distinction had of course been the key idea of Moore's famous attack
on idealism and defence of realism in [Moo22c], and therefore rejecting the
distinction they naturally also rejected Moore's realism. However, they did
not want to go back to idealism either but instead tried to nd a position
between realism and idealism, in which I have argued at least some of them
(e. g. at least Ayer) failed. So it is not vericationism alone, but only
61Carnap broadened his conception of experience in [Car56, pages 70,71], admitting
that
a person's awareness of his own state of imagining, feeling etc. must be
recognized as a kind of observation. . .
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vericationism together with their theory of experience, which led them to
the rejection of realism and into neutral monism. However, later many logi-
cal positivists, in turning from neutral monism to physicalism following the
lead of Otto Neurath took the objects of experience (the entities denoted by
terms occurring in protocol sentences) to already be physical objects6263.
This change clearly involved a radical change in the logical positivists'
conception of experience itself and therefore in the very interpretation of the
vericationist criterion. Statements concerning sense-data or sense-contents,
which earlier were the very paradigm of veriable and hence meaningful
statements, were now often rejected as meaningless and "metaphysical".
Nevertheless, even physicalistic vericationism may not be compatible with
scientic realism; it allows only statements about macroscopic physical ob-
jects like trees and rocks to be meaningful, but not claims about theoretical
entities such as atoms or quarks.
It can be argued that trying to combine vericationism with physical-
ism64 may already lead to inconsistency. There are many kinds of reasons
for this, of which I will mention three.
On one hand the notion of verication is based on the notion of expe-
62Ayer forms an interesting exception as he in [Aye87, page 29] rejected neutral monism
and accepted the existence of irreducible physical objects but yet continued to hold that
the immediate objects of perception are sense-contents (or rather sense-data, as Ayer
returned to the terminology of older analytic philosophy as well as its doctrines).
63One prominent motivation for this was that verication should be intersubjective;
however, this does not seem to be a sucient reason for it. While science should be
in some way intersubjective, it suces for such intersubjectivity as is possible that the
intermediate rather than the ultimate epistemic foundations of science should be the same
for all scientists. Even if the direct objects of experience are physical, yet scientists cannot
have the same experiences (or experiences with the very same objects or content) of them.
No two scientists can observe the same object at the same time from the very same spatial
position relative to it (and indeed usually they observe dierent though similar objects).
Because of this they do not observe the very same facts concerning physical objects and
do not get to know immediately the same propositions concerning them. When a scientist
replicates an experiment made by another, he replicates the same type of experiment,
not the same event of observing, and therefore he has experience of dierent even if
relevantly similar particulars. Another, perhaps more serious reason for rejecting the
sense-datum theory lies in claims that the sense-datum theory would be wrong even as
a phenomenology; I cannot deal with this argument here, and must therefore suspend
judgement on the question of the objects of experience
64It is a bit controversial whether Neurath himself was ever a vericationist, but Carnap
(e. g. in [Car56]) and Hempel at least clearly did try to combine vericationism with
physicalism. However, Neurath surely held that metaphysical statements were senseless,
and it is hard to see what except vericationism could have been the basis of this view.
Therefore if Neurath was not a vericationist, his rejection of metaphysical statements as
meaningful probably was wholly baseless.
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rience, and it is far from clear how the notion of experience could be un-
derstood in physicalistically acceptable terms. The later logical positivists
usually tried to do this by appealing to some kind of behaviourism, which
was the worst possible way to do it. Neurath alrady talked about stimuli
(Reaktionsprufungen) in [Neu32, page 209] (see [Neu59, page 204] for an
English translation). Carnap apparently tried to resolve this apparent in-
consistency in [Car32a] (see [Car87, page 458]) by treating men as similar
to machines which react to certain situations by displaying signal-disks; this
rather crude behaviouristic solution surely alters the meaning of verication
very dramatically. Quine (who I will argue was at least at some phases of
philosophical development a vericationist) tried to replace talk about ex-
perience with talk about stimuli, but there are many problems in this. The
words "stimulus" and "stimulation" are ambiguous and can be used in nar-
rower and broader senses. Chomsky showed in [Cho59] that the behaviourist
Skinner had fallaciously shifted between the narrower and broader senses of
the word. Current vericationists can be accused of doing the same thing
(as Chomsky indeed accused Quine of a similar though less gross confusion
in the case of the related word "reinforcement" in [Cho69, page 555,56]),
though the senses they shift between may be dierent65. It is sure that
65E. g. in [Qui93, pages 107-108] Quine spoke at rst of physical objects and events,
then of the impact of molecules and light rays on our sensory receptors i. e. of sensory
intake and lastly of neural intake in the brain. Quine was to some extent aware of the
danger of equivocation here and tried to avoid it. The discussion in this article, by tak-
ing into account the neural input, is far more sophisticated than the crude behaviourism
Quine exhibited elsewhere (e. g. in [Qui68]). Indeed, the views Quine expressed in the two
articles are hardly even consistent, for in [Qui68, page 186] he denies that a man's seman-
tics might be determinate beyond what is implicit in his dispositions to overt behaviour,
and neural input, which he in [Qui93, pages 107-108] takes as relevant to semantics, is
surely determinate beyond what is implicit in overt behaviour. However, while Quine
may here have had (at least many of) the pieces for a plausible theory of perception, he
did not put them together correctly. The puzzle is more complex than he saw. Quine
took in [Qui93, pages 114-115] the sensory intake to be what was essential to perception,
instead of neural intake further in the brain (where identity theorists would locate the
sensation or perception). Quine gave as the only reason for this that sensory intake is
neater, which is a rather weak reason. A more important consideration would seem to
be that neural intake in the brain is the only one of the dierent kinds of stimulus that
is necessary for the subject seeming to perceive something, and for his uttering sincerely
an observation sentence. Quine seems to have supposed that these three kinds of stim-
ulus are always correlated; he says that the observation sentence is Janus-faced, facing
outward to its subject matter and inward to neural intake. However, in such cases as
illusion and hallucination, they need not be correlated. The sensory intake can occur
without its customary subject matter in the case of illusion and the neural intake can
occur without either the customary subject matter or the sensory intake in the case of
hallucination. The two faces of Janus can, to extend the metaphor, temporarily separate
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the original positivists like Mach or Avenarius would have been horried
by these views, since they were as strongly opposed to physicalism as to
traditional idealism.
Adopting physicalism also makes the problem of demarcating between
observation statements and other statements far harder66. Does observa-
tion through telescopes or microscopes count as genuine, direct observation?
What about observation through spectacles? Through window-panes?
However, these two problems also face attempts to combine physicalism
and direct realism with forms of empiricism weaker than vericationism, so
they should perhaps not be stressed too much in the criticism of verication-
ism. Nevertheless, the behaviourism of logical positivists gave them a much
worse chance of solving this problem than more sophisticated physicalistic
theories like the identity theory or functionalism would have done.
However the line is drawn, there are strong reasons to think that no
statements regarding physical entities are conclusively veriable (in the way
and become dierent heads which utter dierent oracles. In such cases the same sensory
intake may be associated with dierent neural input by dierent speakers. However, it is
surely the neural process with which a reductive physicalist such as an identity theorist
would identify the process of perception or upon which he would hold the perception to
supervene or whose functional role he would hold it to be. Even among logical positivists
Herbert Feigl had advocated (in [Fei58]) such a form of materialism that is surely more
sophisticated than the behaviourism to which Quine is committed. Therefore intersubjec-
tivity in practice, which was as important to Quine as it was to Neurath, breaks down.
The Argument from Illusion then threatens also the physicalized version of vericationism
combined with direct realism. Quine recognizes in [Qui93, page 111] that we are not aware
of our neural intake (which I must qualify by saying that we are at least not aware of it as
neural intake). In this case it cannot be referred to (as a neural process) in an observation
sentence. However, in the case of a hallucination we may not aware of anything objective,
but seem to be aware of something because of the neural intake and can sincerely utter
an observation sentence. It is easy enough to suppose that in such cases we are aware
of a sense-datum; however, there may be other options. One could hold as Place seems
to have done at the end of [Pla56] that even in hallucination one seems to perceive the
same kind of physical objects that normally cause the neural input, but seems to perceive
them in a location where they are not. This kind of causal theory of perception would
allow direct realism about physical objects but would also allow observation sentences to
be fallible, in accordance with weak foundationalism or foundherentism. Naturally there
are many problems also with this view, such as the problem of analysing what "normally"
here means in any exact terms and the diculty of specifying the kind of causal chain that
would endow mental states with the object they are commonly thought to be perceptions
of. Nevertheless, this view is certainly preferable to behaviourism. I will return to this
problem later in Section 3.5.
66Grover Maxwell rst attacked the existence of a distinction between observational
and theoretical in [Max62], but later accepted it in [Max70]. He could accept it only
by assuming that no observational terms denoted physical objects, but the observable is
instantiated only in inner events of observers.
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that statements regarding sense-contents or sense-data could be argued to
be), so the combination of vericationism with physicalism exacerbates the
problem of formulating vericationism. It increases the pressure on verica-
tionists to nd a formulation that is neither vacuous nor requires conclusive
verication, and as we have seen it is far from clear that any such formulation
can be found. Unlike the previous problems, this need not be a problem for
empiricism or foundationalism as such, since as we have seen a weak foun-
dationalist can take the foundations of knowledge to be fallible, but it is
hard problem for the specic strong form of empiricism that vericationism
constitutes. Related to this is the problem that taking observable entities
to be physical makes drawing a sharp line between observable and theoreti-
cal entities or observational and theoretical terms more dicult; sense-data
would be so much dierent from physical objects that few predicates could
apply to both, so drawing a line is quite easy in their case. Also the coheren-
tism that Neurath has been interpreted as holding makes the problems still
more dicult, for coherentism seems inconsistent with both vericationism
(since it is inconsistent with foundationalism and vericationism is a version
of empiricism which is a version of foundationalism) and physicalism (since
theories which claim that non-physical entities exist or even that physical
entities do not exist can surely be coherent and hence according to this
theory they would be true).
As this debate continued, many logical positivists came to think that
the choice of protocol sentences was a matter of convention, as seen for
example in [Car32a] (translated into English in [Car87]) and even more ex-
tremely in [Neu34, page 348] and in [Hem00, page 18]. However, this view
threatens to amount to a complete rejection of empiricism, even of mod-
erate empiricism, and of all kinds of foundationalism, ending in an absurd
epistemic relativism where "anything goes". If protocol sentences can be
chosen arbitrarily by convention, as Neurath and Hempel say, then why not
choose sentences from the Bible or Quran as protocol sentences, as religious
fundamentalists would like to do? Why not take as a protocol sentence
that Noah saw that water covered all the Earth? Neurath's coherentist and
conventionalist version of logical positivism is then an utter failure as a de-
fence of scientic philosophy; it allows young earth creationism to be just as
well justied for creationists and even "true" as evolutionary theory is for
evolutionary theorists.
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Because of this a defender of a scientic world-view must accept foun-
dationalism rather than coherentism or conventionalism, at least if these
exhaust the options. However, even if these are the only options, the foun-
dationalism he has to accept need not be a strong foundationalism such as
Schlick's, but can be weak foundationalism which is compatible with fallibil-
ism. Susan Haack has suggested a third option, which she calls foundheren-
tism. However, it has been argued, at least by Larence BonJour in [Bon97]
and by Peter Ramel in [Tra08] that Haack's foundherentism is really a ver-
sion of foundationalism, what Haack and Tramel call feeble foundationalism.
BonJour agreed that Haack had shown coherentism, which he had supported
earlier, to be untenable, but instead of converting to foundherentism he con-
verted to foundationalism. The question is whether foundationalism can al-
low that basic beliefs are (further) justied by other basic beliefs and even by
derived beliefs. This may be just a verbal question; it does not much matter
what an epistemological position is labelled. The important point is that
we can accept some of the important features of traditional foundationalism
and combine them with features of traditional coherentism67.
It is indeed possible that at least some of the logical empiricists speaking
out on behalf of conventionalism did not intend that the choice of protocol
sentences would be completely conventional, and of course a moderate con-
ventionalism would be defensible, if it could be restrained within reasonable
limits. Obviously it is possible to develop syntactically dierent languages
in which protocol statements can be formulated, if they are semantically
equivalent in some strong sense. However, it seems quite plain that Neurath
and the early Hempel at least did not avoid complete relativism68. I will
later return briey to these fundamental epistemological questions in con-
67Bertrand Russell seems to have anticipated feeble foundationalism or even foundher-
entism, as he said in [Rus40, page 150] that there may be evidence in favour of a basic
proposition, but it is not this evidence alone that causes the belief in such a proposition.
68Carnap accepts in [Car63b, page 864] that some of Neurath's formulations are mislead-
ing, but thinks that Neurath never really held extreme conventionalism or the coherence
conception of truth. It must, however, be suspected that Carnap's interpretation of the
thinking of his fellow positivists was too charitable. Carnap stresses that his Principle
of Tolerance did not refer to the content of synthetic sentences. However, this cannot be
correct; if the inference rules could be chosen arbitrarily, as Carnap claimed in [Car37,
page xv], then we could also choose to hold any synthetic sentence p true just by adopting
an inference rule according to which p can be inferred from any sentence at all. Besides
even if this had been true of all of Carnap's theories, this would not be enough, for Quine's
argument in [Qui76] shows that it is wrong even so far as it refers to the content of logical
theories.
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nection with the problem of universals in 6.4.1, though it is not possible in
this work to attempt any kind of comprehensive solution of them.
3.4 Holistic Vericationism and Semantic Holism
While the stronger version of vericationism was actually a theory of what
meaning was, namely a method of verication, it is not clear whether the
weaker form of vericationism could yield such a theory (even if it turned
out not to be completely vacuous, which is, as we have seen, doubtful). This
is an important question since many modern vericationists say that mean-
ing could be understood in terms of verication conditions or assertibility
conditions (as I will later show Hartry Field does) or acceptance conditions
etc. (there are many expressions for the same idea), and one must ask if
this commits them to a strong form of vericationism or not. A natural way
to generalize the idea of meaning as a method of verication would be to
hold that meaning is a method of defeasible conrmation or disconrmation.
However, this appears to lead to some very strange and unpleasant conclu-
sions. It has often been argued (as was already done by Pierre Duhem) that
conrmation is holistic in nature, and if that is correct then this general-
ization would lead to a view according to which meaning is also similarly
holistic, a view called (strong) meaning holism or semantic holism According
to this view individual sentences are not meaningful in themselves, but only
complete scientic theories are.
Semantic holism was professed by many philosophers within the logi-
cal positivist movement or inuenced by it, e. g. by Carl Hempel (e. g.
in [Hem65, page 113]) and as I will argue by Quine. However, it leads to
many very unattractive, indeed disastrous conclusions. It makes it very hard
to compare theories, since according to it the same term - or at least the
same non-observational term - occurring in diering theories always has a
diering meaning in them, so it leads to well-known problems of incommen-
surability69. It even makes it mysterious how people with dierent beliefs
69One consequence of vericationism and holism drawn out by Hempel is the view ac-
cording to which scientic theories are partially interpreted calculi, a view also defended
by Carnap in [Car56] and by other philosophers such as Ernest Nagel and Braithwaite.
Hempel considered in [Hem65, pages 114-116] several suggestions that consider theoretical
systems to be cognitively signicant if they are partially interpreted to some extent by
means of what are called bridge laws or correspondence rules, and while he did not ulti-
mately accept any of them, yet this kind of suggestion has become widespread. Indeed it
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and thus dierent theories are at all able to communicate. Nevertheless,
it has been argued by Peter Achinstein in [Ach63] that it presents no non-
trivial restrictions on what theories are meaningful, and allows metaphysical
theories to be meaningful along with any theories at all.
It may indeed yet allow us to compare theories in some (unclear and
probably very cumbersome) way as wholes by comparing their observational
consequences as wholes, so the incommensurability this kind of semantical
holism implies by itself is not quite as bad as those implied by some other
theories in the philosophy of science; nevertheless, it still seems quite unac-
ceptable to me. However, if this kind of semantical holism is combined (as
it has often been combined) with the popular view that it is impossible to
draw any line between observation language and theoretical language, and
that observation is theory-laden (as Thomas S. Kuhn argues in chapter X
of [Kuh70]), this leads to full incommensurability of the kind Thomas S.
Kuhn famously argues for in [Kuh70], a situation where any kind of com-
parison between theories is impossible.
It must also be noted that this kind of semantic holism is very odd
as an outcome of analytical philosophy, since it would make any kind of
analysis impossible. Indeed, it resembles very much the views of the monis-
has become known (as e. g. in [Sup00]) as the Received View or the Standard Conception
of scientic theories. It is also sometimes called the Syntactic Approach or the syntactic
view, though what is distinctive of it is not its taking theories to be syntactic entities, but
the way in which theories are interpreted according to it (and it is clearly distinct from the
view according to which theories would be sets of wholly uninterpreted sentences, which
would most appropriately be called the syntactic view). This Received View is sometimes
described simply as the view of logical positivists, though it was a view characteristic
only of the last stages of logical positivism; this may lead to a misunderstanding of logical
positivism as a whole, since most views of theories developed within it were based on a
less holistic kind of vericationism. However, sometimes denitions of theoretical terms
by means of observational ones are considered as limiting cases of correspondence rules,
and in this expanded sense the Received View might cover a lot of logical positivism. The
obvious problem with the view is that intuitively it is clear that no theoretical system
which is only partially interpreted is signicant (at least in an unequivocal sense; at most
such systems are partially signicant). The Received View is often called the Syntactic
View and contrasted with what is called the Semantic View, in which theories are taken to
be sets of models. However, it is by no means clear that the "Semantic View" is the only
or the best alternative to the Received View. As Anjan Chakravartty argues in [Cha01], if
independence from language is the desideratum, why bother with models; wouldn't propo-
sitions suce? The Semantic View also seems to have holistic and structuralist features,
so its dierence from the Syntactic View may not repair what can be argued to be the
worst defect of the Received View. At least a theory cannot be taken to be the set of
all of the models of its formulations, for this would amount to taking it as an abstract
structure, and this would amount to the kind of structuralism that as we saw Newman
has shown to be untenable.
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tic Hegelian idealists as a protest against whom (by Russell and Moore)
analytical philosophy was born. In arriving at semantic holism analytical
philosophy has then in a way nullied itself. Something has then gone terri-
bly wrong, and it is surely plausible that the rst and most important thing
that went wrong was the acceptance of vericationism itself.
Among philosophers who have opposed semantic holism have been Jerry
Fodor and Ernest Lepore in [FL91], Michael Devitt in [Dev93] and others.
Fodor and Lepore defend a rather extreme semantic atomism, while Devitt
argues for a prima facie more plausible, moderate semantic localism. I nd
the criticism of Devitt more to the point than that of Fodor and Lepore
(though I cannot delve into the detailed arguments here), but they show
together that there are many points from which the arguments for semantic
holism can be attacked. Even some vericationists such as Michael Dummett
have been appalled at the consequences of implementing the vericationist
program in this way (though it is far from clear how Dummett could escape
from holistic consequences himself). These philosophers often disagree on
what is wrong in arguments for holism but most see the disastrous conse-
quences of holism as sucient to doubt the premises of any argument for
it.
Other arguments than the one based on vericationism have also been
given for semantic holism - e. g. holism has been defended on the ba-
sis of (crude versions of) functionalism. However, it seems to me that the
argument based on vericationism is by far the most important of the argu-
ments for semantic holism, so if vericationism is rejected then the case for
semantic holism becomes signicantly weaker. One common and important
argument for semantic holism that is often held to dier from the argument
based on vericationism is based on Quine's criticism of the distinction be-
tween analytical and synthetic statements70. However, Quine's argument
70Though the absence of the distinction is commonly used as an argument for semantic
holism, Fodor and Lepore strangely purport to use the absence of the distinction as a
premise in an argument against semantic holism. However, it seems to me that the crux of
their argument against semantic holism lies in their appeal to compositionality, and what
the absence of the distinction really does is motivate them to argue that if semantic holism
is false, then one must accept their extreme semantic atomism. If my interpretation that
Quine's argument for the absence of the distinction depends essentially on vericationism
is correct, then one who rejects vericationism entirely need not accept either semantic
holism or Fodor's and Lepore's extreme semantic atomism. He can reject both, which
should be a welcome result, since both are intuitively extremely implausible positions
with unwelcome consequences.
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is far from being completely independent of vericationism. This may be
somewhat controversial, as there have been attempts to argue that Quine
was not at all a vericationist, as Panu Raatikainen's argument in [Raa03],
while other interpreters of Quine such as Roger Gibson view him as denitely
a vericationist, so I will have to defend this view at some length.
As Raatikainen says in [Raa03], naturally the whole issue of whether
Quine should be considered a vericationist depends essentially on one's un-
derstanding of the term "vericationism". Unfortunately, as we have already
seen, a very great number of formulations of the vericationist criterion have
been proposed, so it is by no means a simple task to say what is essential to
vericationism, but involves a dicult task of explication in Carnap's sense.
If we stuck to the very earliest formulations of vericationism, then the later
view of logical positivists that the meaningfulness of sentences depended on
defeasible conrmation rather than conclusive verication would not count
as vericationist, but it is clearly usually counted as vericationist, and this
seems quite correct to me. Therefore we must be willing to generalize the
formulation somewhat, and it is not clear where the line appears where we
just start talking about a dierent matter. There is also the possibility that
Quine's views with regard to vericationism may have changed signicantly
between dierent writings, perhaps even in ways Quine himself refused to
acknowledge or did not even realize himself. Therefore instead of asking
whether Quine was a vericationist we should ask just whether he was a
vericationist at a certain time or in a certain article or book. Thirdly,
Quine's views may have been at some time so radically inconsistent that it
cannot be said whether he was a vericationist then. If we look at all the
quotations assembled in [Raa03], both those taken from Gibson in favour
of Quine being a vericationist and those gathered by Raatikainen himself
in opposition to it, it is far from clear that the views expressed in them
can be combined consistently. There are then good reasons to suspect that
their diversity reects either a change of views or permanent inconsistency
on Quine's part. Because of these three reasons I agree with Raatikainen
that one cannot straightforwardly or unqualiedly take Quine to be veri-
cationist. However, I will argue that it is less misleading to count the views
Quine expresses in [Qui53e] and many other writings as vericationist than
to deny that they are vericationist, though I will leave open whether the
same holds of other writings of Quine.
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If we look carefully at the argument in his famous article [Qui53e], we will
see that the argument essentially depends upon vericationism in a crucial
point, so Quine surely was a vericationist in a broad sense at least when
he wrote that article. In the beginning of the article Quine attacked the
distinction by arguing that various attempts to analyse it in more primitive
terms are unsuccessful. However, this kind of argument surely does not
suce to show that any distinction would be bogus, at least if the distinction
has some presumption in its favour (as e. g. Grice and Strawson already
argued in [GS56, page 142]). If Quine's argument as a whole is to be taken
seriously, then this initial argumentation can only be a preliminary to the
real nerve of Quine's argument, which depends on vericationism.
Quine's nal attempt to dene analyticity and synonymy in [Qui53e,
x5, page 37] appeals to the verication theory of meaning (in its older phe-
nomenalistic or neutral monistic form). Quine clearly saved for the last the
attempt which he found to be the most plausible. Quine explained that if the
verication theory were correct, then two sentences would be synonymous
if and only if they are alike in point of method of empirical conrmation of
information. However, Quine rejected this attempt because of problems in
Carnap's old atomistic and phenomenalistic form of vericationism in the
Aufbau (though the holistic vericationism Quine arrives at in this article
seems to me to resemble greatly Carnap's later view in [Car56]). It is only
because of vericationism that Quine ties the two "dogmas" together. Quine
showed that if vericationism is correct (as he assumes) and the distinction
between analytic and synthetic sentences is genuine, this implies that re-
ductionism is correct. However, Quine argues that reductionism is false,
on the rather weak ground the best attempt to implement it, Carnap's at-
tempt in the Aufbau, has not succeeded in carrying it through. Therefore,
by modus tollens, either vericationism is incorrect or the distinction is not
genuine. Quine thought that the rst option was unacceptable and hence
deduced that the distinction was not genuine. However, if we reject veri-
cationism, we can consistently both accept the distinction between analytic
and synthetic statements and reject reductionism.
However, it seems to me that Quine did not reject the attempt to illu-
minate the notion of analyticity with the aid of a verication principle, but
only presented as his solution (as we have seen Hempel also did) that the
verication principle must be stated in a dierent, holistic or organic form,
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and his revision of the concepts of analyticity and syntheticity follows from
this. Hempel had already formulated the verication principle in a holistic
form, but had yet clung to the distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements, as can be seen in the very rst page of [Hem65, 101].
I would like to propose that what is essential to vericationism (or at any
rate objectionable in it) is the view that any acceptable semantic notions
must be dened with the aid of epistemic notions like verication, conrma-
tion, etc. If we dened vericationism strictly by referring to meanings of
sentences, then it would be hard for two reasons to apply the denition to
Quine's views, whether to accept or deny that he is a vericationist. First
of all as Raatikainen notes Quine repudiates the very notion of meaning-
ful, if understood as having a meaning. Secondly since Quine denied that
sentences in general - Quine excepts observation sentences from this claim
at least in some of the phases of his philosophy - have independent mean-
ings, he could not say that the meaning of sentences was their method of
verication of conrmation (other than in the case of observation sentences,
in whose case even an opponent of vericationism might admit that claim).
However, both reasons can be circumvented. To the rst point it must be
noted Quine yet seems to retain some semantic notions as acceptable, and
truth is one of them. Therefore my proposal is a natural generalization of
the customary denitions that is applicable Quine's framework.
As to the second reason, even if Quine could not say that the meaning
of a sentence is its method of verication or conrmation, he could yet say
that the meaning or signicance of something is its method of verication or
conrmation. The distinction between vericationist and non-vericationist
theories can also be made in the case of holistic theories of semantics. Since
Quine thought that the unit of signicance was not the sentence but the the-
ory, a cluster of sentences, we must apply the denition of vericationism to
theories. We must ask whether he thought that veriability or conrmabil-
ity was for him the criterion of the meaningfulness of theories and whether
the meaning or signicance of theories is their method of verication or con-
rmation. The answer seems to be that he did, and that suces to make his
theory vericationist. Quine would surely have said that such a theory that
neither it nor any consistent extension of it implies observation categoricals
(or help to integrate any lower-level theory that does imply them) is mean-
ingless, while a theory that implies them is meaningful or signicant. An
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anti-vericationist would, however, say that even a theory which does not
imply observation categoricals is meaningful if the sentences contained in it
are grammatical and all primitive terms occurring in sentences contained in
it or in denitions of its terms have an ostensive denition (i. e. occur in
observation sentences).
Let us see what happens when we apply it to Quine's views in the article
we are examining. Quine says in [Qui53e, page 41] the following regarding
the truth of statements:
The factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to
a range of conrmatory experiences.
The kind of empiricism Quine exhibits here denitely counts as a species
of vericationism in the sense in which I proposed to use the notion, since
truth is a semantic notion and Quine here connected to it the epistemic
notion of conrmatory experiences. This view is unacceptable to a scientic
realist or to anyone who is a correspondence theorist about truth, since
they must hold that the factual component contains unobservable entities
(i. e. entities that cannot be contents or objects of experience) like atoms
or electrons. I suppose it would objectionable to Raatikainen himself (who
does not refer to this passage and may not have noticed it), as he has on
many occasions defended scientic realism. It is surely objectionable to
Michael Devitt and Panu Raatikainen, who are scientic realists and hold a
correspondence theory of truth, so I cannot see how they can consistently
appeal to Quine in defending an extreme holistic empiricism71.
71Devitt claims that one can consistently hold together with Quine that all beliefs are
epistemically revisable without accepting Quine's semantical holism. Such a combination
of semantic localism and epistemic holism might be consistent, as its inconsistency has
not (so far as I know) been proved. However, this does not make it certain that such a
view is consistent; one would require some sort of independent argument for inconsistency,
which has not (again so far as I know) yet been provided either. Nevertheless, even if such
a view is consistent it seems to me that Quine's arguments for the revisability thesis are
not separable from his arguments for semantical holism, so Devitt cannot consistently
appeal to Quine's arguments for the revisability thesis while rejecting semantical holism.
Conrmational holism as already argued for by Duhem does not amount to the full re-
visability thesis, for even if conrmation is epistemically holistic, it does not follow that
all statements are epistemically holistic, for analytical statements would usually not be
taken to require conrmation. I do not think that Quine has any arguments for the claim
that they require conrmation that would be separable from his arguments for semantical
holism.
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3.5 Current Vericationism and Logical Positivism
We have seen that there are very good reasons to think that the verica-
tionism of logical positivists has been shown to be quite unsustainable. Yet
almost no one draws from this the obvious conclusion, namely that if the
main reason the positivists had for opposing metaphysics was wrong then
probably the positivists had no rational cause to think metaphysics illegit-
imate, so metaphysics, even transcendent or speculative metaphysics, may
well be a quite legitimate area of study.
This is perhaps because dierent objections to logical positivism, ob-
jections proceeding from incompatible premises, have been confused with
each other. There are two dierent ways in which later philosophy has di-
verged from logical positivism, which oer incompatible objections to logical
positivism. On the other hand there have been scientic realists who have
objected to the positivists' rejection of realism, and on the other hand there
have been various kinds of relativists, who have diverged even farther from
realism than logical positivists ever did. It is characteristic of the confusion
in which the temporary demise of logical positivism left analytical philoso-
phy that many analytical philosophers have at dierent times rejected logical
positivism as not realistic enough and as too realistic.
3.5.1 Quine and Kuhn and Logical positivism
Quine and Kuhn are commonly thought to have vanquished logical posi-
tivism in [Qui53e] and in [Kuh70], as e. g. Friedman says in [Fri91, page
505]. However, it seems to me that they by no means completely overcame
logical positivism, at least in those writings, but rather transformed it in
many respects into a more extreme form in them.
I have argued that the trouble with logical positivism is that it was too
strongly empiristic and too holistic; however, Quine replaced it with a theory
that was even more radically empiristic and holistic. This may have helped
to remove some small problems and inconsistencies, but the resulting theory
has the same major defects as the philosophy of earlier logical positivists.
Friedman says in [Fri91, page 505] that philosophers of science have
characteristically proceeded on the basis of Kuhn's well-known critique. This
implies that scientic realism, which cannot agree with Kuhn's critique,
would be wholly uncharacteristic of the philosophy of science. However,
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Friedman scarcely provides any evidence for so dramatic a claim. Surely
there have many inuential scientic realists lately; in this work alone I
mention Niiniluoto, Chakravartty, Devitt, Ellis etc. Indeed, I doubt whether
we could say that any single procedure has been characteristic of philosophy
of science after the collapse of positivism, as it has fragmented into several
small schools, and most philosophers of either science or language seem to
vacillate between more and less realistic theories.
So far as it is scientic realism that is thought to replace logical posi-
tivism as the interpretation of science even among analytical philosophers,
then the prospects for not only metaphysics in the broadest sense, but even
for speculative metaphysics, would seem to be bright. One would have ex-
pected that in rejecting the logical positivistic interpretation of science sci-
entic realists would have also rejected the positivists' opposition to (even
transcendent) metaphysics, since the latter was based on the former. This
sometimes happened, as seen in the very title of some works, such as An-
jan Chakravartty's [Cha07] A Metaphysics for Scientic Realism or Brian
Ellis's [Ell09] The Metaphysics of Scientic Realism. However, scientic
realists are not always willing to go along with this since they have often
retained the positivists' hostile attitude to metaphysics even when all justi-
cation for it had passed. However, if it were relativism of Kuhn's brand that
replaced logical positivism (or arguably rather consummated it), then there
might be rational reasons to despair of the possibility of at least speculative
metaphysics.
When Passmore said in [Pas67] that logical positivism was dead, he did
not mention Quine as having defeated logical positivism, but only as a visi-
tor to the Vienna Circle (though the article [Qui53e] had by then appeared
many years earlier). Nor did Passmore mention Kuhn, though Kuhn's major
work [Kuh70] had also appeared before the time he wrote. This suggests
that Passmore did not think that the defects in logical positivism were those
Quine or Kuhn attacked; Passmore's autopsy of logical positivism delivered a
dierent cause of death than Friedman's. One of the doctrines of logical pos-
itivism that Passmore thought was dead was vericationism. Even if Quine
were right that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is problem-
atic, surely vericationism is even more problematic, for well-known reasons
many of which we have gone through. While the distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic has a presumption in its favour, vericationism does not
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have one, as it is explicitly revisionary. Schlick did indeed try to argue that
vericationism would have a presumption in its favour, but I have already
argued that he was mistaken. Also the main problems with vericationism
(as well as the main problems with structuralism) are quite independent of
the purported problems with analyticity72. On the other hand verication-
ism is distinctive of logical positivism, and I have argued that Quine did not
reject vericationism. The unity of science is another doctrine that is com-
monly held to be distinctive of logical positivism and Quine did not reject
that either. Structuralism is yet another common logical positivist doctrine
that Quine held, as seen in such articles as [Qui08a]73. Therefore Quine
cannot be said to have ever rejected logical positivism completely but only
to have created a new form of it. Many philosophers who say that logical
positivism is dead and think that Quine killed logical positivism are really
themselves logical positivists. Contrary to what e. g. Friedman thought,
logical positivism is alive and well today - unfortunately, as its doctrines
have been either denitely disproved or disconrmed several times. Because
of this I have not just been ogging a dead horse in presenting in detail the
arguments against vericationism in this section of my work.
Because Quine argued in [Qui53e] against reductionism, more speci-
cally the kind of reductionism according to which physical objects can be
reduced to immediate experience, a view that scientic realists are also un-
happy with, the view he defended there might seem similar to the view of
scientic realists that physical objects exist independently of human expe-
rience. This impression is naturally reinforced by the fact that in other,
later writings Quine does seem to rather unequivocally defend views charac-
teristic of scientic realism. However, it would be a mistake to understand
Quine's inuential article in this way; the reasons Quine had for objecting
72Opposition to metaphysics might also be argued to be distinctive of logical positivism,
and Quine did relax opposition to metaphysics, so in this one respect Quine did overcome
logical positivism. However, this is just one respect compared to many in which Quine
remained conned by the dogmas of logical positivism
73There is, indeed, some obscurity in Quine's relation to structuralism. Quine declares
himself in [Qui08a, page 405] in favour of a global ontological structuralism; however,
he then says in [Qui08a, page 406] that his global structuralism should not be seen as
a structural ontology. This is either totally incoherent or utterly obscure; what possible
dierence could there be between ontological structuralism and structural ontology? Quine
proposed this distinction in order to escape an incompatibility between structuralism and
naturalism he himself saw to threaten his theory; however, if we cannot make consistent
sense of the distinction, then we must conclude that Quine did not succeed in reconciling
structuralism with naturalism.
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to reductionism in [Qui53e] are exactly the opposites of those a scientic
realist would have. So are the reasons Kuhn has for objecting to logical pos-
itivism; Kuhn carried further the logical positivist objection to the atomism
and realism of original analytical philosophers.
While Quine rejected the atomistic form of Carnap's vericationism,
he did not in this article reject Carnap's phenomenalism, though Carnap
himself and most other logical positivists had long ago (under the inu-
ence of Neurath) rejected this. A the end of [Qui53e, page 19] Quine had
left the choice between phenomenalism and physicalism an open question.
In [Qui53e] he seems to come decisively in favour of phenomenalism, though
in a novel way. Rather than claiming that physical objects exist indepen-
dently of experience, Quine claimed that physical objects are not even log-
ical constructions out of sense data. A reductionist theory that explains
physical objects as logical constructions can yet admit that positive state-
ments concerning physical objects are literally true (when properly inter-
preted). Quine's theory, however, appears to have been instrumentalist; he
said in [Qui53e, page 44] that he thought of the conceptual scheme of science
as a tool for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. An
instrumentalist about physical objects cannot allow that statements con-
cerning physical objects would be literally true. Quine claimed in [Qui53e,
page 44] that physical objects are nothing but myths, comparable to Homer's
gods. Quine's holism led him to a very radical view (see [Qui53e, x6, page
45]); when Carnap had maintained that an ontological question such as the
question of the existence of numbers was not a question of matters of fact,
Quine apparently agreed but said that in that case the same holds regard-
ing scientic hypotheses generally. If Quine really agreed with Carnap and
extended his view to all scientic hypotheses - and not just agreed provision-
ally for the sake of argument, which is also a possible reading - then his view
is not compatible with scientic realism, much less with naturalism or phys-
icalism (which serves to further conrm my suspicions that vericationism
and physicalism are incompatible). Could any physicalist be happy with the
claim that physical objects are myths? A scientist (whether physicalist or
not) would surely be even less happy to hear that such questions as whether
electrons or even planets exist are not questions of matters of fact74.
74The comparison of physical objects to Homer's gods is ambiguous, and since Quine
here speaks of epistemological footing, he could be interpreted (and has been interpreted
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People can be misled by the fact that just rejecting the distinction be-
tween analytical and synthetic statements or accepting extreme empiricism
regarding justication might not by itself lead to this kind of extreme anti-
realism and instrumentalism (as e. g. Devitt's defense of extreme empiricism
regarding justication may not lead him to such an anti-realism). However, if
the distinction is rejected for the reasons and by the way that Quine rejected
it in [Qui53e], namely because of and through a holistic and vericationistic
theory of meaning, then this does lead to anti-realism and conventionalism.
Though Quine's philosophy, like that of the logical positivists, started out
by professing great respect for science, it was yet in the end as dismissive of
the true objective signicance of scientic theories as the logical positivists
turned out to be.
Of course, Quine later changed his view in this respect, accepting physi-
calism for example in [Qui93] and speaking of stimuli rather than sense-data.
However, this might not constitute a complete abandonment of logical posi-
tivism, any more than his earlier turn to holism, but just a change from the
kind of positivism earlier espoused by Schlick, Ayer and the early Carnap
to the kind of logical positivism that had earlier been espoused by Otto
Neurath and Carl Hempel and the late Carnap. Kuhn also seems to repre-
sent a later version of Neurath's kind of logical positivism since like Neurath
he opposes both foundationalism and the correspondence theory of truth
in [Kuh00, page 95]. Both Kuhn and the late Quine then seem to represent
by charitable commentators) as just saying that both are inferred entities, not as denying
that one class of entities exists and the other does not. However, in that case the use
of words like "myth" is surely rather misleading, since the word "myth" in its ordinary
sense surely means (when applied to a story) something that is not true in a literal sense,
though it may be true in a metaphorical sense. Originally the word "myth" in Greek
meant a story concerning gods, and such a story could be literally true. However, as
with the rise of philosophy traditional myths concerning Olympian gods were increasingly
taken to be false in their literal sense, and Greek theologists tried to defend them by
claiming that they were intended to be taken metaphorically (a defence later adopted also
by liberal theologists of other religions), the word acquired its currently ordinary sense.
When applied to an entity the word "myth" therefore means something that does not
exist in the literal sense. Quine's use of the word "posit" has been concentrated on in
discussions of Quine's realism or anti-realism, but this attention to it seems overweening;
that word can surely be understood in a sense compatible with realism. However, the
use of such words as "myth" is far worse. Feyerabend also compared scientic theories to
myths, so Quine here prepared the way for Feyerabend's relativism. In any case, saying
that the truth of a scientic hypothesis is not a question of fact is a quite unambiguous
rejection of realism concerning scientic hypotheses. It cannot be understood as a mere
epistemic claim but is clearly an ontological claim. Presumably questions concerning sense
data would have been questions of matter of fact in this stage of Quine's philosophy.
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and carry further some of the variant tendencies of logical positivism, rather
than fully overcoming logical positivism.
However, there is one problem here in the interpretation of Quine. It has
been debated whether Neurath was or could consistently have been a realist
concerning theoretical physical entities such as quarks or electrons, or only
of observable physical entities such as rivers and trees75. The same question
can of course be raised about Quine. However, Quine did rather clearly
commit himself to realism about theoretical entities in some later writings;
e. g. in [Qui08a, page 406] he said that his tentative ontology continues to
consist of quarks and their compounds. However, it can be asked if this is
consistent with his semantical and epistemological principles, if he continued
to hold vericationism and structuralism. It is not at all clear how one
could give stimulus meaning for a theory speaking about quarks, if the word
"stimulus" is used in any sense of the word narrow enough to be interesting
(e. g. if quarks themselves could be held to be stimuli, then clearly the
meaning of the word "stimulus" would have become utterly vacuous and
have nothing in common with any concept usable in psychology). Can Quine
mean by the claim that quarks exist any more than that the statement
that they do can be used to derive true observation categoricals? Surely
when scientic realists (and philosophically uneducated scientists) claim that
there are quarks, they mean far more than that. However, if Quine did
not continue to hold vericationism, then it can be wondered how good
reasons he could have had to continue to hold semantic holism - which it
is in any case clear he continued to hold - since as I have shown he had
originally justied semantic holism mainly with the aid of vericationism.
At the very least his case for semantic holism would have been weakened
signicantly with an abandonment of vericationism even if not completely
evaporated. Quine's structuralism also seems to be incompatible with his
postulation of quarks since it follows from Newman's argument that quarks
cannot be distinguished from other entities structurally, as a proxy function
can transform a set of quarks to any set with the same cardinality. There are
then reasons to suspect an inconsistency even in Quine's later philosophy
between positivistic and realistic elements it combined.
75If he was not a realist concerning such entities as quarks which physical theories speak
about, then his view should not really be counted as physicalistic in the most common
sense of the word, but only as materialistic.
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Interestingly, later still Quine in several places (as in [Qui08b, page 393]
and in [Qui93, page 111]) seemed to back down from an extreme holism and
even opposed the incommensurability thesis of Kuhn and others. He claimed
no that the unit of signicance was not the whole of science, but clusters
of sentences big enough to imply observation categoricals. However, some
of Quine's claims still seem to imply an extreme holism, and one can doubt
whether it can really be distinguished from Kuhn's theory as Quine himself
supposed. Quine held in [Qui93, page 109] that observation sentences can
function as observation sentences only holophrastically, so that the terms
occurring in them have no denite denotations. However, applying holism
to observational statements is not justied even by vericationism. Further-
more, the consequences of such a move may be disastrous in several dierent
ways. We can adapt a point made by Chomsky against Quine in [Cho69,
page 57]; this would imply that observation sentences should be learned
one by one (if they were to be used genuinely as observation sentences)
and therefore does not appear to be consistent with the obvious fact that
a person learns to use an innite number of observation sentences (without
them becoming theoretical sentences). It is even worse that Quine takes it
in [Qui93, page 112] to license the application of proxy functions to their
content, and this leads to the kind of structuralism that as I have related
Newman showed to be untenable76. Quine's reason for taking observation
sentences to be holophrastic is that if the terms occurring in an observation
sentence had denite denotations, the sentence would then in his view be
theory-laden (as Kuhn held); however, we can doubt whether this would
have to be he case77.
76It is not wholly clear that this move is valid even if observation sentences were
holophrastic; a proxy function or isomorphism need not preserve even an undierenti-
ated range of neural intake.
77One odd feature in Quine's theory, inherited from Neurath, is that he held observation
sentences to be learned in early childhood (and therefore stated in an ordinary language).
This would indeed make them theory-laden. However, this is an odd view for Quine to
take, since Quine elsewhere follows an articial language method rather than an ordinary
language method in philosophy. The role observation sentences are supposed to play in the
theory of science is that they are sentences in which the results of scientic experiments
are formulated. Surely the language in which such results are formulated ought to be more
exact than the language which a child rst learns. In fact, in an ideal case it ought to be
an articial language. It is indeed likely that as Neurath argued a completely precise ideal
language is impossible to construct, but this does not imply that it would be impossible to
construct articial languages far more precise than any ordinary or natural languages, and
in fact the languages of exact sciences like physics are already to a great extent such. It
has not been shown that the sentences of such an articial language must be theory-laden;
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We could in any case avoid Quine's disastrous conclusion (even if we were
physicalists) by hypothesizing that even when the observation sentence faces
inward dierent terms occurring in it could be associated with dierent parts
of the neural intake78. Of course, only the physiology and psychology of a
far future could denitely show if such a hypothesis is true, but the same
holds of Quine's original claims about the role of stimuli.
3.5.2 Dummett's Justicationism
Logical positivists thought that irrational metaphysical theories threatened
natural science and thought that they could use vericationism to defend
science. Vericationism, however, seems to have been originally inspired
by the thinking of Wittgenstein, who was not at all as enthusiastic about
science as most of the logical positivists. When logical positivists saw that
vericationism threatened science as well as metaphysics they were willing
to practically abandon vericationism, even if they did not usually openly
admit that they had wholly reject their previous views. However, later
vericationists have been willing to bite the bitter pill and sacrice huge
amounts of science and mathematics to the altar of vericationism, being in
this more in tune with Wittgenstein's mode of thinking.
For example, the philosophy of Michael Dummett, as developed for in-
stance in [Dum91], has been very infuential, though Dummett, following the
intuitionists, has to sacrice not just a lot of theoretical physics, but even
much of generally accepted mathematics and logic. The early logical posi-
tivists generally thought that mathematical propositions were analytic and
hence vericationism was irrelevant to mathematics, as it only concerned
synthetic propositions. They mainly followed logicists in their philosophy of
mathematics, though with a more conventionalist gloss. However, some of
the earlier thinkers who had inuenced logical positivists such as Poincare
had opposed logicism and instead anticipated intuitionism. Wittgenstein's
we have seen that such modern exponents of an articial language method in philosophy
as Lutz held that they are not.
78Even in the case of hallucination, when the terms occurring in an observation sentence
are not associated with any external entities, they could be associated with denite parts
of the neural intake, even though the observer is not aware of this. This could be argued
to give them a denite reference; they could refer to the entities by which the neural intake
associated with them was originally or is typically caused, even when they are caused by
dierent causes (which is close to the theory that Place suggested in [Pla56]). They would
then denote physical entities without yet being intersubjective in practice.
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original views had according to many commentators been inuenced by in-
tuitionists (see e.g. [Rod11]) though most logical positivists when inuenced
by them had disregarded this aspect of them. Dummett now brought these
intuitionistic ideas into vericationism and thought that vericationism de-
manded radical changes even to mathematical practice. Dummett called his
theory justicationistic rather than vericationistic, but it is clearly in the
vericationistic tradition.
Dummett did not indeed use the principle to attack metaphysics so much
as to defend (what he describes as) a specic metaphysical theory, metaphys-
ical anti-realism; he is more perspicacious or more honest in this respect than
the logical positivists, since as we saw their opposition to metaphysics con-
cealed an implicit anti-realistic metaphysics. However, unlike Ayer's implicit
metaphysics, Dummett's metaphysics is not a version of neutral monism but
a far more radical sort of anti-realism. Indeed, Dummett went so far as to
use in [Dum06, chapter 8] his anti-realism as a premise in an argument
for the existence of God just like Berkeley, though unlike Berkeley Dum-
mett did not denitely commit himself to the conclusion of this argument.
Dummett argued in [Dum06, page 96] that the concept of the world as a
whole is correlative to that of God, as standing over against the world and
if this contrast is removed, no room remains for distinguishing the world as
it is in itself from the world as we experience and nd it. This is rather
ironic as such vericationists as Ayer had claimed that sentences apparently
speaking about God were meaningless, and it is far from clear how peo-
ple could manifest their understanding of sentences speaking about God.
Clearly Dummett was not trying to use vericationism to defend a scientic
world-view, as the logical positivists were, but rather a religious world-view
(though on the other hand - just as in the case of Ayer - many aspects of
Dummett's theory, such as the behaviourism implicit in it, do not t well
with a religious world-view either).
Unlike the logical positivists Dummett admitted (in [Dum91, page 11])
that metaphysical realism and anti-realism had content i. e. were meaning-
ful instead of gibberish, and further that the choice between them is not a
mere convention, as desperate logical positivists had sometimes suggested
(and many of the more extreme relativists do today). Nevertheless, Dum-
mett claimed (e. g. in [Dum91, page 15]) that the content of metaphysical
questions, properly understood, is a thesis in the theory of meaning, so
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he does in the end attack metaphysics as a separate discipline. Dummett
claims (see [Dum91, page 10]) that metaphysically formulated claims are
pictures, whose literal content is unclear, and only become clear when they
are reformulated as semantical claims. This is not a novel claim; as we
have seen, the late Ayer held it, and Gustav Bergmann, though he rebelled
against the anti-metaphysical tendency of logical positivism, could not free
himself from it. While I argue in this work that the theory of meaning or
semantics is essential to metametaphysics, the clarication and justication
of metaphysical claims, agreeing so far with Dummett's approach from the
bottom up, I most emphatically do not want to say that the the content of
metaphysical claims would be semantical. These are two entirely dierent
claims, and could only be conated by a vericationist. Since Dummett is
in some strong sense a vericationist, this may not be surprising; however,
since it is semantical research which Dummett claims to provide an answer
to the problem of realism, it seem highly premature for him to characterize
the problem in a way that presupposes an anti-realist answer to it before he
has engaged in the actual research. While I also agree that the content of
most traditional metaphysical claims is unclear before a semantical analysis,
this of course does not imply that these claims would be metaphorical, or
that their clarication by semantical means would turn them into semanti-
cal claims any more than the clarication of a claim in the natural sciences
by a philosopher of science turns such a natural scientic claim into a se-
mantical claim. While metaphysicians often have to employ pictures and
metaphors for pedagogical purposes, so do the researchers in any discipline
remote from common experience (including semantics); most metaphysical
claims are wholly literal as such, without any need for radical reformulation.
Furthermore, Dummett holds that the theory of meaning is the theory
of understanding, so metaphysical claims end up according to him as claims
in the theory of understanding, i. e. in the philosophy of mind or even in
psychology. This is far from a clearly correct claim. While there clearly
are close connections between semantics and the theory of understanding,
they can scarcely be simply identied. Identifying them seems like claiming
that optics is the same as ophthalmology. It can be argued that it already
introduces a commitment to anti-realism concerning meaning. Externalist
theories of meaning would typically dispute this claim, as argued e. g. by
Panu Raatikainen in [Raa05], as they hold that the meaning of a sentence
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consists in its truth-conditions and these are determined by the reference
of the terms occurring in it but persons using a sentence need not know
what those terms refer to. It seems to me that internalists in some senses
of the word need not accept this claim either; even if the meaning of a word
supervened on the neural states of its speakers alone instead of on causal
chains reaching beyond speakers' internal states speakers need not be aware
of such neural states.
Perhaps the most popular version of the vericationist principle today is
Dummett's manifestation requirement, backed up by his acquisition argu-
ment79. This requirement says that if a person understands the meaning of
a sentence he must be capable of completely manifesting this understanding
behaviourally80.
79The acquisition argument is based on the idea that a person cannot learn to apply an
expression to unobservable entities. The argument is based on a simplistic view of what it
is to learn to use a language. As e. g. Noam Chomsky has often argued (e. g. in arguing
against Skinner in [Cho59]), the learning of a language cannot be understood as a simple
matter of conditioned reexes. In order to be at all capable of learning a language, a
person must be capable of using inductive generalization; from observing a nite number
of uses of a language he must be able to infer how an innite number of sentences are
well-formed as well as what meanings the innite number of sentences all have. I will argue
at more length later that induction can led to knowledge of unobservable entities. If this
is true, then since the learner must in any case be capable of using induction, he can use
it to make generalizations applying to how the word would apply to unobservable entities,
including the mental states of the people teaching him to use the language. Herbert Feigl
argued in [Fei58] that if behaviourism is replaced with identity theory, we must return to
the view that knowledge of the mental states of others is based on analogy (which is a
form of induction).
80Dummett also appeals to Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning and his private lan-
guage argument in arguing for the manifestation requirement. Sometimes these are viewed
as additional reasons to accept the manifestation requirement. However, Wittgenstein was
(at least at one stage of his development) a vericationist, so the use theory of meaning
and private language argument themselves were probably motivated by vericationism,
so they cannot count as reasons to accept the manifestation requirement independent of
vericationism. Dummett said in [Dum78, page xxxiii] that he had not space to rehearse
the argument, and simply recorded his conviction that it is incontrovertible. This is rather
high-handed, since (as can be seen in the discussion of the argument [CW12]), there is
little agreement even about what the argument is. If Wittgensteinian philosophers cannot
even agree on what the form of the argument is, how could they possibly be as sure as
they seem to be that it is valid? Since then there have been many arguments against
Wittgenstein's conclusion; e. g. Baker and Hacker and Jussi Haukioja in [Hau04] have
argued in favour of solitary rule-following and hence of the possibility of a private lan-
guage. It seems to me that the rejection of vericationism requires also the rejection of
the use theory of meaning, at least if it is understood in so narrow a way as Dummett
understands it (though as I will show later, not if it is understood in a wider way as e.
g. the later Horwich seems to understand it). Therefore the use theory of meaning in
this narrow sense of the word is not consistent with scientic realism. In a wide sense
of the word "use" it is indeed plausible that the meaning of expressions supervenes upon
154
Like the vericationist principle, the manifestation requirement can be
understood in stronger or weaker senses. It can be taken to hold either that
statements about understanding can be conclusively veried by means of
observations concerning behaviour, or just that observations concerning be-
haviour should be relevant to the determination of the truth or falsehood of
statements concerning understanding. Dummett admitted in [Dum78, page
xxxviii] that he had had usually concentrated misleadingly on a form of anti-
realist theory of meaning where the meaning of a statement is given in terms
of what conclusively veries it, but such conclusive verication is not always
to be had. Noting in [Mis95, page 137] this vacillation on Dummett's part,
Misak thought (see [Mis95, pages 139,140]) that Dummett had gone wrong
in this admission and that we should stick to conclusive verication, argu-
ing against such philosophers as Anthony Appiah who held in [App86] that
the trouble with Dummett's requirement was that it was stated in terms of
conclusive verication. We have seen that there are strong arguments by
such philosophers as Berlin, Church, Kaplan, Lewis and Achinstein that the
weaker versions of the principle are vacuous, and are so for logical reasons,
and if so they must be as vacuous when applied to understanding as when ap-
plied to anything else. If this is correct they could not be used to validly sup-
port an anti-realistic metaphysics any more than opposition to metaphysics.
Understood in this weaker sense the manifestation requirement would per-
mit even the understanding of verication-transcendent truth-conditions to
be manifestable, though not when understood in the stronger sense.
Dummett argues in my view quite plausibly from the strong reading of
the manifestation requirement to a general anti-realism. There have been
philosophers - e. g. Mark Quentin Gardiner in [Gar00] and Christopher
Peacocke in [Pea86] - who have thought that the argument is in the end
their use (though it is not identical with it, as this would destroy the distinction between
semantics and pragmatics). However, in this sense of the word, the use of the expressions
of a language need not always be accessible to the reection of a speaker of that language,
as Dummett supposes, but can already be evidence-transcendent. The causal relations
between expressions, neural processes in their users and the entities the words are used to
speak about are partly constitutive of the use of expressions, so a use theory of meaning
in the widest sense of the word is not incompatible with a causal theory of reference as
is often supposed. However, such causal relations may be evidence-transcendent, and so
can the use that they constitute. Just as we cannot even by means of dissection observe
the atoms of which our muscles are constituted, so we may be permanently incapable
of observing some of the relations, causal and otherwise, between us and the world that
constitute the meanings of our words.
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not valid, but it seems likely that they implicitly used the weak reading of
the requirement. However, at most Dummett's arguments show that if we
are to be strong vericationists about statements concerning understanding,
we must be strong vericationists about all statements. Dummett does not
give anyone who is not inclined to be a strong vericationist about anything
any reason to change his opinion; taken as a general argument on behalf
of strong vericationism Dummett's manifestation argument comes close to
being circular.
There is also the problem that it is far from clear that even a justica-
tionist theory of meaning could satisfy the manifestation requirement, if it is
taken to demand conclusive verication of claims regarding understanding.
A justicationist claims that we can manifest our knowledge of the meaning
of a sentence by accepting the sentence in some canonical conditions (or as
Dummett says in [Dum06, page 59], when suitably placed), conditions in
which we can verify that statement. However, the problem is how to specify
these canonical conditions, how to tell when we are suitably placed. Most
statements can be justied in the most varying ways in dierent situations,
and it is not clear that there is anything in common between these ways that
could count as verication conditions that every speaker would understand.
Furthermore, it can be argued that there is no way to specify those
conditions, at least not without lapsing into the kind of semantic holism
Dummett himself rejected. The obvious way in which a statement can be
veried is by it being perceived that it (or something from which its truth
follows) is true. However, contrary to crude behaviourism even a plausible
form of physicalism (such as the identity theory) must agree that percep-
tion requires the occurrence of neural processes in the perceiver. Even if
your eyes are open and in working order (which itself may not be observable
to a typical language-learner, but only to an ophthalmologist), and there
is sucient light, this does not guarantee that you are seeing anything, if
your nerves are not functioning normally. While such neural processes may
be in principle observable (though even this is not clear), they cannot be
observed in common situations but at most in laboratories with the aid
of rare cerebral scanning equipment (if this counts as direct observation)
or in ethically unacceptable vivisection experiments. Therefore there is in
most situations no way in which people who would ordinarily be said to
understand a statement can be sure that someone perceives that it is true,
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i. e. that it can be veried. A child who is learning a language certainly
does not observe the neural processes of those from whom he learns the
language. However, in that case there cannot be any way to conclusively
verify that someone knows how a statement can be veried either. Doubts
about whether we can understand verication-transcendent truth-conditions
are then extensible to doubts about whether we can understand even veri-
cation conditions. Carried through consistently, Dummett's manifestation
requirement and acquisition argument would result in the absurd view that
we cannot have any understanding at all of the meaning of any sentences
speaking about physical objects.
Like the early logical positivists, Dummett also had a very impoverished
conception of experience, learned fromWittgenstein, excluding introspection
and memory, which led him to troubles with such statements as statements
concerning the past or concerning pain.
Dummett therefore missed all the lessons that he should have learned
from the development of logical positivism, and because of his popularity, a
lot of philosophy has regressed to the point where it was at the the beginning
of the logical positivist movement.
One recent theory used to attack metaphysics is deationary semantics,
which tries to deate the metaphysical implications of semantical theories
like the theories of truth and reference. There are curious connections be-
tween deationism and vericationism, which may be rather surprising as
some deationists (such as Horwich) have tried to deny them. Already Ayer,
the arch-vericationist, was also one of the rst deationists, defending a re-
dundancy theory of truth in Chapter 5 of [Aye36a]. This might of course
be just a coincidence, but there are more important indications of a tight
connection between deationism and vericationism: as I will later show at
length in 4.3.1, Hartry Field, one of the most famous deationists, has mo-
tivated his version of deationism by the vericationist theory of meaning
in [Fie94].
3.6 Other Miscellaneous Objections to Metaphysics
Ordinary language philosophy has also been used as an objection to meta-
physics (though some philosophers, such as Peter Strawson have tried to
combine ordinary language philosophy with the acceptance of a kind of meta-
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physics, descriptive metaphysics, so the incompatibility of ordinary language
philosophy and metaphysics is not obvious).
Ordinary language philosophy was partly inspired by the philosophy of
the late Wittgenstein81, as logical positivism was partly inspired by the
earlier philosophy of Wittgenstein; it was mostly developed in Oxford. Or-
dinary language philosophy concentrated attention instead of syntax (like
the earlier Carnap) or semantics on pragmatics (like the later Carnap). It
stressed the multiplicity of possible uses of expressions and often denied the
possibility of any systematic generalizations, and is in this respect hostile to
metaphysics, whose very denition is based on extreme generality.
Ordinary language philosophers typically argue that metaphysicians use
words outside of the context of their use in ordinary language and that leads
to their sentences being meaningless or in some way out of order. However,
it must be replied that a scientist also uses words in contexts dierent from
those in which they are used in ordinary language. If the objection of ordi-
nary language philosophers to metaphysics were valid, it would also count
against natural sciences. Therefore no one who thinks that any scientic re-
search at all is legitimate can consider this a valid objection to metaphysics.
This problem in the argument of ordinary language philosophers against
metaphysics is of course similar to the way in which the verication crite-
rion would rule not only the sentences of metaphysics but also the sentences
of sciences meaningless.
Just like logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy is outdated
and should be dead but unfortunately is not. The striving for systematic
generalizations is the very essence of any kind of science - not just science
in the sense of natural science but science in the more general sense of sys-
tematic research or scholarship (what Germans call Wissenschaft). Someone
who denies the possibility of systematicity has no right to pretend to be a
scholar. Ordinary language philosophers often try to justify their view by
pointing out to other uses of language than making statements. However,
not only the making of statements but all important use of language depends
on its relations to the world. We can give a semantic theory not only for
indicative statements but also for commands and questions by considering
81Ordinary language philosophy was also presented (especially by Norman Malcolm)
as developed from the common sense philosophy of G. E. Moore; however, it diered
signicantly from Moore's original philosophy.
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their relations to the world. Just as statements have truth-conditions, con-
ditions under which they are true, so commands have obedience-conditions,
conditions under which they are obeyed, and a question has conditions with
respect to every possible answer to it under which that answer is the correct
answer to it. Formulating these conditions involves in all cases assigning in-
terpretations, denotations and intensions and characters and other kinds of
semantic values, to expressions occurring in these statements or commands
or questions, and these semantic values are entities in the world, entities all
of which fall under some ontological categories.
While every systematic reason given for the impossibility of ontology is
shown untenable, anti-metaphysical philosophers come up with ever new rea-
sons to declare ontology impossible. Indeed, even a single anti-metaphysical
philosopher has often sought several dierent reasons for opposing meta-
physics. As an example, Carnap had at least three dierent reasons for
opposing metaphysics (vericationism, syntacticism and the distinction be-
tween external and internal questions in [Car50]82) and Ayer likewise at
least three (in his case vericationism, common sense and ontological rela-
tivism). This strongly suggests that the motivation to deny the possibility
of metaphysics is not rational but some purely irrational prejudice that is
only rationalised afterwards. We might even, coining a word, speak of an
ontophobic attitude.
Some philosophers have attacked metaphysical and ontological problems
not as meaningless but as trivial, and have claimed that since the problems
are trivial their study is worthless. There are indeed good reasons to suspect
that many ontological problems, including many that analytical metaphysi-
cians have discussed at great length, are relatively trivial. However, this
does not make their investigation completely worthless. Many of the ques-
tions dealt with in many academic disciplines are relatively trivial. Perhaps
82I will discuss this pseudo-distinction later in Section 5.9, when explicating Quine's
theory of ontological commitment, since this distinction is, I will argue, based on an
erroneous conception of ontological commitment. Carnap did indeed try to show that
there was continuity in the reasons of his opposition to metaphysics, for he claimed that
the non-cognitive character of what he called external questions in [Car50] was already
recognized by the Vienna Circle. However, this is a very problematic claim, for the logical
positivists of the Vienna Circle never explicitly formulated any concepts like the concept
of an external question that Carnap used in [Car50]. Therefore if they recognized such
a distinction this must have been just implicit in their theory; however, since as I will
show the distinction is rather obscure, this is also obscure, though I will show that some
remnants of vericationism did lie concealed in Carnap's later distinction.
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the extreme example is formal logic, which might be described as in one
sense completely trivial, but whose study is yet generally held to be of great
importance. Ontological questions are on any construal of ontology no more
trivial than logical questions, especially since which some of them indeed
are, as I have argued and will later argue further, very closely connected
with them83.
Very few philosophers recommend that we should completely abandon
the study of logic even though they hold that logical statements and ques-
tions are trivial; while philosophers may dier over why the study of logic
is useful or how useful it is, most of them think that it is in some way and
at least to some degree useful. For instance, it has been suggested that the
knowledge of logical laws is not of any intrinsic importance yet it can used
to check the correctness of deductive reasoning used in any disciple whose
results are held to be important, and so is of indirect importance. Of course,
people can reason deductively even without the development of a system-
atic theory of logic, but such reasoning is likely to be full of mistakes which
can be avoided with the aid of systematic theory of logic. However, others
think that even the study of pure logic would be of some limited intrinsic
value, even if intuitive deductive reasoning would be reliable enough not to
need the aid of deductive logic (which can or course be argued to be a too
optimistic view of human cognitive capacities).
If then the study of logic can be useful even though logic is trivial, then
if as I argue many ontological problems are trivial either in the same way
as logical problems or at least in a very similar way, their study can also
be useful in the same way or a similar way as the study of logic. Just as
reasoning in any discipline must conform to the laws of logic so the theories
of any discipline must be consistent with ontological principles. Ontology
might then be of indirect importance for other disciplines. To give just one
83We can distinguish two kinds of concepts of information and informativeness; epistemic
and semantic information. Standard theories of semantic information do result in the
claim that logically true statements have zero semantic information. A true statement
whose semantic information is zero might yet have high epistemic informativeness, if many
people do not see that it is true without the aid of articial methods or even due to some
confusion reject its truth. It is often useful to point out such confusions. There are
indeed generalizations of the concept of semantical information on which at least some
logical statements are semantically informative, such as Hintikka's surface information;
however, some logically true statements lack even surface information. Nevertheless the
study of even such statements is not wholly useless, since many of them are surely highly
epistemically informative. I think the same holds of many ontological statements.
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relatively timely example, computer science has recently made much use
of ontology. Computer scientists indeed often use the word "ontology" in
a sense completely dierent from the philosophical sense, referring to any
classication as an ontology. However, what many of them call "upper ontol-
ogy" or "upper level ontology" or "top-level ontology" is really connected to
ontology in the philosophical sense as it describes very general concepts that
are the same across all knowledge domains, and philosophers such as Barry
Smith have contributed to its development. Computer scientists, however,
use ontology, even upper ontology, mostly to organize existing knowledge,
so the usefulness of ontology for computer science does not require that it
would be capable of producing new substantive knowledge of its own.
However, as it can be held that the study of pure logic is of a limited
intrinsic value, so it can also be held that the resolution of ontological ques-
tions can be of a limited intrinsic value even if it could not be applied to
any other subject.
With respect to many metaphysical problems I nd plausible a metameta-
physical view that David Manley in [Man09, page 4] calls mild deationism,
separating it both from strong deationism (which is anti-metaphysical84)
and from mainstream metaphysics85. Manley says that mild deationists
admit that there is a genuine dispute at issue, but believe that
it can be resolved in a relatively trivial fashion by reecting on
conceptual or semantic facts.
I will argue that many of the metaphysical problems dealt with in analytical
metaphysics are relatively trivial. While I cannot of course in this work go
through all metaphysical problems and divide them into trivial and substan-
tive ones, I will argue for this in the case of two important and historically
prominent metaphysical problems, namely the (basic part of the) problem of
84One advocate of strong deationism, Eli Hirsch, has also (in [Hir02]) called it a shallow
approach to metaphysics; mild deationism could also be called a mildly shallow approach
to metaphysics.
85Manley gives as an example of mild deationism in [Man09, page 25] the metaonto-
logical theory given by the Neo-Fregeans Bob Hale and Crispin Wright in [HW09]. David
J. Chalmers calls this type of view in [Cha09, pages 78,94-99] lightweight realism. I must
stress that though I support mild deationism aka lightweight realism with regard to many
ontological problems, this does not imply that I would agree with all of the metaontologi-
cal views of Hale and Wright; I do agree with some of them but not all. Hale and Wright
have been strongly inuenced by Dummett, and hold some form of vericationism, which
I will argue against.
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universals and the metaphysics of truth. I want to argue that strong forms
of nominalism are just trivially inconsistent with obvious facts while weak
forms of realism follow deductively from obvious facts. I will also argue
for a weak correspondence theory which takes the truth predicate to be a
genuine and complex predicate (and so is opposed to strong deationism)
but does not take truth to be an explanatory concept (as substantivalist
theories of truth are by many supposed to do) either and is therefore mildly
deationary.
However, I do not want to hold a mildly deationary view with respect to
all traditional metaphysical problems; I agree that there are some genuinely
substantive metaphysical problems, but I tend to be rather pessimistic about
the possibility of these problems being solved, at least in the near future86.
I suggest that the division between those metaphysical problems of which
mild deationism holds and those which are more substantive corresponds
roughly to the division between ontological problems and (other) metaphys-
ical problems made by those who distinguish between ontology and meta-
physics, starting from Wol; it corresponds especially closely to the distinc-
tion between ontology and metaphysics made by realistic phenomenologists.
Of course, even such philosophers have sometimes misclassied questions so
that some questions which are not relatively trivial have been held to be part
of ontology, so we cannot rely on their authority in the division of problems
to ontological and metaphysical.
One attack on metaphysics is directed at metaphysics as an independent
discipline. Many people today think that metaphysics is superuous, since
they think that natural science already answers metaphysical questions. Of
course, the premises of this kind of attack on metaphysics are entirely in-
compatible with those of the attack that holds metaphysical questions to be
meaningless, since this view holds that they are meaningful questions which
physics can answer. If physicalism is true, then physical entities are funda-
mental entities, so it is suggested that physics already counts as metaphysics
in the sense of aetiology, the science of the fundamental constituents of all
86Manley himself mentions such questions as whether there is a God as examples of ques-
tions with respect to which people are generally not tempted into deationism, whether
mild or strong. I suspect this also holds of many traditional problems of philosophy such
as the problem of the relationship of mind and matter. However, I do not think that it
holds of other problems such as the Problem of Universals or most questions relating to
the ontology of mathematics.
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things. However, this would leave metaphysics as ontology partially inde-
pendent of physics, as it would examine truths common to both fundamental
and derivative entities, drawing both on physics and other sciences.
Also even if physicalism were true, it would yet have to be shown rigor-
ously that it is true, and physics by itself cannot show it. In order to show
that for example psychological entities are less fundamental than physical
ones (i. e. can be reduced to physical entities, or supervene upon them
etc.) one must compare the results and methods of psychology to those of
physics. A physicist is not qualied to perform such a comparison simply
by reason of his expertise in physics. This task requires someone who views
all of knowledge together, synoptically, and this task has traditionally been
entrusted to philosophers, specically metaphysicians.
Besides, metaphysics considers more abstract and general questions re-
garding fundamental entities than even theoretical physics. Even if it were
shown conclusively that all entities or all fundamental entities were physical,
there would yet remain a distinction - although in that case a rather subtle
one - between examining all (fundamental) entities as physical and viewing
them simply as (fundamental) entities. It is no part of the metaphysician's
task to ask such questions as what fundamental particles there are. On the
other hand, a physicist as such need not consider whether the fundamen-
tal entities are enduring entities or events and processes, or whether they
have bare particulars as constituents or are just complexes of properties.
A physicist might even consider many such questions too trivial for him to
consider.
While metaphysics is intended to be a separate discipline, this does not
imply that there would be in practice any sharp line between it and other
disciplines such as natural sciences or mathematics, since there are not such
sharp lines between any other disciplines; for example, it is pretty impossible
to draw a sharp line in practice between physics and chemistry or between
theoretical physics and mathematics. The separation of disciplines cannot
imply that they would be wholly independent from each other; chemistry is
surely dependent on physics, and neither can metaphysics then be wholly
independent of the natural sciences. Every discipline has occasionally to
encroach on the territories of other disciplines, appealing to results derived
in other disciplines and producing results that they can in their turn appeal
to. Even if metaphysics is continuous with natural science, as naturalistic
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metaphysicians claim, this would not impugn its claim to be a separate dis-
cipline. In fact theoretical physicists and metaphysicians occasionally have
to consider the same questions, as do metaphysicians and mathematicians,
and metaphysicians and general linguists etc. For example, such questions
as whether time is linear or cyclic and whether time travel is possible lie in
the line between metaphysics and physical cosmology. Even here, however,
the approach to these questions may be dierent; metaphysicians mostly
ask whether e. g. time travel is conceptually possible, while physicists ask
whether it is actual or nomologically possible.
Of course, the fact that all attempts to prove metaphysics impossible
or illegitimate have failed does not show conclusively that metaphysics is
possible and legitimate. However, it does oer inductive proof that there are
no systematic reasons to think that metaphysics would be impossible which
we could discover. In such circumstances, trying to develop metaphysical
theories is surely justied even if it is not wholly certain that the attempt
has any chances of success.
It may be thought that besides such systematic reasons as the veriabil-
ity principle, structuralism, syntacticism and coherentism the opponents of
metaphysics had another reason to doubt the possibility of ontology, namely
the fact that much traditional ontology had been unsuccessful. It is indeed
controversial whether and how much progress has occurred in metaphysics.
Personally I think that quite a bit of progress has occurred, but admittedly
it is very modest compared to the progress of natural sciences, and it is hard
to prove that even modest progress has occurred. Positivists used to point
to the lack of agreement after centuries of discussion as a reason for the im-
possibility of metaphysics. Of course, if this were a valid reason to doubt the
possibility of ontology, it would be valid reason to doubt the possibility of
all philosophy, since despite the bright hopes of the positivists, later history
has shown that no more agreement has been reached in anti-metaphysical
philosophy than in metaphysical philosophy87. It would also be a reason to
87Indeed, agreement is hard to nd even in the history of philosophy, though one might
think that there we have just to follow ordinary historical methods. However, one could
just as easily challenge the possibility of progress in history as in metaphysics. I will
later show as an example that there is no more agreement about what Aristotle thought
to be the correct answer to the problem of universals than about what is the correct
answer to that problem. Obviously philosophers' own opinions about universals aect
their interpretation of Aristotle. Philosophers who respect Aristotle typically want to nd
in Aristotle's doctrine support for their own beliefs and therefore interpret him as having
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doubt the possibility of nearly all humanistic disciplines; for instance, the
disagreements between rival schools of psychology, between behaviourists,
psychoanalysts, humanistic psychologists, transpersonal psychologists and
cognitive psychologists, are just as deep as those between rival schools of
philosophy. Therefore metaphysicians are in the same boat with psycholo-
gists and sociologists and literary researchers.
However, mere lack of increasing agreement with respect to any disci-
pline does not do anything to justify the claim that the statements of that
discipline would be meaningless or without truth-value. It does not do it
in the case of ethics any more than in the case of metaphysics. At most it
could provide evidence for the sceptical or agnostic thesis that metaphysical
or ethical questions are too dicult so that it would be impossible for us
to attain justied beliefs in metaphysics. For some reason, today's philoso-
phers are very unwilling to seriously consider this kind of thesis; one must
be afraid it is just arrogance that blocks this alternative from their sight.
Even so, lack of increasing agreement would not provide any evidence for
the thesis that progress in metaphysics would be impossible in principle, as
Kant claimed would be the case for transcendent metaphysics, metaphysics
dealing with things in themselves. Such a strong thesis would require a sys-
tematic grounding in some ambitious epistemological doctrine like Kant's,
about whose truth no more agreement is likely to emerge than about the
metaphysical theories whose truth it would pronounce unknowable. Lack of
increasing agreement could at most provide evidence only for the less radical
sceptical thesis that metaphysics would be impossible in practice.
Now I do not think that we should be too sanguine about how much
progress is possible in metaphysics, and this is just because of this kind of ev-
idence. Nevertheless, the scarcity of increasing agreement scarcely provides
sucient justication for even the claim that all progress in metaphysics
would be impossible in practice, but only for the depressing yet bearable
claim that the probability of progress is rather small, and if any progress
occurs it can only be very slow and modest. I do fear that we can in the
near future gain rigorous knowledge only about the most trivial metaphysical
truths, but even such relatively trivial results are of some worth. The dismal
roughly the same view as they do. On he other hand those who do not respect him often
want to nd as big a gap as possible between their views and Aristotle's. Both motives
lead to the distortion of Aristotle's own ideas.
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prospects of progress scarcely justify us in ceasing to investigate anything
but the hard sciences where alone indisputable progress appears; mankind's
desire for knowledge is not satised by having knowledge only about physical
and chemical questions. If someone is genuinely interested in metaphysical
questions, he is justied in investigating it even if the probability of progress
is small, so long as it is not completely non-existent.
In fact one important reason for the bad quality of much traditional
metaphysics is very clear; metaphysics has typically been used to defend be-
liefs that had been adopted beforehand, independently of scholarly research,
and often for irrational reasons, as at least often in the case of traditional
religious beliefs. Defenders of religious orthodoxy have usually not scrupled
to make knowingly use of fallacious arguments to defend the beliefs they
consider important. On the other hand opponents of traditional religious
beliefs have not always if ever been more honest but have also used meta-
physics just as a weapon to attack traditional religious beliefs, and have used
clearly fallacious arguments for atheism. Very few metaphysicians have been
even close to impartial or intellectually honest in their research. Of course
the questions of metaphysical would not be so easy even if prejudices could
abolished. Many metaphysical and especially ontological problems are so
abstract that maintaining a clear idea of what one is talking about is quite
dicult (though it would surely not be more dicult than in more rareed
branches of mathematics like set theory or algebra if irrational prejudices
did not compound the diculty). Thus it is no surprise that traditional
metaphysical discussion has not led to any kind of agreement.
The situation has of course not changed much in this respect; religious
questions and other questions connected with one's world-view still often
arouse vehement passions and philosophers can seldom avoid being swept
up in them. Thus I think that an intellectually honest philosophical dis-
cussion of such dicult and sensitive questions as the existence of God is
nearly practically impossible even today (which does not imply that we
should not strive for it). However, when ontological discussion is conned
to more abstract questions which are not of much practical relevance, such
as the problem of universals, it should be easier to maintain some amount of
intellectual honesty, though of course even these questions have some con-
nection to the more substantive ontological questions which have religious
and ethical importance, so the maintenance of intellectual honesty is dicult
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even in discussing them. Nevertheless, even if the attainment of agreement
is unlikely, this does not make it impossible for individual philosophers to
reach justied conclusions.
I will argue that the legitimacy of ontology and metaphysics is the only
rational conclusion to draw from the failure of the vericationist principle
and other similar principles. While I will not try to decide the question
of the correctness of empiricism as an epistemological doctrine, I will argue
further that what holds of classical vericationism holds also of other initially
plausible forms of empiricism which have been presented as an obstacle to
metaphysics or to specic metaphysical theories. These forms of empiricism
can also be formulated in dierent ways that are of dierent strength, and it
then turns out that either they are weak enough to allow for the possibility
of metaphysics or are so strong that they are also block much intuitively
indispensable non-metaphysical knowledge and so are quite implausible. For
example, one such principle which has often today been presented as an
obstacle to the existence of uninstantiated universals has been the demand
that entities of which one has knowledge must aect one causally, often
known as the Eleatic Principle, which I will discuss in 5.3.
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Chapter 4
Metaontology and the
Theory of Truth
4.1 Correspondence Theory of Truth and Dea-
tionism
In this chapter I will discuss the metaontological implications of the prob-
lem of truth, namely the question of what truth is. In current philosophy
the most prominent candidates for theories of truth are often thought to
be the correspondence theory of truth and the deationary conception of
truth, though epistemic conceptions of truth still have their defenders. A
third popular conception of truth is Tarski's Semantic Conception of truth.
There is much confusion over how it is related to the other two theories, cor-
respondence theory and deationism. There has been much debate about
whether it is indeed a version of the correspondence theory of truth as Tarski
himself claimed it was or whether such a theory might better be described
as a deationary theory of truth.
This debate over the interpretation of Tarski's theory of truth is relevant
to my dissertation in two dierent but complementary ways. The rst of
them is negative; I will use Tarski's theory to argue against competitors to
my metaontological theory, namely against truthmaker theories. I will argue
in Section 6.5 that the Problem of Universals concerns primarily the onto-
logical commitments rather than the truthmakers of predicative statements.
To prepare the way for that claim I will here argue in Section 4.2.4 that
no sucient reasons have been given for the claim that ontology requires a
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truthmaker principle in the rst place. One prominent reason, probably the
main reason, why many philosophers have been attracted to a truthmaker
principle has been that they think that a genuinely realistic metaphysics
requires a correspondence theory of truth and a correspondence theory of
truth requires truthmaking. I am in favour of a rather strong version of
realism; this dissertation argues for realism about universals, and I view
such realism as a natural part of a general realistic theory. I have already
argued against such anti-realist principles as vericationism. However, I do
not think that a truthmaker theory is the right way to defend or develop a
realistic theory, even a strongly realistic theory.
It has been questioned whether correspondence theory is necessary or
even relevant for realism, as Michael Devitt has done in [Dev84]. However,
there are serious problems with Devitt's view. Devitt begins by saying that
no doctrine about truth is constitutive of realism, which is indeed plausible
if "constitutive" is understood in some very strong sense. However, he goes
far further than this. He says in [Dev84, x4.2, page 41] that Realism does
not strictly entail any doctrine of truth at all. However, he later in [Dev01b,
x43, page 46] says quite plausibly that realism requires that truth be abso-
lute, since it is inconsistent with relativistic anti-realism, and if truth were
relative, we could use the equivalence thesis (i. e. the T-schema or Con-
vention T) to derive relativism. I cannot see how these two claims could
be consistent with each other. This requirement seems to be a strict en-
tailment, quite unlike the abductive links between Realism and theories of
truth Devitt dealt with earlier in that section, since the T-schema is a strict
entailment. However, absolutism concerning truth is surely a doctrine of
truth.
Devitt claims that though this link between realism and truth is close,
it is not signicant. However, it is in fact very signicant, because (all or
most) traditional rivals to the correspondence theory imply that truth is not
absolute. Neurath's coherence theory of truth implied that a sentence was
only true relative to a theory or to arbitrarily chosen protocol sentences,
and the pragmatic theory of truth implies (at least in most of its forms)
that truth is relative to the interests of the inquirer. Curiously Devitt does
not even mention these two famous theories, but he does mention epistemic
theories of truth (with which pragmatic theories do overlap). However,
surely epistemic theories of truth strictly entail rather than just abductively
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indicate the relativity of truth1. What is known is always known by someone
and therefore knowledge is always relative to a person or a community, and so
must according to epistemic theories of truth be truth also. While epistemic
1In contradiction to this Devitt claims that even the epistemic theory of truth does
not strictly entail anti-realism. He demands an argument from the theory of truth to
anti-realism. The problem with Devitt's characterization of realism is that while Devitt
denes realism partly (in [Dev84, x2.2]) in terms of the independence of the world from
the mental, he does not provide any explanation of what he means by independence.
Nor does he explain what he means by strict entailment. However, one common theory
of ontological dependence, the modal conception of independence such as is presented for
example by Peter Simons in [Sim87, x8.3, pages 294-301], is that an entity is dependent on
another if and only if it cannot exist without the other existing. It follows from this that
an entity is independent of another if and only if it can exist without the other existing,
i. e. a is independent of b if :2((9x)(x = a) ! (9y)(y = b)). Strict entailment is also
often understood in modal terms; a sentence entails another strictly if the entailment is
necessary, i. e. p entails q strictly i 2(p! q).
If we accept these two modal denitions we can give an argument that anti-realism
can be inferred from many epistemic theories of truth demonstratively and not just ab-
ductively. Devitt says that if TE expresses an epistemic conception of truth, then given
the equivalence thesis, the epistemic doctrine requires that the appropriate instances of
s is TE if and only if p hold. However, while the epistemic doctrine does require this,
it requires more. Surely, the epistemic theory of truth entails strictly that the epistemic
conception of truth is strictly equivalent with the pre-theoretic or intuitive notion of truth,
as the epistemic conception of truth is supposed to be an analysis or a reduction of the
pre-theoretic notion, and even in the latter case it should be just as necessary as Kripke
argued the identity Water is H2O to be. Therefore it requires that necessarily s is true
i s is TE i. e. that 2(TE(s)$ T (p)). However, the equivalence thesis is also commonly
taken to be necessary; if s is taken as an interpreted sentence (i. e. a sentence which
is partially individuated on the basis of its meaning) then it is necessary that s is true
i p i. e. 2(T (s) $ p) (and uninterpreted sentences cannot be true in the rst place).
We can infer in any standard modal logic by combining these that necessarily s is TE i
p, i. e. 2(TE(s) $ p), which entails 2(p ! TE(s)). However, this conclusion expresses
some kind of dependence of reality on the human mind for many epistemic conceptions of
truth, if we accept the modal denitions of dependence and independence. E. g. if p were
the proposition or sentence that the Sun exists and TE(s) were Devitt's own example of
an absurd epistemic theory "The Pope arms that s", then we can surely argue that it
is impossible for the Pope to arm anything if he does not exist and have a mind, i. e.
if o symbolizes the mind of the Pope then 2(TE(s) ! (9x)(x = o)) and therefore this
epistemic theory entails that 2(p ! (9x)(x = o)). i. e. that the Sun cannot exist if the
Pope's mind does not exist. According to the modal conception of dependence this then
entails that the Sun is ontologically dependent on the mind of the Pope and therefore
on something mental. Actual epistemic theories will of course instead entail that TE(s)
entails the existence of humanity as a species or in some cases just of some kind of mind
and therefore entail that physical objects like the Sun are dependent on humanity or some
mind.
This argument has of course the problem that the modal conception of dependence is
controversial (e. g. Kit Fine has argued against it). However, without having any denite
conception of dependence we cannot have a denite conception of what realism is, and an
indenite conception of realism is not of much value, so the burden of proof should here
fall on those realists who reject the modal conception of dependence to provide a better
conception of it.
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theories of truth usually explain truth as what can in principle be known,
even this must be relative to cognitive faculties of human beings though not
to actual evidence. Strongly deationist theories are not consistent with the
absoluteness of truth either; e. g. Quine's disquotational theory is so close
to a coherence theory that it also makes the truth of individual statements
and the reference of terms relative to a theory (as clearly seen in [Qui68]).
So a realist is motivated to defend a correspondence theory of truth since
he has to preserve the absoluteness of truth. This link between realism and
correspondence theory may not be a strict entailment, like the link between
realism and absolutism on which it is based, but it is yet quite close and sig-
nicant. Devitt does not see this because he sees the correspondence theory
of truth as a stronger theory than it is; Devitt thinks that a correspondence
theory must be an inationary theory, but I will show that it need not be.
However, even if realism left open the choice between correspondence theory
and deationism, yet it would still have huge entailments for the theory of
truth if it excluded all the other theories.
Devitt has a maxim, Maxim 3, in [Dev84, page 4] to settle the realism
issue before any epistemic or semantic issue. However, he himself admits
that it is oversimplied, as realism is a little bit semantic, since according to
it the world must be independent of our knowledge and ability to refer to it.
Furthermore, Devitt argues in [Dev84, page 70] against phenomenalism (and
so on behalf of realism) by appealing to a truthmaker principle, arguing (as
such ontologists as Armstrong have also done) that subjunctive condition-
als concerning sense-data would need something that makes them true, but
phenomenalists cannot provide such truthmakers. In doing this Devitt vio-
lates his own Maxim 3, as such a truthmaking principle is surely a semantic
principle. Devitt's appeal to the truthmaker axiom seems fallacious even
if the maxim is abandoned for though he argues for an inationary corre-
spondence theory, he (unlike Armstrong) nowhere argues specically for a
variety of inationary correspondence theory that would imply a truthmak-
ing principle2. Surely the fact that Devitt himself could not follow his own
maxim is a reason to doubt how well-advised it is3. Also as we have seen
2Also problems with subjunctive conditionals are not exclusive to phenomenalists.
Even physicalists who subscribe to a truthmaking principle have a problem with sub-
junctive conditionals, for natural laws are arguably expressed by such.
3Devitt labours in [Dev84, x4.4, page 46] the point that realism does not imply any
doctrine of truth in the context of the contemporary debate over scientic realism. How-
ever, it seems to me that this is the wrong context. The theory of truth is indeed not of
171
in discussing Ayer's theory, the opposing party, the phenomenalists, also
appeal to semantic claims, as they argue that statements concerning physi-
cal objects can be semantically analysed in terms of sense contents, a claim
realists like Devitt must disagree with. Therefore semantic claims seem to
be in many dierent ways closely relevant to the debate over realism.
I will argue that a correspondence theory need not be a truthmaker the-
ory, so that even if Devitt is wrong, a realist need not accept a truthmaker
theory4. Therefore I will argue that Tarski's theory of truth can provide
(if developed further and generalized) an adequate version of the correspon-
dence theory of truth such as a realistic theory requires, but does not have
any need for truthmakers, so a correspondence theory of truth has no need
for truthmakers.
The second way in which the debate is relevant to the theme of my
dissertation is more positive. The theory of ontological commitment is at
the basis of my approach to the problem of universals and I will argue (in
Section 5.11) that the theory of ontological commitment is highly analogous
to the theory of truth. Therefore choosing the right theory of truth is crucial
to the development of the theory of ontological commitment, since the theory
of ontological commitment should be developed as an analogue of the theory
of truth. I think that Tarski's theory of truth is the best theory of truth
so far found and therefore the theory of ontological commitment should be
developed analogously to Tarski's theory of truth rather than some other
theory of truth.
It seems that every possible view about the relation between Tarski's
theory and correspondence theory has been taken, both as to its interpreta-
much direct relevance to the debate over scientic realism. It is more centrally relevant to
the debate over Common-sense Realism, to which Devitt also subscribes. We have seen
that Devitt himself appeals in violation of his own Maxim 3 to the theory of truth in
defending common sense realism against phenomenalism. Also semantic properties such
as truth are postulated by common sense rather than natural sciences (though the science
of linguistics does indeed need to postulate them). As we have seen Schlick argued that
correspondence (and hence if the correspondence theory is correct truth) would in some
cases (though obviously not all) be observable. The relevance of truth to general scientic
realism is more indirect, based mainly on the fact that scientic realism is built on top of
common sense realism.
4This implies that Devitt's main argument against phenomenalism may not be valid.
However, this certainly does not imply that we should accept phenomenalism, as there
are many other arguments against phenomenalism. Nevertheless, it does weaken the
case against phenomenalism; I do not think that phenomenalism can yet be conclusively
refuted, though realism concerning physical objects does seem to be a better hypothesis.
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tion and as to how to evaluate it. Many philosophers have even at dierent
times taken dierent views. Many philosophers, starting from Karl Pop-
per, and including famous philosophers like Jan Wolenski (e. g. in [Wol])
and Ilkka Niiniluoto (in [Nii99] and [Nii04]), claim that Tarski's theory is
a correspondence theory (as Tarski himself claimed) and think that Tarski
was right in defending a correspondence theory. However, even they might
disagree among each other about what kind or version of correspondence
theory Tarski's theory was. E. g. Ilkka Niiniluoto thinks that Tarski's the-
ory of truth was a strong, classical correspondence theory while Wolenski
and Simons think that it was only a weak correspondence theory. Of course
such philosophers may yet think that Tarski's theory is in some way an
unsatisfactory correspondence theory. Some philosophers such as Donald
Davidson (in [Dav69]) and Hartry Field (in [Fie72])have initially held this
view but then abandoned it; Davidson changed his interpretation of Tarski's
theory as a correspondence theory (see [Dav90, page 302]) without changing
his evaluation of Tarski's theory but Field apparently only changed his eval-
uation of it. Other agree that Tarski's theory was indeed a correspondence
theory, but think that such a theory is wrong, and that Tarski's theory
must be replaced by something more deationary or by something more
epistemic; many deationists (such as Horwich and to an extent the later
Field) belong to this group and so do such semantical anti-realists as the late
Putnam. Still others, like Devitt, Patterson and most truthmaker theorists,
think (often for dierent reasons) that Tarski's theory was a deationary
theory and therefore wrong, since it is so weak as to be trivial and some-
thing stronger is needed, and therefore we need a correspondence theory (or
an epistemic theory). There are also those like Soames (in [Soa77, page 18])
and Quine who think that Tarski was a deationist and was correct in being
so, though curiously nearly all of them claim that Tarski's theory did not
represent quite the right kind of deationism. Finally, there are those who
think that Tarski's theory is compatible with both correspondence theory
and deationism (perhaps including the later Field). There are also more
complex and subtle views about the relationship between Tarski's theory
and correspondence theory that would take long to explain properly. Dea-
tionists often seem to vacillate between accusing Tarski's theory of being too
inationary and attacking correspondence theorists by claiming that they
cannot make use of Tarski's theory because it is not inationary enough; the
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attitude they take towards Tarski's theory does not always seem to be even
formally consistent. Poor Tarski is attacked from the deationary direction
for being too inationary and from the inationary front for being too de-
ationary; he is caught between two extremes like a social democrat caught
between communists and capitalists.
The reason for this diversity of opinions is to be found not only in dif-
culties in interpreting Tarski's theory, even though there are some such
(not very great) diculties, but more fundamentally in diculties in agree-
ing about what correspondence theory and deationism are (and therefore
about how they are related to each other, e. g. what if anything distin-
guishes them from each other) and in agreeing about what the problem is
to which they provide answers. The example of Donald Davidson helps to
conrm this view. Davidson apparently did not change his interpretation
of Tarski as a correspondence theorist because of any substantive changes
in his own theory, but only because he changed his mind about what cor-
respondence theory amounted to. At rst he took object-based correspon-
dence theories to be possible but then came to think that a correspondence
theory would have to involve commitment to facts, which he consistently
detested5. Indeed, Tarski was an exceptionally clear writer, so it is strange
that there should be many problems about how to interpret his theory;
nevertheless, since even Tarski had to use natural languages in presenting
the philosophical motivation and interpretation of his theory, he could not
be completely unambiguous, and like all humans he made slips, so it is to
be expected that small disagreements about how to understand him should
arise. However, not only do philosophers disagree about whether Tarski was
a correspondence theorist, but there are also disagreements about almost
5Davidson seems to have been extraordinarily unclear in formulating the distinctions
between various theories of truth. In [Dav86] he defended a coherence theory of truth
and knowledge that yet was in his view compatible with a correspondence theory but
did not demand that truth should be denable and was therefore also compatible with
primitivism. Both coherence theory and correspondence theory on most understandings
of them seem to me incompatible with primitivism, though the words can also be used
in a weaker sense in which they are compatible with it. Later Davidson came to consider
that he had not been well-advised to describe his theory as either a correspondence theory
or a coherence theory. However, apparently he never considered that the very phrases
"correspondence theory" and "coherence theory" might be ambiguous or vague. Clearly
this terminological muddle indicates that the very basic concepts of the theory of truth
were so muddled in analytical philosophy that extensive work was needed to clarify them
before any solution to the problem of truth could be expected - a work that has hardly
been completed yet.
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any philosopher who has presented a theory of truth that might be called a
correspondence theory or a deationist theory, whether ancient or modern.
Not only are there disagreements about whether such ancient philosophers
as Aristotle (whose interpretation is notoriously dicult, as we have already
seen) are correspondence theorists or deationists, but disagreements con-
cern even modern philosophers. E. g. Grover, Camp and Belnap present
themselves as deationists, but Hartry Field at one time denied that they
were genuine deationists. These disagreements are connected with dis-
agreements about how correspondence theory and deationism are to be
dened; there are circulating any number of dierent denitions many of
which are held to be equivalent by some but not by others.
Like a lot of philosophical disputes, much of the dispute is just based
on mutual misunderstanding and failure to communicate. The correct an-
swer to the question of whether Tarski's theory of truth is a correspondence
theory or a deationist theory is, I fear, rather disappointing. Given some
common denitions of correspondence theory it is a correspondence theory
but given other common denitions it is not. The answer about its relation-
ship to deationism is similar: given some interpretations of deationism it
is compatible with both inationism and deationism, but given others it
is inationary. Also given some ways of understanding the problems that a
theory of truth is trying to solve Tarski's theory counts as a nearly complete
theory of truth but given other ways of understanding the problems, it only
scratches their surface or is not even relevant to those problems at all.
Indeed, given suitable denitions Tarski's theory of truth can be said to
be both a deationary theory of truth and a correspondence theory of truth;
more specically, it can be said to be both a weak correspondence theory and
a mildly deationary theory6. I will argue that it can be viewed as both (so
long as the Convention T or T-schema is formulated in terms of translation
and is not understood as just disquotationalist) and that so interpreted it
is a very plausible theory of truth, though it requires some generalizations,
which I will try to begin providing. Such a theory is then opposed both
to substantival correspondence theories of truth (such as truthmaker theo-
6Even this is slightly inaccurate, for it seems that rather than a binary or trinary
distinction there are rather continua of more and less inationary theories, and moreover,
theories which are more or less inationary in dierent ways. The distinction is really
a matter of degree. However, a division of the non-epistemic theories into three is good
enough for many purposes.
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ries) and to strongly deationary theories of truth (where most deationary
theories of truth that have been proposed, both prosentential theories and
minimalist theories, can be seen as strongly deationary).
Rather than strongly deating the notion of truth, I will then have to
deate the very debate concerning deationism. I will argue that the dif-
ferences between philosophers who call themselves correspondence theorists
and those that call themselves deationists are often less signicant than
their similarities, such as their opposition to the epistemic theory of truth.
Quite often the dierences are purely terminological, so the debate comes
quite close to being a pseudo-debate. Nevertheless, I think that there are
some genuine disagreements (and several of them) at work behind the debate
(though they are not so much about truth as about more general semantic
concepts such as reference and meaning).
Deationism is often presented as a new theory of truth, an alternative
to traditional theories of truth, both to correspondence theories of truth
and epistemic theories of truth such as vericationism or coherentism or
pragmatism and to eliminationism about truth. However, there are good
reasons to doubt whether it really is a completely novel option in the theory
of truth, or whether it is an option in the theory of truth at all. If it
were to be a new option this would require that it would be incompatible
with all earlier theories of truth, and I will argue that deationists do not
show that it is so, at least on most interpretations of deationism. I will
in fact argue that when we examine deationist theories carefully it turns
out that a deationist theory, when its possible ambiguities are resolved,
either collapses into one of the traditional theories of truth or some kind of
combination of traditional theories or turns out to be compatible with several
traditional theories, again depending entirely on how it is understood. E. g.
Devitt's deationary theory threatens to collapse into either eliminativism
or traditional correspondence theory.
In order to explain and try to dispel the confusion we can argue that
there are several denitions of correspondence theory and several denitions
of deationism which are commonly used and which need not be equivalent
though they are commonly taken to be such. There is not one correspon-
dence theory but there are several correspondence theories7 and there is
7It might then be doubted whether it is legitimate to speak at all of the correspondence
theory (or of the deationary theory or of the coherence theory), using the denite article.
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not one deationism but several deationist theories, and these are not just
dierent ways to implement the same basic idea but dierent basic ideas
which are confused together. Some correspondence theories are consistent
with some deationary theories (or even imply them) but all correspondence
theories are clearly not consistent with all deationary theories.
In order to show this I will in the next sections of my dissertation com-
pare dierent denitions of correspondence theory and dierent kinds of
correspondence theories and later I will go through dierent denitions of
deationism and dierent kinds of deationary theories.
4.2 Dierent Denitions of Correspondence The-
ory and Dierent Correspondence Theories
4.2.1 What is Correspondence Theory?
The main evidence for Tarski holding his own theory to be a form of cor-
respondence theory can be found in two statements he makes. In [Tar83a,
153] he says the following:
I would only mention that throughout this work I shall be
concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions which are
contained in the so-called classical conception of truth ('true -
corresponding with reality') in contrast, for example, with the
utilitarian conception ('true - in a certain respect useful').
In order to nd out whether Tarski succeeded in grasping those intentions
we must nd out in what sense Tarski used the words "corresponding with
reality". It is interesting to not that Tarski here contrasts the classical
conception with he utilitarian i. e. pragmatic conception of truth. In his
less technical and more philosophical article [Tar44] Tarski repeats the words
However, we can use the expression "the correspondence theory" as shorthand for "the
theory containing whatever is common to all correspondence theories" (and similarly for
all families of theories of truth). Even when understood in this way, the expression is
ambiguous and vague, since the indenite expression "a correspondence theory" is also
ambiguous and vague; nevertheless, it is determinate enough to be useful in initially
characterizing the disputes in the theory of truth. More unambiguous expressions are
such complex and unwieldy phrases as "the weak object-based correspondence theory",
"the strong fact-based correspondence theory" etc., which stand for what is common to all
weak object-based correspondence theories, all strong fact-based correspondence theories
etc.
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"classical conception of truth", adding that this conception is supposed to
be the Aristotelian conception of truth. Tarski said there in [Tar44, page
342] that he would like his denition to do justice to the intuitions that
adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth. According to him,
these intuitions nd their well-known expression in the lines of Aristotle's
metaphysics:
To say of what is that it is not, or to say of what is not that
it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or to say of what
is not that it is not, is true.
Directly after this he said that in more modern philosophical terminology,
we could perhaps express this by saying that the truth of a sentence consist in
its agreement with or correspondence to reality and that for a theory which
is to be based upon this formulation the term "correspondence theory" has
been suggested.
Tarski then supposed his theory to be a correspondence theory in a sense
in which Aristotle's theory was a correspondence theory but the pragmatic
theory of truth is not. We will see later that Patterson thought that the
words "correspondence theory" should be used in a sense in which Aristotle's
theory was not a correspondence theory, namely as referring only to theories
in which truth plays a serious explanatory role. Naturally Tarski's theory
is not a correspondence theory in this sense, but then he never claimed
that it was and it can be doubted if anyone has claimed that it would be a
correspondence theory in such a sense.
Early in the 20th century Polish philosophers such as Kotarbinski and
Ajdukiewicz generally used such phrases as "classical conception of truth"
and "correspondence theory of truth" to refer to something like an Aris-
totelian theory of truth. Some of them saw the beginning of the classical
correspondence theory in the Middle Ages, as in Thomas Aquinas's deni-
tion of truth as the agreement (adequatio) of thought and thing; Aquinas
even at least once (in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate question 1 articulus
3) uses the adjectival participle "correspondens" though not the correspond-
ing nominalization "correspondentia". For instance, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz
speaks in [Ajd73, page 9] of the classical denition of truth and says that the
classical answer to the problem of what is truth is that the truth of a thought
consists in its correspondence with reality and then quotes Aquinas's deni-
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tion. Similarly, Tadeusz Kotarbinski in [Kot66, x17, pages 106,107] contrasts
the classical interpretation of truth with the utilitarian (i e. pragmatic)
interpretation of truth and says that in the classical interpretation, truly
means the same as in accordance with reality. Tarski's claim that his theory
is a version of the correspondence theory and of the classical conception of
truth must be viewed against this background.
However, what I think is most commonly called the classical correspon-
dence theory of truth by philosophers today is a version of the correspon-
dence theory of truth that was developed nearly two thousand years after
Aristotle's conception of truth, and which makes essential use of the con-
cept of state of aairs or fact in the account it gives of truth. For example,
Michael Glanzberg says in [Gla09] that it was prominent in the early 20th
century and its modern history starts with the beginnings of analytic philos-
ophy at the turn of the 20th century. Perhaps most famous examples of such
a theory appear in the work of the British Cambridge philosophers Bertrand
Russell, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein; however, other early forms
of it appear in German philosophers such as the phenomenologists Edmund
Husserl and Adolf Reinach in attempts to replace German idealism with
a more realistical alternative8. Clearly a correspondence theory developed
8Exactly where this correspondence theory originated is a dicult question in the
history of philosophy, similar to the question of where the notion of ontology originated.
Russell and Moore certainly did not see themselves as creators of the correspondence
theory or of the concept of states of aairs; they referred to them as commonplaces
of philosophical knowledge. This question is connected with the question of where the
notion of state of aairs originated. This is not just a question of who rst used the words
"Sachverhalt" or "state of aairs" in a technical sense (though some historians seem to
understand it in this way and that is also a dicult historical question), since the words
are often used to refer to truth-bearers, to true propositions of some kind (especially true
propositions with less ne-grained conditions of identity). Rather, the notion in question
is that of a non-linguistic complex entity that is essential to the truth of truth-bearers but
is not itself a truth-bearer, or at least not just a truth-bearer. Very often the line between
truth-bearers and truth-makers is hard to draw and a theory that is presented as an early
version of the classical correspondence theory of truth turns out on closer consideration
to be a version of the identity theory of truth - a theory that may perhaps in some of
its forms be a version of the correspondence theory of truth but can hardly be called a
version of the classical correspondence theory of truth. Carl Stumpf has sometimes been
suggested as the inventor of the concept of state of aairs, but he was himself asking where
the notion came from. It is sometimes said (e. g. by Barry Smith in [Smi89] and by Artur
Rojszczak) that the rst occurrence of the conception of a state of aairs (Schaverhalt)
in German philosophy was in a work on logic by Julius Bergmann, a follower of Hermann
Lotze. Nikolay Milkov has in [Mil02] attributed the origin of the idea (at least in German
philosophy) to Lotze himself. Bergmann dened logic traditionally (and of course very
dubiously from a more modern perspective) as the art of thinking (Denken) in the sense
of judging (Urtheilen), which he says is also the art of knowing or knowledge (Erkennen).
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two thousand years ago and a correspondence theory developed a century
Bergmann said in [Ber87, page 2] that we understand by knowledge such thinking that
what is thought in it corresponds (ubereinstimmt) with a state of aairs (Sahverhalt), i. e.
which is true (Wahr). This is of course an extremely dubious denition of knowledge (for
reasons Bergmann himself acknowledges later and tries to explain away, most importantly
that it leaves out the element of justication in knowledge). However, it may well be
a very interesting anticipation of what is commonly called the classical correspondence
theory of truth. Bergmann says so little about states of aairs and truth, however, that
it is yet not quite certain that he is not defending an identity theory of truth rather
than a fact-based correspondence theory. The case for attributing the notion of state of
aairs to Lotze seems weaker to me; Lotze does use the term "Sachverhalt" a few times,
but does so rather casually, so it is not clear that the word is at all a technical term
for him. Milkov admits in [Mil02, x6, page 446] that Lotze only uses the word twice
in the work on logic in which he according to Milkov introduces it; in the rst of these
passages it is clearly used in a non-technical sense, and only in the second can we see
any connection with deep philosophical questions, especially questions concerning truth.
Lotze's works, unlike Bergmann's have been translated into English, but the word "state of
aairs" does not occur in the translations of these passages. "Erkenntnis des jedesmaligen
Sachverhalts" in [Lot12, x138, page 169] has been translated in [Lot88, x138, page 181]
as "special knowledge", which is rather loose but ts the informal context; in the latter
passage [Lot12, x327, page 534] the word has been translated more exactly in [Lot88, x327,
page 235] as "state of things", which could indeed serve as a good synonym for "state of
aairs". Let me quote this passage:
Nothing is therefore left of this inexact comparison except the conviction
that even the mere perception of a given state of things as it really is, is only
possible on the assumption that the perceiving subject is at once enabled
and compelled by its own nature to combine the excitations which reach it
from objects into those forms which it is to perceive in the objects.
The context is a discussion that we would today call epistemological (regarding the a priori
preconditions of knowledge), though Lotze viewed it as a part of logic (in the very wide
sense of the word German philosophers of his day used). The inexact comparison Lotze
refers to is the comparison of knowledge to a copy of this object; since correspondence
theory is often called a copy theory (although inexactly, as Lotze at least recognizes),
Lotze seems to be arguing against a correspondence theory here, not developing one.
There is nevertheless here a notion of correspondence whose second member is a state
of aairs, though its rst member is a perception, not a common truthbearer such as a
sentence or a judgment or a proposition. Perceptions would not ordinarily be called true
or false; however, the relations of correspondence between perceptions and their correlates
and between judgments and their correlations seem very similar, so if one should support
a correspondence theory of truth, one could well call perceptions that correspond with
their objects or correlates also true in an expanded technical sense, so one can see an
implicit correspondence theory of correct perception in Lotze. In any case, Lotze does not
use the term "Sachverhalt" in an explicit (even though rather casual) denition of truth
as Bergmann does. On the other hand Lotze uses besides "Sachverhalt" also the word
"Thatsache", which could be translated as "fact" and understood as synonymous with
"state of aairs", which Milkov does not note, though it would give as good a reason to
hold Lotze as anticipating the modern theory of states of aairs as his use of the word
"Sachverhalt". In any case, however, consistently with Lotze's attacks on a copy theory of
knowledge Milkov himself attributes to Lotze in [Mil02, x2, page 439] an identity theory
of truth rather than a classical correspondence theory, so even if Milkov's interpretation
were correct and Lotze had a concept of a state of aairs, Lotze's theory is probably not
a classical fact-based correspondence theory of truth.
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or two ago are likely to dier widely.
Tarski was of course to some extent aware of and inuenced by the
modern classical correspondence theory of truth, and Tarski does also give a
formulation which even makes use of the notion of states of aairs. However,
Tarski says that all of these formulations can lead to various misunderstand-
ings, since none of them is suciently precise and clear, and adds a very
interesting qualication; according to him this applies less to the original
Aristotelian formulation than to the others.
This raises an important question; why does Tarski say that the original
Aristotelian formulation is more precise and clearer than the more modern
ones? He must surely have had a reason for saying so. Marian David
says in [Dav09] that Aristotle's denition oers a muted, relatively minimal
version of a correspondence theory. She adds that for this reason it has also
been interpreted as a precursor of deationary theories of truth. I suggest
that one likely reason why Tarski said that this denition was more precise
and clear was just because it is so minimal. Tarski probably wanted to make
clear his commitment to the most basic ideas of a correspondence theory,
but wanted to avoid commitment to any stronger version of the theory.
Tarski might have thought that reifying states of aairs as genuinely existing
entities was one of those misunderstandings to which the formulations could
lead. If this was Tarski's intention then he acted wisely, since we will see
that his denition does not support a stronger theory, such as Moore and
Russell (and Husserl and Reinach and many other philosophers) developed
at early 20th century. Especially Aristotle's denition does not make any
use of the notions of truth-making or facts, as I will show in Section 4.2.3
of this work, and this suggests that Tarski wanted to avoid making use of
them.
While Tarski's theory is not ontologically neutral but implies an ontology
of sets, it does not imply an ontology of facts to which sentences (or beliefs
or assumptions or propositions) would correspond in a literal sense, since
Tarski does not quantify over such entities when actually developing his
theory. Tarski mentions facts only in a brief preliminary remark he himself
says is not suciently clear, so quantication over facts is not part of Tarski's
theory proper.
This does not imply that there would be no need to accept the existence
of facts even if Tarski's theory is sucient as a theory of truth. Even if
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facts are not needed in the theory of truth, they may be needed for other
purposes, for instance as the members of the causal relation. There can be
arguments for facts based on the notion of ontological commitment instead
of the notion of truthmaker. For instance, some sentential anaphora in bits
of natural language discourse we hold to be true seem to involve quanti-
cation over facts. I will sketch the argument that could be given for the
existence of facts from ontological commitment. As has often been pointed
out, sentential anaphora are similar to variables for which sentences can be
substituted, so they seem to involve quantication over something. If the
quantication involved in such sentential anaphora is objectual, then it must
be quantication over propositions or facts, and in some cases (e. g. when
saying "The earth shook. It caused the statue to fall.", since propositions
are not taken to be causes of spatio-temporal events like a statue falling) it
seems that it cannot be quantication over propositions so we have reason
to think that it is quantication over facts.
4.2.2 Fact-based and Object-based Correspondence Theo-
ries
Wolfgang Kunne distinguishes in [K03, x1, page 5] between fact-based and
object-based correspondence theories of truth, and Marian David follows
him in [Dav09]. Kunne argued in [K03, x3,1, pages 93-112] that the earliest
correspondence theories such as Aristotelian theories of truth and Kant's
theory of truth were object-based correspondence theories9. Such earliest
correspondence theories did not suppose that the entities truth-bearers cor-
responded with were facts. As to their positive nature, this was more ob-
scure, but Kunne concluded in [K03, page 108] that according to such the-
ories a mental or verbal predication was true if the predicate t the object
it was predicated of.10 In the case of a verbal predication the object of the
9I will later in Section 4.2.3 examine in more detail whether this interpretation of
Aristotle's theory of truth is correct.
10How is the word "object" to be understood in the characterization of object-based
correspondence theories? It must not be understood as referring to any specic ontological
or semantical category, as in Frege's distinction between objects and functions or in the
distinction between objects and events. Even if Frege's controversial distinction were
correct, functions could still be objects in the sense in which object-based correspondence
theories make use of the word. Kunne may seem to contradict this, when he says that
paradigmatic elements of the right eld of the correspondence relation thus understood
are material objects such as mountains and people and when he distinguishes event-based
correspondence theories from object-based correspondence theories. However, telling what
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predication was typically the grammatical subject of the sentence. Accord-
ing to David this actually involves two relations to an object: (i) a reference
relation, holding between the subject term of the predicative judgment and
the object the judgment is about (its object); and (ii) a correspondence
relation, holding between that object and the predicate of the judgment11.
However, there are really two more relations at work, (iii) a reference (or
denotation) relation between the linguistic predicate and the property or set
it refers to and (iv) a correspondence relation between the linguistic sub-
ject of the judgement and the property that its referent is predicated of.
Of course, we could equivalently say that a predication is true if an object
t the predicate it was predicated of. We could then equally well take the
correspondence to consist of a relation between the subject term and the de-
notation of the object term.12 The great limitation of this theory, of course,
are the paradigmatic examples of some class does not tell what the limits of this class
are, so he need not mean that all objects would have to be material enduring objects
like his examples. In fact Kunne admits in [K03, page 100] that such things as Helen's
beauty (a property) and the fading of her beauty (an event or process) count as objects
in Aristotle's theory, and therefore presumably in object-based correspondence theories
generally. However, he still says that anything denoted by a singular term is an object;
this seems too restrictive since I see no reason why entities denoted by predicate terms
or expressions of other syntactic categories could not be objects as well (especially given
that the same entity can be denoted by expressions from dierent syntactic categories, as
I will argue later to be the case). Whatever he thought, it is in any case clear that the
objects in question are in the original version of the theory just the objects of the ideas or
presentations which a belief or judgement or assumption which is taken to be a truthbearer
contains, whether as subjects or predicates. Therefore in the case of a revised sentential
version of the object-based correspondence theory such as I argue Tarski's theory to be
they have to be the objects of the terms (whether singular or predicate terms) a sentence
or statement contains, i. e. the entities they designate or have as extensions etc. It seems
that entities of any ontological category could be objects in this sense, be the subjects of
predications or predicated of such subjects or designated. Events and even facts can be
taken to be objects in this wide sense if they happen to exist, at least in the case when
a sentence speaks explicitly of events and facts (as for example this very sentence does);
what dierentiates object-based from fact-based and event-based correspondence theories
is that according to the former we do not need facts or events to explain the truth of
every truth-bearer (or even every contingent or atomic truth-bearer). However, not all
objects in every sense of the word should be allowed among the objects in question, for
instance objects in the Meinongian sense, such as the round square, should not be allowed
among the objects in question; therefore it might have been better to speak of entity-based
correspondence theories than of object-based correspondence theories.
11Using such modern notation of as I use elsewhere in this work we can say that if
kkg signies the denotation of an entity , specically a linguistic predicate) relative to
assignment g where  is an individual variable (of the metalanguage) denoting in this case
a predicate variable of the object language, then the correspondence relation would be the
dyadic relation ()()( 2 kjg.
12We could also (to anticipate suggestions I will develop at length later) take the corre-
spondence relation itself to be the four-place relation ()()()()( = kk ^ kk =
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is that it presupposed that all sentences were of the subject-predicate form.
It seems to me that Tarski's theory can be viewed as a modernized version
of object-based correspondence theories, even though it cannot be viewed as
a fact-based correspondence theory or a modernization of such. Davidson
saw this in [Dav69], even though he did not use the phrase "object-based cor-
respondence theory", yet his basic notion of a correspondence theory without
facts was essentially similar. However, later he seems to have thought for
some reason that the very notion of a correspondence theory without facts
did not make sense. Tarski himself may have been aware (even if dimly) of
this and this may have been why he said that the Aristotelian formulation is
more precise and clearer than the modern ones. Of course, Tarski is not very
precise himself in saying that the dierence is that the modern formulations
would be less clear; that is clearly not the only dierence, since at least
the second modern formulation has on any natural interpretation stronger
implications than the Aristotelian formulation Tarski quotes (though as I
show elsewhere there are other statements made by Aristotle that may have
equally strong implications).
Of course, there are signicant dierences between Tarski's theory and
traditional versions of object-based correspondence theories; Tarski does not
think that truth-bearing items (which with him are sentences) would always
have subject-predicate structure. Only atomic sentences have a structure
like that, and even in their case it is a predicate-arguments structure rather
than a subject-predicate structure. However, even in the case of complex
sentences it is a relation to objects denoted (whether absolutely or with
respect to a sequence or assignment) by the terms of those sentences that
determines the truth of the sentence.
Kunne says in [K03, page 5] that what is essential to all correspondence
theories of truth, both object-based and fact-based, is that truth is a rela-
tional property13 and the implied relation is not one in which truth-bearers
 ^  2 ).
13In fact this assumption, that truth is a relational property is problematic for me since
I want to nd a metaontological criterion for ontological claims that would help me to
decide the problem of universals, and such a criterion should have to be independent of any
substantive solution to the problem of universals. Therefore I cannot assume that truth is
a relational property as I cannot assume that it is a property at all since I cannot assume
that properties exist, for this might be begging the question against nominalism. Besides,
as I will show later, even if we nd out in the end that there are some properties, there may
be special reasons to think that truth cannot be a property (for instance, because there
may be reasons to think that there are no relational properties or because this might lead
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stand to other truth-bearers.
This denition of a correspondence theory was anticipated by Bertrand
Russell in the third of the requisites he gave in 1912 to a satisfactory theory
of truth; this requisite was very similar to Kunne's denition of a correspon-
dence theory, though it was not exactly the same and is not quite equivalent.
Russell said in [Rus12b, page 189]:
But, as against what we have just said, it is to be observed that
the truth or falsehood of a belief always depends upon something
which lies outside the belief itself . . . Hence, although truth and
falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent
upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any
internal quality of the beliefs.
Of course, Russell's denition can be modied as Kunne does so that the
idea that the truthbearers are beliefs (which is an earlier one of Russell's
requisites and is presupposed by Russell here) is removed from it and it
becomes neutral with respect to the question of what truth-bearers are,
though even so it is not quite equivalent with Kunne's denition14. Also it
to the Liar Paradox). However, Kunne's point can be reformulated so that we do not have
to assume the existence of properties; e. g. we can say following Devitt in [Dev01b, page
580] that for correspondence theorists the truth term is a one-place relational predicate
and add for the sake of clarity that it must be this not only in surface syntax but also
in logical form. Devitt himself did not think that this was enough for a correspondence
theory of truth, since he thought that a correspondence theory of truth would have to hold
truth to have an explanatory role; however, I will argue later that for historical reasons
this cannot be part of the denition of a correspondence theory. Devitt also added that
correspondence theorists think that the truth-predicate has the standard sort of semantics
of such predicates; however, this assumption is problematic, since it is not clear that there
is any standard semantics for one-place relational predicates, but it may be that dierent
one-place relational predicates generally have very dierent semantics.
14Clearly it makes as much sense to speak of entities being external to sentences - at
least in the case of token sentences or utterances - as to speak of them being external to
beliefs (where again externality must mean externality to token beliefs, belief acts or states
of believers, not externality to belief types, whose meaning is less clear). However, in the
case of substantially conceived propositions, which are generally supposed to be outside
time and space, it is not so clear what externality might mean. We can still make sense of
it most plausibly in mereological terms by taking externality to mean the lack of common
constituents or more weakly the existence of a non-common proper constituent. However,
at least a Russellian proposition cannot in this sense be external to the entities on which its
truth depends, since if that entity is a fact then it shares its proper constituents with the
proposition and if those entities are the entities which the proposition is about then those
entities are the (immediate and therefore proper) constituents of the proposition. This, of
course, is as it should be; while Russell did not make clear what he meant by externality,
he gave this denition after he had abandoned the idea that Russellian propositions were
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is surely an exaggeration to say that the truth of the belief always depends
on something external; you can have beliefs about beliefs, and if Othello
believed that he is believing something the truth of this (very rare) kind
of belief would not depend on anything external. In the sentential case it
is surely possible to have sentences like "This sentence is longer than two
words."; in this case the truth of the sentence depends on the sentence
itself. It is better to say more weakly that the implied relation is sometimes
or often a relation to something other than a truthbearer, whether a belief
or a sentence.
This denition (so modied) appears to go beyond the famous Aris-
totelian formulation I quoted before, though it is consistent with it, and
leads us towards a slightly (very slightly) more substantive theory of truth.
If the Aristotelian formulation is considered to be consistent with some de-
the bearers of truth and had even begun to doubt their existence. In fact even if we
do not demand that the entities on which the truth of a truth-bearer depends have to
be external to it we still cannot reconcile a theory of propositions which takes them to
be Russellian with the view that propositions are truth-bearers and with a fact-based
correspondence theory, if we assume mereological extensionality (as is standardly done
in mereology), since in this case as the Russellian proposition and the fact share their
proper constituents, they must according to mereological extensionality be identical. Now
it is not clear whether Russell himself was motivated by this kind of considerations, since
he rather appeals to the unintuitiveness of objective falsehoods (which is a far weaker
argument since other philosophers have not found objective falsehoods unintuitive at all)
and Russell of course did not have any explicit theory of parts and wholes i. e. mereology
and since Russellian logic was to a large extent intensional he might not have accepted
mereological extensionality even if the option had been presented to him. However, many
later philosophers have surely noticed at least dimly this inconsistency and been motivated
by it in their theories of truth to reject either facts or Russellian propositions. The
common argument that true Russellian propositions cannot be distinguished from facts
that would make them true appeals tacitly to mereological extensionalism; the only reason
to think that facts and true Russellian propositions would be identical is that they have
the same constituents and according to mereological extensionalism entities with the same
constituents (or rather an identical partition) will have to be the same. However, many
important ontologists have rejected mereological extensionality, for instance because such
rejection solves problems associated with material constitution even though it is at the
price of a bigger ontology. If we reject mereological extensionality and adopt an intensional
mereology, where two dierent entities can share a partition, then we can even reconcile
a Russellian theory of propositions and the view of propositions as truth-bearers with
a fact-based correspondence theory; we can then take a true Russellian proposition and
the fact that makes it true to have the same constituents (i. e. share a partition) but
be dierent since they are put dierently together to form diferent wholes. Whether
such a combination is plausible is a dierent question (though there are many plausible
arguments against mereological extensionality), but at least it is possible, and of course if
your conception of propositions is not Russellian (but e. g. Fregean) then you can have a
correspondence theory for propositional truth with even less cost. So the options in the
theory of truth are very wide indeed (and since truth is not the main topic of this work I
must leave them so wide open).
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ationist theories which are held to be inconsistent with a correspondence
theory (both by themselves and their opponents), then this Russellian def-
inition might formulate the minimal genuine correspondence theory. It is
indeed rather weak, so some might call it also deationary; however, it is
by no means completely trivial since it has been denied by most deation-
ists. Many of the more extreme deationists, such as most prosententialists
(like Dorothy Grover and Nuel Belnap) have denied not only that truth is
a property-ascribing predicate, but even that it would be really a predicate
at all. Even more moderate deationists such as Paul Horwich, though they
accept that the truth term is a predicate and even that truth is a property,
deny that truth is a complex relational property or even that the truth term
would be a relational predicate15. Therefore this is already a somewhat
controversial principle and substantial at least to a minimal degree.
It is important to notice that this denition leaves a lot of leeway for
what kind of relation the implied relation may be16 - and what kind of
entities have to be in its range - so it leaves room for a very great variety
of dierent correspondence theories of truth. Russell inexplicably went on
to say that this requisite, the third in his theory of truth, leads us to adopt
the view - which he says has on the whole been the commonest among
philosophers - that truth consists in some form of correspondence between
belief and fact. However, if Russell means by "leads" anything like "implies
logically" or "entails" and uses the word "fact" in any technical sense he
commits a clear non sequitur here. This requisite as he initially formulated
it by no means implies that truth consists in correspondence between belief
and fact, only that it consists in some relation between belief and something
external to it. Russell's claim is at most true if "leads" means something
like "suggests" but in this case the suggestion can be resisted and probably
should be resisted given Russell's own commitment to Occam's razor17. It
15On the other hand, Russell's formulation is (like Kunne's) clearly inconsistent with
the inationist view of truth that would take it to be sparse property, since it implies
that truth is a relational property, and sparse properties are by denition intrinsic, i. e.
such that they (or more rigorously expressed their instantiation) cannot depend on any
relations of their possessor to other things.
16It is not or at least need not be dependence - Russell spoke of dependence, but so that
according to him the relation is something on which truth depends, the relation itself is
not dependence.
17Of course, you could say that Russell does not in this passage use the word "fact" in
any technical sense here. However, Russell later in any case makes use of a very technical
notion of fact which is associated with a substantive theory, which says (see [Rus12b, page
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is very signicant that though Russell's theory of truth is a paradigmatic
fact-based correspondence theory, yet Russell's initial characterization of the
motivation for the correspondence theory of truth does not mention facts
or logically imply that correspondence would have to be correspondence to
facts. This shows that object-based correspondence theories are a viable
option and do not just constitute changing the subject.
In fact, this denition does not even imply that the implied relation could
be naturally described as a correspondence relation, even though Kunne is
not willing to go this far; he says that you cannot have a correspondence
theory without correspondence, but his own denition of the theory implies
otherwise.
Whether either elimination, whether of propositions or of facts, is tenable
in the end is of course highly doubtful, as there are all kinds of diculties in
implementing either proposal and all kinds of relevant considerations (e. g.
in the case of facts the question whether the theory of causation needs facts
and the semantics of sentential nominalizations and sentential anaphora and
the phenomenology of perception). In fact while I think it unlikely that
either elimination can in the end be carried out, I think that the prospects
for eliminating propositions are in the end, contrary to what Russell thought,
worse than those for eliminating facts. However, when it comes to the
basic principles of the general theory of truth, we can initially do without
either. Wolenski considers this kind of Russellian correspondence theory
with a more than two-place relation briey, but he rejects it because it has
non-standard truth-bearers; however, it is possible to modify this kind of
theory so that it has dierent truth-bearers that Wolenski might consider
more standard (even though I rather doubt whether there really are any
standard truth-bearers, so great is the diversity of opinion with regard to
truth-bearers), and I will argue that in fact this is what Tarski implicitly
did.
Kunne himself ultimately rejects all correspondence theories of truth in
199]) that:
Whenever a relation holds between two or more terms, it unites the terms
into a complex whole.
Facts are such complex wholes, and Russell's statement taken at face value implies that
there are lots of them. Therefore it is likely that Russell is already presupposing this
technical notion and this theory, and even if he is not this leaves it mysterious why (and
with which justication) Russell later introduces that technical notion.
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favour of a theory he calls the Modest Account of Truth which can be fairly
called deationist (even though he does not like that word). However, it
seems to me that this is only because though he resurrected the notion
of object-based correspondence theories of truth, he understood them too
narrowly. He did not see that object-based correspondence theories can be
modied considerably from the admittedly primitive Aristotelian version. I
will in the last section of this chapter show how to develop a new version of
the object-based correspondence theory on the basis of Tarski's theory that
escapes problems in Tarski's theory.
4.2.3 Aristotle's Theory of Truth and Aristotelian Theories
of Truth
While Aristotle's famous denition suggests a weak correspondence theory
of truth, yet this denition is not the only passage where Aristotle speaks
about truth. Aristotle's full theory of truth clearly goes beyond this def-
inition. However, since Aristotle's writings are rather obscure to modern
readers it is extremely controversial what kind of theory it might have been
and in what way it goes beyond the minimal theory. Nevertheless, clarifying
this is essential to understanding the nature of correspondence theory since
as I have argued, Aristotle has often (e. g. by classical Polish logicians)
been taken to be a paradigmatic correspondence theorist, so that a corre-
spondence theory in one common sense of the word is by denition the kind
of theory of which Aristotle's theory is an instance.
Paolo Crivelli has presented probably the most thorough discussion of
Aristotle's theory of truth by any modern commentator in [Cri04, page 130];
this is clearly relevant to the subject we are discussing. One possibly du-
bious feature about Crivelli's interpretation is that Crivelli gives a strongly
realistic interpretation to Aristotle's theory; he thinks that Aristotle is a
realist about universals as well as states of aairs. While this interpreta-
tion is plausible, less realistic interpretations of Aristotle's theory are also
equally plausible as I will show later in this work (e. g. Aristotle could also
be viewed as precursor of trope theory)18. Not being an expert on ancient
18It is quite dramatic to contrast Crivelli's interpretation with a strongly anti-realistic
interpretation such as that of Gregory Salmieri in [Sal10]. Seeing how much these two
versions of Aristotle dier, one is made highly sceptical about the possibility of our ever
attaining any reliable interpretation of Aristotle's theory.
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philosophy, I must rely to a great extent on Crivelli's interpretation, which
I will try to relate to the modern discussion.
The question whether Aristotle had a theory of facts as truthmakers is
extremely controversial. David says that Aristotle sounds much more like
a genuine correspondence theorist in the Categories (12b11, 14b14), where
he talks of "underlying things" that make statements true and implies that
these "things"(pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz.,
his sitting, his not sitting). The question of how to interpret or even translate
such passages in Aristotle's texts is a very dicult one. Aristotle has a
word, "", "pragma", that is occasionally translated as "state of
aairs". However, the word is very obscure and translating it as "state of
aairs" already involves a lot of controversial interpretation. It has also been
translated more literally as just "thing" or "object", as we have already seen
that Kunne translated it19. Aristotle's theory of pragmata might be easily
mistaken for a precursor of a fact-based correspondence theory with states
of aairs as truthmakers such as Armstrong's theory. For example, Barry
Smith seems to make this kind of assumption in [Smi89], as he says that
traces of the Sachverhalt concept are discoverable by hindsight already in
Aristotle in those passages where Aristotle speaks of the pragma as that on
which the truth of the logos depends, and distinguishes states of aairs from
propositions. However, while the exact interpretation of Aristotle's theory
is a very complex question, it can relatively safely be said that it is not a
straightforward anticipation of modern fact-based truthmaker theories.
Such an interpretation faces two serious problems. First of all, it is not
clear that Aristotle is wholly realist about these states of aairs. Secondly
and even more importantly, Aristotle says in Metaphysics (1024b18) that
these things or states of aairs are themselves true or false. Because of
19The word in Aristotle's Greek which most closely corresponds to the English words
"beings" and "entities", which express the object of ontology, is "o", "onta". It is
not wholly clear how the two concepts expressed by the two words, "onta" and "prag-
mata", are related; they seem sometimes to be synonymous, like the (probably roughly)
corresponding Latin words "entes" and "res", but there do seem sometimes to be dier-
ences of meaning. Gregory Salmieri argues in [Sal10, page 19] that "pragma" is not an
ontologically loaded term for Aristotle at all, but refers to the object or subject matter
of a thought (or other mental state). It would then be like Brentano's and Meinong's
German term "Gegenstand". If Salmieri is right then the meaning of the words would
dier dramatically, and this would of course count against Aristotle's theory of truth being
a truthmaker theory as well as against a realistic interpretation of Aristotle's theory of
universals. I am not at all certain if he is right, however.
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this these states of aairs are more plausibly taken to be truth-bearers such
as propositions rather truth-makers20. Indeed, it can even be argued that
Aristotle thought that these states of aairs are primary truth-bearers, as
Crivelli does in [Cri04, pages 56-57].
Crivelli says in [Cri04, page 130] that Aristotle's theory does not qualify
as a correspondence theory on the conception according to which an as-
sertion is true just in case there is some fact to which it corresponds, since
Aristotle's theory does not mention facts. Crivelli says that he uses the word
"fact" in the Russellian sense (apparently referring to the phase or Russell's
philosophical development shown in [Rus12b]); every fact, by its very na-
ture, is true (i. e. obtains). This seems to be close to the sense in which
such truth-maker theorists as Armstrong use the word, so we may interpret
Crivelli as implicitly saying that you cannot nd a theory of facts as truth-
makers in Aristotle (even though truth-maker theorists would be unlikely to
speak of facts being true, though they would speak of them obtaining).
Perhaps surprisingly, Crivelli yet thinks that Aristotle had an ontology
of states of aairs. The phrase "state of aairs" is of course very often (e. g.
by Armstrong) used as a synonym of "fact". However, Crivelli uses it in a
dierent sense, which seems to be closer to the way many philosophers use
the word "proposition". In fact, these states of aairs which are not facts
or truthmakers seem to be just like Russellian propositions, since according
to Crivelli's interpretation they are composed of individuals and universals.
Of course, many other modern philosophers have used the word in this
sense; for example, Roderick Chisholm, Alvin Plantinga and John Pollock.
Chisholm in [Chi70] took propositions and events (understood as recurring)
20On the other hand, Aristotle also says in Metaphysics (1027b26-28) that falsehood
and truth are not in objects (pragmata) but in thought (o, dianoia), which seems
to contradict his claim that objects (pragmata) are true of false. In fact, the context of
the latter claim also provides a possible key to resolving the contradiction, since Aristotle
there distinguishes between several senses of being, and apparently the things that are
true or false, whether they are propositions or states of aairs, are not (do not exist) in
the strict sense. It is not wholly clear what this means, but one way of understanding this
might be that these states of aairs or propositions are just logical constructions out of
thoughts (entia rationis as medieval scholastics or such Austrian philosophers as Brentano
said). We can suggest that this less than strict sense of existence corresponds to what
would in today's philosophy be called non-objectual quantication. This would leave us
with an anti-realistic account of states of aairs or of propositions. Of course, Aristotle
can also be interpreted so that all of his senses of existence correspond to dierent kinds
of objectual quantication, which would give us a realistic theory of states of aairs or
propositions.
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to be a subspecies of states of aairs; the dierence Chisholm makes between
propositions and states of aairs might also be described as a dierence be-
tween tenseless (eternal) and tensed propositions. Furthermore, the states of
aairs into which moderate modal realists such as Alvin Plantinga in [Pla74,
page 44] want to reduce possible worlds are also similar to Russellian propo-
sitions. Plantinga identies possible worlds with maximal states of aairs.
While Plantinga leaves in [Pla74, page 45] open the question whether states
of aairs and propositions are identical (referring to Chisholm's view), he
does say that they correspond to each other21. Plantinga also says that
every world (maximal state of aairs) exists in every world but does not
obtain in more than one. Plantinga says in [Pla74, page 47] that obtaining
or actuality for states of aairs is like truth for propositions. If the actual
world  would not have obtained, there would till would been such a thing as
. This clearly diers from how Armstrong and his followers think of states
of aairs and obtaining; according to them, if a state of aairs (including
the totality state of aairs which in a way corresponds to the actual world)
had not obtained, it would not have existed, i. e. there would not have been
such a thing as that state of aairs22.
One modern philosopher specializing in the theory of truth who actually
explicitly states that propositions and states of aairs can be identied is
Marian David in [Dav94, page 46]. David adds that the obtaining of states
of aairs can then be identied with the truth of propositions. However,
David qualies this in [Dav94, page 47] by saying that when the represen-
tation theorist spells out her theory, she may nd that there are additional
roles that need to be lled, which may motivate some redistributions of her
terminology. The representation relation may according to David have to be
explained (I would say analysed) in terms of a further notion of content for
which the term "proposition" seems appropriate. Dierent sentences may
express dierent propositions that determine the same state of aairs, so
21Plantinga distinguishes from each other a world as a maximal state of aairs and the
book on W which is the set of propositions that are true in that world; however, it is not
clear what the point of distinguishing them is, and other moderate realists have identied
worlds with sets of propositions.
22However, Aristotle's theory does not seem to be similar to Plantinga's in this respect,
since Aristotle seems to have thought that states of aairs that are false (i. e. do not
obtain) do not exist. Aristotle's states of aairs seem to be closer in this respect to
Meinong's objectives; Meinong thinks that some objectives (those that are thought of
by human beings) are true or false yet false objectives do not exist (but can still have
properties and be referred to).
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states of aairs would not be the same entities as propositions. However,
even if such a development of a representation theory of truth is needful, this
would not count against my view that David's and Crivelli's states of aairs
can be identied with Russellian propositions. David does not distinguish
two conceptions of proposition that are often distinguished, Russellian and
Fregean propositions. We can say that David's states of aairs are Rus-
sellian propositions, but the propositions that determine them are Fregean
propositions.
Many philosophers, e. g. Horwich in [Hor90, x31, page 94], have claimed
that we can acknowledge the existence of both Fregean and Russellian propo-
sitions Horwich thinks that Russellian propositions (which he also calls con-
crete propositions) expressed by a sentence consist of the referents of the
words constituting the sentence while Fregean propositions (which he also
calls abstract propositions) consist of their senses; Horwich thinks that there
are also mixed propositions which contain both referents and senses. David
identies facts with obtaining states of aairs and therefore (since she iden-
tied states of aairs with propositions and obtaining with truth) with true
propositions, here diering from Crivelli; however, this is a dierent concep-
tion of fact than Armstrong's.
We can then distinguish from each other four dierent kinds of pur-
ported entities in order of increasing abstractness: facts or states of aairs
in Armstrong's sense, Russellian (or concrete) propositions i. e. states of
aairs in Chisholm's, Plantinga's and David's sense, mixed propositions and
Fregean (or abstract) propositions. It is quite consistent to hold, so long as
we reject mereological extensionality, that all of these entities coexist and
are distinct from each other and that the three latter kinds of entities are
all truth-bearers. Of course, this does not imply that we would have any
positive reason to hold that all of these entities exist, or even that any of
them exist (or even that it is metaphysically possible for them to exist);
which (if any) of them exist is a further and independent question. How-
ever, distinguishing these four conceptions clearly is the rst prerequisite for
nding any sensible answers.
However, while Crivelli's interpretation is plausible, there are points on
which it can be doubted. Aristotle also says (in Metaphysics 1027b32-33)
that what is in the sense of being true is a dierent thing that is from the
things that are in the strict sense (Crivelli's translation) i. e. that this sense
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of being (being qua truth) is dierent from the proper (u!, kyrioos)
senses (Tredennick's translation). While this passage is a bit obscure it can
naturally be interpreted as saying that states of aairs (which are in the
sense of being true or false) do not exist in the strict sense, and this implies
that they ought not to belong to our ontology23. Furthermore, Aristotle
also says immediately afterwards (Metaphysics 1028a1-2) that the cause of
what is in the sense of being true is an aection of thought, and this seems
to imply that these states of aairs are dependent on human minds, which
also suggests an anti-realistic theory of them.
If you want to insist that these things (pragmata) are also truth-makers,
you could even nd an identity theory of truth in Aristotle as well as a
correspondence theory. Aristotle's theory might then possibly be viewed
as a predecessor of the view Russell had in the very rst years of the 20th
century, but not of the fact-based correspondence theory Russell developed
in the 1910s24.
While according to Crivelli Aristotle's theory does not qualify as a cor-
respondence theory on the conception according to which an assertion is
23Aristotle then apparently says that some items are non-beings in the sense of things
that are false. He even thinks that some of these are impossible, since he gives as an
example "the diagonal's being commensurable". You can then even nd an anticipation
of Meinong's theory of objects in Aristotle; P. Thom has done so in [Tho02, page 298]),
claiming that Aristotle's ontology is formally parallel with Meinong's according to which
some Objects have Being and some do not (so that neither Being nor Non-Being is perva-
sive). Indeed, Aristotle's theory of truth can be interpreted so that it bears surprisingly
many similarities to Meinong's (which would of course be no accident, since Meinong was
certainly familiar with Aristotle's theory to some extent, whether directly or indirectly,
and inuenced by it). Aristotle's states of aairs may be in some ways even closer to
Meinong's objectives as well as Russellian propositions. However, Aristotle also says that
being is common to everything (e. g. in Metaphysics 1004b; see [Cri04, page 159]), so
he may not be consistent in anticipating Meinong if he does so. This contradiction can
perhaps also be resolved by taking into account Aristotle's distinction between dierent
senses of being. One way of interpreting this distinction is to understand Aristotle so that
he does think it legitimate to speak about Meinongian impossible objects as a facon de
parler, but thinks that these are to reduced away into thoughts as mere logical construc-
tions out of them. This seems to me to be a quite plausible theory when it comes to
impossible objects, but less so when it comes to propositions.
24Even if Aristotle thought of these things (pragmata) as truthmakers these things
(pragmata) Aristotle speaks about might also be taken to be more like combinations of
tropes (or of tropes and concrete individuals) instead of combinations of individuals and
universals. So even if Aristotle hints at a theory of truthmaking in such passages, it may be
a theory of truthmaking by tropes rather than a theory of truthmaking by facts. Crivelli
considers a similar possible interpretation in [Cri04, page 48] though without connecting
it to modern discussions of trope ontologies. In the end Crivelli disagrees with it, but
admits that it cannot be ruled out with condence.
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true just in case there is some fact to which it corresponds, yet according to
Crivelli [Cri04, page 135] Aristotle's theory can be regarded as a correspon-
dence theory based on an isomorphism between an assertion and an object
which corresponds to the whole assertion. These objects corresponding to
the whole assertion can according to [Cri04, page 134] be non-composite
items such as esences and incorporeal substances or composite objects, ei-
ther material substances composed of form and matter25 or states of aairs
composed of universals or a universal and an individuals26.
However, there is something strange here; since states of aairs are sup-
posed to be truth-bearers the isomorphism would in some cases be between
two truth-bearers. Because of this it apparently does not count as a corre-
spondence theory at all for all assertions in the sense Kunne denes, since the
entities to which assertions are related are themselves truth-bearers (though
it might count as a correspondence theory for some assertions since essences,
incorporeal substances and material substances are presumably not truth-
bearers)27. If Aristotle's theory is such as Crivelli says, then though it
25This again raises of the question of how the central concepts in Aristotle's ontology
are to be interpreted in modern terms; you could see these forms of material substances
as trope-like entities or as universals. Crivelli notices in [Cri04, page 121] that Aristotle
regards the relation of matter to form as analogous to the relation of a material substance
to universals. This could be interpreted so that forms are universals. The interpretation
of the concept of matter is even more dicult. If forms were interpreted as universals and
matter as consisting of bare particulars, then Aristotle's composite material substances
would be similar to facts in Armstrong's sense, and could even be viewed as truthmakers
for statements concerning the existence of material substances and the inherence of forms.
While as we have seen it is very doubtful if Aristotle was a realist concerning states of
aairs, it is highly likely that he was a realist concerning material substances. Nevertheless,
not only is this way of nding a theory of facts as truthmakers in Aristotle a highly
speculative interpretation of Aristotle's theory, but it is not based on Aristotle's theory
of truth but rather on his general metaphysics, so it would in any case not justify us in
taking any kind of truthmaker principle to be a part of Aristotle's correspondence theory
of truth.
26Aristotle's theory as interpreted by Crivelli is similar to a theory which Marian David
calls in [Dav94, page 31] the representation theory of truth, according to which a sentence
is true i it represents a state of aairs that obtains. Crivelli says that Aristotle's theory
is not quite the same as David's, since Aristotle unlike David allows only armative states
of aairs, but this is a small dierence. David distinguishes this theory in [Dav94, page 33]
from the classical correspondence theory, saying that strictly speaking it competes with
the classical correspondence theory, but also says that it can be regarded as a revisionist
reconstruction of the classical theory. It is rather ironical that if Crivelli's interpretation
of Aristotle is right, then this revisionism leads back to one of the very oldest versions
of correspondence theory, namely Aristotle's theory. Of course, the trouble is in the
apparent statement of Aristotle that the states of aairs do not exist in the strict sense,
which Marian David does not make - and which neither Chisholm nor Plantinga would
make - which probably does not t together with the representation theory of truth.
27The same reason naturally makes it dubious whether David's representation theory
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contains elements from the strong correspondence theory, namely the no-
tion of an isomorphism, it may not yet count even as a weak correspondence
theory. Besides, there is another reason why it yet may not count as even
a weak correspondence theory, since we have seen that Aristotle may have
thought that the states of aairs do not exist in the strict or proper sense,
and not independently of thought, so a relation of assertions to states of
aairs may not count as a relation of them to reality. After all, reality is
often (and rather naturally) understood by philosophers, especially ontolo-
gists, as the aggregate of all entities which exist in the strict sense (or as
some part of this aggregate, such as spatio-temporal entities which exist, as
some ontologists understand it) or even as the aggregate of all entities which
exist independently of thought. In any this interpretation leaves open the
question what kind of theory can be given for the truth of states of aairs
(pragmata), since in their case it could not be an isomorphism to an inde-
pendent object corresponding to them, as Aristotle's theory as interpreted
by Crivelli contains no such object.
Indeed, one might even accuse the theory of containing a circle; the
truth of one kind of truth-bearer is reduced to that of another kind of truth-
bearer, but the theory yet owes us an account of the truth of these Russellian
propositions, i. e. of the obtaining of states of aairs28. It seems necessary
that we must introduce a further correspondence, in which the states of
aairs stand to some entities, and since Aristotle's theory does not have
of truth really counts as a correspondence theory, if states of aairs are identied with
propositions as David suggests might be legitimate.
28David suggests in [Dav94, page 38] that one could hold that the state of aairs that
Socrates is dead obtains just in case Socrates instantiates the property of being dead
and fails to obtain just in case Socrates does not instantiate the property of being dead.
However, rather than saying that sentences correspond to states of aairs that obtain in
this sense, one can just as well dene truth directly for sentences in this way, saying that
the sentence "Socrates is dead" is true just in case Socrates instantiates the property of
being dead. The detour through states of aairs appears to be quite useless if we are
trying to dene sentential truth; it just makes the denition needlessly complex. Indeed,
David seems to have later realized this as she has in later writings (e. g. in [Dav09])
paid more attention to object-based correspondence theories which do not make use of
states of aairs. I must caution that I am not saying and do not want to say that the
postulation of states of aairs would be useless; they have many important possible uses.
As David says, they can be taken to be the bearers of modal properties and also the relata
of psychological relations like belief and desire. They can also be taken to be not only
bearers of modal properties but also to constitute possible worlds as in Plantinga's theory
and hence to provide truth conditions for modal statements. However, the use of them
is pointless in the theory of truth for sentences in which modal concepts or concepts of
propositional attitudes do not occur.
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facts, it must be a correspondence of the states of aairs to the objects
these states of aairs concern (and perhaps contain), the particulars and
universals (or perhaps concrete particulars and tropes). However, in this
case one might have immediately dened the truth of assertions or judgments
or thoughts with the aid of a correspondence to individuals and universals.
Therefore even if Aristotle's theory of truth is a correspondence theory in
the sense in which it is according to Crivelli's interpretation, it is not a very
satisfactory correspondence theory.
Because of these reasons it seems doubtful that Aristotle's theory can be
a correspondence theory unless it is either an identity theory of truth and
identity theories of truth count as a limiting case of correspondence theories
of truth or it is an object-based correspondence theory as Kunne claimed.
In any case it cannot be a satisfactory fact-based correspondence theory.
However, it is easy to see how one can get a fact-based correspondence
theory (whether satisfactory or not) out of Aristotle's theory with only small
modications, and indeed it seems likely that this is one way in which fact-
based correspondence theories have historically arisen in the late 19th and
early 20th century. However, most of the ancient and medieval interpreters
of Aristotle seem to have either ignored, de-emphasized or explained away
his claims about the states of aairs (pragmata), whether as truth-makers
or even as primary truth-bearers29. For example, Richard Sorabji, who has
directed a mammoth project of translating the ancient commentators on
Aristotle and therefore studied them quite thoroughly, says in [Sor04, x7(g),
29There are some exceptions such as the scholastic Gregory of Rimini (and possibly
Adam of Wodeham before him, from whom Gregory may have gotten the idea), whose
theory of complexe signicabilia (complex signiables) can be interpreted as a theory of
non-lingustic and non-mental propositions as primary bearers of truth and falsity or as a
theory of states of aairs as truthmakers. It is not wholly clear which, however; Simons
interprets the complex signiables as truthmakers, but this interpretation is questionable.
In order to make any sense of the history we must make clear how the terminology has
changed in the course of history; as Norman Kretzmann says in [Kre70], when medievals
spoke of a propositio they were speaking not of a propositional content (as is usually done
in modern analytical ontology) but of a propositional sign, written or spoken or mental.
Gregory said that the complex signiables were the entities signied by propositions, but
here the propositions mean the sentences or judgments that are propositional signs, so
when he spoke of propositions this did not commit him to propositions in the modern
sense, propositional contents which would be non-linguistic primary truthbearers, but
when he speaks of the entities signied by the propositions this may commit him to them.
However, it is not clear whether the signication of sentences Gregory spoke of is to be
understood as sentences designating states of aairs or having propositions (in the modern
and not the medieval sense) as their senses, and therefore it is not clear either whether
these complexe signicabilia are primary truth-bearers or truth-makers.
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page 229] that according to them the primary bearers of truth and falsity
are composite thoughts, not composite sentences nor composite things. Here
the composite things clearly correspond to Crivelli's states of aairs, so
that the ancient commentators interpreted Aristotle dierently from Crivelli.
Because of this their Aristotelian theory of truth was probably in any case an
object-based correspondence theory (taking beliefs or judgments as truth-
bearers) even if Aristotle's own theory was not.
In any case when Tarski says that the intuitions to which he wishes to
do justice nd their expression in the words quoted above, it is likely that
he did not want to commit himself to any further aspects of the Aristotelian
theory of truth. Clearly there are signicant dierences between Aristotle's
and Tarski's theories of truth as well as Tarski's theories and most theories
of Aristotelians. Tarski considers only sentential truth and left open the
question of what other truth-bearers there are and what kind of theory
might be developed for them, while as we have seen most Aristotelians took
the primary truth-bearers to be mental, private entities such as judgments
and thoughts and Aristotle himself may have taken either thoughts or states
of aairs to be primary truth-bearers. However, this dierence is not a
contradiction, since Tarksi never denied that there were other truth-bearers
than sentences nor expressed any opinion about what truth-bearers were
primary.
4.2.4 Truthmaker Theories
What are truthmakers?
Tarski's theory does not imply any truth-maker axiom such as could be
used to argue for the existence of facts or tropes. Indeed, we cannot even
ask whether the truthmaker axiom is true in the rather poor extensional
language in which Tarski's theory was originally formulated nor in most of
the languages in which it is formulated even today, since that axiom cannot
be formulated in such an extensional language.
The notion of truthmaking is usually understood in modal terms so that
an entity makes a proposition true, i. e. is its truthmaker, only if it is
necessary that the proposition be true if the entity exists. For instance,
Armstrong says in [Arm97, x8.11, page 115]:
The assumption here is that the truthmaker for a truth must
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necessitate that truth. In the useful if theoretically misleading
terminology of possible worlds, if a certain truthmaker makes a
certain truth true, then there is no alternative world where that
truthmaker exists but the truth is a false proposition.
The notion therefore makes use of the modal concept of necessity and must
be formulated in an intensional language. If we use the symbol j= for truth-
making, then we can say that x j= p ! 2((9y)(y = x) ! p). The impli-
cation is sometimes altered into an equivalence and taken as a denition
of truthmaking, but most truthmaker theorists think that there is more to
truthmaking than just the modal aspect.
Axiom 1 x j= p! 2((9y)(y = x)! p).
The principle that every proposition or (interpreted) sentence (of a cer-
tain kind) has a truthmaker in this sense, an entity whose existence ne-
cessitates the truth of that proposition or sentence, is generally called the
truthmaker principle, the truthmaking principle, the truthmaker axiom or
even simply the truthmaker. The truthmaker axiom can be formulated
as either an axiom schema or as an axiom; the latter involves some kind of
propositional quantiers, whether objectual or substitutional, so it is a more
controversial formulation, but it has of course all the advantages a nite ax-
iomatization has. So if p is a propositional variable, the following will give
a symbolisation of the standard formulation of the truthmaker axiom:
Axiom 2 (8p)(p! (9x)(2((9y)(y = x)))! p).
While most truthmaker theorists accept this principle, some truthmaker
theorists have rejected this principle or rather this formulation of the truth-
maker principle in favour of a weaker principle or formulation. Some of
these formulations are rather obscure. Josh Parsons has given a rather clear
alternative to the standard truthmaker theory. Parsons calls in [Par99]
the view that the standard truthmaker principle holds truthmaker essen-
tialism30; other have called it truthmaker necessitarianism. According to
30This expression is not wholly appropriate; there is a sense in which even the (in
some ways) weaker theory which Parsons supports is essentialistic. As seen below, he
thinks that every true sentence supervenes on the nature of some thing; however, one
sense of the word "essence" is identical to the sense of the word "nature" Parsons uses.
The expressions "essence of a thing" does indeed usually stand for the conjunction of the
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Josh Parsons, the name "truthmaker principle" should be given to a weaker
principle according to which every truth has a truthmaker, but this does
not have to be essentially a truthmaker of that truth. Parsons would ex-
plicate this weaker truthmaker principle so that every true sentence's truth
supervenes on the nature of some thing. He adds that one might gloss a
thing's nature as a grand conjunctive property, conjoining all of a thing's
intrinsic properties31. He emphasises that it is no part of the conception of
a nature that a thing could not have failed to have the nature it does; so
the nature is a conjunction of all intrinsic properties, including contingent
intrinsic properties.
The following formula might symbolize Parsons's formulation of the
truthmaker axiom, if P is a predicate variable and Intr(P ) means the P
is an intrinsic property.
Axiom 3 (8p)(p! (9x)(9P )(Intr(P ) ^2(P (x)! p))).
This truthmaker principle must be formulated in modal terms just as
much as the standard essentialist principle, since while there are innumer-
able suggestions as to how the notion of supervenience is to be properly
formulated it is generally agreed that it must be formulated in modal terms,
essential properties of a thing, but it can also stand for the conjunction of all its properties
or of all its intrinsic properties; it is in these later senses that essence is contrasted with
existence and this is the way that philosophers such as Husserl used the word. So even if
a thing does not according to Parsons essentially make the truth-bearers it makes true,
it nevertheless makes them true because of its essence, in the sense of the conjunction
of all its intrinsic properties, so this view also could be called truthmaker essentialism.
However, since every name for these theories is to some degree misleading, I will use the
expression "truthmaker esentialism" as Parsons uses it for the standard truthmaker theory
of Armstrong and others.
31Parsons is seeking to defend extreme nominalism and trying to show that there is
no valid truthmaker argument against nominalism. However, as he himself admits, this
gloss is, to say the least, not obviously compatible with nominalism. Indeed, this is
an understatement; we might rather say that it is obviously not compatible with extreme
nominalism. It does nothing to help the defence of nominalism to claim that properties are
not truthmakers, if the formulation of the truthmaker axiom presupposes the existence
of properties in virtue of which individuals are truthmakers. However, while Parsons's
truthmaker theory would not help us to get rid of universals as he himself hoped, it is
yet more economical than Armstrong's, since it does help us to get rid of states of aairs;
Parsons's truthmaker principle only leads to the existence of universals and particulars,
which Armstrong also supposes to exist as constituents of states of aairs, but not of the
states of aairs Armstrong supposes them to constitute. At least this is so if Armstrong
is supposed to be a realist about universals, as he mostly claims to be; at some places
Armstrong does seem to suggest that only states of aairs exist, and if this were so, the
question of economy would become more complex.
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so it also requires an intensional language and cannot be formulated in the
language of Tarski's original theory.
However, even if we admit contrary to Parsons that a truth-maker must
necessitate the truth of what it makes true by itself this is apparently not
enough, for otherwise every entity would be a truth-maker for a necessary
truth, and in this case the truthmakers of a necessary truth can hardly ex-
plain its truth. It is a dicult problem how the notion of truth-makers
should be characterized more precisely. Many philosophers, such as Gon-
zalo Rodriguez-Pereyra in [RP02, opage 35], have argued that the notion
of truthmakers should be taken as a primitive in the sense that it has no
non-circular denition, though it can be usefully claried in formally cir-
cular ways. However, I do not see why taking the notion of a truthmaker
as a primitive would be better than just taking the notion of truth itself
as primitive, as many philosophers have done, e. g. the early Russell and
Moore and later Donald Davidson. Rodriguez-Pereyra says that the lack
of a non-circular denition of truthmaking need not be a problem provided
we have fairly clear understanding of the concept in question. I am not
sure that we have a fairly clear understanding of the concept in question
(exactly who are the "we" and how clear would that have to be?). When
truthmaker theorists give simple examples to introduce their theory I seem
to understand what they are talking about, but when I read their advanced
internal debates all the ideas seem to go blurry in my mind; I am practically
sure I am not the only one with this experience. However, even if we had
a fairly clear understanding of what truthmaking is, the early Russell and
Moore could equally well say that the lack of a non-circular denition of
truth need not be a problem provided we have a fairly clear understanding
of the concept in question. I certainly do not think that we have (at least, I
do not have) a clearer intuitive understanding of the notion of truthmaking
than of the notion of truth.
Another controversial point with regard to truth-makers is whether we
need a truth-maker for every truth. Armstrong defends in [Arm03] Truth-
maker maximalism, according to which every truth has a truth-maker (though
Armstrong has not always held this view). Kevin Mulligan has also at one
time defended this view. However, Barry Smith and Peter Simons have of-
ten (e. g. in [Smi99] though here Mulligan joined with them) defended the
view that there are truth-makers only for atomic truths.
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It seems to me that Smith's and Simons's view is rather ad hoc, mainly
designed to prevent an argument for the existence of entities they are op-
posed to such as facts, especially negative and disjunctive facts (i. e. facts
that are negations or disjunctions of other possible facts), but also even con-
junctive facts that other atomists such as Armstrong accept. Truthmaker
maximalism seems to commit us to such complex facts, as it requires truth-
makers even for such purely negative sentences as "There are no unicorns.".
As Armstrong has shown, truth-maker maximalism commits us to at least
one negative fact, which he calls the totality state of aairs. Armstrong does
not seen to think this totality state of aairs would be a negative fact, but
as it is surely a truth-maker for a purely negative sentence, I would call it
negative.
Smith and Simons's argument why Tarskian account neglects precisely
the atomic sentences, though they think it is sucient in other cases, is very
weak indeed. Smith and Simons say in [MSS84, page 288]:
In the wake of Tarski, philosophers and logicians have largely
turned their attentions away from the complex and bewilder-
ing diculties of the relations between language and the real
world, turning instead to the investigation of more tractable set-
theoretic surrogates. . . . we are left with such bloodless pseudo-
elucidations as; a monadic predication 'Pa' is true i a is member
of the set which is the extension of 'P'. Whatever their formal
advantages, sentences of this kind do nothing to explain how
sentences about the real world are made true or false. For the
extension of 'P' is simply the set of objects such that, if we re-
place 'x' in 'Px' by the name of the object in question, we get a
true sentence.
The force of this argument is based on claiming implicitly that a Tarskian
theory is circular. However, there is surely no need at all to use the notion
of truth in characterizing the extension of 'P', at least if 'P' is a genuinely
atomic predicate. We can use the notion in doing so, but this does not show
the elucidation to be circular; the elucidation would only be circular if there
was no way to elucidate the notion of the extension of 'P' without mentioning
truth. The notion of extension is just designation in the case of predicates,
and the notion of designation need not be explained in terms of truth. The
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extension of 'P' is just fx : Pxg. For instance, if 'P' stands for 'red', then
the extension of P can be explained just as the set of all red things. We do
not have to say that the extension of 'red' is the set of such things x that
'x is red' is true. We have to make use of the notion of set in the original
interpretation of Tarski's theory (though other philosophers such as Field
and Devitt have suggested, whether successfully or not, ways of modifying
Tarski's denition to get rid of even that notion), and many semanticists
are anti-realists about sets who think that sets are just surrogates for real
entities. However, not all semanticists think so; an ontologist can interpret
the theory of sets realistically and hold that sets exist in the real world and
help to make atomic sentences true (though not necessarily in the essentialist
sense). Therefore the Tarskian denition of the truth of atomic sentences is
not circular and contrary to Simons is a quite genuine elucidation, whether
correct or not.
Smith's and Simons's view is also faced with the diculty of determin-
ing or even making sense of the question which truths are atomic truths.
We can without diculty say what are the atomic sentences of a natural
language or the atomic formulas of a formal calculus (and hence the atomic
sentences of the articial language we get when we that calculus is given
an interpretation). However, a sentence that is atomic in one language can
be given exactly the same interpretation as a sentence in another language
that is not atomic in that calculus. A sentence of a natural language that is
syntactically atomic is very often represented by a complex formula when it
is translated into an articial language based on a formal calculus. Indeed,
even two sentences of the same natural language can be necessarily equiv-
alent and probably even synonymous even if one of them is syntactically
atomic and the other is not. E. g. "John is bald" and "John has no hair
on his head" are surely equivalent and would naturally be said to be syn-
onymous (though some semanticists might disagree) and express the same
proposition. Would we say that the statement made by the rst has a truth-
maker and that made by the second has not? Surely if one of the statements
has a truthmaker it also makes the second statement true, as they are nec-
essarily equivalent! Or would we say that the second has a truthmaker just
because our language happens to have in it the word "bald"? Surely such a
linguistic accident cannot determine what exists in the world, unless we are
to be anti-realists such as Simons would not want to be. However, surely
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such a linguistic accident cannot even provide any evidence as to what ex-
ists in the world. This seems to show that syntactically atomic (structurally
identied) sentences of natural languages need not be semantically atomic.
Besides an atomic sentence of one natural language can (and even must)
often be translated by a non-atomic sentence of another natural language.
Thus if a distinction between atomic and non-atomic truths is to have any
ontological signicance it must be a distinction between dierent kinds of
non-linguistic propositions, not of physically identied linguistic sentences,
strings of sounds or marks on paper. Thus truth must primarily be a prop-
erty of propositions if there is to be an ontologically signicant distinction
between atomic and non-atomic truths.
However, if truth is primarily a property of propositions, it is doubtful
whether propositions can be objectively divided into atomic and non-atomic
ones. It need not be the case that every proposition consists ultimately only
of atomic propositions. It might be that some positive propositions are
endlessly divisible to their conjuncts; e. g. a proposition p might be a
conjunction of propositions q1; : : : ; qn, q1 again a conjunction of proposi-
tions r1; : : : rn, and so on for ever. It might even be that every true posi-
tive proposition concerning particulars would be such an endlessly divisible
proposition. I will have already argued that the world might consist of end-
lessly divisible particulars and the properties of such particulars can also
be innitely complex. If this is so, then the true propositions about them
whose structure corresponds to or reects the structure of the world could
also be analogously innitely complex and endlessly divisible. Even if a sen-
tence of a natural language or even an articial one is syntactically atomic
it may still express an innitely complex proposition that has no simple
constituents. In this case if only simple propositions had truthmakers then
if the truth-conditions of complex propositions would ultimately have to be
be resolvable to the existence or non-existence of truthmakers for simple
propositions it would follow that some propositions that have truth-values
would not have any truth conditions at all, which is of course absurd.
Smith and Simons do occasionally ascribe truth to propositions, but do
not seem to understand propositions fully realistically, so the ultimate status
of the truth-bearers in their theory remains very obscure. Even if truth were
primarily a property of sentences, whether there exists a truth-maker for a
truth cannot depend on what interpreted calculus or what natural language
204
the truth is represented in, unless reality itself is to be viewed as relative to
language. Thus the view of Smith and Simons would lead towards an anti-
realism they themselves would not accept, if we would not accept a baseless
fundamentalism.
There is another important problem with non-maximalist tuthmaker the-
ories. As Candlish and Damnjanovic see (see [CD07, x3.4]), if all sentences
do not need truthmakers, then a truthmaker theory cannot give a general
theory of truth. Truth itself cannot in that case consist in the existence of a
truthmaker. Nor can such a non-maximalist truthmaker theory be a version
of correspondence theory (as usually interpreted), for correspondence theory
says that truth is correspondence. While sentences with truthmakers could
perhaps correspond to their truthmakers, if some sentences do not have
truthmakers, what would they correspond to? At most a non-maximalist
truthmaker theory could be a version of correspondence theory for some
truth-bearers, not all; however, being a correspondence theorist about some
sentences and not all would obviously lead to an undesirably complex theory
of truth. Even if a truthmaker axiom restricted to some sentences, such as
atomic ones, were true (which I do not want to deny, preferring to suspend
judgement on the matter), it could not by itself answer the question of what
truth is.
Since the truthmaker axiom can only be formulated in an intensional
language, to ask whether the axiom is true Tarski's theory must therefore
be extended so that it is formulated in an intensional language. Of course
this can be done, and very many semanticists have long since done it. How-
ever, there are no reasons to think that even if we extend Tarski's theory in
this way, it would have to imply any truthmaker axiom or carry ontological
commitment to facts or tropes. Nevertheless, since such an enrichment of
the language in which Tarski's theory is formulated would inevitably also
increase the ontological commitments of that theory, such an extension of
that theory might have to carry ontological commitment to properties -
for example if properties are either understood as the intensions of expres-
sions whose extensions are sets or if sets are straightforwardly replaced by
properties as the extensions of predicates - and so be even more blatantly in-
compatible with any kind of nominalism (and therefore also with any kind of
minimalism) than Tarski's original theory. Therefore Tarski's theory shows
that a semantical realist does not have to be either a minimalist or a clas-
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sical correspondence theorist; there are viable positions between the two
extremes. Of course, Tarski's theory is not incompatible with a truth-maker
axiom, as it is incompatible with minimalism, so Tarski's theory could be
combined with a neo-classical correspondence theory though it cannot be
combined with minimalism. However, the fact that Tarski's theory of truth
does not require any truth-maker axiom already gives us at least some rea-
son to suspect that no such axiom is needed, since Tarski's theory seems
to answer satisfactorily all the problems connected directly with truth as
such. Of course, as we saw that Field has shown, Tarski's theory leaves
open questions about the nature of reference even though reference is cen-
tral to Tarski's theory, but theories of facts have surely not been proposed
as answers to such questions. Therefore Tarski's theory gives us reasons to
be very suspicious of any classical or neo-classical correspondence theory of
truth.
Ilkka Niiniluoto's Interpretation of Tarski as a Truthmaker Theo-
rist
As David says, a truthmaker theory may be presented as a competitor to
the correspondence theory or as a version of the correspondence theory. As
if just to make the confusion complete, some recent truthmaker theorists
(for example see [Asa11, page 73]) have even said that truthmaker theory
is not a theory of truth in the classical sense (since they think it is a purely
metaphysical rather than semantical theory) and so is neither a form of
correspondence theory nor a competitor to it. However, the notion of truth-
making and the truthmaker principle are even sometimes held to be essential
to correspondence theories. Ilkka Niiniluoto says in the abstract of [Nii04,
page 57]:
A hallmark of correspondence theories of truth is the principle
that sentences are made true by some truth-makers.
However, this is surely historically false. The notion of truthmaking is not
a part of traditional object-based correspondence theories of truth. You can
scarcely nd any explicit notion of truth-making in Aristotle or Aquinas; as
I have argued, the states of aairs (pragmata) that Aristotle occasionally
speaks about are more likely mere truth-bearers than truth-makers. Modern
advocates of truth-makers like Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry
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Smith in articles such as the classic [MSS84, page 287] refer to 20th century
philosophers like Russell, Husserl and Wittgenstein as their predecessors,
not to ancient Aristotelians.
Furthermore, the notion of truthmaking is not even essential to all fact-
based correspondence theories (nor of course need a truthmaker theory be a
fact-based correspondence theory, since there are truthmaker theories such
as trope theories which do not make use of facts). While all fact-based
correspondence theories say that truth is based on a relation between truth-
bearers and facts, yet they may disagree widely about what that relation
is. There have been many fact-based correspondence theories which say
that true sentences are names of facts or denote or designate facts, and
these theories are dierent from fact-based correspondence theories which
say that true sentences are made true by facts. Even Tarski, in the one
sentence where he mentions states of aairs, speaks of a sentence designating
an existing state of aairs, not of a state of aairs or fact making a sentence
true, so even if this one sentence were to be taken at face value, it would not
indicate a theory of truthmakers, even though it would indicate an ontology
of states of aairs32. The relation of designating or naming is very dierent
from the relation of truth-making: the notion of the relation of truthmaking
as it is commonly conceived is a modal notion but the notion of designation
or naming is not a modal notion (even if there are interesting connections
between naming and necessity as Kripke has shown. There is even a formal
dierence between designation and truthmaking; a sentence can be made
true be many dierent facts (e.g. sparse truth-making theories which do not
admit disjunctive facts hold that a disjunctive sentence is made true by a fact
which makes either of its disjuncts true, so if both of the disjuncts are true
then both of the facts making them true also make the disjunction true), but
32Indeed, the qualication of states of aairs as existing would be redundant unless
some sentences designated states of aairs which did not (actually?) exist, so Tarski's
statements seems to actually imply a possibilist or even a Meinongian ontology if taken
at face value despite Tarski's warnings! It is perhaps no wonder that Kunne calls the
paragraph where Tarski formulates this irritating; as he says, some ends of the category
of states of aairs nd the qualication "existing" less then happy, and tend to say rather
that there are states of aairs of which roughly half obtain. Perhaps Tarski should have
said "obtaining" rather than "existing" to make his true intention clear. However, this is
by no means certain; I argue elsewhere in this work that Aristotle's theory of truth bears
many similarities to Meinong's when it is closely examined, so the apparent Meinongian
implications of Tarski's formulation might actually t well with Tarski's stated aim of
explicating an Aristotelian conception of truth.
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a sentence surely cannot be designate many facts; the designation relation
is many-one but the truth-making relation is many-many. Of course, it is
possible to hold that both relations hold between truthbearers and facts,
and some fact ontologists have no doubt done so, but this is by no means
necessary and perhaps not even natural. There have also been other relations
besides truthmaking and designation suggested as the relations at the basis
of truth; even picturing has been suggested.
As the truthmaker principle is then not an essential part of either object-
based or fact-based correspondence theories of truth, it is surely not a hall-
mark of correspondence theories of truth, and therefore Tarski's theory can
be a correspondence theory of truth even if it does not imply or justify
the truthmaker principle. Therefore Niiniluoto is correct in claiming that
Tarski's theory of truth is a version of the correspondence theory of truth,
but incorrect in claiming that because of this it would be a truthmaker
theory.
This, of course, leaves open the question whether Tarski's theory can be
shown to imply the truthmaker principle. Niiniluoto considers a suggestion
of P. Kolar in [Kol99] that innite sequences of objects or sets of them could
be truthmakers. However, this theory has fatal aws. Kolar himself [Kol99,
page 77] abandons this idea as a way of interpreting Tarski's theory as a
strong correspondence theory of truth because it would clash with the idea
that dierent truth-bearers are not always made true by the same truth-
makers. This is a perfectly valid reason to reject this suggestion, However,
there is a a deeper problem with the notion. Even if an innite sequence
satises a sentence, yet if the sentence is a contingent sentence attributing
an accidental property to an object, the sequence does not satisfy the sen-
tence necessarily. This implies that the sequence can exist but the sentence
need not be true, and therefore the sequence is not a truthmaker for the
sentence in the most common sense of the word (the sense used by such
classical truthmaker theorists as Mulligan, Simons and Smith). The same
holds of sets of sequences; any set of sequences can exist and yet a sentence
attributing an accidental property to an individual can fail to be true. The
basic problem with this kind of suggestion is that notion of truthmaking is a
modal, intensional notion and cannot be dened by means of the extensional
notions of model theory. Actually, if we want to interpret Tarski's theory
as a fact-based strong correspondence theory in this way, then it might be
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better to make use of the version of fact-based strong correspondence the-
ory according to which the relation between truth-bearers and truth-makers
is designation, since designation is not an intensional notion; however, the
problem Kolar pointed out would still recur, since then all sentences would
designate the same fact, and this would surely be unwelcome.
Using sets of sequences and worlds or functions from worlds to sequences
(such as are used in the model theory of modal predicate logic) would repair
this problem; however, it can be argued that in this case we would arrive at
the notion of proposition rather than the notion of fact. Carnap, who gener-
alizes Tarski's theory in this way (and to whom Niiniluoto refers), does speak
of propositions, not of facts or even states of aairs. Such sets or functions
would correspond one-to-one with sentences and would function as their
meanings (as they do in the semantics of modal predicate logic) and could
even be taken to be truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Facts would
then be just true propositions - propositions which contain a sequence con-
taining the actual world - so we would arrive at the identity theory of truth,
rather than a fact-based correspondence theory of truth. Of course, the
identity theory of truth might also be taken to be version of correspondence
theory in a broad sense of the word, so this might not be a bad outcome for
a defender of a correspondence theory, but it would make the terminology
of truthmaking redundant.
Niiniluoto agrees with Kolar that taking sequences as truthmakers will
not work; however, he has a proposal for nding truthmakers in Tarski's the-
ory of his own which makes use of the formal conditions for truthmaking that
Kolar gives. Unfortunately Niiniluoto's positive proposal is not presented
in very much detail. Nevertheless it is clear that there are serious problems
with it. Niiniluoto does not analyze the notion of truthmaking suciently
before setting out to nd it in Tarski's theory, so it is not clear what kind of
evidence he would take to be enough for him to prove his claim. However, I
will prove that in any case Niiniluoto does not succeed in proving that any
standard theory of truthmakers - a theory accepting what Josh Parsons has
in [Par99] called truthmaker essentialism - such as the famous theories of
Armstrong, Mulligan, Barry Smith, Rodriguez-Pereyra etc. - would follow
from Tarski's theory. Perhaps some non-standard theory of truthmaking
could follow from Tarski's theory, but this would have to demonstrated by
dening clearly the notion of truthmaking one claims to follow from it.
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Niiniluoto suggests in [Nii04, page 70] that the models of a language can
be taken to be truthmakers for the sentences of that language. He goes
further and suggests that truthmaking be then identied with the semantic
truth relation j=. However, this view is based on a confusion; though the
two relations are often symbolized with the symbol, they yet cannot be
the same relation. What Niiniluoto apparently means with the semantic
truth relation, the notion of truth with respect to a model, is a logical,
formal notion, while the general notion of truthmaking is a non-logical and
probably material notion. There is much inconclusive debate over exactly
what the notion of necessity involved in the truthmaker principle is, but
at any rate it is agreed that it cannot be the notion of logical necessity
in a narrow sense which model theory can capture. Niiniluoto's theory of
truthmakers does not capture the notion of material necessitation, whether
it be some primitive notion of metaphysical necessity or logical necessity
in a broad sense which nearly all truthmaker theories agree to be essential
to the notion of truthmaking (even if many of them hold that truthmaking
cannot be reduced to such necessity). Niiniluoto agrees that Tarski's theory
of truth is a theory of truth for interpreted languages. However, this means
that the interpretation of a sentence in such a language is essential to it, and
therefore such a sentence cannot be reinterpreted without turning it into a
sentence of another interpreted language. This, however, amounts to just
changing the subject. Nevertheless, in applying the relation of truth in a
model to the sentences of an interpreted language Niiniluoto does reinterpret
them, since the notion of a model contains the notion of interpretation, and
this means that he does not speak any more of the truth of those sentences
but of the truth of sentences of a dierent language, which means that he
just changes the subject.
It is easy to show by means of concrete examples that Niiniluoto's theory
of truthmaking does not work. Niiniluoto's theory implies that many sen-
tences which are in fact not true are yet made true by existing entities and
therefore that they are true. It follows from Niiniluoto's theory that some
models are truthmakers for sentences which (it is pretheoretically obvious)
can be false even though a model for them exists and even for some sentences
which are false. A model whose domain contains water but not snow and
which interprets the word "snow" as water might make the sentence "Snow
exists." true according to Niiniluoto's theory but snow might still fail to
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exist even if such a model exists so the sentence might be false. Even more
egregiously, a model whose domain contains water and whose interpretation
function associates the word "phlogiston" with the word "snow" would make
the sentence "Phlogiston exists." true according to Niiniluoto's theory even
though phlogiston does not exist so that the sentences is in fact false. At
most the totality of all models would make logically true sentences true but
even it cannot make contingent non-logical sentences true (and cannot even
make materially necessary sentences true) so much less can a single model
do so.
In fact it is doubtful whether the theory of truth to which Niiniluoto's
theory of truthmaking would lead if consistently followed can even be con-
sidered to be a correspondence theory at all. It has many similarities with
coherence theory, because of which it could also be accounted a coherence
theory, for all that mere model theory can show is that some sentences are
logically consistent and consistency is a kind of coherence. Actually most
historical coherence theorists had a notion of coherence that was stronger
than logical consistency, even though it is usually quite obscure just in what
way it was stronger, so Niiniluoto's theory would (contrary to his own in-
tentions) be even more radically anti-realistic than most coherence theories.
It would be more appropriate to call the relation of truth with respect to
a model coherence-making (or even better consistency-making) than truth-
making and to call relational structures coherence-makers (or even better
to call them consistency-makers) than truthmakers. In fact if we follow
Niiniluoto in taking models to be truthmakers this leads immediately to
Putnam's argument against realism. Since Putnam, however, is supposed
to be an opponent of the correspondence theory and of realism while Ninilu-
oto purports to be a defender of both, this convergence of Niiniluoto's and
Putnam's ideas shows that something has gone seriously wrong.
Even if the relation of truthmaking cannot be the same as the relation
between sentences and models with respect to which they are true, rela-
tional structures might still be truthmakers, since an additional relation of
truthmaking might hold between then and sentences besides the relation of
truth with respect to a model. Is this the case? We can easily show that
it is not the case, if the notion of truthmaking we are using is the standard
necessitarian notion fullling truthmaker essentialism. In [Nii99, page 98]
Niiniluoto suggests that the relational system consisting of John and Mary
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and the relation of loving between them is a truth-maker for the sentence
"John loves Mary". However, the problem with this suggestion is familiar.
This kind of theory not full the truthmaker principle as standardly formu-
lated. This relational system can exist even if the sentence is not true, even if
John does not love Mary. Any set theory implies that if John and Mary and
the relation of loving exist then the relational system exists but this can take
place even when John does not love Mary. In fact, this kind of theory does
not even fulll a weaker principle which Mulligan, Smith and Simons call
(in [MSS84, page 313]) the rst principle of truth-making, namely that what
is made true is true. It is then easy to nd counter-examples to Niiniluoto's
theory that show this; let us just take a slight modication of his own ex-
ample.The relational system consisting of Sarah Paley, Barack Obama and
loving exists, since its constituents do, so according to Niiniluoto's theory
the relational system makes the sentence "Sarah Palin loves Obama." true,
but the sentence is not true, since Palin does not love Obama but hates him.
However, if we use a non-essentialist notion of truthmaking as mere
supervenience of truth on reality such as Josh Parsons proposes, then the
relational structure can perhaps be called a truthmaker; that the relation
contained in the structure relates the other members of the structure might
considered to be a part of the nature of the structure, since it does not
involve relations to any entities outside the structure. However, in this case
the relational structure is already unnecessarily rich; the mere unordered
set or mereological sum composed of the members of the structure would be
enough33. We can even say that the components of the relational structure
are also truthmakers (even if not separately then together) in this weak sense
so the relational structure is in any case not essential to truthmaking even
in this weak and non-standard sense.
Besides, the relational structures are also suited to play another role
in the theory of truth; relational structures can play the role of Russellian
33Indeed, we might even say that in the specic example given by Niniluoto, John
himself might suce as a truthmaker in Parsons's sense, since loving Mary can perhaps
be said to be an intrinsic property of John and so part of his nature. After all, people
can love or have other attitudes towards objects that do not exist; John could also love
Galadriel or any ctional object; however, externalist theories of content would object to
the assumption that this is possible in the case of attitudes directed at existing objects.
In any case in the case of other sentences (e. g. "John hits Mary") both John and Mary
are needed for truthmaking in this sense; the mereological sum of John and Mary might
in such cases be the best candidate for a non-essentialist truthmaker.
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(though not Fregean) propositions (or what Marian David and Crivelli call
states of aairs, though not what Armstrong calls states of aairs) and
serve as truth-bearers. If they were also taken to be truth-makers, then
Niiniluoto's theory of truthmaking would lead to an identity theory of truth
rather than a classical correspondence theory. This would not show that it
is not a correspondence theory, since as we have seen some kinds of identity
theories can be taken as versions of correspondence theories, but it shows
that it is not a classical correspondence theory as he claimed, so far as we can
even legitimately speak of a classical correspondence theory at all. It might
be considered as a version of what David calls a representational theory of
truth; however, this does not justify attributing a representational theory
of truth to Tarski. In any case we have argued that such a theory is either
circular or needlessly circuitous.
4.3 Dierent denitions and kinds of deationism
and inationism
Perhaps the strongest sense of deationism about truth (formulated by an
opponent of deationism, Gupta, in [Gup93, 359]) is that according to it the
concept of truth cannot play a substantive role in, for example, philosophy
of language and metaphysics. However, this characterization of deationism
is somewhat vague or obscure, which leaves its strength also vague; what
kind of role is considered to be substantive? The notion of substantiveness
at play here seems to be subjective; dierent people will nd dierent meta-
physical commitments substantive, and therefore dierent people will nd
dierent theories of truth to be deationary. We can distinguish between
mild deationism and strong deationism, where mild deationism takes the
concept of truth to play a mildly substantive role and strong deationism
which takes truth to have no substantive role at all. Even further, we can
distinguish degrees of substantiveness, so that there can be lengthy series
of less and more substantive theories of truth. Sometimes - although only
very rarely - deationism is characterized as saying that according to it the
theory of truth has no metaphysical implications at all, but this mostly oc-
curs in popular or rather unreliable sources (e. g. Wikipedia's entry on
deationism has at times claimed this). This would be a rather exact char-
acterization of deationism; however, it is almost certain that no theory that
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has been presented satises this denition of deationism, and certainly no
theory that would be at all plausible. In fact every theory of truth that is at
all plausible has some ontological and therefore metaphysical commitments.
Even the strongest deationist theories have ontological commitments (e.
g. as Field admits they always have ontological commitments to the exis-
tence of some kind of truthbearers), and these are often stronger than their
proponents realize.
Tarski's theory would surely not be a deationary theory in this strong
sense. Tarski's theory of truth certainly has ontological commitments ac-
cording to the theory of ontological commitment developed in this disserta-
tion, for example commitments to a variety of set-theoretical entities which
most nominalists would not want to accept into their ontology, such as
the sequences that satisfy sentences and the sets which serve as the ex-
tensions of predicates, since Tarski certainly quanties over such entities
in the metalanguage. This may be obscured by the perhaps unfortunate
fact that the object language Tarski was using as his example itself con-
tained set-theoretical notions; however, this is not the reason why Tarski
made assertions in his article which carried ontological commitment to set-
theoretical entities. Tarski's general method of dening truth demands the
use of set-theoretical notions like sequences and sets of sequences in the met-
alanguage even in cases where the object language would not contain any
set-theoretical notions. Because of this we cannot get rid of the commit-
ments of Tarski's theory to set-theoretical entities just by refusing to deal
with object languages that employ set-theoretical notions or treating object
theories that imply the existence of set-theoretical entities as false. Nor
does it matter that Tarski himself may have been occasionally sympathetic
to nominalism; no matter how reluctant he may have been to endorse the
anti-nominalist implications of his theory, his theory yet has them. There-
fore (since as we have seen in our historical excursus at the beginning of the
dissertation ontology is part of metaphysics or identical with it or a more
fundamental discipline on which metaphysics is founded) if the theory of
this article is correct Tarski's theory has metaphysical implications. There-
fore a minimalist interpretation of Tarski's theory is not possible, as is often
thought, nor is Tarski's theory even wholly neutral with respect to the con-
troversy between philosophical theories of truth, but is at out incompatible
with a minimalist theory. Of course, this does yet not suce to rule out an
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attempt to replace Tarski's theory with a minimalist theory nor even some
other, weaker deationist interpretation of Tarski's theory.
4.3.1 Field's Two Theories of Truth and Meaning
Hartry Field has been one of the most inuential philosophers working lately
in the theory of truth. Therefore discussing Field's views is essential to any
contemporary account of truth. However, Field has changed his views radi-
cally, and both his earlier and later view have still followers who have devel-
oped both of his theories in new directions; e. g. Michael Devitt to a large
extent follows Field's earlier theory. Without doubt Field has contributed
many correct and important insights to current semantical discourse. How-
ever, I will argue that Field has unfortunately also helped to obscure what
the theory of truth is about and what its problems are.
Field's Earlier Correspondence Theory
Tarski claimed in [Tar44] that he did not make use of any semantical con-
cepts he could not reduce to other concepts. However, it has often been ar-
gued that Tarski did not succeed in this aim. Hartry Field argued in [Fie72]
that Tarski only succeeded in reducing the notion of truth to other semantic
notions. His argument is based on the fact that the denition of designation
given by Tarski is list-like; a similar argument was already given by Max
Black in [Bla48].
It seems to me that Field is essentially correct. This is one of his impor-
tant and valid insights. However, there is one important caveat to be made.
Tarski surely succeeded in reducing truth to non-semantical concepts, if we
accept the extensional conception of reduction according to which just giving
a co-extensive complex concept counts as a reduction, as Tarski did. Many
of Tarski's contemporaries thought that this was enough for reduction, and
this is especially true of the positivists who had doubted the meaningfulness
of the concept of truth. For instance, Carnap said in [Car67, x2, page 6]:
An object (or concept) is said to be reducible to one or more
other objects if all statements about it can be transformed into
statements about these other objects.
Carnap explained in [Car67, x35, page 60] this with the aid of the concept
of coextensiveness of propositional functions. An object a is reducible to
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objects b, c, . . . if for each propositional function which is exclusively about
objects a, b, c. . . , there exists a coextensive propositional function exclu-
sively about b, c, . . . . A proposition or propositional function is exclusively
about objects a, b, c, . . . , if in its written expression there occur as extralog-
ical symbols only "a", "b", "c", etc. Most of Carnap's phenomenalistic and
behaviouristic reductions were just as list-like as Tarski's denition of truth.
Therefore showing that the concept of truth could be reduced in the way pos-
itivists generally tried to reduce concepts was a quite eective ad hominem
argument against positivist eliminativists. Many philosophers who carry
on the positivist tradition are still satised with this kind of reduction, so
Tarski's attempt at reduction still retains some power as a basis of an ad
hominem argument.
However, along with Field, I do not think this kind of reduction would
be a philosophically satisfactory kind of reduction. Nevertheless, it is not
easy to provide a better theory of reduction, and it is scarcely justied for
a philosopher to appeal to the inadequacy of the extensional conception of
reduction in objecting to Tarski's theory if they have no positive suggestion
about what a more adequate conception of reduction would involve. Field
admitted in [Fie72, page 362] that he does not have a better theory of
reduction.34 However, the discussion over reduction seems to indicate that
a better theory of reduction must make use of controversial concepts like
modalities or essences; necessary co-extensiveness is surely according to most
persons' intuitions (including the later Carnap, who requires it in a preface
to the second edition of Aufbau; see [Car67, page ix]) at least necessary
for an intuitive reduction. Field objects that this will not do, for even if
there is an intelligible notion of intensional equivalence, his concern is not
with analysing the meaning of the word 'true' but performing a reduction.
This is a very weird objection for someone who was at the time appealing
to Kripke's causal theory of denotation, since Kripke pointed out that all
modal i. e. intensional statements are not true by virtue of meaning; even
if a necessity is involved in a reduction, it may be an a posteriori necessity
34In a postscript to this article in [Fie01b, page 28] Field says a bit more about what
concept of reduction he was employing. He says that he took the concept of reduction
somewhat broadly; in particular, he held that it counts as a reduction of of a property or
relation if you specify the property or relation functionally and show that the property or
relation is physically realized. However, this does not make suciently clear what Field
means by reduction.
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such as Kripke defends. Indeed, these a priori necessities for which Kripke
is famous are typically cases of reduction; it is necessary a priori that water
is H2O because water can be reduced to H2O, and similarly the reduction
of denotation to causal relationships that Kripke considers would also be a
case of intensional equivalence. It seems to me that intensional equivalence
is necessary for reduction; however, there are reasons to think that even it is
not sucient for it, so this does not clear away all the diculties. Also these
modal concepts are typically seen as just as mysterious as the concept of
reference taken as a primitive, and extreme naturalists would usually reject
both, so it seems that extreme naturalists who object to the use of the notion
of reference as a primitive must accept the extensional denition of reduction
if they are to have any denite idea of what a reduction involves, so they
cannot have any coherent objection to Tarski's procedure. Since Field does
not know what an adequate reduction would involve, he cannot be sure that
Tarski's reduction of reference is not adequate or that the causal theory of
reference he uses is better.
However, Field stresses that he does not mean to suggest that Tarski's
results are trivial. Unlike some others who have made use of his arguments to
discredit Tarski, Field himself thought (at least in this article) that Tarski's
results are extremely important, even though they could not provide the
kind of eliminativist reduction many philosophers had longed for. Surely any
reduction that decreases the number of primitive concepts is an achievement
from a purely theoretical point of view; the extreme importance attached
to purely physicalistic reductions by many philosophers may derive from its
importance to their world view, which is not a purely theoretical matter.
Field refers to a writing of Tarski's that is not devoted directly to Tarski's
theory of truth where Tarski says that a denition of semantic concepts of
truth is necessary to bring semantics into harmony with the postulates of
the unity of science and physicalism. Field claims that this shows that one
of Tarski's motives in his theory of truth was to show that semantics was
compatible with physicalism, and a reduction of semantic notions would be
needed for this cause. However, though Tarski says that physicalism requires
the reduction of semantical notions, this does not show even that he himself
was a physicalist, much less that his theory was motivated by physicalism.
As Greg Frost-Arnold argues in [FA04], Tarski is likely to just have been
attempting to appease an audience of physicalists that he viewed as hostile
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to his ideas, namely the members of the Vienna Circle, by appealing to their
views which he need not himself have shared.
In any case, even if this was one of Tarski's motives it can surely not
have been the only one; Tarski said that he was trying to do justice to the
intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth, and
while it is controversial just what such a conception is, yet for any plausi-
ble interpretation of that conception, such a conception has been held by
many philosophers who have not been physicalists (even if most of them
have been naturalists in some weak sense). Surely the rst philosopher
who has generally been held to be a correspondence theorist, Aristotle, who
believed in immaterial Intelligences, the Prime Movers, or still more later
Aristotelians like Aquinas, who believed even human souls to be capable
of existing after the destruction of the body, were not physicalists. Nor
were later correspondence theorists always physicalists; phenomenologists
like Husserl and Reinach were surely not, and even Russell, who is usually
held as the paradigmatic classical correspondence theorist, was at rst some
kind of dualist and then a neutral monist rather than a physicalist. Many
historians of philosophy (e. g. Peter Simons, Jan Wolenski and Artur Ro-
jszczak - see [Roj02]) have claimed that the philosophical background of
Tarski's denition is not so much the Vienna Circle but rather the tradition
of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which ultimately goes back to Brentano (though
Brentano's evidence theory of truth was denitely not a correspondence the-
ory, so this is doubtful) and to Bolzano (who clearly was a correspondence
theorist, so this is more plausible). While some philosophers in this tradition
like Tarski's immediate teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski were indeed physical-
ists, the earlier philosophers taking part in the tradition were not; Brentano
was a dualist while Bolzano was a Leibnizian panpsychist. Tarski's theory
was in any case not compatible with Kotarbinski's philosophy, since it made
extensive use of sets whose existence Kotarbinski denied. Tarski could have
succeeded in explicating the classical correspondence theory of truth even if
his theory implied that it was not compatible with physicalism, though of
course it at worst leaves the question of the compatibility wide open.
Field tries (see [Fie72, page 367]) to develop a denition of denotation
and then of truth that would be compatible with physicalism by making
use of Saul Kripke's causal theory of denotation. However, it is highly
doubtful if Kripke's theory is suitable for his purpose. Kripke himself is
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not a physicalist, and indeed at the very end of the same work where he
developed his causal theory of denotation, as the culmination of his work,
he argued against physicalism (see [Kri72, pages 334-342]) on the basis of
his theory of denotation. Kripke did indeed argue directly only against a
specic version of physicalism - the Identity Theory - but it seems clear that
he thought that his argument counted against physicalism as such. Therefore
Kripke would not have been interested in developing a theory of denotation
that was compatible with physicalism, so it would be strange if he had by
pure accident developed such a theory. Also Kripke himself did not apply his
causal theory of denotation to all terms but only to proper names and natural
kind terms; he admitted that there were many terms of which the descriptive
theory of truth was correct, and "truth" is plausibly such a term. At least
Kripke's theory would then need lots of modications and supplementations
before it could be yield a physicalistic theory of denotation.
In any case, the causal theory would have to be developed in far greater
detail than it has been in order to show that it worked and was compatible
with physicalism (even if we had an adequate theory of reduction and knew
what counted as a physicalistic reduction of semantical notions; since we
do not even have that the prospects of showing that a causal theory of
denotation was compatible with physicalism are dim indeed!). All that the
causal theory of reference says is that there must be some sort of causal
chain between an expression and the entities it refers to; this is very plausible
indeed, but very vague, as it does not say much about what kind of causal
chain is in question. The causal theory as it stands now is more a manifesto
for a research program to be initiated than a nished theory. It is quite
likely that in order to specify the causal chain in question we would have to
appeal to non-physicalistic notions, if we would be at all capable of specifying
it. Nevertheless, I do not want to commit myself to the statement that
the causal theory of denotation would be false; the questions are far too
dicult to give any rm answers to in the current state of philosophical
research, and again, the theory would have to be specied far more precisely
even in order to be shown wrong even if it were wrong. My theory of
ontological commitment and truth will be fully compatible with a causal
theory of denotation as well as almost any realistic (or as it is sometimes
called referential or representational) theory of denotation.
In any case, my motive for using Tarski's theory of truth in this work is
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not to defend physicalism, but to defend semantical realism and show (here
agreeing with the early Field) that it does not require a truthmaker principle
or fact ontology but does imply signicant ontological commitments. Even
most physicalists agree that realism is a weaker theory than physicalism,
so the reduction of semantical notions is not necessary for my purpose, but
taking them as primitive is legitimate for my purpose.
Field's later Deationism
Field proclaimed his conversion from correspondence theory to deationism
in [Fie94] (reprinted in [Fie01b, pages 104-140]). Since Field is one of the
most inuential philosophers writing about the theory of truth, this article
has been very inuential in spreading deationism. However, while Field is
usually a very clear writer, this article is remarkably obscure in many ways,
which may not be apparent on a casual skimming of it; it leaves it rather
unclear just what the kind of deationism he converted to was and just why
he converted to it, and therefore whether he was at all justied in doing
so. In fact, these reasons, which I will proceed to specify in detail, make it
likely in my view that Field's earlier theory, sketchy and promissory though
it was, was better than his later one.
Field begins this article very obliquely by distinguishing two traditions
in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. According to him
one of the traditions, whose early advocates include Frege, Russell, the early
Wittgenstein and Ramsay, says truth conditions play an extremely central
role in semantics and the theory of mind; a theory of mind is in large part
a theory of truth conditions. As to the other tradition, Field says only that
the veriability theory of meaning provides a crude paradigm of it. He tells
us that in this the main concept are not truth conditions but verication
conditions. Field sketches this theory so that the verication conditions of
a type of utterance might be given by the class of sensory stimulations that
would or should lead to the acceptance of an utterance in that class. Field
does not even give any examples of representatives of this tradition as he
gave of the other tradition35, so it can be doubted whether this supposed
35Ayer would seem at rst sight to be the best possible representative of this tradition,
being both a deationist (as seen in Chapter 5 of [Aye36a]) and a vericationist. However,
there is the big problem that rather than replacing truth conditions with verication
conditions in the theory of meaning, Ayer identied the two kinds of conditions. E. g.
Ayer said in [Aye34, page 337]:
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second tradition has even existed, and it can be suggested that it is just a
research program newly cooked up by Field. Nor does he even tell us whether
there are more than two traditions or whether all theories of meaning and
content should fall into one of the two traditions.
Even more importantly, Field never gives any reasons for thinking that
the second tradition or research program is better than the rst. There are
of course many arguments in the literature for such a tradition (as we have
already in part seen in this dissertation), and Field may just suppose that
the reader is familiar with them, though it is far from clear which of these
arguments Field himself would accept. However, there are also well-known
diculties with this tradition. In fact because of the well-known diculties
with vericationism, which I went through in Section 3.3 of this dissertation
(and which Field does not address in the article, or anywhere as far as I
know), I would think the rst tradition denitely better than the second,
if they did indeed exhaust the options in the general theory of meaning.
However, it is by no means clear that they do. In fact there are reasons to be
dissatised with both traditions; meanings and content are naturally viewed
as more ne-grained than either truth conditions or verication conditions
(as indeed Field himself had recognized in other articles such as the one
collected in [Fie01a]). Therefore it may be possible and advisable to reject
both traditions.
This characterization of deationism is more narrow than Gupta's, since
Field speaks only of a role in the theory of meaning and content, not in
philosophy of language and metaphysics generally, but it shares the same
to give the meaning of a proposition is to give the conditions under which
it would be true and those under which it would be false. I understand a
proposition if I know what observations I must make in order to establish
its truth or falsity.
Ayer then thought contrary to Field that truth-conditions played a central role in seman-
tics, but verication conditions played an equally central role according to him since they
played the very same role. As we see from the quotation above, he slid instantly and un-
selfconsciously from truth conditions to verication conditions, seeing no dierence at all
between them. In this he was like most of the early positivists. Carnap perhaps saw the
ostensible dierence between the two kinds of conditions but explicitly identied them,
as seen e. g. in [Car32b, pages 221-222]. Therefore even a logical positivist like Ayer
or Carnap is not a good example of Field's supposed second tradition. The same holds
of at least many other current vericationists. Michael Dummett did initially suggest a
theory like the one Field describes, and Dummett may have inuenced Field (though two
like-minded thinkers scarcely constitute a tradition). However, Dummett later rejected
this suggestion as misleading and also explicitly identied conditions of correct assertion
and truth-conditions in [Dum78, page xxii].
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kind of vagueness. The notion of centrality is as vague as the notion of
substantiveness. What is a central role? Centrality is intuitively a matter
of degree; truth conditions can play a more or less central role, and so we
can again distinguish between milder and stronger forms of deationism,
indeed a continuum of them. Field indeed admits that the notion is not
initially clear, but promises that his goal is to clarify it as he goes along:
unfortunately, this is not always a very good way of making one's notions
clear, and at lest as far as I am concerned, the notion never gets very clear
in this case36.
More importantly, deationism as Field or Gupta dene it does not seem
to directly concern the theory of truth in the usual or at least traditional
meaning of the word, i. e. attempts to solve the question of what truth is,
at all. Field himself argues primarily for (see [Fie94, page 252] and [Fie01b,
page 107]) a deationary view of meaning and content or a deationist view
about the role of truth conditions in content, not for a deationary view or
theory of truth. Surely questions of how truth is to be dened are dierent
from questions about how the notion of truth is to be used. Of course, what
a philosopher thinks truth is aects what he thinks it can be used for, but it
does not determine it completely; whether truth plays a central role in the
theory of meaning depends not only on what truth is but also on what the
correct theory of meaning is like. However, Field also mentions (in [Fie94,
page 250] and in [Fie01b, page 105]) a deationary conception of truth, which
is in his view one way in which a vericationist can speak about truth and
various disquotational theories, starting from a pure disquotational theory,
36Some of Field's formulations and arguments actually seem to suggest a very radical
view, according to which truth conditions could not play any role. E. g. Field says
on [Fie94, page 272] and on [Fie01b, page 128] that the deationist/inationist contrast
was explained in terms of whether truth conditions play a role in semantics and the
theory of content. Here Field does not use the word "central" at all and seems to deny
that truth conditions could play any role in such a theory. If deationism about meaning
and contents boiled down to this claim it would be a quite clear and sharp if implausible
claim. However, it would be eliminativist rather than deationist. Dummett also came
close to eliminativism when he said in [Dum78, page 11] that we should abandon the
notions of truth and falsity altogether, but he denounced this view afterwards. This kind
of claim could be justied by arguing that physicalism implies that sentences could have
no truth conditions at all. However, Field says much that seems to be inconsistent with
this claim. He does say that a deationist can speak about truth conditions. However,
as I will show in a footnote below, there are reasons to think that his attempt to show
how a deationist can speak about truth conditions does not work, so there are reasons to
suspect that Field's premises might consistently followed out lead to eliminativism rather
than deationism.
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as examples of this deationary theory of content37.
However, what Field says leaves it quite obscure whether there are any
ways to implement a deationary theory of content other than verication-
ism and the deationary conception of truth and if so what they might be
and why the deationary conception of truth would be better than them.
It also leaves it obscure whether there might be other reasons to accept a
deationary conception of truth than vericationism and whether one might
consistently accept a deationary theory of truth without accepting a de-
ationary theory of content generally. We must recall that of the logical
positivists Schlick had combined a correspondence theory of truth with a
vericationistic theory of meaning in [Sch79b] and in [Sch34] (translated
in [Sch59]), and if this combination is consistent then the acceptance of
vericationism would not force one to reject correspondence theory as the
later Field does. However, Field does not try to show that such an option
would be impossible. It does seem possible for a vericationist to claim that
truth consists in a correspondence between truth-bearers and observable en-
tities, whether macroscopic physical entities or sense-data. Field then does
not give good reasons either to accept vericationism or to proceed from
such an acceptance to the rejecting of correspondence theory of truth, as he
37Field's denition of disquotational theories, however, is peculiar in one way. Field
has given statements regarding the kind of equivalence that occurs in the T-schema or
Convention T that do not seem to t together very well. Field actually says in [Fie92, page
322] that the equivalence should be logically necessary. Field describes this equivalence
in [Fie01b, page 114] as conceptually necessary, which need not be quite the same thing.
However, in [Fie94, page 250] and in [Fie01b, page 105] Field tells us that the pure
disquotational theory says that "p" and "it is true that p" are cognitively equivalent. The
problem is that it is not clear that cognitive equivalence would imply logical equivalence or
conceptual equivalence or even material equivalence, and the last at least is clearly required
for Convention T or T-schema as they are commonly understood. Field says in [Fie01b,
page 106, footnote 2] that his preferred reading of cognitive equivalence is that to call
two sentences cognitively equivalent for a person is to say that the person's inferential
procedures license a fairly direct inference from a sentence containing an occurrence of
one to the corresponding sentence with an occurrence of the other substituted for it. It
is not wholly clear to me what Field means with an inferential procedure, but the most
natural way of understanding that notion is a purely psychological one, according to
which an inferential procedure licensing an inference from on sentence to another is just a
disposition to change (under some unspecied triggering conditions) from a state in which
one believes one sentence to a state in which one believes also the other. Now it seems
to me that if a person is irrational then the inferential procedures in that sense of that
person can be fallacious so that p and q can be cognitively equivalent for him even when
it is not the case that p if and only if q. This, of course, implies that Field's attempt
to reconstruct the notion of truth conditions by means of a pure disquotational notion of
truth fails.
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does. So he surely does not give any good reasons for his rejection of the
correspondence theory of truth.
Nor is it clear whether there are any varieties of the deationary con-
ception of truth besides the dierent kinds of disquotational theories Field
mentions and if so what they might be and what might be common to all of
them. Furthermore, the two traditions Field distinguishes are not connected
with specic theories of truth, and therefore by bringing them into the dis-
cussion of truth theories Field has helped to sow confusion about what he
theory of truth concerns. The rst tradition includes according to him both
Russell, who was a paradigmatic correspondence theorist (and surely an in-
ationary correspondence theorist, as his version of correspondence theory
was based on a fact ontology), and philosophers who were not correspon-
dence theorists at all. Frege, whom Field presents as one of the founders of
the rst tradition, notoriously did not hold a correspondence theory of truth,
though the second of the founders of the tradition, Russell, did. Indeed, one
of the reasons why Frege apparently rejected correspondence theory was that
in his view truth was too fundamental to be dened (see [Fre56, page 291]);
so Frege rejected correspondence theory (so far as he did) just because truth
had a too central role in his view. Frege himself has sometimes been counted
as a deationist, though he is probably better counted as a primitivist about
truth. However, the rst tradition includes also Ramsay, who is generally
regarded as the rst deationist and the founder of deationism, and who
is therefore a paradigmatic deationist.
The traditions or research programs Field postulates do not therefore
seem to be associated with denite theories of truth at all. Nevertheless,
Field presents a deationary theory of meaning and content as incompatible
with the correspondence theory of truth, and most of today's philosophers
concerned with truth have followed him in this. It is certainly not at all
obvious that it should be incompatible with it. In fact it seems to me that
Field's deationism about content is probably indeed incompatible with the
specic version of correspondence theory he himself had earlier held, based
on Tarski's theory but modifying it considerably, and with some other mod-
ern versions of correspondence theory38. However, there is no good reason
38Davidson advocated most prominently the view that a truth-conditional theory of
meaning can be based on Tarski's theory of truth, and many Davisonians have followed
their master in this. However, Davidson also eventually came to the view that Tarski's
theory (as he interpreted it) was not a correspondence theory, so this does not give very
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to think that it would be incompatible with all versions of correspondence
theory or with (all interpretations of) Tarski's original theory sans Field's
modications of it. Deationism about content need not then be incompat-
ible with the correspondence theory of truth as such.
Field's sketch of the traditions leaves then very obscure both what their
limits are and how they are related to theories of truth. Recently, there has
been much debate about the relations between theories of truth and mean-
ing. One vital question is whether deationism concerning truth is con-
sistent with truth-conditional theories of meaning. There is an inuential
argument by Dummett and Davidson that these two theories are not consis-
tent, as combining them would lead to vicious circularity; however, recently
many philosophers such as Mark Lance (in [Lan97]), Michael Williams, Max
Kolbel and Alexis Burgess (in [Bur11]39) have argued that they are consis-
tent. There is then no agreement at all on this question, so the answer to
it cannot be obvious as Field assumed. In any case, even if deationism
were inconsistent with a truth-conditional theory of meaning, this would
not show that it was inconsistent with correspondence theory of truth, since
as I have shown the correspondence theory does not imply truth-conditional
semantics.
However, the pure disquotational theory Field formulates contains some
very specic and strong (and intuitively highly implausible) restrictions on
a deationary theory of truth - such as the radical claim that a person can
meaningfully apply a pure disquotationalist truth predicate only to sentences
he himself understands, i. e. sentences in his idiolect. This surely makes
a purely disquotational truth predicate intuitively very dierent from the
strong support to the view that truth-conditional semantics and correspondence theory of
truth should be connected.
39Burgess's claim is weaker than that of the others in an interesting way he dos not
himself notice. Burgess defends the compatibility of deationism with mainstream se-
mantics, which he describes both as truth-conditional and model-theoretic and as formal
and linguistic. However, as i have already explained in Section4.2.4 of this work, there
is a dierence between truth-conditional semantics and model-theoretic semantics. As
two interpreted sentences could be true in the same models but yet have dierent truth-
conditions, truth-conditional semantics goes beyond model-theoretic semantics. Unlike
model-theoretic semantics, truth-conditional semantics tries to account not only for formal
but also for material meaning. Therefore some kinds of deationism might be compatible
with model-theoretic semantics but yet incompatible with truth-conditional semantics.
Burgess admits that there is a kind of circularity in combining model-theoretic semantics
with deationism but denies that it is vicious. It is notoriously dicult to decide what
kinds of circularity are vicious, so the question is far from simple.
225
ordinary truth predicate. Many philosophers who call themselves deation-
ists would not agree with these restrictions. E. g. Horwich says in [Hor90,
page 106] that legitimate instantiation of the disquotational schema cannot
be restricted to sentences in our current language, but we must be allowed
to instantiate an unspeciable, unlimited number of future sentences of our
language. Field himself in a review of Horwich's book [Fie92, page 325]
says that he takes it as a corollary that we do not now understand those
instances. Horwich's theory is then not deationist in the very strong sense
in which a purely disquotational theory would be, and so is not really mini-
malist as Horwich calls it, as a pure disquotational theory would be weaker
than it.
I would certainly want to defend a more inationary theory of both truth
and ontological commitment than a purely disquotational theory of either
would be. Nor do I see that Field gives any good reasons for accepting
or even considering seriously a purely disquotational theory, for it surely
would not follow even from any reasonable version of vericationism. A
vericationist would say that we can only apply the concept of truth to
sentences speaking about observable entities. However, surely for any person
there are lots of sentences in other languages which he cannot understand
which yet speak about observable entities, even entities observable to him.
A vericationist can then apply the concept of truth to such sentences, but
a pure disquotationalist cannot. However, as the main reason Field gave
for considering deationist theories was based on vericationism, he surely
then gave no reasons for considering purely disquotational theories seriously.
Also applying the truth predicate to sentences we do not understand does
not imply that we would have to take truth as causally explanatory as
Field's previous theory did, for a property applying to sentences we do not
understand might still be an epiphenomenal property.
Nevertheless, there still remain problems even in distinguishing Field's
version of deationism from inationary correspondence theories. Though
Field formulated the pure disquotational theory, Field has never said out-
right that he would accept the pure disquotational theory, probably sensing
that it is absurd, and even if Field might have at one time accepted that
theory, he has clearly come to reject it. The problem is that when Field later
in his article (in [Fie94, x8-11]) and even more in the postscript in [Fie01b,
pages 141-156], tries to defend deationism against the obvious objection
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that it is just absurd, he seems to modify and weaken its deationary nature.
While a pure disquotationalist theory of truth is clearly dierent from an
inationary correspondence theory, Field's quasi-disquotational truth and
extended disquotational truth are already hard to distinguish from ina-
tionary truth concepts. Furthermore, it is far from clear that they are any
longer compatible with a deationary theory of meaning and content. Field
indeed admits in [Fie01b, page 119] the possibility that as the deationist
tries to explain various facts, he will have reconstructed the inationist's
relation 'S has the truth-conditions p'. Just as logical positivists discovered
that the weakening of vericationism, with which Field's deationism is con-
nected, threatened to make it vacuous, so analogously and hence predictably
does this weakening of deationism threaten to make it vacuous in the sense
that it becomes indistinguishable from a weak correspondence theory. Field
goes on to weaken these modied forms of disquotationalism even further
in section 4 of his postscript, where he apparently gives up the main point
in which his theory clearly diered Horwich's and about which he criticized
Horwich in [Fie92] as we have seen. Namely, he here seems to admit that
an agent can apply a disquotational truth predicate to utterances he himself
does not understand.
Field explains that all he really hopes to motivate in his article is that
we should be methodological deationists, i. e. assume deationism as a
working hypothesis. However, I cannot see how he could possibly hope to
motivate it, as he nowhere motivates the adoption of the tradition including
vericationism that is supposed to motivate deationism (or even shows
that such a tradition exists) or even defends this tradition against the well-
known objections to the only apparent candidates for membership in that
tradition. Field does not even make it clear to the reader why he himself
converted from the inationary correspondence theory he held earlier to
methodological deationism, much less provide any good reasons for the
reader to follow him. All he does is sketch what the research program based
on methodological deationism would look like, but this gives no reason to
prefer it to the research program based on a causal theory of reference, which
is is equally sketchy but no more so.
Field's theory seems to be threatened with all the problems that we
have become familiar with in the history of logical positivism. There are,
however, dierences between Field's theory and that of logical positivists.
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We must examine whether these are sucient to save Field's later theory, i.
e. whether his deationist theory of meaning and content could motivate a
deationist, specically disquotational theory of truth independently of any
pre-existing tradition, which we have already seen either does not exist or is
a failure and hence cannot successfully motivate any theory of truth. I will
argue at this last part of this subsection of my dissertation that there are
reasons to think they are not, and this will suce to refute methodological
deationism, though of course it does not prove that no deationary theory
of content could ever be made to work.
The main dierence between the version of vericationism Field sketches
and most earlier versions of vericationism is that where logical positivists
such as Ayer originally took the verifying experience to consist of sense-
contents, Field speaks of sensory stimulations, which gives his theory a more
physicalistic veneer. Of course, here Field is just in line with the way logical
positivists themselves, following Neurath, later modied their theory. Field's
formulation is specically similar to the way the later Quine, in whose theory
'stimulus meaning' is a central concept, developed vericationism. However,
this attempt at amalgamating vericationism and physicalism shares all the
well-known problems of vericationism and physicalism and causes novel
diculties of its own. The use of the notion of stimulation suggests a be-
haviourist theory of the mind, though Field himself has in other writings
(e. g. in [Fie01a, pages 56-58,62, 74-75]) suggested a functionalist theory.
There are well-known arguments that the two theories Neurath and Quine
attempt to combine are incompatible, which I have already gone through,
such as the possible ambiguity of the word "stimulation", and many of these
apply also to Field's sketch of vericationism40. Also Field's use of the nor-
mative term "should" raises questions about how to understand it; Field's
40I distinguished three senses of the word "stimulus" in the case of Quine: the perceived
object or event, the sensory intake and the neural input in the brain. It is not at all clear
which of these Field intends to denote with his use of the word "stimulation", and every
option presents problems of its own. As we are usually not aware of the neural input
(at least as such), it cannot verify any statements as a neural process. However, neither
can the other kinds of stimulations verify anything by themselves, as they can occur
without any perception or even without bringing about any reactions, if the connection
to neural input happens to be absent. However, an experience which veries statements
might supervene upon the neural process or be a functional role it plays (as Field's own
statements in [Fie01a, pages 56-58,62, 74-75] would suggest) or be an aspect of it or be
related to it in some of these ways, so it would seem that some modication like this would
be the next step in turning Field's formulation into a less crude one.
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physicalism, as a form of naturalism, can hardly accept primitive normative
properties any more than primitive semantic properties, but it is far from
clear how Field would reduce this normativity to anything physicalistically
acceptable.
Field's sketch of vericationism sounds like it presupposes a strong con-
cept of verication, conclusive verication. If all that were demanded were
conrmation, then a single class of sensory stimulations could hardly suce
to determine the meaning of an utterance type, as Field's sketch demands,
since any statement can be conrmed in innumerable ways by all kinds of
dierent evidence. As successors to logical positivism such as Hempel and
Quine have shown, if assertibility conditions were conrmation conditions,
then only whole theories could have assertibility conditions, not single utter-
ances (if even whole theories could have denite verication conditions)41.
41On the other hand, Field himself had in other writings favoured a conceptual role
semantics, which is generally associated with holism, and even in the article in question
he hints that vericationism should be combined with conceptual or computational role
semantics. Therefore it may be that Field's sketch of vericationism sounds atomistic
just because it is, as he admits, a crude paradigm of the tradition he defends. However,
Field only suggests supplementing vericationism in the theory of meaning with other
factors like indication relations, not modifying his formulation of vericationism itself.
Surely this is not enough to remove the defects of his formulation. Even if Field is not
committed to his crude formulation of vericationism, yet he has said nothing about how
his deationism would t with a more subtle holistic vericationism he really believes
in, and in such circumstances it is hard to evaluate his theory at all. The Kripkean
causal theory of reference Field had championed earlier was of course an atomistic or
localistic theory, so if Field had now switched to holism this was another big change in his
thinking he did not make clear to the reader. Surely Field would have to provide more
details before his theory could be considered justied in any way. Also a holistic theory of
meaning causes diculties about the possibility of communication, as we have already seen
thinkers like Fodor and Lepore have argued. It seems such diculties also aict Field's
theory. Field says explicitly in the preface to [Fie01b, page viii] that the deationary
picture gives a strongly rst-person orientation to the theory of truth and reference. Such
a rst-person orientation is what is often also known as the phenomenological perspective.
However, such a perspective drove the founder of phenomenology Husserl to transcendental
idealism, and it is not at all clear how such a rst-person orientation ts together with
Field's rather strong physicalism. A pure disquotational concept of truth only applies to
sentences in a person's idiolect, a private language. Other philosophers who are like Field
both physicalists and deationists like Quine have argued (e. g. in [Qui68, page 185]) that
there cannot be such a private language, so Field's position is rather weird in this respect.
Can Field avoid the conclusion that the same sentence has entirely dierent contents for
dierent people? The same physical entity can cause entirely dierent sensory stimulations
to dierent people whose sense-organs are dierent. Do not these people then associate
entirely dierent verication conditions with the same sentence? Also indication relations
also seem to vary widely from person to person. If an atomic physicist makes a claim
about electrons, this makes it far more likely that the electrons are as he says they are
than if an ordinary person makes such a claim. Field states that indication relations are
supposed to give meaning a social aspect. Unfortunately he does not go into any details,
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However, if meaning were to consist in methods of conclusive verication,
then statements referring to theoretical entities (such as subatomic particles)
would be meaningless, since they are not conclusively veriable (or have all
the same meaning, the same null conditions)42.
It is not clear whether Field's addition in [Fie94, pages 253-256] (reprinted
in [Fie01b, pages 108-112]) of conceptual or computational roles and indica-
tion relations to assertion conditions as components of content dierentiates
his theory enough from the theory of logical positivists to remove this in-
consistency. The most promising part of this is the addition of indication
relations, which Field says are intended to give content externalist and social
aspects. This does seem to indeed go beyond what even the most exible
positivism would allow, since Field allows the relata of this indication rela-
tion to be unobservable. However, the introduction of indication relations
does not seem to help much with the construction of content or meaning.
Belief states that would intuitively be said to have the same meaning can
have entirely dierent indicative relations. Intuitively we would say that
the same belief can be held both irrationally and rationally, but a belief has
which makes his claim quite unconvincing. All he says in [Fie94, page 256] is that
the conceptual roles and indication relations of other people's states of be-
lieving a certain sentence are counted as relevant to the content of my state
of believing that sentence
Exactly how are they counted as relevant to that content?
42It seems unlikely that Field would be willing to accept the kind of radical anti-realism
to which there are good reasons to think vericationism leads. Field has indeed been very
hospitable to anti-realistic theories of mind (though he shrinks from full-edged elimi-
nativism) and meaning and universals. There are indeed some signs that he may have
relented lately of his opposition to universals, considering in [Fie98] seriously a theory he
calls plenitudinous platonism - apparently the same kind of theory propounded by Mark
Balaguer in [Bal98] - which might be a form of realism about universals. However, since
Balaguer himself says (in [Bal98, page 152]) that this kind of theory is similar to ctional-
ism, it seems that it is not genuinely realistic, but just a more subtle kind of anti-realism.
However, Field seems in any case quite unwilling to accept anti-realism concerning physical
objects. Even more Field has often (e. g. in [Fie80, page 34]) shown himself hospitable to
substantivalism concerning space-time, a theory which is a notorious example of an unver-
iable theory. Indeed, Field's realism concerning space-time forms an essential premise in
his argument against realism concerning universals in[Fie80]. This separates him sharply
from the positivistic tradition where vericationism originates, to which Mach's rejection
of substantivalism was crucial. Substantival space-time is surely a theoretical entity if any,
and it is very unclear indeed how statements concerning substantial space-time could be
given meaning by means of any stimuli! Perhaps Field has rejected this substantivalism
when embracing vericationism; however, I do not nd that he anywhere says that he has
done so, and therefore there exists the danger of a radical inconsistency in Field's theory
as a whole. Field's introduction of indication relations, which I will discuss below, might
help this problem, but introduces other problems of its own.
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indication relations to the state of aairs it would be said to be about only
when it is rational. Indication relations seem to be better suited to account
for justication in an externalist epistemology, as in Goldman's reliabilism
(see [Gol86]), than for content. Indication relations cannot then account
for the content of irrational beliefs, at least not alone43. Field seems then
to confuse epistemological and semantic concepts just as much as logical
positivist did, even with his addition of indication relations, though that
addition changes the way they are confused.
On the other hand, the verication conditions contained in the concep-
tual role would do a better job in the case of many irrational beliefs, namely
those that concern observable entities. The conceptual role, however, cannot
give meaning to sentences speaking about substantival space-time, or even
most physical objects, which Field would want to be meaningful, though
indication relations possibly might. So it seems that neither indication re-
lations alone nor conceptual role alone can serve to reconstruct content.
However, Field leaves it quite unclear how these three aspects of content
are to be integrated. He does say that the conceptual role of a belief state
includes its verication conditions but says nothing about how conceptual
role and indication relations are to be combined. This is is big defect because
this combination is quite problematic, as the two ingredients often when
they both exist so to say pull in dierent directions. It is quite possible
if a person is suciently irrational or just suciently misinformed that the
belief state of that person would be veried by a class of sensory stimulations
whose absence it indicates for that person. Conceptual roles and indication
relations seem combine as well as re and water.
Furthermore, it is part of our common notion of meaning and content
that a person can have untrue and irrational beliefs whose content concerns
unobservable entities (and can meaningfully speak about such entities with-
43Field himself gives a counterexample to trying to construct truth conditions from
indication relations (even though he also says he doubts that there is a clear matter of
right or wrong here). This counterexample (which in my view is quite clearly a counterex-
ample) also serves as a counterexample to an attempt to construct meaning or content
from indication relations. Field considers in [Fie01b, page 110] an ancient Greek whose
judgements that Zeus is throwing thunderbolts are correlated reliably with (i. e. indi-
cate) the presence of lightning in his vicinity. Field admits that we would not say that
the truth-conditions of his utterance "Zeus is throwing thunderbolts" are just that there
is lightning in his vicinity. However, neither is the content of the Greek's belief in the
ordinary sense of the words just that there is lightning in his vicinity.
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out having justied beliefs concerning them)44. Neither conceptual role with
its verication conditions nor indication relations can account for the con-
tent of such beliefs or the meaning of sentences expressing them, so there is
reason to think that Field's later theory as a whole cannot account for them
(which may be due to its holistic character)45. However, his earlier more
atomistic theory had at least some potential for dealing with such cases if
further developed, as in it sentences speaking about unobservable entities
could be constructed out of primitive terms referring to observable entities
whose reference might be somehow explained causally, quite independently
of the justication of the beliefs such sentences would express. Because of
this Field's earlier theory seems slightly better to me than his later one.
Furthermore, we can argue that physicalism or even moderate scientic
realism cannot be coherently combined with strong kinds of deationism,
at least not with a pure disquotational theory, whatever its motivation. A
physicalist (or any scientic realist) would surely have to say that many
statements of current physical theory, or statements of an ideal physical
theory, are true - this is generally taken to be what distinguishes physical-
ism from materialism pure and simple. However, modern physics uses lots
of technical terms and outlandish notation, so that physicists (like other
groups of scientists practising a highly developed science) essentially use a
language of their own. Therefore people who are not (qualied to be) pro-
fessional physicists cannot understand most of the sentences used in current
44Also such beliefs can help us in predicting and explaining the behaviour of the person
just as much as rational beliefs and their contents play an essential role in this; they can
indeed not often explain the success of the person's actions based on them, but they can
explain and more importantly predict the failure of such activities. Predicting failure (and
predicting exactly how a person is going to fail) is surely at least as important as predicting
success, as failure is far more common; even if we cannot stop a person's disastrous actions,
preparing for their failure can help us to minimize the inevitable catastrophe.
45One way for Field to respond to this argument would be to opt for eliminativism.
He might say that instead of trying to construct our common notions of meaning and
content out of conceptual roles and indication relations, we ought to just abandon those
notions (as unacceptable for a physicalist) - which would involve abandoning the ordinary
notion of belief itself, as the notion of content is surely essential to it - and replace them
with conceptual roles and indication relations. Field does say that the line between re-
ductionism and eliminativism is not sharp, so this would be a natural way to modify his
theory. However, as deationism has usually been advertised as a novel theory, it would
become much less interesting for many philosophers if it were admitted that it just col-
lapsed into old-fashioned eliminativism. Besides, Field has expressed reluctance toward
accepting such eliminativist physicalism - e. g. he says in [Fie01b, page 30] that we do
unquestionably believe and desire - so there is a likely internal conict in his theory as
well as a conict with common conceptions.
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physical theory. Probably no one living today is capable of understanding
an ideal physical theory, which would be likely to use far more technical
terminology and complex notation. Therefore if anyone who is not a profes-
sional physicist or qualied to be one claims to accept physicalism, this must
imply for him the claim that some sentences which he does not understand
(or propositions he does not and often cannot grasp) are true. However,
the pure disquotational theory demands that a person can only call such
sentences as he himself understands true. Therefore if an adherent of a pure
disquotational theory is not a professional physicist, as most deationists
surely are not, he cannot consistently say that such sentences are true and
therefore he cannot be a physicalist (or even a moderate scientic realist).
Since most philosophers are not (qualied to be) professional physicists and
do not understand (and perhaps are not intelligent enough that they could
ever understand) most of the sentences of a physical theory, they cannot
consistently accept both a pure disquotational theory and physicalism (or
even moderate scientic realism). Field could scarcely honestly say that he
understands most of the sentences of physical theory, so if he were a pure
disquotationalist he could not consistently be a physicalist. As I have shown
before, it is not clear what kind of deationist theory Field actually accepts
in the end, so it is not clear if he could consistently be a physicalist, but
there are surely at this point in the research good reasons to doubt (even if
not denitely deny) whether any seriously deationary conception of truth
which diers signicantly from more traditional inationary correspondence
theories is compatible with physicalism or even with moderate scientic re-
alism.
4.3.2 Realism and the Theory of Truth
The relation of deationism to the controversy between realism and anti-
realism in the theory of truth is as obscure as everything concerning dea-
tionism. Indeed, the relations between the problem of truth and the problem
of realism are subject to much dispute. Many philosophers, including many
scientic realists, think that a correspondence theory is constitutive of re-
alism, or at least of some kind of realism; e. g. William Alston defends
in [Als97] alethic realism, realism concerning truth. If this is correct, and if
deationism is inconsistent with a correspondence theory, then deationism
would be inconsistent with realism. However, other philosophers such as
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Michael Devitt in [Dev84] have argued that no theory of truth is constitu-
tive of realism (though Devitt is still both a realist and a correspondence
theorist). I havve argued that Devitt is not consistent in this view. Some-
times deationists (e. g. Horwich) agree with correspondence theorists like
Devitt that the theory of truth is not relevant to the debate between real-
ists and anti-realists, and this would make deationism weaker than either
realistic and anti-realistic theories. Horwich has defended this view strongly
in [Hor90, x16-17].
However, there are reasons to think that even if deationism does not
directly and by itself imply anti-realism it is at least strongly motivated by
anti-realistic considerations. As we have seen, Field presented the deation-
ist conception of truth as a way in which a vericationist can speak of truth.
Vericationism, however, has traditionally been connected with anti-realism
and there are reasons to think that it is inseparable from anti-realism. Field
does indeed reject a vericationist denition of truth, but he yet seems to
accept a vericationist theory of meaning, just as the logical positivists did.
Also, of the two traditions which Field distinguishes, the one that he rejects,
that of Frege and Russell, has traditionally been associated with realism.
Since deationism is often motivated by vericationism, which is almost
certainly incompatible with realism, a realist will be inclined to oppose de-
ationism, However, matters are complicated by the fact that deationism
seems to be sometimes motivated at least partly by other reasons than veri-
cationism. We have seen that Field himself counted a deationist, Ramsay,
as part of the rst tradition, the tradition that he did not say included
vericationism (though there are surely vericationist elements in Ramsay's
Wittgenstein-inuenced philosophy). Also when Field names vericationism
as a crude paradigm of the second tradition, he leaves it unclear what less
crude, subtler examples of the tradition might be. Also Field's own sketch
of the vericationist theory of meaning is in some ways weaker than the kind
of vericationism favoured by logical positivists, so it might not suer from
all the same problems.
Horwich strongly opposes the idea that deationism would imply anti-
realism; however, there are reasons to think that Horwich may still him-
self be motivated by anti-realism. Horwich agrees with Field in rejecting
a truth-conditional theory of meaning in [Hor90, x22, pages 71-74] and so
apparently places himself in the second of the traditions distinguished by
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Field; he says that meaning should be understood in terms of assertibility
conditions rather than truth conditions, and assertibility conditions sound
a lot like verication conditions. Even more, Horwich makes use in [Hor90,
page 73] of Dummett's manifestation requirement and acquisition argument.
At the very least Horwich's theory is incompatible with realism concerning
understanding. Realism concerning understanding would assert that un-
derstanding is independent of (other) mental states, and this implies that
it is possible that a person understands something even if others (or even
he himself) cannot know that he does, and the manifestation requirement
directly denies this.
However, we have seen that Dummett's argument leads to a strong form
of vericationism and Dummett argued that this kind of vericationism is
incompatible with realism regarding pretty much anything. This certainly
rouses a strong suspicion that Horwich's overall semantic theory would have
to be be inconsistent with realism regarding pretty much anything just like
Dummett's theory is, even if Horwich's version of deationism is not by itself
inconsistent with realism. Moreover, Horwich's vericationism is connected
with deationism; Horwich accepts in [Hor90, page 71] Dummett's argument
that deationism is inconsistent with truth-conditional semantics. Therefore
if the argument is correct (which, as we have seen, is highly controversial)
deationism lends at least some support for vericationist semantics (and
hence for anti-realism), as it is the most prominent competitor for truth-
conditional semantics, even if deationism does not imply it outright.
However, Horwich refuses to admit that his theory would imply anti-
realism. Is there then some dierence in the kind of manifestation require-
ment Horwich accepts from the kind of manifestation requirement Dummett,
the notorious anti-realist, accepts, that would explain and justify the dier-
ent consequences the two philosophers draw from their seemingly identical
premises? Or is there some error in Dummett's argument that Horwich has
seen? Unfortunately, it is far from clear that either would be the case46.
46Later writings of Horwich such as [Hor04] suggest there may indeed be at least one
signicant dierence between Horwich's sketch of a use theory of meaning and those
of Wittgenstein, Dummett and Field, though it is not clear if those dierences already
existed in [Hor90]. Unlike Field, Horwich says (in [Hor04, page 357] that his attempt at
a reductionistic theory of meaning is not motivated by physicalism. Horwich also says
in [Hor04, page 358] that his version of the use theory of meaning leaves open accounts
of meaning in psychological terms, and actually appeals to a visual experience in one
of his examples [Hor04, page 351]. However, Dummett (and Wittgenstein) apparently
235
Horwich says in [Hor90, page 73] that he is not simply identifying the mean-
ing of a sentence with its assertibility conditions. Unfortunately Horwich
does not say much about exactly how meaning should be understood in
terms of assertibility conditions if it is not to be identied with them, so
unless he says more about his theory of meaning it remains unclear whether
his theory can be combined with realism as he thinks it can.
If Horwich were correct that his theory does not imply anti-realism, then
a defender of realism could accept Horwich's kind of moderate deationism
and just try to make clear how his theory goes beyond it and argue that he
is justied in going beyond it. In this case there would not be much dier-
ence between deationism and weak correspondence theory for metaphysical
purposes. However, as we have seen it is quite doubtful whether Horwich is
correct, and therefore a realist is well advised to stick to a less deationary
correspondence theory.
4.3.3 Truth as a Property
The debate between deationism and inationism is also often connected
with such questions as whether truth is a property; sometimes deationism
is characterised as denying that truth is a property. This kind of characteri-
sation would bring the debate on the theory of truth into a close connection
with the problem of universals, which will be the nal theme of this dis-
sertation. There are two extreme positions on this issue, between which I
want to develop a compromise position. On the one hand some deationists
such as prosententialists deny that "true" is even a predicate, while on the
other hand some inationist correspondence theorists think that truth is a
did not leave accounts of meaning in psychological terms open, but required accounts of
meaning to be in behavioural terms, since they required such accounts to be in public
terms, and internal psychological experiences are not public. However, if this is correct, it
was rather misleading for Horwich to claim that he accepts the manifestation requirement,
for internal mental states like visual experiences are not manifested in the common and
obvious meaning of the term (unless indeed Horwich has between the two writings changed
his view and abandoned the manifestation requirement). Indeed, it is slightly misleading
for him even to present his theory as a use theory of meaning, for the words "use theory
of meaning" immediately suggest a Wittgensteinian behaviourist theory. I am not saying
that Horwich's theory is any worse because it diers from those of Wittegenstein and
Dummett, only misleadingly expressed. As I have argued that those theories are hopeless,
this makes Horwich's theory better than their theories, though one can still doubt whether
it succeeds in its highly ambitious goal of working towards a reductive account of meaning.
One can still doubt whether the dierence from Dummett's theory I have pointed out is
big enough that Horwich can completely avoid anti-realism, as he clearly wishes to do.
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sparse property. I want to show that neither of these extreme positions is
attractive (though the second is arguably incoherent and the rst not, so
the rst is not as bad as the second).
Against Prosententialism
Some deationists such as prosententialists deny not only that truth is a
property but even that "true" is a predicate47. They claim (see e. g. [Gro92,
pages 88-89]) that the truth term itself is a syncategorematic part of a
prosentence, which is like an anaphor except that its syntactical category is
a sentence.
The claim that atomic sentences in which the truth term occurs are
prosentences does indeed sound plausible. However, this claim does not
imply that the truth term would be syncategorematic. It is consistent to
claim both that the truth term is a predicate and that atomic sentences
whose predicate it is are prosentences. So what reason do prosententialists
have to deny that the truth term is a predicate?
Prosententialists appeal to Russell's treatment of denite descriptions,
which according to Russell are not singular terms as they appear to be but
quantier phrases, as a precedent. However, few people today would say
that Russell would have shown that denite descriptions and proper names
in natural languages (which seem to be the main target of most deation-
ists, who seldom venture into constructing articial languages - at least in
detail - as Tarskians do) dier in their basic syntactic category (though
some would say that they have dierent syntactic subcategorization fea-
tures); both are clearly noun phrases. If there is a signicant dierence
between them as Russell plausibly claimed, then this dierence must be se-
mantical, and manifest itself as syntactical only when natural languages are
47Grover has vacillated on this point. At one point she admitted that if having an ex-
tension suced for a property, then truth would be a property. However, as she tells the
story in [Gro92, page 23], she then changed her mind because she became convinced that
an extension does not suce to establish that we have an interesting property. However,
in this case we must remark that if such a property (an abundant property in Lewis's
terminology or a second class or third class property in Armstrong's terms) is not inter-
esting, then it is not interesting to deny its existence any more than to arm it. Why
then create a complicated semantical theory just in order to deny the existence of such an
uninteresting property? In any case, also other philosophers such as extreme nominalists
including Nelson Goodman and the early Quine in [GQ47] have expended great eort in
trying to deny the existence of this kind of properties, which would seem to show that the
claim that such properties exist is an interesting claim.
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translated into a more perspicuous articial language, where semantics and
syntax are better correlated than in natural languages. However, there have
been theories of natural language semantics that would remove even this dif-
ference; e. g. Montague's theory takes both of them to be quantier phrases
(thereby radically altering our understanding of the semantic behaviour of
singular terms such as proper names). Therefore the claim that "truth"
is not a syntactic predicate in natural languages is scarcely justiable, but
prosententialists like Grover do claim unlike Tarski that their theory of truth
applies to natural languages like English. Also the fact that truth can be
expressed by a prosentence in an articial language does not imply that
it could not be expressed by a predicate in another equally good articial
language, so prosententialism is not obviously incompatible with the kind
of inationism that claims "true" to be a predicate in logical form. How-
ever, prosententialists at other passages merely deny that truth would be a
property-ascribing predicate, and this is a slightly more plausible claim; it is
a commonplace in ontological debates concerning the problem of universals
that it can be held that at most some predicates, namely those that can be
replaced by a variable bound by an objectual quantier), ascribe properties
to their subjects.
It is hard to see the motivation of this kind of radical deationary the-
ory. The picture it gives of the semantics of natural languages is highly
unnatural even if coherent, so accepting it would require a very powerful ar-
gument. Though there are some disagreements among historians of philoso-
phy with regard to the motivation of Russell's theory of denite descriptions,
Russell's own claims indicate that it was at least partly motivated by the
problem of non-existence. Russell wanted to eliminate apparent reference
to non-existent and even impossible objects, in order to avoid a theory like
Meinong's theory. Whether or how far he succeeded is highly controversial;
I argue in another section of this dissertation that there is also purported
quantication over non-existent objects, which must also be somehow elimi-
nated or accounted for, so Russell's theory is not completely sucient for his
purpose, but is helpful for it. What then is the motivation of prosentential
theories?
One prominent ontological argument against correspondence theories
and therefore for deationist theories such as prosententialist theories is
that it is doubtful if correspondence theories are compatible with physical-
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ism; however, it is not clear that prosentential theories would be compatible
with physicalism either. It is not clear how an intralinguistic anaphoric
relationship could be reduced into physical relations any more than how a
relationship of reference between linguistic and non-linguistic items could be
reduced to physical relations48. Devitt for example claims in [Dev01b, page
604] that Brandom is totally upfront about abandoning naturalism and of
course if this is correct it implies that Brandom also abandons the stronger
theory of physicalism.
There is, however, a more serious problem with the prosententialist the-
ory. Prosententialists claim that the role of the concept of truth is not to
explain anything, but only to increase the expressive power of a language;
a claim with which I am sympathetic, at least so far as it concerns the pri-
mary role of the concept of truth, since I am a mild deationist. However,
I will argue that they or at least most of them cannot provide an adequate
account of this expressive role of the notion of truth, of how strong it is,
which makes their theory too radically deationist.
Prosententialists generally take the sentential quantication that they
take truth to involve to be substitutional, rather than objectual quanti-
cation over propositions49. This is because they foten deliberately try to
48Grover suggests in [Gro92, pages 113-115] that the prosentential theory can help a
physicalist to get rid of mysterious facts concerning truth that do not seem to t his
world-view. However, she admits that this will leave him with the problem of facts about
referring, facts about synonymy, and whatever other semantical facts there may be in
the world, but claims that it is a start. However, Tarski's theory as reformulated by the
early Field could give the physicalist just as good a start, reducing truth to reference but
leaving reference unaccounted for. Because of this Grover's theory is in no way better than
Tarski's (as reformulated by the early Field) even from the point of view of a dogmatic
physicalist, but requires a far more convoluted semantics than Tarski's, so it is overall
worse even for convinced physicalists. Brandom's theory, which is far more radical than
Grover's, might help to get rid of reference but leaves anaphoric relationships unaccounted
for, so it does not ultimately help to get rid of semantical facts and relationships either.
Just like Tarski's theory as reformulated by Field, these prosentential theories are just
reducing semantical notions to other semantical notions, and doing nothing to reduce
them to physical or other non-semantical ones. There is at present no guarantee that any
theory of truth other than radical eliminativism would be consistent with physicalism,
and many reasons to suspect that none is, though of course it is not certain that some
less nihilist theory might in the end turn out to be consistent with physicalism either.
49Mark Lance says in [Lan97, page 183, footnote 4] that one should not think that a
substitutional interpretation of quantiers is required of the anaphoric theory (of which
the prosentential theory is a special case). There seem to be dierences about where the
boundaries of anaphoric theories lie. If an anaphoric theory allowed the use of objectual
quantication, it might escape my objection. However, in this case it might no longer count
as deationary - at least, it would not be deationary to the same degree as Grover's
theory is - and indeed Lance does claim that the anaphoric theory is compatible with
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avoid ontological commitment to propositions, unlike such less radical de-
ationists as Horwich. However, this implies that a speaker of a language
can attribute truth only to sentences of the same language he speaks, since
only these sentences can serve as substitution instances of a sentential vari-
able bound by a substitutional sentential quantier. He cannot attribute
truth to sentences in other languages, at least not those that could not be
translated into his language. However, it is surely possible to do this in
natural languages; for example, a speaker of English can say that something
a speaker said in German is true50. Therefore Grover's prosententialist the-
ory suers from a similar defect as Field's pure disquotational theory (but
which Horwich's theory avoids, though only at the loss of clarity), where a
speaker could only attribute truth to sentences he himself understood. The
notion of truth Grover's prosententialist theory yields is too weak to do jobs
a notion of truth is expected to do.
Truth cannot be a sparse property
Sometimes inationism and deationism are characterised so that ination-
ism claims and deationism denies only that truth is a genuine property
or that truth is a substantive property or a robust property etc. Unfortu-
nately it is often obscure what a genuine property or a substantive property
or a robust property is supposed to be, and also who is supposed to have
held that truth is a substantive property. A natural interpretation would
be that a genuine property is any property we are (or better ought to be)
ontologically committed to. However, often the expression seems to mean
something stronger. Often in such a case it means something we will have to
discuss at more length in the course of this dissertation, for example some-
thing like a sparse property in David Lewis's sense or a rst class property
substantivalist theories.
50This may indeed sometimes lead to paradoxes; however, there are cases where this
can occur without a risk of paradox (for instance, if the second language does not contain
any resources for talking about the truth of sentences in the rst language or itself, but
still contains some non-semantic predicates which cannot be translated into the rst lan-
guage). However, the mere fact that natural language can lead to paradoxes shows that
the notion of truth employed in it is radically stronger than the prosententialist notion;
mere sentential quantication could never lead to paradoxes. While the notion employed
by natural languages therefore has to be weakened in being regimented to avoid contra-
diction, this does not imply that it would have to be weakened so radically that it would
turn to anything like the prosententialist notion.
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in Armstrong's sense51.
It seems to me that even if the theory of truth has signicant metaphys-
ical implications it need not follow that truth is a genuine property52 in
any strong sense of that expression. These two views constitute then novel
senses of the words "inationism" and "deationism". It is blatantly false
to claim that a correspondence theory of truth would require inationism in
this new sense, i. e. require truth to be a sparse property. In fact the claim
that truth would be a sparse property is incompatible with the basic idea at
the basis of all correspondence theories of truth. As we have seen Wolfgang
Kunne has shown, all correspondence theories of truth take truth to be a
relational property (if they take it to be a property at all); as I have also
already shown, Bertrand Russell, who counts as a paradigmatic correspon-
dence theorist for current philosophers, explicitly dened correspondence
theory so that according to it truth was a relational property. However,
David Lewis says in [Lew86, page 60] that sparse properties are intrinsic,
and this can indeed be taken to be part of Lewis's denition of a sparse
property. That truth cannot be an intrinsic and hence not a sparse property
51In [Asa11, page 152] Jamin Asay calls this kind of deationism concerning truth
metaphysical deationism and explicitly identies it with the denial of the view that truth
is a sparse property. Asay is in favour of this metaphysical deationism. However, Asay
does not see that there is also a genuine metaphysical question concerning whether truth
is an abundant property. He argues in [Asa11, page 177] that the property truth (by which
he obviously means the abundant property truth) denitely exists, for there are truths (by
which he means truthbearers). Asay seems to take that view as metaphysically innocuous;
indeed, he says in [Asa11, page 146] following Shoemaker that there is a broad sense
of the word "property" in which there is a property corresponding to any grammatical
predicate. However, I have already argued that the postulation of abundant properties is
not ontologically innocuous. There certainly is no sense of the word "property" in which
there is a property corresponding to any grammatical predicate, since the assumption that
there is leads directly into a property-theoretical analogue of Russell's Paradox. Consider
the grammatical predicate "is an abundant property which is not instantiated by itself"; is
it instantiated by itself or not? I certainly agree that there are truths, but it is important
to see that this does not imply that an abundant property of truth would exist.
52Devitt took in [Dev01b] the opposite position to the one Asay was to later take and
opposed the adequacy of this kind of characterisation of deationism. Devitt admits that
deationism has a metaphysical dimension and is a kind of anti-realism about truth and
says that there is no reality to truth. However, Devitt thinks that this cannot be under-
stood in terms of there being no property of truth, since in his view a nominalist or a
selective realist like Armstrong who does not take truth to be a property need not yet be
a deationist. There are problems with Devitt's attempt to separate realism concerning
truth from realism concerning properties; for instance, Devitt does not notice that Arm-
strong distinguishes, as we will see, between rst class and second class and third class
properties, and truth (or at least the truth of sentences of a semantically open language)
might well be a second class or third class property for Armstrong, even though it cannot
be a rst class property.
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becomes still clearer when we look at Lewis's way of clarifying the notion of
intrinsic properties with the aid of the notion of possible worlds. According
to Lewis [Lew86, page 62] an intrinsic property is one which can never dier
between duplicates. However, any truth-bearer which is only contingently
true or false (and does not concern truth-bearers) can obviously be true in
a possible world and its duplicate can be false in another possible world. It
is then certain that truth cannot be sparse property in Lewis's sense.
The claim that truth is a sparse property ts better together with prim-
itivist identity theories of truth (such as presented in [Moo99]), according to
which truth is a primitive property of propositions or states of aairs such
that a proposition or state of aairs with that property is a fact. Identity
theories of truth, however, have generally been held to be incompatible with
correspondence theories of truth (though they might also be counted as a
limiting case of them, for identity is surely a limiting case of correspondence;
everything corresponds with itself). The most that a correspondence theory
(which is not an identity theory) might plausibly hold is that truth is an
abundant or second class property.
There might be some interesting conception of "genuine" property nar-
rower than the concept of abundant properties other than Lewis's concept of
a sparse property that might apply to truth. However, it is not clear what it
would be, and surely the burden of proof in on those who think that truth is
a genuine property to dene a concept of "genuine" property that can do the
job. In any case those ontologists who draw a distinction between "genuine"
properties and other properties generally think that relational properties are
not "genuine" properties. It is rather obvious that a relational property is
nothing besides the relation on which it is based and it is easy to leap from
this to the conclusion53 that it is not a genuine property.
It is not quite as clear that the correspondence relation or relations
cannot be a sparse relation. However, presumably the same holds of sparse
relations as of sparse properties namely that there are only just enough of
them to characterize things completely and without redundancy. However,
since the correspondence relation is according to correspondence theory to
be dened with the aid of reference, then if reference is a sparse relation the
53Not everyone would leap to this conclusion. Aristotelians commonly tried to reduce
relations to relational properties rather than the other way around. Some modern philoso-
phers like Casta~neda have defended this view; however, it is denitely a minority view,
and its coherence is very controversial.
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correspondence relation cannot be such, for in saying which terms are related
by reference to which entities, we already characterize by implication all
extensional semantical relationships completely. However, correspondence
relations can be abundant relations, and I think that they are. In fact, I will
later tell exactly what abundant relations these correspondence relations
are, dening them with the aid of the relation of reference or denotation
(leaving open whether this relation of reference or denotation is abundant
or sparse).
However, neither correspondence theory as such nor Tarski's specic
theory implies even that truth would be an abundant property or that there
would exist a correspondence relation as an abundant relation. In fact,
Tarski's original theory does not even require that we would have to take the
truth-predicate as one of the expressions substitutable for a bound variable,
much less for a variable bound by an objectual quantier, so it does not even
involve ontological commitment to truth (though very natural and minor
extensions of it do). Therefore truth does not have to be a property at all,
not even an abundant property, according to it. Nor does it seem to me
that any weak denitions of correspondence theory would imply even this
much; some such denitions may require that the correspondence relation
used in the denition of truth is an abundant relation, but not that truth is
a property; they can be taken to be just denitions of the truth predicate.
Nor do all of them require even that the correspondence relation would be an
abundant relation; the quantication over the correspondence relation many
of them employ can be interpreted as non-objectual. Nevertheless, I think
that the correspondence relations are abundant relations, which I will dene,
and therefore the version of correspondence theory I will develop at the end
of this chapter in Section 4.4 will be slightly stronger, more inationary,
than Tarski's theory, though it will still be far weaker than theories which
would take truth to be a sparse property.
Indeed, there are reasons to think that even the supposition that truth
is an abundant property might lead to semantical paradoxes (together with
such plausible additional assumptions as the law of excluded middle). If
such an abundant property of truth i. e. of being true as such, existed,
and the law of excluded middle were true, then this property would have
to be either instantiated by the Liar sentence or not, and both alternatives
lead to a contradiction. However, I think that it is plausible to hold that
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there are such abundant properties as being true in some semantically open
fragment of English (in which phrase "some" has a broad scope); this claim
cannot be adequately justied in this dissertation, but it becomes plausible
once we have given arguments for the general claim that there are abundant
properties.
4.3.4 The Theory of Truth and Explanation
The dispute between inationists and deationists is also often seen to re-
volve around the notion of explanation; deationists often deny that the no-
tion of truth would be explanatory and inationists claim that it is. Those
who hold correspondence theory to be inationary by denition therefore
often claim that correspondence theorists hold truth to be explanatory. The
word "inationist", the opposite of "deationist", is often used as a synonym
of "substantivalist", and for example Patterson says in [Pat03, page 422]:
As I use the terms a substantivalist account of truth is a theory
on which truth is treated as a property that can in particular
play certain explanatory role in serious theory. A correspondence
theory of truth is a substantivalist theory that in particular treats
this property as consisting in a relation between its bearer and
something else, which relation in addition can be considered one
of "correspondence". . .
Substantivalism in this sense is one possible way of interpreting ina-
tionism about truth, but a very strong way of interpreting even it. Not even
versions of strong correspondence theory, such as fact-based correspondence
theories, count as substantivalist theories of truth in this sense though they
are surely inationist in some sense. Fact-based correspondence theories
such as Armstrong's claim that truth is something to be explained rather
than just analysed, but they need not claim that truth itself would explain
anything; for them truth is an explanandum, not an explanans. It is far from
obvious that this denition is equivalent with either of the ones I quoted pre-
viously, even though it shares some obvious similarities with it. It is not clear
that an explanatory role is the same as a central role or a substantive role.
A good feature in Patterson's denition is that the notion of an explanatory
role might be less vague than that of a central or substantive role, but it
also suers from unclarity, and in any case the expression "serious theory"
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introduces new vagueness of its own54. It seems to me that any property (or
other entity) whatever can occur in some explanations in some theories, and
this might well mean that any property could play an explanatory role in
some correct theories (and Patterson gives us no way to distinguish serious
theories from frivolous theories) However, if fundamentalism is not correct,
as I have argued in Section 2.1.4 of this work it might not be for all we know,
then it might well be that no entity occurs essentially in any explanation in
any correct theory. Any entity that occurs in an explanation might then be
replaced by a more fundamental entity on which it supervenes. The notion
of an explanatory role would then threaten to be trivialized, as either any
entity would play an explanatory role or no entities would play such a role.
Furthermore, there may be several notions of explanation. For these reasons
Patterson's denition does not make the matter suciently clear.
Field does say that full-edged deationism must deny that truth has
an explanatory role, so an explanatory role seems to be a central role to
him. Nevertheless, the concept of truth might play a central or substantive
role in metaphysics without the notion of truth being explanatory; it might
be that even if they do not explain anything, truths and truth conditions
might still be something that would have to be explained and in this case
they would have epistemological and metaphysical implications.
Many deationists apparently accept a similar conception of correspon-
dence theory as Patterson's, and claim that their theory diers from corre-
spondence theory since according to it truth has a purely logical role, not
an explanatory one. Dorothy Grover apparently starts by supposing that an
inationary theory says that we need an analysis of the nature of truth, as
she says in [Gro92, pages 4] that this is a common assumption of correspon-
dence theories, pragmatic theories and coherence theories. She somehow
infers from this that an inationary theory implies that truth has an ex-
planatory role, as she argues at length in [Gro92, pages 7-10] that the early
Devitt is not correct in ascribing to truth an explanatory role and hence
54At the end of his article in [Pat03, page 439] Patterson indicates that he is thinking
primarily of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, so his notion of a substantivalist theory
is in the end close to that of the later Field, which I have already discussed in section 4.3.1.
Where the later Field opposes such a substantivalist theory, however, Patterson is in favour
of it, and Field thought that Tarski's theory could be developed to a substantivalist
theory in this sense by being combined with a causal theory of denotation and so was at
least compatible with such a theory while not amounting to such a theory by itself while
Patterson thinks it was incompatible with it.
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does not succeed in justifying a correspondence theory. It is not clear how
she connects the two characterizations of an inationary theory, for I cannot
see why we should not need an analysis of the nature of an epiphenomenal
property which has no explanatory role55. Moreover, Dorothy Grover then
goes on to remark (in [Gro92, page 189]) that logicians provide explanations.
If logicians provide explanations, then a logical role can be an explanatory
role, so this attempt to distinguish between correspondence theories and
deationary theories collapses into incoherence. One way to try to save this
attempt would of course be to say that logicians provide a dierent kind
of explanation than the one that correspondence theory claims the truth
predicate to gure in: for instance, it might be suggested that the expla-
nations in which the truth predicate gures are causal ones (as Field does
seem to claim) while the explanations logicians provide are not causal. The
problem with this suggestion is that it is not historically defensible; none of
the paradigmatic correspondence theories claimed that the truth predicate
would gure in causal explanations.
The problem with many arguments purporting to show that Tarski was
not a correspondence theorist is that the same forms of argument could, if
correct, be also used to prove that none of the paradigmatic correspondence
theorists such as Aristotle or Russell or Reinach were correspondence theo-
rists either. This is especially obvious when it comes to the arguments given
by Patterson. Patterson at least addresses explicitly the question of what a
correspondence theory of truth is, which many philosophers who treat the
question whether Tarski was a correspondence theorist leave implicit. How-
ever, Patterson does not examine the history of how the term has been used
in any detail and because of this his answer is not historically plausible.
While Patterson's denition of a substantivalist theory is slightly vague,
his denition of a correspondence theory is far worse. This latter denition is
far too strong. If the notion of substantivalism is removed from his denition
of a correspondence theory, we get what has been a standard account of a
correspondence theory (as can be seen by comparing it to the denitions I
have gone through). It seems to me that any theory of truth that treats the
property of truth as consisting in a relation between its bearer and something
55It might be that Grover thinks that there could not be epiphenomenal properties,
since she subscribes to some version of the Eleatic Principle according to which causal
ecacy is a criterion of existence. I will argue in Section 5.3 that we have no reason to
believe in such an Eleatic Principle.
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else (which need not always be a truth-bearer) can be quite naturally called
a correspondence theory of truth, even if it does not treat truth as a property
that could play any explanatory role in any serious theory and even if it does
not treat that relation in which truth consists as one that could play any
explanatory role either.
This corresponds to the traditional denitions of correspondence theory
that are found in the literature. As we have seen, neither Aristotle nor Rus-
sell stipulated that a correspondence theory would have to imply that truth
can play any explanatory role. If we look at Crivelli's thorough examination
of Aristotle's theory of truth, the notion of explanation does not once occur
in it. Nor does Russell take truth to be an explanatory concept56.
Explanation was not the reason why these philosophers were interested
in correspondence truth. Philosophers like Russell and Moore were chiey
interested in the correspondence theory of truth because it blocked the way
to anti-realism and rank subjectivism that such competing theories as the
coherence theory and the vericationist theory and the pragmatic theory
56Grover suggests in [Gro92, page 10] that Russell at least sometimes assumed that truth
has an explanatory role, just like Field, since in his view (and Plato's also) an account of
knowledge called for an account of the dierence between true and false belief. However,
Russell was clearly thinking that the concept of truth was needed in the conceptual analysis
of knowledge (as the overwhelming majority of philosophers have always thought and think
even today, at least if they think that a conceptual analysis of truth is possible at all).
However, this is entirely dierent from Field's idea that truth has a causal explanatory
role. After all, explanation and conceptual analysis are usually contrasted sharply, as we
will later see in this dissertation Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra does. As we have already
seen, logical positivists such as Ayer thought that all analyses, the analysis of knowledge of
course included, were tautologies. However, guring as part of a tautology hardly makes
truth a substantive concept! Even if we admit that all analyses are not tautologies and
that conceptual analysis counts as explanation in a wide sense, as conceptual explanation,
this is an entirely dierent kind of explanation from the kind of causal explanation Field
had in mind. Because of this Grover gives no reason to think that Russell's (or Plato's!)
theory of truth would be substantive in the same sense in which Field's theory was.
Indeed, it is even doubtful whether Russell could have thought that anything was to
be causally explained in the literal sense, since Russell famously denied the existence
of objective causal relationships in [Rus12a], though no doubt Russell could have given
some substitute for causal explanation. Grover does seem to use the word "explanation"
in a rather wide sense, since she says in [Gro92, x6.1, page 189] that logicians provides
explanations; however, if she uses the word this widely, then it becomes problematic what
reason she has to deny that truth would be explanatory in so weak a sense. However, Field
clearly uses the word in a stronger, narrower sense. However, if we take Russell's theory of
truth to be a paradigmatic correspondence theory (as my reading of the literature indicates
is usually done by those philosophers who bother to look at the history of philosophy to nd
out what a correspondence theory is supposed to be), this then implies rather conclusively
that a correspondence theory of truth need not be a substantive theory of truth.
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(which is closely allied to the vericationist one57) oered. This does not
imply that the correspondence theory would by itself ensure realism but
only that it blocks some of the most important kinds of argument in favour
of global anti-realism. We have already seen when discussing Devitt that
realism implies the absoluteness of truth and correspondence theory helps
to ensure this absoluteness. Versions of the coherence theory of truth (es-
pecially Neurath's linguistic version in [Neu34]) and the pragmatic theory
of truth are still around, and often even taken for granted, so opposition to
them is far from irrelevant.
Patterson addresses in [Pat03, page 425] the notion of a weak correspon-
dence theory58 formulated in [Wol] by Jan Wolenski (who attributes the
distinction between weak and strong correspondence to Kazimierz Twar-
dowski) according to which a theory is a correspondence theory if according
to it truth depends on extra-linguistic fact and argues that this is not a legiti-
mate notion of correspondence theory. Patterson argues that even deation-
ary theories are correspondence theories in this sense and that therefore this
is far too weak a notion to be of any interest if we wish to understand what
is at issue between contemporary deationists and their correspondence-
theoretic opponents. It is of course quite plausible that this notion does not
help us to understand that debate (though not all deationists would agree
that truth depends on extra-linguistic reality). However, the problem with
this argument is that it assumes without justication that the notion of a
correspondence theory should help us to understand what is at issue between
these two camps. However, it is possible that the notion of correspondence
belongs to an entirely dierent, older debate. Patterson is confusing, along
57In [Jam48, page 160] William James said;
True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and
verify.
58Patterson understands a strong correspondence theory so that it involves some gen-
eralized and noteworthy structural relationship between a sentence and the worldly state
of aairs it concerns. This seems to restrict strong correspondence theories to fact-based
correspondence theories, though Wolenski's original denition which Patterson quotes did
not speak about states of aairs but only more generally of extralinguistic entities and
so could count some object-based correspondence theories as a subspecies of strong corre-
spondence theory. Patterson seems then to either misunderstand Wolenski's denition or
alters it without giving any reason. In fact no plausible theory could hold that the kind of
correspondence used in the denition of truth would be a purely structural relationship,
though it might involve a structural component, since the notion of truth comprehends
the notion o material truth, not merely logical or formal truth.
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with many current philosophers, two very dierent debates. One of them
is an old but yet still ongoing debate between correspondence theorists, co-
herence theorists, pragmatists - and let us remember that that as we have
seen Tarski and other Polish logicians contrasted correspondence theory pre-
cisely with pragmatism - and other such camps. Weak correspondence does
help us to understand what is at issue between these camps. The other
is a newer, mostly unrelated debate between deationists and inationists.
As I have already indicated when discussing Field's development, the rst
of them is a relatively trivial debate about what truth is or how the truth
predicate functions, but the other is a far more profound and dicult debate
about the nature of more fundamental semantic notions like meaning and
reference.
Patterson argues in [Pat03, page 432] for the same conclusion that the
dependence of truth on extra-linguistic fact does not suce to make a theory
a correspondence theory also by considering a vericationist theory accord-
ing to which sentences are associated with sets of experiences and are true if
those experiences are had by someone. According to Patterson such a theory
would not be a correspondence theory because all correspondence theories
ought to endorse the principle that the things a sentence is about are among
the things to which it corresponds; however, he says that a vericationist
does not intend that all sentences are about experiences. I agree that a
correspondence theory ought to endorse that principle (though endorsing it
will not make it an explanatory theory)59. However, Patterson gives no ev-
idence for his claim that a vericationist does not intend that all sentences
are about experiences. As we have already seen in Section 3.3, historically
most or all of the earliest vericationists (including Ayer and Schlick) were
phenomenalists or neutral monists and did intend that all sentences would
be about experiences, or if they did not consciously intend this, their overall
theory in any case implied this. As we have seen, according to Ayer mate-
rial and mental objects were logical constructions from sense-contents and
it follows from this that sentences which apparently are about material or
mental objects are really about sense-contents. However, sense-contents are
59I agree that Tarski's theory is slightly defective as it does not follow this principle;
in the last section of this chapter of my dissertation (Section 4.4) I will suggest a small
modication to Tarski's theory that will remove this defect from it (without yet making
it explanatory). However, I would say that a theory that did not endorse it would still
count as a correspondence theory, only not a wholly satisfactory one.
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what constituted experience according to Ayer, so even sentences ostensibly
about material objects were according to Ayer all ultimately about expe-
rience. Later vericationists did indeed try to combine their theory with
physicalism but it can be argued that this was not a consistent or well-
considered combination60. Vericationism can probably be combined with
a correspondence theory, as. e. g. Moritz Schlick combined it (in [Sch79b]
and in [Sch34] - translated in [Sch59]) and as Carnap tried to do. Such a
vericationist correspondence theory would be a very unsatisfactory version
of correspondence theory (but it would still be a better theory of truth than
a coherence theory such as Otto Neurath's in [Neu34], since it would be less
subjective, as it would make truth independent of what we say or believe,
even though not of what sensations we have or can have).
However, a correspondence theory of truth can also have a more con-
structive interest even if does not treat truth as an explanatory concept, so
it is far from being so uninteresting as Patterson paints it. Even if meaning
cannot be explained in terms of truth-conditions, so that truth-conditions
cannot serve as an explanans, yet truth-conditions can serve as an analysan-
dum or an explanandum (even if only for a conceptual explanation, not a
causal one) and therefore our knowledge of truth-conditions provided by
a theory of truth can serve as evidence for a general theory of meaning,
since a theory of meaning must at the very least get the truth-conditions of
sentences right.
Patterson explicitly admits in [Pat03, 438] that his argument does imply
that Aristotle was not a correspondence theorist (in any interesting sense)
either; he does not note that the same argument probably applies to Rus-
sell and Moore and Wittgenstein etc. The earliest philosopher Patterson
mentions whom he admits to have been a correspondence theorist is J. L.
Austin (in an article reprinted in [Aus61], though originally published in
1950). Even worse, however, Patterson does not give any reason to think
that even Austin held truth to have any explanatory role, so even Austin's
theory need not count as a correspondence theory as Patterson has dened
60Patterson says that the idea of vericationism is to reconstruct being about cats from
association with catty experiences, not to identify the two. This certainly does not hold
of most vericationists. It holds to some extent of Field's strongly revised modern version
of vericationism (though Field uses in his reconstruction also such concepts as indication
relations, which a vericationist could not accept). However, I have already argued that
there are good reasons to doubt whether Field's attempt to reconstruct content from
verication conditions can work (even with the addition of indication relations).
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it61. In fact ordinary language philosophers like Austin generally held phi-
losophy as a whole to be descriptive (though only of our linguistic practice
rather than of the world as a whole or even of experience) rather than ex-
planatory, so it is unlikely that Austin would have thought his theory of
truth to be explanatory, though as far as I have found he does not explicitly
state his position on this matter. Really, if Patterson were right about what
correspondence theory is then Field would be the rst correspondence the-
orist in the history of philosophy! This is of course an absurd conclusion; it
is just as absurd as it would be to dene dualism so strictly that Descartes
was not a dualist (in any interesting sense) or redening materialism so that
Marx was not a materialist (in any interesting sense) or redening theism so
that Augustine was not a theist (in any interesting sense). Patterson is then
just arbitrarily redening the expression "correspondence theory of truth".
Patterson's argument is then in fact a reductio ad absurdum of the idea
61Patterson argues in [Pat03, pages 438,439] that Austin's theory is of a substantivalist
form because
we are told in a way independent of any assumptions about meaning under
what condition in general a statement is true, namely, that the token state
of aairs it is assigned by one set of linguistic conventions is of the type
assigned to the sentence used in making the statement by another set of
linguistic conventions.
However, none this implies that the property of truth would have any explanatory role
- if this account makes anything have an explanatory role, it is conventions (and they
would be explanatory only in a very weak sense of the word "explanatory"). Furthermore,
in talking about conventions we are implicitly making quite strong assumptions about
meaning, as it is conventions that give linguistic expressions their meaning. Saying that a
state of aairs (or any entity) is assigned to a statement (or any linguistic expression) by
linguistic conventions amounts to saying (as Austin himself stated plainly in a quotation
Patterson himself gives on page 438 of his article) that the linguistic expression refers
to (or denotes or means) it. Reference is, of course, what Field showed to be the basic
concept in Tarski's theory, so Austin made exactly as strong assumptions about meaning
as Tarski did. Of course Tarski took for granted that reference or denotation was based
on conventions. It is easy to reformulate Tarski's theory in Austin's terminology and this
should show very clearly that Tarski makes no stronger assumptions about meaning than
does Austin (but Tarski does not assume the existence of states of aairs as Austin does
and therefore makes weaker assumptions overall). We have just to express the base clause
of Tarski's recursive denition in Austin's words, as the rest follows from it. We can say
that an atomic statement is true in general if and only if the sequence of entities which
are assigned its arguments (i. e. its subject, object and indirect objects) by one set of
linguistic conventions belong to the type of sequences assigned to its predicate by another
set of linguistic conventions. You could try developing this into the germ of a reductive
account of truth if you combined it with some detailed theory of conventions (such as
David Lewis's theory). However, no such theories of convention are (at least not yet) of a
form acceptable to a physicalist (like Field), as all such accounts make use of mentalistic
notions (though they might suce the milder reductive ambitions of Horwich).
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that Tarski was not a correspondence theorist and of the whole currently
fashionable understanding of what correspondence theory is.
A more adequate view of the terrain is that there are both substantivalist
and non-substantivalist correspondence theories. The notion of a substanti-
valist theory can be interpreted in dierent ways, so the distinction between
substantivalist theories and non-substantivalist ones can also be understood
in dierent ways, but on most ways of interpreting the distinction it is or-
thogonal to the distinction between correspondence theories and theories of
truth which are not correspondence theories.
Patterson is at least partly right in one of his major claims, in denying
that instances of the T-schema (which he calls T-biconditionals) state cor-
respondences between the sentences they mention and something else. If we
use the word "state" in a strong sense, then it is correct that the instances
of the T-schema do not explicitly state any correspondences62. If some cor-
respondence theorists have stated that they would state correspondences,
then they have been imprecise, though not far from the truth.
However, contrary to Patterson, Tarski did not assert that they state
correspondences. In saying that the denition of truth is the logical product
of the instances of the schema he is more likely intending to say that the
theory of truth is implied, not explicitly stated, by such schemata. After all
in talking about a logical product we usually talk about something that is
derived by deductive inference from those sentences whose product it is.
Patterson, however, denies also that instances of the T-schema would
even imply such correspondences. It is indeed not immediately obvious that
they do, and it can be argued that Tarski's own eort to derive correspon-
dence from them does not wholly succeed. However, in order to derive
correspondence relations from the instances of the t-schema we need just
some kind of comprehension axiom schema of either higher order logic or
set theory63; I will show in the last section of this chapter in detail how this
can be done.
62Patterson argues that the T-biconditionals are not of the right form to state a relation
at all, since they are just biconditionals. Tarski was of course quite aware of this, and
this may be why he added the formal conditions of correctness to the requirements of an
adequate theory of truth.
63If the axiom needed is an axiom of set theory, then many would say that such an
implication is not a purely logical one. However, I have already argued that is is far from
obvious that set theory is not part of logic.
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Patterson constantly confuses two questions: whether Tarski's theory
is a correspondence theory of truth and whether it is a satisfactory corre-
spondence theory of truth. He also confuses the latter question with a third
question; whether Tarski gives a good argument for a correspondence theory
of truth. A theory of truth given by a philosopher could be a correct theory
of truth even if the philosopher could not justify that it was. All the common
denitions of a correspondence theory dene not just one theory but a big
family of theories; so there is not just one correspondence theory of truth,
but there is an immense (probably innite) number of possible correspon-
dence theories of truth, of which presumably at most one is correct while all
the others are false (with the caution that it may be hard to distinguish dif-
ferent theories from dierent formulations of the same theory, and therefore
apparently dierent theories may turn out to be equivalent and so can both
be correct). It is in fact highly unlikely that any philosopher will ever de-
velop a fully satisfactory theory of truth, whether a correspondence theory
or some other kind of theory; at most philosophers can hope to approach
it. Therefore Patterson's kind of fallacious argument would show that no
theory of truth is a correspondence theory (or even that no theory of truth
is a theory of truth at all). Patterson constantly gives arguments that could
at most prove that Tarski's theory is not a fully satisfactory correspondence
theory (though most of them do not prove even that) and thinks that they
prove that Tarski's theory is not a correspondence theory at all. Perhaps the
most egregious instance is in at the culmination of his argument in [Pat03,
page 434]. In this place he starts from the correct claim that Tarski's view
amounts to a kind of extensionalism about truth, since the property of truth
is identied as the property of being a member of a certain set. However,
he then argues that we have been given no argument that truth itself is
implicitly relational, unless we are given a nominalism about truth that few
correspondence theories will accept. However, Patterson was not arguing
just that Tarski did not give a satisfactory argument for correspondence
theory but that Tarski's theory was not even an unjustied correspondence
theory. Therefore even if Tarski had not given any argument for the claim
that truth is implicitly relational, the mere fact that he made the claim is a
reason to think that he was a correspondence theorist, even if a bad one.
However, I do not think that Patterson has shown even that Tarski
did not give a satisfactory argument for his correspondence theory. First
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of all it is arguable whether Tarski's extensionalism is really a nominal-
ism, since most nominalists will not admit the existence of even sets which
Tarski does64. However, this is a purely verbal question; more importantly,
it seems to me that the majority of correspondence theorists (and lots of
philosophers who are not correspondence theorists, including deationists
like Quine) both at Tarski's time and today do accept this kind of exten-
sionalism, though this may be a small majority. At least Patterson does
not provide any evidence that only few correspondence theorists would ac-
cept such an extensionalism. In any case since Tarski accepted such an
extensionalism (and it was probably even a part of his conditions of formal
correctness for truth) this provided him with a valid argument from the
T-biconditionals and extensionality to a correspondence relation, and it is
irrelevant that some correspondence theorists will not accept the premises
of this argument.
An intensionalist correspondence theorist will think that Tarski's theory
is not yet fully satisfactory but not that it is a bad correspondence theory,
much less that it would not be correspondence theory at all. Besides, even
many intensionalists about properties will usually claim that every property
has a set as its extension (as e. g. Carnap did as one of the rst). There
are many exceptions, like the early Goodman, but I doubt that they are a
majority. Therefore most intensionalists will agree that a complete theory
of truth, even if it treats truth as an intensional property (or at least as an
intensional predicate), will have to tell which is the extension of that prop-
erty (or predicate), and this will still require treating truth as a relational
property, if Tarski's argument is valid (and Patterson gives no reason for sup-
posing that it would not be). Therefore a very great number of philosophers,
whether extensionalists or intensionalists, should accept Tarski's argument
for the relational character of truth as valid.
It may be a relatively uninteresting verbal question what we should mean
with the expression "correspondence theory of truth"; while I have argued
that the way many philosophers like Patterson use the term today is highly
misleading and therefore inappropriate, it is not of course wrong in any ab-
solute way, since language is conventional and any term can be used any way
64There is evidence that the late Tarski denied the existence of sets in conversation.
However, this does not show that he would not have believed in them when formulating
his theory of truth. In any case, if he had denied the existence of sets as a metaphysical
thesis while yet making use of sets, this would only show that he was so far inconsistent.
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one pleases. However, it is interesting that the way the terminology is gen-
erally used and the debate conducted hides out of sight one very interesting
option in the theory of truth, the view that truth is a complex relational
property (or at least the truth term is a one-place relational predicate) but
truth has no explanatory, at least no causally explanatory role (i. e. is
epiphenomenal). I think that it is most appropriate to call such a theory
a non-substantivalist correspondence theory of truth, but since language is
conventional, it could of course also be called something else. What I am
arguing is that this kind of theory should be seriously considered; it seems
plausible to me, even though I am not willing to yet fully commit myself to
it.
This is basically because of doubts which I have already expressed about
what counts as an explanation and explanatory role. (There are even more
dicult questions about what counts as a causal explanation and as a
causally explanatory role, but I do not have space here to go into the causal
aspect of the question.) Though the notion of explanation is heavily used in
modern philosophy, detailed theories of what explanation is are rare yet ex-
hibit remarkable variety given their small number. The notion of truth can
of course be used in some low-level or proximate explanations; any notion
can be used in some explanations. If claiming that truth is an explanatory
notion is to help to erect a dividing line between (some kinds of) ination-
ism and deationism, it surely must imply something more, such as that
the property of truth occurs essentially in explanations. Whether it does so
occur is a dierent and harder question. Putnam and the early Field did
give a plausible (and very simple) argument for the claim that the notion of
truth has an explanatory role; the fact that a person has true beliefs surely
often helps to explain his success in his projects. However, both later came
to reconsider the correctness of this argument.
The late Field argues against this earlier theory of his own in his last
postscript to [Fie94] in [Fie01b, pages 153-156]. His argument seems to boil
to the inference that truth does not occur essentially in explanations, and
hence is not explanatory (though Field does seem to admit that truth can
occur in a second class explanation, so presumably it can be still said to
play a second class explanatory role). Field argues that explanations of a
person's ability are expressible (in principle) without talking of the truth
conditions of a person's representions, and infers from this that reference to
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truth conditions plays only a heuristic role. However, as I have argued, if
ontological fundamentalism is false, then it might be that no property or
particular occurs essentially in any explanations. In that case any explana-
tion could be replaced with a fuller explanation, so all explanations would
be second class explanations. Therefore this does not show that truth is any
less explanatory than any other entity. Furthermore even if fundamentalism
turned out to be true, any explanation making use of familiar middle-sized
is in principle expressible without talking of these entities and talking only
of their microscopic constituents. Therefore an argument of the very same
form as Field's argument could be used to show that no macroscopic entities
have an explanatory role but of entities known to us only such as quarks and
electrons and their properties could do so, and macroscopic entities would
play only a heuristic role and hence that any macroscopic properties and
particulars are epiphenomenal (or, as mereological nihilists claim, do not
exist at all). However, it seems absurd to claim that no macroscopic entities
play an explanatory role (or that any theory concerning them would be a
frivolous theory) and still more absurd that there would be no macroscopic
entities, though there have been philosophers, extreme scientic realists,
who have defended this conclusion.
Therefore if we are willing to admit that any familiar middle-sized entity
whatsoever plays an explanatory role, we should admit that truth also plays
an explanatory role and that our account of truth should be substantivalist
(at least on some ways of interpreting Pattersons's imprecise denition).
Nevertheless, that truth is explanatory need not be taken to be part of the
denition of correspondence theory, since a correspondence theorist surely
could consistently believe that all macroscopic entities are epiphenomenal.
Furthermore, that truth is in some way explanatory does not imply that the
explanatory role of truth would be the only or primary reason why we need
the concept of truth; I agree with the deationists so far that I think the
primary reason why we use a concept of truth is for expressive purposes.
4.3.5 Conservativeness and Deationism
Jerey Ketland suggests in [Ket99, page 79] that non-substantiality is con-
servativeness from which suggestion it of course follows that substantiality
is non-conservativeness. Ketland further distinguishes in [Ket99, page 71-
72] two kinds of conservativeness, semantical conservativeness and deductive
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conservativeness and claims that the non-substantiality of deationist theo-
ries of truths is deductive conservativeness.
Ketland's suggestion is interesting but there are some problems with
it. Intuitively substantiality is a general notion which should be applica-
ble to other theories than the theory of truth. However, there are serious
problems with extending Ketland's identication of substantiality with non-
conservativeness to other subjects. It seems intuitively that "substantiality"
is a monadic predicate. However, "conservativeness" is a dyadic one; as Ket-
land says, a metatheory is conservative over theories in the object language
or in other words a theory is a conservative extension of another theory.
Because of this conservativeness cannot serve as a general criterion of sub-
stantiality, even if it might do so in the special case of theories of truth.
However, the claim that it does so in the case of truth would require a
deeper motivation than Ketland gives.
A deeper worry lies in Ketland's appeal to deductive conservativeness.
After all, the concept of truth is a semantical one, so surely the distinc-
tion between two theories of truth should be semantical, not syntactic,
but the concept of deductive conservativeness is syntactic. Trying to de-
fend Ketland's view, Shapiro claims in [Sha98, page 499] that in order to
capture generalizations concerning truth the deationist must appeal to a
consequence relation that is higher order while the Tarskian can use a rst-
order consequence relation. However, Tarski's original theory of truth was
a higher-order theory, so Tarski had in any case to appeal to a higher-order
consequence relation! It must of course be admitted that later modications
of Tarski's theory have usually (though by no means always) been rst-order
theories. However, surely Tarksi's original theory should also count as a cor-
respondence theory. There is the danger in Shapiro's argument that it will
imply that Tarski's original theory was non-substantial i. e. deationary
and only later modications of it count as substantial, which was surely not
Shapiro's intended conclusion. Furthermore, the reason philosophers are of-
ten opposed to a higher-order consequence relation is that it is undecidable.
However, if as I argue correspondence theory is motivated by realism, then a
correspondence theorist should in any case be hospitable to undecidable no-
tions. After all, a realist should have no problem with undecidable relations
any more than with any other things which are not knowable completely or
easily; it is only anti-realists and extreme vericationists of Dummett's type
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who are hostile to undecidable notions.
Ketland tries to show that various deationary theories of truth are
deductively conservative over theories the truth of whose sentences they
concern while Tarski's theory is not. Ketland's proof may indeed show
that many deationalist theories (even if not necessarily all) are because
of their conservativeness weaker than Tarski's theory and are therefore at
least in one respect more deationary than it, i. e. that Tarski's theory is
in one respect more inationary than it. This ts well with my view that
Tarski's theory is only mildly inationary while theories called deationary
by their proponents are strongly deationary. However, I do not think that
Ketland's proof would show that we could establish a binary distinction
between deationary and inationary theories with the aid of the concept
of conservativeness.
Stewart Shapiro claims in [Sha98, pages 503-507] that non-conservativeness
also implies being explanatory (a claim that goes beyond what Ketland says
in [Ket99]). Shapiro admits in [Sha98, page 507], however, that there is
no consensus on the notion of explanation, and that the notion he requires
is one on which there is explanation in mathematics, while other accounts
require a causal relation between explanans and explanandum. He insists,
however, that on an intuitive level a Tarskian theory of truth is explanatory.
I would suggest, however, that have to do here not with competing accounts
of one notion, but with several basically dierent notions of explanation. In
one very weak sense of the word "explanation" mathematics does provide
explanations, but this is a very dierent sense of the word than the com-
monly used one in which theories in natural science provide explanations
(often but not always causal ones). Therefore while Shapiro's argument
shows that Tarski's theory is inationary to some degree, it would still allow
it to be less inationary than Field's original theory. My argument at the
end of Section 4.3.4 of this work shows that truth does play a role at least in
second class explanations of behaviour, so if correct it shows the notion of
truth to be more inationary than Shapiro's, but this is still less inationary
than the kind of theories philosophers like Patterson and Sher dream about.
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4.4 A New Formulation of Correspondence The-
ory: Non-dyadic Correspondence Relations
Kunne's characterization of object-based correspondence theories of truth
has one serious limitation. Kunne supposes that the implied relation has
to be a two-place relation, whether a relation between sentences and states
of aairs as in fact-based correspondence theories or a relation between the
referent of the subject and the predicate as in object-based correspondence
theories. However, Kunne's own denition (or Russell's formulation) does
not imply this. The notion of correspondence is often outside the theory
of truth (e. g. when discussing intertheory relations between theoretical
terms) used in logic and philosophy for relations which are not dyadic, so
there is no reason why it would have to stand for dyadic relations in theory
of truth either. It seems to me that in order to satisfy this denition and the
realistic intuitions behind correspondence theory that it expresses, all that
is necessary is that the implied relation is a polyadic relation and the rst
member of the implied relation must be a truth-bearer but the remaining
members of the relation, no matter how many of them there are, need not
be truth-bearers.
Even more, there need not be a single correspondence relation, but there
can be dierent correspondence relations for dierent sentences. A corre-
spondence theory says that a truthbearer is true if and only if it corresponds
to reality, i. e. if and only if for every true truthbearer, there is a corre-
spondence relation (an abundant, not a sparse relation) between it and a
reality. There is no reason why this relation would have to be the same
in the case of all sentences or all judgements or all propositions. There
is, however, a reason why this relation cannot be the same; supposing a
single correspondence relation leads swiftly to paradoxes. Of course, these
relations must have something in common since they all are relations on
which truth depends and presumably the truth of dierent truthbearers is
somehow similar65.
In fact Russell in his theory considered the possibility that we might
65It might be possible to make do with one single correspondence relation if it were
taken to be an anadic relation, as in the anadic logic developed in [Gra76]; however, I
will not investigate this possibility at further length but will develop my new version of
correspondence theory in a predicate logic closer to standard predicate logic.
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avoid having to postulate objective propositions66 as correlates of belief (as
he himself had done earlier) by supposing that belief was a more than two-
place relation. According to him, when Othello believes that Desdemona
loves Cassio, then there is a relation of four terms whose members are Oth-
ello, Desdemona, Cassio and loving. However, Russell still thought that in
the case of a true belief the objects of the belief formed a complex that was
a fact, e. g. in the case of the previous example, Desdemona's love for Cas-
sio. However, Russell's train of thought can be followed further by taking
also the relation implied by the relational property of truth to be a more
than two-place relation, similar to the relation of belief in Russell's theory
(though it obviously cannot be the same relation, for innumerable reasons,
perhaps the most important of which is that there are false beliefs and in
order to be false they cannot correspond to anything in the same way in
which true beliefs do), and so it can lead us to consider eliminating facts
just as easily as propositions. Therefore when the sentence or belief "Des-
demona loves Cassio" is true, then a four-place relation holds between the
sentence or belief, Desdemona, Cassio and loving, the relation that holds be-
tween four objects when the rst of them is a truthbearer consisting of three
terms denoting the three remaining objects and the fourth of the objects is
a relation which holds between the second and third object. In symbols, if
we take C(x1; x2; : : : xn) to mean that x1 is the concatenation of x2; : : : ; xn
and D(x; y) to mean that x denotes y (i. e. that y is assigned to x by some
linguistic conventions, to use Austin's and Pattersons' terminology), then
the relation is (x)(y)(z)(R)((9u)(9v)(9w)(C(x; u; v; w) ^ D(u; y) ^
D(v; z) ^D(w;R) ^ R(y; z)).
This would be easy to generalize to all sentences if it were not for the
paradoxes; in a naive theory of truth where we make no careful distinc-
tion between a language and its metalanguage we would just say that if 
is a sentence with n constant terms (that do not occur in an intensional
context) t1; : : : ; tn and C is such a relation that for all terms x; x1; : : : ; xn
C(x; x1; : : : ; xn) i x = (x1=t1; : : : ; xn=tn) where (x1=t1; : : : ; xn=tn) is the
66Russell still used the word "proposition" in this writing, but this is very misleading
since he only means declarative sentences with the word, reverting to pretty much the
medieval terminology after he had been one of the philosophers who trained analytical
philosophers of his time to use the word in a very dierent way. What he denies are ob-
jective falsehoods such as "that Desdemona loves Cassio" in the case in which Desdemona
does not love Cassio. Clearly these objective falsehoods are what are usually called false
propositions.
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formula which we get when we replace all the constant terms (which oc-
cur in an extensional context) with variables then the implied relation is
(x)(y1)    (yn)(x =  ^ D(t1; y1) ^    D(tn; yn) ^ (y1; : : : ; yn)). In
order to take account of the semantical paradoxes we must make our theory
more complex; if  is a sentence with n constant terms (occurring in an
extensional context within it) t1; : : : ; tn and M(1; : : : ; n) is the transla-
tion into the metalanguage of the formula (x1=t1; : : : ; xn=tn) which we get
when we replace all the constant terms with variables the implied relation
is ()(1) : : : (n)((91) : : : (9n)(C(; 1; : : : ; n) ^    ^ D(1; 1) ^
D(n; n) ^ M(1; : : : ; n)).
There is also the far more serious problem that this account might lead
to set-theoretical (or rather property-theoretical) paradoxes; if  is Q(Q) or
Q((x)(Q(x))) or ti 2 ti, then the correspondence relation so dened can-
not exist on pain of contradiction, at least in a two-valued logic. However,
we can easily restrict these relations further in some way so that paradoxes
cannot arise. There are many ways to do this; as a very simple but rather
extreme solution, we can dene a separate correspondence relation for ev-
ery sentence (where the earlier theory only dened dierent correspondence
relations for sentences of dierent logical forms). The correspondence re-
lation for many sentences, specially unquantied positive sentences, will
then in such a theory be a relation that is instantiated by a single se-
quence if the sentence in question is true and by no sequence (i .e. will
have the empty set as its extension in a normal set theory) if the sentence
is false. If  is a sentence with n constant terms (which occur in it in
an extensional context) t1; : : : ; tn and M(1; : : : ; n) is the translation into
the metalanguage of the formula (x1=t1; : : : ; xn=tn) which we get when we
replace all the constant terms with variables then the implied relation is
()(1)    (n)( =  ^ D(1; 1) ^   D(n; n) ^ M(1; : : : ; n)).
If it can be understood as an extensional relation then it is the same as the
class fh; 1; : : : ni :  =  ^ D(1; 1) ^   D(n; n) ^ M(1; : : : ; n)g;
even if understood as an intensional relation, however, it has this class as
its extension. Though this kind of theory will give every sentence its own
correspondence relation (which may or may not hold), it is yet a general
theory, since it gives a general rule by which all of these correspondence
relations can be constructed for every sentence.
In fact this formulation makes use of unnecessarily many primitives and
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indeed sounds yet too deationary, since while it makes use of the notion
of denotation it also uses the interlinguistic notion of translation as a prim-
itive. The notion of denotation must according to realist theories be prior
to the notion of translation, as denotation is a relation between linguistic
expressions and the rest of the world while translation is a relation between
linguistic expressions, and a realistic theory takes relations between language
and the world to be prior to any semantical relations between linguistic ex-
pressions. Therefore it not yet a denition of truth but only a material
condition of adequacy for a denition of truth like the T-schema (though
closer to a true denition) and it must be replaced with a recursive deni-
tion of correspondence relations analogous to Tarski's recursive denition of
truth itself.
I will begin with dening correspondence relations for an extensional
language, because I can then follow the Tarskian example rather closely. I
will suppose for the sake of simplicity that all primitive singular constants
in the language that are of a kind that could denote actually denote some-
thing. This will have to supplemented later with a denition for intensional
languages, in which the non-linguistic members of the correspondence rela-
tions are at least in some cases intensions or characters or other semantic
values rather than extensions of the constants of the language. We might
eventually have to assume that some sentences such as those containing non-
denoting singular constants are neither true nor false, and in this case they
would not have any correspondence relations associated with them.
I will then give the following recursive denitions of correspondence re-
lations and of truth itself. I will use Corr(; g) as the symbolization for the
correspondence relation for sentence  with respect to assignment g.
Denition 1 A sentence  with is true if and only if there are such entities
;1 ; : : : ; n (for some number n) that for all assignments g Corr(; g)(1; : : : ; n).
The denition of correspondence relations must naturally begin from
atomic sentences.
Denition 2 If  is identical with a sentence R(t1; : : : ; tn) and there is such
an entity  that kRk = , then Corr(; g), the correspondence relation rela-
tive to assignment g for it is the n-place relation ()(1)    (n)()( =
 ^ kt1kg = 1 ^    ^ ktnkg = n ^  = kRkg ^ h1; : : : ; ni 2 )
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which has as its extension the class fh; 1; : : : ; n; i :  =  ^ kt1kg =
1 ^    ^ ktnkg = n ^  = kRkg ^ h1; : : : ; ni 2 )g.
Accounting for the truth of negative sentences has usually been very
dicult for correspondence theories, especially fact-based ones and most
especially truth-maker theories. Especially negations of existentially quan-
tied sentences - of the form :(9x) - are problematic. One of the most
intense debates between truth-maker theorists has been whether negative
facts are needed as truth-makers for negative sentences. Even an object-
based correspondence theory, though free of this problem, would run into
troubles with the case of negative sentences if it was based on the assump-
tion that the terms which correspond were singular terms and the members
of the correspondence relation on the mundane side would have to be par-
ticulars, since in this case the correspondence relation would in the case of
negations of existentially quantied sentences collapse to a property of the
truth-bearer. However, even a negation of an existentially quantied sen-
tence always contains some predicate terms to which abundant properties
will correspond; e. g. :(9x)P (x)) contains P , :(9x)(P (x)^Q(x)) contains
P and Q etc. There might also be a problem if the correspondence rela-
tions (or the relations that might be their members) were taken to be sparse
properties, for the correspondence relations for negative sentences would be
negative relations; the correspondence relation for a negative sentence would
be a relation which would hold between the sentence and the entities which
the terms occurring in the sentence denote if they did not satisfy a condi-
tion, namely the condition expressed by the sentence whose negation the
negative sentence in question is. However, negations of sparse relations are
according to most theories of sparse properties not sparse relations. How-
ever, if abundant relations are taken as correspondence relations there is no
problem since negative relations are quire legitimate abundant relations.
Denition 3 If  is identical with a sentence :p and the correspondence
relation for p relative to assignment g is an (n + 1)-place relation R then
the correspondence relation for  relative to g is the n + 1-place relation
()(1)   n)( =  ^ :(R(; 1; : : : ; n)) which has as its extension
the class (fh; 1; : : : ; ni :  =  ^ : h; 1; : : : ; ni 2 Rg.
Denition 4 If  is identical with a sentence p^ q and the correspondence
relation for p relative to assignment g is the (n + 1)-place relation R1 and
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the correspondence relation for q relative to assignment g is the (m+1)-
place relation R2 then the correspondence relation for  relative to g is
the (n + m + 1)-place relation ()(1)    (n)(1) : : : (m)( =  ^
R1(p; 1; : : : ; n) ^ R2(q; 1; : : : ; n)) which has as its extension the class
fh; 1; : : : ; n; 1; : : : mi :  =  ^R1(p; 1; : : : ; n) ^ R2(q; 1; : : : ; n)g.
Denition 5 If  is identical with a sentence p_ q and the correspondence
relation for p relative to assignment g is the (n+1)-place relation R1 and the
correspondence relation for q relative to g is the (m + 1)-place relation R2
then the correspondence relation for  relative to g is the (n+m+ 1)-place
relation ()(1)    (n)(1)    (m)( =  ^ (R1(p; 1; : : : ; n) _
R1(q; 1; : : : ; m))) which has as its extension the class fh; 1; : : : ; n; 1; : : : ; mi :
 =  ^ (R1(p; 1; : : : ; n) _ R1(q; 1; : : : ; m))g.
Some might see it as a defect of this denition that it allows arbitrary
entities to appear as members of the correspondence relations. We could
avert this by instead using the following denition: If  is identical with a
sentence p_ q and the correspondence relation for p relative to assignment g
is the (n+1)-place relation R1 and the correspondence relation for q relative
to g is the (m + 1)-place relation and r = max(n + 1;m + 1), then R2
then the correspondence relation for  relative to g is the r-place relation
()(1)    (n)( =  ^ (R1(p; 1; : : : ; n) _ R1(q; 1; : : : ; m))).
Denition 6 If  is identical with a sentence (9x) then the correspon-
dence relation for  relative to assignment g is ()(1)   n)( =
 ^ (9)(Corr( ; g(=x))(; 1; : : : ; n))) which has as its extension the
class (fh; 1; : : : ; ni :  =  ^ (9)(h; 1; : : : ; ni 2 Corr( ; g(=x)))g.
This is obviously not yet a wholly rigorous development of such an object-
based correspondence theory, though it already comes close. It would be
rather complicated to develop this kind of account fully rigorously, but it
could be done. It may be not obvious that it is worth doing, since it would
just mean developing a more convoluted notational variant of Tarski's the-
ory. The theory I have presented is of course equivalent with Tarski's theory
given some very weak set-theoretical assumptions; however, this does not im-
ply that it does not add anything to Tarski's theory (after all, it has been
argued - though the validity of the arguments is controversial - that some
deationary theories are also equivalent with Tarski's, yet they have been
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held to have dierent philosophical implications). Such a notational vari-
ant can be philosophically illuminating, since it would show explicitly and
in detail how Tarski's theory is a version of the correspondence theory in
the sense of Russell's denition even though it does not postulate facts or
truthmakers in the standard sense.
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Chapter 5
A Theory of Ontological
Commitment
5.1 Introduction
So far I have argued that neither verication conditions nor truthmakers are
central to the ontological analysis of scientic and other theories. While the
arguments by which I have tried to show this are not fully conclusive, I think
that they have at least motivated a tentative search for some alternative to
both. This has been the negative part of my thesis, and now I can proceed to
a more positive part it, which many readers may nd more interesting. I will
argue that ontological commitment is the central metaontological concept,
and try to develop a fully rigorous theory of it. However, there yet remain
some negative arguments, as I must try to overthrow views of ontological
commitment I nd to be false.
This chapter deals with the metaontological question of what ontological
commitment is. The question of ontological commitment is what we assume
to exist, i. e. are ontologically committed to, in our discourse. Obviously if
we cannot answer this question, we may then both implicitly suppose that
there are some entities and implicitly deny this without being able to notice
the inconsistency. In such a case we are unable to nd out what evidence
our theories outside ontology provide for ontological theories. Therefore this
is one of the most important metaontological questions, one which must be
answered before any substantive ontological questions can be addressed in
any very rigorous way. The fact that ontologists today often disagree greatly
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over what ontological commitment is shows that at least many of them do
not really know clearly what they are doing. Ontologists rely on their intu-
itions about what ontological commitment is, and the intuitions of dierent
ontologists do not agree even to the very limited extent that the intuitions
of philosophers in other elds of philosophy agree. This may be one of the
reasons which explain the relative lack of progress in ontology. Because of
this it is of the utmost importance for the future progress of ontology to de-
velop a systematic and rigorous theory of ontological commitment, a theory
that does not depend on any direct ontological intuitions. Naturally such a
theory will have to depend on intuitions at some point, to gain some sort of
starting point, but I will argue that these need not be directly ontological
intuitions, but can be logical and mathematical and linguistic, specically
semantical intuitions. Since logic and mathematics and linguistics have (in
the opinion of most philosophers) made far more progress than ontology,
this should be a key to progress in ontology also, if it is possible.
I attempt to construct such a systematic theory in this chapter of this
dissertation by retrieving forgotten ideas of Alonzo Church and combining
them with the basic ideas of Tarski's theory of truth. The resulting theory
of ontological commitment will be just as rigorous as Tarski's theory of truth
and its modern day descendants, such as the model-theoretic conception of
truth. As a price of the rigorousness it will naturally be rather trivial, just
as Tarski's theory has been accused of being. Of course, in spite of its rigour
it will still not be fully certain, since even Tarski's theory is not that; as I
will show, nearly all of the objections that have been commonly brought
against Tarski's theory would also, if there were anything to them, apply to
the theory presented in this dissertation. Therefore those who reject Tarski's
theory of truth (as not only trivial, but as wrong) will naturally, if they are
consistent, also reject the metaontological theory of this dissertation and
therefore also its substantive ontological consequences. However, it will be
rather hard for those who wholly accept Tarski's theory of truth to reject
the theory presented in this dissertation.
267
5.2 Historical Background: Earlier Candidates of
the Criterion of Ontological Commitment
5.2.1 Logical Positivism and Reality and Existence
The most famous answer to the question of the criterion of ontological com-
mitment was that of Quine, who famously proposed in [Qui53d, page 12])
that we are committed to what we quantify over with bound variables.
In order to see the importance of Quine's criterion properly we must
contrast it with earlier answers given by analytical philosophers during the
dominance of logical positivism to the problem. For instance, the logical
positivist Schlick tried to dene actuality, reality or existence (all three of
which concepts he apparently presupposed to be the same)1. Schlick tried to
answer this question on the basis of vericationism, and analysed existence
on the basis of the notion of regularities or law-governed connections; he
came to the following conclusion in [Sch32b, page 18] (translated in [Sch49b,
page 97]):
When we say of any event or object - which must be des-
ignated by a description - that it is real this means that there
exists a very denite connection between perceptions or other
experiences, that under certain conditions certain data appear.
This analysis permitted Schlick to say that logical positivism in its phe-
nomenalist or neutral realist form does not deny the existence of the external
world. It even led Schlick to conclude in [Sch32b, page 20] (translated into
English in [Sch49b, page 98]) that the statement "My contents of conscious-
1It is plausible that these words "actual", "real" and "existing" are synonymous on at
least one reading of them. However, it is not clear that this is the case with all readings
of them, and it may be that in some sense of the words actuality and reality are more
than just being a value of the bound variable. The German word Schlick and Carnap
used, which is translated as "real", is "wirklich", and it has arguably somewhat dierent
connotations than the English word "real". As German philosophers quite often are
pleased to remark, the adjective "wirklich" is obviously derived etymologically from the
verb "wirken", to act; however, the English word "real" has no similar obvious etymological
connections. Schlick argued in [Sch18, x23, page 164] that only temporal things are real.
Even many German philosophers whose total viewpoint is very dierent from Schlick's
such as phenomenologists, would agree with this. It seems likely that the word "wirklich"
has a sense in which it only applies to temporal entities; however, it is not clear that the
same holds of "real" and it is at least not plausible that all of the three English words
would apply only to temporal entities in all of their senses. In the Section 5.5 I will deal
further with questions of this kind when treating of existential multivocalism.
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ness exist." is meaningless2, even though the contents of conciousness are
what ultimately veries all statements in his theory. Schlick tried to appeal
to Russell's symbolism in [Sch32b, page 20] (translated in [Sch49b, page 98])
in arguing for this view. He claimed that since in Russell's symbolism an ex-
istential proposition has the form (9x)fx, the combination of words "There
is an a.", where "a" is a proper name of an object directly present and there-
fore means the same as "this", cannot be written in Russell's symbolism,
and hence is meaningless according to symbolic logic.
However, Schlick's theory of existence is not compatible with his claim
of the form of existential propositions, for a claim about connections and
regularities would have to be formalized in Russell's symbolism with the aid
of universal quantiers and implications and conjunctions, not with the aid
of just an existential quantier and a description. I.e. it would be of the
form (8x1) : : : (8xn)(fx ! gx) (or a conjunction or a disjunction of such
formulas), not of the form (9x)fx. This incompatibility is interesting, for it
is a case where the two traditions which served as sources of inspiration for
logical positivism, classical positivism and modern logic, come into conict,
suggesting a deeper incompatibility between them.
Schlick followed Russell faithfully in his view about the meaninglessness
of claims of the form "There is an a." However, this view does not neces-
sarily follow from the use of Russell's symbolism, though Russell himself
held it (very uncharacteristically genuinely anticipating logical positivism in
this one detail). Such a combination of words where "a" is a proper name
can be written (whether a is directly present or not) in the symbolism of
predicate logic as (9x)(x = a). It is indeed taken in such a symbolization
to have a more complex logical form than the syntax of natural languages
would suggest, as natural languages do not suggest that such a sentence has
anything to do with identity, but not to be meaningless3.
2Schlick had earlier, as seen in [Sch18, x22, page 157] (translated in [Sch74, page 179]),
held a more sensible view, saying that the supposition put forward by the naive view, that
the directly given counts as real, must be adopted. The reason Schlick gives for this, that
here is the source of the concept of reality as such, is also one that one would expect to
be very compelling to a positivist. Yet strangely later logical positivists such as Schlick
himself and Carnap held that reality could not be attributed to basic entities; perhaps
this is the inuence of structuralism derived from Neo-Kantians.
3There is indeed one qualication to be made. This formalization of existential state-
ments in which proper names occur is inadequate in one signicant way. If we use standard
predicate logic (which Russell helped to create) then all such statements are logically true.
This is quite outrageous, since it cannot be a logical truth that a particular (such as many
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Carnap treated the concept of reality somewhat similarly in [Car67, x170-
178], except that he held it to be ambiguous and therefore his theory was far
more complex than Schlick's. Carnap thought because of his vericationism
that since dierent existential statements could be justied in dierent ways,
they had dierent meanings because of this. Carnap said that he calls the
only concept of reality which occurs in the empirical sciences the empirical
concept of reality. According to him it is this concept which distinguishes a
geographically determined mountain from a legendary or a dreamed moun-
tain. Carnap dened empirical reality dierently for physical objects, psy-
chological objects and cultural objects. For example, physical bodies (such
as the aforementioned mountains) are according to him called real if they
are constructed as classes of physical points which are located on connected
bundles of world-lines and are placed within the all-comprehending four-
dimensional system of the space-time of physics. The empirical concept of
reality is according to Carnap dierent from the metaphysical concept of
reality, which is (see [Car67, x176, page 282]) independence from the cog-
nizing consciousness. This concept does not according to him belong within
science and is in fact meaningless4. Carnap also said (see [Car67, x64, page
101]) that the dierentiation between real and nonreal objects does not
stand at the beginning of the constructional system, which means that it
cannot be applied to basic elements. We must draw especial attention to
one weird feature of Carnap's theory; it allows that physical things can be
constructed as classes of physical points which are not placed within the
proper names and individual constants denote) exists. This defect in standard predicate
logic helped to foster the positivists' view that the existence of an individual cannot be
stated but only shown, which in turn supported their irrationally mystical view that lots
of important things cannot be stated but only shown. As I will argue later in more detail,
in order to remove this problem we have to move from standard predicate logic to some
free predicate logic.
4While the theory called realism maintains that independence from consciousness of
whatever it is realistic about, it is doubtful if the bare word "real" yet signies such
independence. In any case, however, Carnap's argument for the meaninglessness of the
metaphysical concept of reality is bad indeed. Carnap claims (see [Car67, x176, page
283]) that this concept cannot be constructed in an experiential constructional system,
and infers that this characterizes it as a nonrational, metaphysical concept. If the concept
could not be constructed in Carnap's constructional system, this might just as well show
the limitations of Carnap's constructional system. However, while the concept may not
be constructible, it can be at least partially characterized in the theory of construction. If
some entities are logical constructions out of some other entities, this surely makes them
dependent on those entities. Therefore Carnap's theory does imply that physical objects
are dependent on consciousness, since he claims that they can be constructed from the
autopsychological.
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all-comprehending four-dimensional system of the space-time of physics and
such physical things are therefore unreal. In other words, Carnap agreed
with Meinong that there are unreal objects5.
The word "real" is surely at least on one reading synonymous with the
word "existing" (as Carnap's fellow logical empiricist Schlick testies), so
Quine would have said that real objects are those which are values of bound
variables, and the concept of reality which occurs both in the empirical
sciences and in ontology is the concept of being the value of a bound variable
(or to express it in less semantic terms, the concept of being something). The
dierence of this theory from Carnap's theory is clearly enormous. Quine
would have said that what distinguishes a real mountain from a legendary or
dreamed mountain is that a legendary mountain does not occur as a value
of bound variable while a real mountain can. Let us for example introduce
"t" as an individual constant symbolizing Mount Taniquetil (a mountain in
Tolkien's mythology) and "b" as a constant symbolizing Mont Blanc. Then
the sentence (9x)(x = t) would according to Quine be false, as there is no
such entity  that for any assignment g ktkg = . However, the sentence
of the same form, (9x)(x = b), is true, as there is an such entity , namely
Mont Blanc itself, that  = kbkg. This makes the dierence between real
and legendary or dreamed mountains clear. This concept of reality can be
applied to the basic elements of a system, and indeed with the best right.
Also it excludes the possibility of there being nonreal objects of any kind,
even nonreal physical objects6.
5While Carnap probably rejected many of the details of this specic theory later, Car-
nap still held later that the word "real" had dierent meanings when applied to dierent
kinds of objects. E. g. in [Car56, pages 44,45] he still claimed that when we spoke about
the reality of events we used the word "real" in a dierent sense than when speaking
about the reality of e. g. electrons in general. Carnap still wanted to use such a dubious
distinction to avoid traditional ontological questions. Even Carnap's later distinction be-
tween internal and external questions in [Car50], which I will discuss in a later subsection
of this work, was viewed by him as a descendent of these distinctions between dierent
senses of the word "reality", for while it does not ascribe lexical ambiguity to the word
"real" or "exist", it still claims that there are two signicantly dierent kinds of assertions
concerning reality. So this kind of distinction between dierent kinds of reality assertions
goes though all stages of Carnap's philosophy, so in attacking it Quine was dealing a blow
to an essential part of Carnap's type of thinking.
6There is in Carnap's theory of nonreal objects a core that is possibly defensible, if
it is separated from Carnap's theory of reality. If a neutral monist constructs physical
things from sense-data or identies them with complexes of sense-data, then there may
be constructions or complexes which are similar to physical objects but are not physical
things. Carnap calls such constructions nonreal physical things, but it is better to say that
they would be real but not physical; they might be called perceptual things or something
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Quine's theory is clearly far simpler than Carnap's; one might fear that
it is too simple, and as I will later show, there are qualications that need
to be made, but it still remains simpler than Carnap's. On the other hand,
Carnap's theory brings in all kinds of considerations that are irrelevant to
the question of reality, though they are important ontological considerations
in their own right. Carnap may give us something that is coextensive with
reality, but does not tell us what reality itself as such is. It may be true that
physical points belonging to Mont Blanc are located on connected bundles
of world-lines and are placed within the all-comprehending four-dimensional
system of the space-time of physics. However, this does not follow from its
being real.
We have seen in 3.3 that there are very strong (even if not wholly con-
clusive) reasons to think that vericationism is false, and this gives us a
reason to reject Schlick's and Carnap's analyses of reality and existence as
well as the causal analysis of reality and existence. As vericationism forced
him to do, Schlick confused the question of how we can justify the claim
that something exists or is real, and the question of what that claim means.
Quine's criterion of ontological commitment avoids this confusion (though I
have argued that Quine falls into the very same kind of confusion elsewhere
in his philosophy, in his arguments against the distinction between analytic
and synthetic judgements). Quine's theory, unlike Schlick's, is really based
on the philosophical application of modern symbolic logic and Russell's sym-
bolism (and can indeed be viewed as being little more than a return to the
view of existence common in analytical philosophy before the rise of logical
such. Of course, this theory is false if physical things are not constructions out of sense-
data - to say nothing of what is the case if there are no sense-data at all - but it is
compatible with Quine's theory of reality.
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positivism7, with some clarications and simplications8).
5.2.2 Bergmann's Theory of Ontological Commitment
There is yet one theory of ontological commitment that is inuenced by log-
ical positivism, though it is already partly liberated from logical positivism,
namely Gustav Bergmann's theory. Bergmann said in [Ber54, page 135] of
classical ontologists:
When these philosophers asked themselves what existed, they
really asked for the entities that were named by their undened
descriptive terms.
Bergmann calls descriptive terms what are currently more commonly called
non-logical constants (of an articial language, not any natural language).
Expressed in the terminology I have been using, this implies that according
to Bergmann, a theory carries ontological commitment to entities which are
denoted by the primitive non-logical constants of the language the theory is
7Quine's view is similar to the view of the common concept of reality G. E. Moore
expressed in [Moo22a, page 211] when he said that to say "Unicorns are unreal." means the
same as "There are no unicorns." or "Unicorns do not exist. Moore then almost explicitly
denied Carnap's later assumption that there are unreal objects. Moore's view is already
incompatible with the view of such current opponents of Quine's theory of ontological
commitment as Jody Azzouni, who denies in [Azz04] that "there is" expresses existence.
This is rather ironical, since both Moore and Azzouni claim to be defenders of common
sense. Criticizing Bradley's idealistic theory, Moore did suggest that Bradley might have
used the word "real" in a special sense. This would t with Carnap's distinction between
empirical and metaphysical concepts of reality (though you could not really infer from
Bradley using the word "real" in a peculiar sense that all or most metaphysicians would
have used it in a peculiar sense, as Carnap claimed). However, Moore ultimately concluded
that such an interpretation would not solve the many problems in interpreting Bradley's
obscure theory. A dierence between Moore and Quine is of course that Moore did not
connect his theory of existence with the quantiers and variables of articial languages,
since he was not an articial language philosopher as Quine was. Later in [Moo53], Moore
had a view which is similar, but not quite as close to Quine's later one. Moore accepted
in that book a weak version of existential multivocalism, saying in [Moo53, chapter XVII]
that some things (namely fact and universals) probably are without existing.
8Among such simplications are the following: there is no evidence that Quine would
have accepted Frege's and Russell's idea of existence as a higher-order property , though
such a conception has sometimes been ascribed to him (e. g. apparently by William F.
Vallicella in [Val03]). Quine seems rather to consider the quantiers of predcicate logic
(and hence such natural language expressions as "existence") themselves as a syncategore-
matic expression. Nevertheless, Quine's theory could rather easily be modied so that it
would take existence as a higher-order property, so Vallicella is right so far that Quine's
theory has similarities to the higher order theory of existence. Another simplication is
that Quine does not accept Russell's distinction between existence and subsistence (or
Moore's similar distinction between being and existence).
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formulated in. These undened descriptive terms could be either individual
terms or predicate terms.
One very weird thing about this theory is that according to it the onto-
logical commitments of a theory depend only on the language of the theory,
not at all on what statements are contained in that theory. This is surely
already a reason to be suspicious of Bergmann's theory. There are other
reasons. The theory presupposes strong fundamentalism, since it implies
that only simple entities exist in the ontological sense. I have already ar-
gued that we have no good reasons to believe in strong fundamentalism, so
that would already be a reason to reject Bergmann's theory. However, it
seems that Bergmann's theory also presupposes vericationism, so that it
is unacceptable also to a fundamentalist who is not a vericationist. Prim-
itive descriptive terms are just the terms associated with entities we are
acquainted with (unless they are non-denoting i. e. empty); they are ob-
servational terms in the language of later logical positivism. Bergmann's
theory then implies that ontology can only contain entities we can observe.
Bergmann's theory implicitly denies the possibility of knowledge by descrip-
tion. Bergmann did not see that even a simple entity may be denoted by a
complex description, if the description picks it out by means of its relational
properties instead of its internal constituents.
Summing up our results, we can safely say that Quine's theory of ex-
istence or being or reality, then, is clearly an improvement over such posi-
tivistic theories as Schlick's, Carnap's and Bergmann's, and even the Eleatic
Principle so far as it competes with it. However, this does not yet show that
it would be wholly correct. Was Quine right or wrong? Unfortunately, the
question has no simple answer. Quine formulated his criterion in dierent
ways in in dierent places. Quine apparently thought that all these formu-
lations were equivalent; however, this can be doubted and I will show that
all of them are not equivalent. Thus even if some of them are correct all of
them cannot be. Trying to reconcile all of Quine's often slapdash utterances
into one systematic theory in the spirit of authoritarian respect, in the way
scholastic philosophers treated Aristotle's texts, would not be a promising
way to set about constructing a theory of ontological commitment. Any vi-
able interpretation of Quine's theory must be mixed with a healthy amount
of criticism. Besides this most of Quine's formulations are not wholly free
of obscurity. Therefore it is possible that most of his formulations will be
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correct under one legitimate reading but incorrect under another. I will
argue that this is in fact the case.
5.3 The Eleatic Principle
There have been many other theories of existence which can also be argued
to be based at least partly on vericationism (even if their authors do not
always recognize this). One very popular theory is that the criterion of ex-
istence is (ability to exert) causal inuence. David Armstrong used such a
criterion in [Arm78] to argue against uninstantiated universals. This crite-
rion was dubbed by Graham Oddie (who did not nd the principle correct)
in [Odd82] the Eleatic Principle, after the Eleatic stranger who in Plato's di-
alogue Sophist (247e) propounds a similar principle. This name has become
popular; Armstrong himself used it in [Arm97, x3.82, pages 41-43]. It has
also been called by other names such as Alexander's dictum and the causal
criterion (of ontological commitment). This principle seems to be the most
popular current rival to Quine's criterion.
The principle has been presented in various formulations, which need
not be equivalent, as Oddie already pointed out. It could be understood as
either a logical or a factual principle. Armstrong prefers (see [Arm97, x3.82,
page 41]) a relatively weak formulation according to which everything which
exists must make a dierence to the causal powers of something instead of
a stronger formulation according to which everything that exists must itself
have causal power. Similarly Oddie distinguished between a stronger formu-
lation that appeals to being causally active and a weaker formulation that
appeals to playing a role in the causal structure of the world and Colyvan
distinguishes between being causally ecacious and being causally relevant.
I would guess that all three distinctions are equivalent.
The most important argument for this theory is that if something was
incapable of exerting causal inuence on us we could not have any evidence
that it existed. This argument is often directed specically against the exis-
tence of mathematical entities such as sets, and therefore against the literal
truth of mathematical theories, following a line of thought presented by Paul
Benacerraf in [Ben64] (though Benacerraf did not yet use the name "Eleatic
Principle). Benacerraf himself did not yet draw the conclusion that math-
ematical entities did not exist, for he presented a dilemma to which he did
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not see any satisfactory solution. However, many later philosophers have
not hesitated to grasp the horn of the dilemma according to which mathe-
matical entities do not exist and mathematical statements are not literally
true. However, there has not been unanimous agreement that mathemati-
cal entities would be incapable of exercising causal inuence or of making
a dierence to the causal powers of something. E. g. Penelope Maddy has
argued in [Mad80, page 182] that sets can be causally responsible for per-
ceptual beliefs9. Oddie also gives in [Odd82, page 293] an example of how
mathematical objects could play a role in the causal structure of the world,
which does not appeal to perception. Suppose that Jones weighs 100 kilo-
grams. As a result whenever he climbs the stairs in his house they creak.
His being one hundred kilos certainly plays a causal role in this type of event
and so it would seem that derivatively the number 100 also plays a role.
The Eleatic Principle is even often used to argue against all kinds of
realism about universals, which is rather ironic since the name was originally
coined to apply to a principle by David Armstrong, who was an immanent
realist. The Eleatic Principle works at most (as Armstrong intended it to
work) against transcendent or "Platonist" realism, that takes universals to
be outside space-time, and not10 immanent or "Aristotelian" realism, which
holds universals to be multiply located within space-time11.
9Maddy changed later her views in the philosophy of mathematics, and opted for a
less realistic account of mathematics. However, she does not appear to have backed down
from the view that accepting the existence of mathematical entities is compatible with a
causal theory of knowledge.
10A lot of discussions in the philosophy of mathematics - as opposed to discussions in
general ontology - contrast "Platonism" with Nominalism as if these exhausted the op-
tions and just leave "Aristotelianism" out of consideration. If such discussions recognize
the possibility of an "Aristotelian" alternative at all, it is only as a belated afterthought,
and they usually try to assimilate it to one of the two options than treat it as an inde-
pendent type of theory. Thus Mark Balaguer argues in [Bal98, x2.5.1, pages 29-31] that
Maddy's theory is really platonistic and that she does not really view mathematical ob-
jects as concrete as she claim, but must treat them as abstract in some non-traditional
sense. Balaguer's argument is that if Maddy were really non-platonistic, she would have
to admit that sets are aggregates of physical matter. However, it is by no means obvious
that aggregates (mereological sums?) of physical matter are all that is spatio-temporal.
Weirdly enough, Balaguer's own position seems to be "Aristotelian", though he says it
is nominalistic, for he says in [Bal98, x6.5, page 127] that physical properties are nomi-
nalistically kosher. They are certainly not such if the word "nominalistic" is used in its
common sense. If Balaguer can admit the existence of physical properties, why not say
that mathematical objects are physical properties? This would indeed dier a bit from
Maddy's theory, but be but a small modication of it.
11I use the scare quotes because (as I show in Section 6.3 of this dissertation) it is
highly doubtful if these two kinds of theories are genuinely similar to Plato's or Aristotle's
276
The Eleatic Principle is faced with many problems, especially in its
stronger versions, many of which Oddie already pointed out when providing
it with a name and many more of which Mark Colyvan points out in [Col98].
There are of course metaphysical theories, such as Bertrand Russell's view
in [Rus12a] that there are no causes, which would imply together with the
Eleatic Principle that nothing exists, which would be absurd. However, even
if Russell's arguments for his view are not considered sucient12, problems
remain.
Stronger formulations of the principle are also in danger of collapsing
into forms of vericationism; Armstrong himself did not want them to do
so, which caused to leave his discussion of the Eleatic Principle in [Arm97,
x3.82, page 42] in uncertainty. However, Evan Fales defends in [Fal90, page
213] a doctrine he actually calls neo-vericationism which as an ontological
principle says that something which (causally) cannot make a dierence to
the rest of the world (hence to our senses) has no physical existence at all.
On the other hand, weaker formulations of the principle threaten to collapse
into vacuity. Oddie suggests in [Odd82, page 2929] a formulation according
to which nothing is real unless it is at least conceivable (intelligible) that
it should play some role in the causal structure of the world. However,
such a formulation would contrary to Armstrong's intentions allow even the
existence of uninstantiated universals, for if a universal is uninstantiated but
it is conceivable that it should be instantiated, and if it would play a causal
role when instantiated, then it is conceivable that it should play a causal
role.
The argument for the Eleatic Principle presented above of course presup-
poses13 a causal theory of knowledge or justication (such as was sketched by
historical theories.
12Some of Russell's arguments presuppose strong fundamentalism, which I have argued
against. The argument that the word "cause" never occurs in advanced sciences only
shows, if we do not accept strong fundamentalism, that causation is not fundamental,
not that it does not exist. However, even this conclusion, if correct, would be enough to
refute the Eleatic Principle, for surely more fundamental entities exist if less fundamental
entities do.
13Mark Balaguer argues in [Bal98, x2.2, page 23] that Benacerraf's epistemological
argument against (traditional forms of) platonism can be reformulated so that it does not
depend on a causal theory of knowledge. He suggests that the premise of the argument can
be reformulated so that they say that mathematical objects are totally inaccessible to us,
i. e. that information cannot pass from mathematical objects to human beings. This gives
according to him rise to a worry about whether human beings could acquire knowledge
about mathematical objects. However, it is not at rst sight at all clear what Balaguer
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Paul Benacerraf in [Ben64, page 671]), which is quite controversial, though
popular14. If some such theory were correct, then it may be correct that
if something was completely causally isolated from us, we could not have
any reason to think that it existed. However, this would scarcely give us
a reason to think that no such entity exists either. Rather, the best re-
sponse to a claim about the existence of such entities would be to suspend
means with information and its passing. Information itself, as commonly understood, is
something abstract, so it could be argued that if we can have information at all about
any objects, we must already be related in some way to an abstract object. Balaguer says
later in [Bal98, page 25] while arguing against Godel's view that mathematical objects
could not generate information-carrying signals, which makes the argument a bit clearer.
However, it is not clear that knowledge presupposes that information-carrying signals
should pass from the objects of the knowledge to the knower any more than that there is
a causal relation between them. Balaguer adds later in [Bal98, page 26] that the notion of
an information transfer is a causal, spatio-temporal one, and this indeed claries matters
further. However, it seems also to reduce his purported reformulation of Benacerraf's
argument against traditional forms of Platonism to its original formulation. If according
to Balaguer the acquisition of knowledge requires information transfer (from the objects
of knowledge to the knower) and information transfer is a causal relation, then it follows
that according to him knowledge requires a causal relation between the knower and the
objects of knowledge. Balaguer is therefore presupposing a causal theory of knowledge
after all in his argument. This kind of theory seems to share all of the same problems
as a causal theory of knowledge, which is natural if it is after all just one form of it. E.
g. it would make knowledge of the future impossible. Could information-carrying signals
pass from future to the present either? What diculties the "Platonist" has in accounting
for mathematical knowledge are then not greater, so far as the argument goes, than the
diculties anyone has in accounting for knowledge of the future.
14The eleatic principle is not directed against the possibility of ontology as the original
vericationist principle was but only against specic ontological theories. However, it is
similar to the vericationist principle in one respect; it is based on an epistemological
principle that is mostly appealed to in discussions concerning ontology and only seldom
held to be plausible in epistemological discussions which have nothing to do with ontology.
While causal theories of knowledge have occasionally been developed by philosophers
specialising in epistemology, these theories have been criticised heavily as epistemological
theories and most epistemologists have shifted away from them to other kinds of theories.
For example Alvin Goldman argued for a causal theory of knowledge in [Gol67], to which
Benacerraf indeed referred, but later (e. g in [Gol86]) he replaced it with a more general
reliabilist theory of justication that cannot be so easily be used to justify the Eleatic
Principle. It is easy to see what serious problems there are in the principle in question
if it is held in an unqualied form. This principle would make impossible any knowledge
of the future (or more generally as Colyvan notes of entities outside our light cone), since
future entities cannot aect anyone's present state of knowledge. Thus it would make all
knowledge useless, since knowledge is only practically useful if it can be used to predict
the future. Of course attempts can be made to weaken the causal theory as attempts
were made to weaken the vericationist principle. The causal theory can be weakened
so that it only demands that epistemically basic knowledge is of entities aecting the
knower, while less basic knowledge can be derived from this basic knowledge inductively
or abductively. However, so weakened the principle might allow the existence of even
transcendent universals, since induction or abduction might then be used to support belief
in such universals.
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judgement about their existence15. Furthermore something could make a
dierence to the rest of the world without making a dierence to our senses,
and such an entity would also be unknowable to us. Therefore this kind of
argument would if valid at all lead to a far stronger conclusion, namely that
the criterion of existence is ability to exert causal inuence on us. How-
ever, this sounds (as Mark Colyvan also points out in [Col98]) rather too
anthropocentric to be credible.
5.4 Motivating Quine's Theory
Quine does not really motivate his suggestion at length, intuitively appealing
as it is. A more elaborate motivation is clearly needed. Unfortunately, I can
for reasons of space only sketch such a motivation in this dissertation, which
will rather concentrate on the interpretation and consequences of Quine's
widely accepted suggestion than its motivation.
It must be admitted that it is by no means obvious at rst sight that
the suggestion is true. At least linguistically quantication is expressed in
natural languages very dierently than being; quantication is expressed
primarily with the aid of determiners such as "some", "every", "most", etc.
while being is expressed primarily with the aid of verbs like "be" and of
course "exist" together with prepositions like "there" and adjectives like
"real". It has often been argued with some cogency that what is usually
called the existential quantier would be more accurately called the partic-
ular quantier. However, even long before the rise of modern logic it was
rather easy to see that natural language sentences formulated with the aid
of quantiers and sentences formulated with the aid of existential verbs were
often logically equivalent. Consider the following example sentences:
15Even those who think that one has to be non-realistic about entities with no causal
powers need not deny that theories, even scientic theories, could carry ontological com-
mitments to such entities. Rather they could treat causally inert entities as van Fraassen
does unobservable entities; namely recognize that a theory can meaningfully carry com-
mitments to them but hold that such theories cannot be known to be true and treat
such portions of a theory which make such commitments instrumentalistically. In other
words, using Quine's terminology (see Section 5.8), the Eleatic principle would according
to them aord a criterion for adjudicating between rival ontologies, not for recognizing
the ontological commitments of a discourse. Indeed, many proponents of the principle
seem to use it as such a principle for adjudicating between dierent ontologies; Armstrong
says explicitly in [Arm97, x3.82, page 42] that it does not have to be taken as a semantic
principle. However, the arguments of Oddie and Colyvan are eective also against the
principle if taken as a criterion for adjudicating between dierent ontologies.
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Example 1 There is a mortal man.
Example 2 A mortal man exists.
Example 3 Some man is mortal.
The sentences Example 1 and Example 2, in which being or existence is
explicitly expressed, are clearly equivalent with the sentence Example 3, in
which only a quantier occurs, at least given one very natural and common
reading of these three sentences. Obviously the equivalences would remain
valid if the noun phrase "mortal man" and the adjective "mortal" were in
all these sentences replaced systematically with almost any phrases of the
same syntactic and semantic category, with only some rare exceptions like
"alleged criminal" and "is ctional", so there are here an innite number
of potential examples. Such equivalences clearly suggest that the particular
quantier can also be legitimately called an existential quantier. Modern
logic and semantics show systematically what such equivalences hold and to
some extent why they hold; furthermore they suggest that the existential
quantier is a basic quantier with whose aid all other quantiers can be
dened, using no other quantiers but many other other notions besides it
(including set-theoretical or property-theoretical notions in the case of such
semantically complex quantiers as "most"). However, non-standard logi-
cians have suggested some purported counterexamples to such equivalences;
I will deal briey with one prominent counterexample later.
Drawing on such intuitive equivalences between quantication and exis-
tence, Quine's suggestion can be motivated if we can also show that there is
a close connection between the concept of ontology and the concept of being;
however, I have already presented historical evidence for such a connection
in Chapter 2 of this work.
5.5 Existential Univocalism and Multivocalism
Matters are complicated by claims that being is not univocal. With Quinean
metaontologists the criterion of ontological commitment is usually closely
connected with the thesis of the univocity of being. This thesis has been
called univocalism by Berti in [Ber01] following Morton White (who also
280
defended16 it) in[Whi56, page 61] and existential monism, as the phenomeno-
logical ontologist Roman Ingarden, (who opposed the thesis) called it in [Ing64,
page 48]. For instance, Peter van Inwagen explicitly and strongly defends
the univocity of being in [vI98, page 236]. White called the opposite of uni-
vocalism multivocalism while Ingarden spoke of existential pluralism. Many
philosophers such as Putnam (see [Put94, page 450]) and Eli Hirsch follow-
ing him (see [Hir02]) have objected to Quine's criterion exactly because it
presupposes univocalism.
However, denials of the univocity of being are far older. Aristotle him-
self already thought that being was not a genus17 and that there were many
dierent senses of being18. For instance, as I will show in Section 4.2.3, Aris-
totle thought that states of aairs existed in a dierent sense than substances
or even accidents, and hence were not full-edged members of his ontology.
These dierent senses of being Aristotle distinguished were according to
him not entirely heterogeneous but connected, the relation between them
being what medieval philosophers called analogy (more specically analogy
of proportion in Cajetan's terminology) and what is sometimes today called
core-dependent homonymy. Aristotle gave the following kind of examples to
illuminate this notion: a man can be called healthy and food can be called
healthy in a dierent sense, but the second sense can be dened with the aid
of the rst, for food is healthy if eating it helps a man to keep healthy; Aristo-
16White claims in [Whi56, page 62] that John Stuart Mill also earlier defended univo-
calism but also expressed a number of worries over it that have reappeared in more recent
literature. Looking at the places in Mill's writings that White refers to I cannot say that I
am convinced by White's interpretation. Rather than defending univocalism, Mill seems
to rather unquestioningly presuppose it, and asks what term we should use for that which
exists in this one sense of the word "exist": the terminological questions that Mill deals
with are far more trivial than the genuinely semantical and even ontological questions
discussed in later literature. These terminological questions are, however, still relevant; I
use the word "entity", but other ontologists have other uses.
17Apparently Aristotle and medieval philosophers thought that being was not one of
Porphyry's other ve predicables either. The Arabic philosopher, Ibn Sina or Avicenna,
apparently challenged this view and held very interestingly that existence was an accident
of essence. The distinction between existence and essence that Avicenna made (with
some predecessors who were not so clear about the matter going back to some obscure
terminology and remarks of Aristotle himself) was also a kind of distinction between
dierent sense of being. However, Avicenna's view did not become popular either in
Arabic or western scholastic philosophy.
18How many modes of being Aristotle distinguished is a bit obscure and controversial,
since Aristotle divides being dierently in dierent places and it is not clear how (if at
all) these divisions t together. Gareth B. Matthews examines this question in [Mat95],
showing that there are reasons to think that Aristotle distinguished either as many as ten
or as many as fourteen or as many as forty or even indenitely many.
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tle claimed that the dierent senses of being were related in this way. Very
startlingly, however, as Enrico Berti remarks in [Ber02], Aristotle almost
never brings any argument in defence of this doctrine; actually Aristotle has
only one passage that can be viewed as proof of this doctrine (and this ar-
gument is very weak since it is based on his very narrow theory of denition
by means of genus and dierentia19. As Berti says, by so doing Aristotle
gives the impression of considering his doctrine perfectly evident, though
he was clearly persuaded that he was the rst philosopher who discovered
this truth. Nevertheless this became a standard dogma in medieval scholas-
ticism; because of the authoritarian nature of most medieval philosophy,
scholars accepted Aristotle's pronouncements meekly as the truth. Notions
such as being and unity which were not genera or species but could in some
way be predicated of all entities were called transcendentals by the scholas-
tics; due to their ridiculously great theistic optimism they also thought that
good could also be predicated of all entities and was also such a notion.
Medieval philosophers expanded Aristotle's claim to the theological claim
that God existed in a dierent sense than creatures, thereby making it a
religious dogma and ensuring it would not be questioned. However, already
some medieval Aristotelians such as Duns Scotus at least partially denied
this assumption of Aristotle himself and claimed that there was a concept
of being univocally common not only to entities of dierent categories but
19The argument occurs at Metaphysics 998b22-27. It starts from the premise that
a genus cannot be predicated of its dierences (or dierentiae, however we translate
o) by means of which species are split o from genera, and shows that if being
were a genus then its dierences (dierentiae) could be predicated of it, since being would
have to be a genus of all entities. The argument is formally valid, but its premise, that a
genus cannot ever be predicated of any of its dierences, seems completely unjustied to
me. Indeed, the whole distinction between species and dierences seems very obscure and
dubious from the point of view of modern logic and semantics. So far as I can make any
sense of the distinction, it is based on the notion of identity conditions: species and genera
are supposed to provide a identity conditions for the entities of which they are predicated,
but dierences are not. However, as I point out also elsewhere in this work, this whole
notion of identity conditions has been questioned by such philosophers as Michael Jubien
in [Jub96].
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also to God and creatures20.
Of course, many later philosophers have also claimed that being is not
univocal, but have divided its various senses in very dierent ways than Aris-
totelians did. This kind of doctrine can be found in all major modern philo-
sophical traditions, as well in analytical philosophy (both non-positivistic
and positivistic) as in phenomenology.
Famously Frege and Russell claimed that the word "being" (or concretely
"be") could stand for existence, predication, class inclusion and identity; we
have already seen how this theory has been opposed on the basis of Charles
Kahn's historical studies. This is a far smaller variety of modes of being
than the one Aristotle arrives at. Furthermore, it is one that Quine himself
and van Inwagen probably would have accepted. When van Inwagen says
that being does not dier from existence, he carefully explains in [vI98, page
236] that what he means to deny is that the phrases "there is" and "exists"
mean the same thing when applied to dierent subjects. This does not imply
that he would have to deny that being as predication diers from being as
existence. What neither Quine nor van Inwagen would not have accepted is
the claim that "existence" or in more concrete terms such phrases as "there
is" and "exists" (which are according to Quine symbolized by the existential
quantier) or indeed "some" have themselves many senses or uses.
Lambertus Marie de Rijk, who rejects Kahn's theory of the development
of the Greek verb yet follows him in rejecting the Frege-Russell thesis of
ambiguity, says in [Rij02, x1.4, page 24]:
. . . contemporary analytical philosophy is generally inclined to
emphasize that once the various notions involved in our use of
'be' have been logically analysed, they appear to form a hetero-
geneous bundle without any focal concept of 'be' to hold them
together. It will be plain that to establish an unambiguous sys-
tem of metaphysics must seem a chimaeric endeavour to these
logicians.
20However, there are reasons to fear that Scotus's denial of the univocity thesis was very
partial; Scotus apparently insisted that the application of a common concept to dierent
entities did not imply that they shared a common nature, and because of this his denial
did not have metaphysical but only semantical implications (see for example [Dum92]).
Even though Aristotle did not give almost any arguments for his claim that being was
equivocal, the authoritarian nature of mediaeval philosophy kept medieval philosophers
from questioning it seriously, so that rejecting it completely would have been a serious
option for them.
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However, the modern logical theory by no means implies that the notions
of being would be a heterogeneous bundle, though this is a common mis-
understanding. Many of these notions can be dened with the aid of each
other and even in the case where such denition is not possible, a sentence
containing one of them always implies a sentence containing others, so these
notions are very tightly connected together. Class inclusion can of course
be dened with the aid of quantication, implication and membership (or
just predication in higher-order logic); A  B df (8x)(x 2 A ! x 2 B) in
rst order logic combined with set theory or A  B df (8x)(A(x)! B(x))
in higher-order logic. Identity can be probably dened with the aid of uni-
versal quantication and predication in higher order logic or set theory;
a = b df (8P )(P (a)  P (b) or a = b df (8x)(a 2 x  b 2 x), though
this is more controversial; in any case, saying that two entities are identical
always involves predicating identity of them, so predication always goes to-
gether with identity and is therefore more fundamental even if identity could
not be reduced to it. Therefore while there is no single focal meaning, yet
existence and predication are two focal meanings on which the rest of the
notions are based, so the modern theory can be viewed as a version of an ana-
logical theory of being, even though the principle of the analogy in question
is more complex than in Aristotelian logic (though simpler in its applica-
tions). Furthermore, these two always go together. You cannot formulate
a statement in the language of predicate logic (at least not in a standard
rst-order one) that contains a quantier but no instance of predication
or identity. Neither (9x)(x) nor (9x)(P ) is well-formed; the simplest well-
formed quantied formula is of the form (9x)(P (t)), and the more complex
formulas always contain one or more instances of predication. A predicative
statement P (a) implies in standard predicate logic and negative free logic
such quantied existential statements as (9x)(x = a), (9x)(P (x)), etc. The
notions of being distinguished by Frege and Russell are then very tightly
bound together so establishing an unambiguous system of metaphysics is a
quite tenable goal on the basis of their theory.
However, Russell held also the kind of serious existential multivocalism
that Quine and van Inwagen oppose in a weak form, as he found it conve-
nient in [Rus12b, pages 155-156] to distinguish existence from subsistence.
According to him things exist only when they are in time, while timeless en-
tities (which universals according to him were) subsist or have being. Russell
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apparently later rejected this distinction. Russell also developed the theory
of types as a solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes, and it is often held
that the theory of types supports multivocalism. According to it there are
as many types of quantiers as there are types, i. e. innitely many, and
if existence is expressed by quantiers, then we can infer that a plurality of
quantiers implies a plurality of modes of existence. It is not clear if Russell
himself would have accepted such a corollary to his theory. In any case,
since later set theory and property theory have mostly rejected type theory,
this naturally weakens the force of this reason for existential multivocalism.
Russell's notion of subsistence comes from the German (or perhaps
rather Austrian) tradition; Meinong had already spoken of subsistence (beste-
hen) as the mode of being of ideal entities such as universals or propositions
(which must be sharply and carefully distinguished from Meinong's far more
controversial impossible objects). Many phenomenologists made a similar
distinction speaking of the ideal being of universals.
However, the Polish realist phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden, was unique
in developing a very elaborate and complex theory of dierent modes of be-
ing in his main work The Controversy over the Existence of the World,
originally written in Polish, of which only a very small amount has been
translated into English in [Ing64] but far more of which has been translated
into German. Ingarden distinguished in [Ing64, page 22] a basic group of on-
tological questions, existential-ontological questions, which were concerned
with modes of being. Ingarden distinguished in [Ing64, page 41] moments of
existence aka existential moments in modes of being, of which he in a way
built up these modes of being. Unfortunately Ingarden's theory cannot be
discussed here in any detail for reasons of space.
Logical positivists also sometimes denied univocalism; Ayer claimed on
the basis of his neutral monism in [Aye36a, page 130] that
when one says that a sense-experience or sense-content exists,
one is making a dierent type of statement than when one says
that a material thing exists.
Ayer took entities which he supposed to be logical constructions (such as
material things and minds) to exist in a dierent sense than entities which
he took to be primitive. Carnap says similarly in the Aufbau (see [Car67,
x42,page 70]) that one could speak of the dierent modes of being of the
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objects of dierent object spheres (where object spheres are the lovels of
logical construction), and gives as an example (see [Car67, page 71] that
classes do not have being in the same sense as the things from which they
are in his view constructed21. This really amounts to claiming that quanti-
cation over logical constructions is non-objectual; this claim is not peculiar
to Ayer but is a view which is implied by strong fundamentalism and which
all strong fundamentalists implicitly hold.
As White and van Inwagen show, even ordinary language philosophers
such as Gilbert Ryle and Austin held that being was equivocal and were
inuenced by Aristotle in doing so. They actually tried to use this to ar-
gue against metaphysics, paradoxically justifying their opposition to meta-
physics by Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine. Ryle for example claimed
in [Ryl49, page 23] that when we say bodies exist and when we say minds ex-
ist we use the word "exist" in dierent senses, and because of this we could
not say that both minds and bodies exist If we accept Quine's claim of
the connection between existence and quantication, then the acceptance of
dierent kinds of quantication counts as the acceptance of dierent kinds
of existence. Therefore if we must distinguish from each other objectual
and substitutional quantication, this is already a weak kind of descriptive
existential pluralism.
In most of the forms we have gone through, multivocalism is not con-
nected with any kind of relativism. Most multivocalists (e. g. Aristotle and
Ingarden) thought that expressions like "is" or "exists" have many senses in
the same ordinary language, and that the same metaphysical theory must
distinguish several modes of existence. This allowed several dierent meta-
physical theories to speak about the samemodes of existence. It seems to me
that this still held also of Carnap's theory in the Aufbau. However, with the
last stages of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy emerged
a relativistic form of multivocalism that is still prominent in metaontology.
This shift to relativism resulted from a combination of multivocalism with
21Logical positivists did not agree on this point. Though Schlick is one of the ma-
jor sources of Ayer's doctrines, on this point Schlick seems to have diered from Ayer
in [Sch32b, page 20] (translated in [Sch49b, page 98]), denying that the claim that a feel-
ing or sensation is real would have a meaning dierent from the claim that a physical
object is real. However, as I show in comparing Schlick's theory of existence and reality
to Quine's theory in 5.2.1, Schlick's theory is utterly incoherent and in fact I think that
Aeyr's theory is a more coherent application of the vericationism both shared to the
question of existence, though of course also suspect to those who reject vericationism.
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semantic holism based on vericationism. Eli Hirsch claimed in [Hir02] on
the basis of the ideas of Hilary Putnam that when philosophers apparently
disagreed with each other or with common conceptions on what existed,
they were just using dierent concepts of existence so that they did not
really disagree. On Hirsch's view then dierent metaphysical theories al-
ways employed dierent concepts of existence. Matti Eklund calls this kind
of view ontological pluralism and claims in [Ekl09] that Carnap held such
a view in [Car50]; I will examine this kind of relativistic view in detail in
Section 5.9.2 of this work and argue that it is not tenable.
If being is really equivocal it becomes unclear what the denition of
ontology as the science of being qua being means. Should we allow that
there are several ontologies corresponding to dierent senses of "being" aka
dierent modes or ways of being, or should we pick one of them as the
one true ontology? How are these possible dierent senses of being to be
distinguished from each other anyway?
I propose that contrary to what Quine himself and van Inwagen may
have thought, the criterion could be modied so that it does not presuppose
the univocity of being, at least if the univocity thesis is understood as a de-
scriptive thesis concerning natural languages. What happens to the criterion
if words like "be" or even "exist", as they are used in ordinary languages,
are equivocal? Does this show that the criterion is false? No, it only follows
from this that the notion of ontological commitment is also equivocal. How-
ever, I think that this would be a quite acceptable result. As we have seen,
it was held by the very founder of metaphysics, Aristotle. Many modern
ontologists such as Ingarden have held that there are many modes of being,
and if the word "be" is ambiguous then this view of existential pluralism
follows from Quine's criterion.
In fact, it seems to me that there is such ambiguity in natural language.
Quine's claim of univocity in fact ts in very badly with his own later thesis
of the indeterminacy of denotation, and even though there are good reasons
to think that denotation cannot be quite as indeterminate as the later Quine
himself claims (for in that case we could not talk intelligibly of anything at
all), yet there is enough indeterminacy in natural languages and whatever
articial languages have been constructed that the absolute univocity of
any concept is as such very implausible. Thus we should except to nd
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multivocity, and in fact there is detailed evidence for such multivocity22.
Wolterstor has in my view argued very convincingly in [Wol70, page 167]
that the words "there are" are ambiguous when applied to universals. Saying
"there's no such thing as genuine humility" can naturally be used to mean
that humility is not exemplied. On the other hand, the sentence "There's
no such property as being a round square." has a stronger meaning as it
implies that there could not be round squares. This variety of uses could,
of course, be also interpreted as a purely pragmatic matter. Even if it is
a genuinely semantic phenomenon, however, it does not really threaten the
criterion of ontological commitment. However, it does raise the question
what this implies for the unity of ontology as as scholarly discipline.
However, the thesis of the univocity of being is better understood as a
partly revisionary than as wholly a descriptive proposal (as Owen Pikkert
also argues in [Pik12, page 7]). Even though all quantication in ordinary
languages would be ambiguous, this does not imply that the ideal languages
or even articial languages we can in practice construct for purposes of
scholarly research should be ambiguous in a similar way. Ambiguity should
of course always be eliminated in philosophical systematization (what Quine
calls regimentation) of common sense notions so far as it can be eliminated.
Putnam and even Quine may, of course, think because of their semantic
holism that ambiguity cannot ever be eliminated; however, as I have already
argued this kind of holism is in itself quite implausible. Nevertheless, we can
only know how far we can eliminate ambiguity by trying and seeing what is
the result.
However, eliminating ambiguity may involve symbolizing the same ex-
pression of a natural language with several primitive expressions, or using
only one expression to indicate one of the senses of the natural language ex-
pression and introducing the rest of the senses as dened expressions. The
debate between univocalists and multivocalists can be understood as involv-
ing which of these two options should (or could) be adopted; Quine's view
would be that it is the latter option. It then implies a position that is the
very opposite of the one Hirsch maintains; Hirsch thinks that being is not
equivocal in ordinary languages, but claims that when dierent philosophers
22If we look at words such as "real" which are (at least in some of their uses) synonymous
or similar in meaning to "being", the evidence for a variety of readings is even clearer; see
Footnote 1 in the previous section.
288
try to regiment it the results of their work dier from each other. However,
the way quantication is actually ordinarily used may not be the most useful
one! This is something that opponents of Quine's criterion like Putnam or
Hirsch do not seem to realize. Just distinguishing dierent senses of quan-
tication is not enough; we must ask about how these senses are related.
One question concerning their relationship is paramountly important. Given
that there are many modes of being, we must ask whether they can be in
some way reduced to one mode of being.
Many philosophers have thought that they can. Aristotle himself thought
that there was one sense of being, that in which actual substances (whether
concrete composite individual substances or forms are in question is dis-
puted) existed, which was the primary sense of being and the only strict
and proper sense of being, in terms of which the other senses of being were
to be characterized. The same holds of most later theories that try to divide
the senses in which entities exist; they may not agree that substances exist
in a primary sense (or exist at all) or even that being is not a genus, but most
of them agree that there is one basic sense or there are a few basic senses into
which all of the remaining ways of being have to be related (which according
to some of them is indeed a genus under which all or at least some of the
remaining ways of being fall). If this is possible, then many kinds of quan-
tication can be replaced with one basic kind of quantication in articial
languages. I will later in Section 5.9 argue that objectual quantication is
primary with respect to other kinds of quantication such as substitutional.
However, the argument is far from conclusive. Even I were wrong in this
and there were many primary kinds of quantication, this need not yet lead
to any disastrous consequences for ontology such as relativism, since as we
have seen most forms of existential multivocalism are not relativistic.
I think that there are two basic senses of "being", predication and ab-
solute real existence (where the latter is the sense that can be symbolized
by an unrestricted objectual quantier). These senses cannot be reduced to
each other, but they always go together, for when we say that entities of
some kind exist, we always predicate something, in the simplest cases that
kind itself, of some variable bound by the unrestricted objectual quantier
symbolizing absolute real existence. I will show that absolute real existence
can be viewed as a genus under which many other forms of being (such as
restricted quantiers) fall, but many other forms of being have to be related
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to it in a more complex way, closer to the Aristotelian way of analogy.
5.6 Unrestricted Quantication and Absolute Gen-
erality
We have seen that ontological statements in the sense of Wol and meta-
physical statements in the sense of Aristotle's conception of metaphysics
as the science of being as being are absolutely general; they concern all
entities, entities belonging to any domains. This means that they employ
unrestricted quantication23. However, the meaningfulness of unrestricted
quantication has been disputed by many philosophers, which threatens the
possibility of ontology or metaphysics in this historical sense. However,
lately it has gained many defenders. I think that the most important of its
defenders is Richard Cartwright in [Car94]. Other more recent defenders of
absolute generality have been Timothy Williamson in [Wil03], ystein Lin-
nebo, Vann McGee and Alan Weir. Both Cartwright and Williamson point
out that commitment to unrestricted quantication is essential to Quine's
philosophy. Cartwright points out in [Car94, page 1] that variables are to be
regarded as taking as values any objects whatever in Quine's set theory NF.
Williamson in [Wil03, page 415] stresses that Quine's conception of ontology
also requires absolutely general, unrestricted quantication24.
However, I think that the defence of absolute generality provided by
such recent thinkers is often weaker than that of Cartwright, as they gen-
erally concede too much to the opponents of absolute generality. Many of
them think that the possibility of absolute generality has some very strong
presuppositions; they think that it requires that there must be a kind of
higher-order quantication that is not reducible to rst-order quantication
or a revision of standard propositional logic. I want to argue, however, that
the possibility of absolute generality does not require either of these assump-
tions (though they might, of course, still be true for other reasons). Indeed,
23I do not mean that using unrestricted quantication would be sucient for a statement
being absolutely general, only that it is necessary. A statement can only be absolutely
general if the predicates that occur in it must also be very general, indeed categories.
24Chalmers also holds in [Cha09, x9,page 105] that ontological statements cannot be
restricted to a domain, but holds that they must be restricted to a world; Chalmers thinks
that they demand that there is an absolute domain, the domain of the actual world. I will
argue, however, that ontological statements do not require the existence of any absolute
domain either.
290
one of the most prominent proponents of absolute generality, Quine (whose
commitment to it Cartwright shows) thought that higher-order quantica-
tion that was not reducible to rst-order quantication was not possible.
Quine sometimes went so far as to deny the intelligibility of higher-order
quantication even if it was held to be reducible to rst-order quantica-
tion, and I think that this was highly implausible; however, I think that
there is a good case against a kind of higher-order quantication that would
not be reducible to any kind of rst-order quantication (and not just to
standard rst-order quantication).
The kind of quantication that Tarski used in his theory of truth was
unrestricted quantication. Tarski thought that variables could range over
all classes. This can be conrmed if we look at Tarski's treatment of quan-
tication in [Tar83a, page 190], where Tarski is being most precise; here
Tarski says for example that
for all a, a satises the sentential function \2t1;2 if and only
if for all classes b we have a  b.
Note that Tarski speaks here unrestrictedly of all classes, not just of all
classes belonging to the domain of a model, as would be typically done in
modern model-theory25.
A whole book has been gathered containing articles on this topic, namely [RU06],
edited by Agustn Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano. The possibility of meta-
physics and ontology in the traditional sense depends on the possibility of
unrestricted quantication i. e. of absolute generality, so it is one of the
most important metantological or metametaphysical questions and I must
deal with this topic.
25There is one way in which the quantication used by Tarski and that used by
Williamson, Weir and many others is not wholly unrestricted. Tarski only quanties
over classes in the examples he gives. This is not because he would think that only classes
can be quantied over; it is only one example he uses out of many he could have chosen.
Tarski does think that quantication must be restricted typically; he is still thinking in
terms of Whitehead's and Russell's type theory. However, this is an entirely dierent and
far weaker restriction than the restriction to members of the domain of a model. Hilbert
apparently shared this restriction but thought that there had to be a further restriction
within every type; by relativising quantication over individuals to some individual domain
all class types are at once also relativised to classes that are classes of those individuals
or classes of those classes of those individuals or . . . Cartwright and Williamson quantify
only over individuals; the typical restriction they use is the reverse of that used by Tarski.
I will argue that quantication can be unrestricted also in the stronger sense that it need
not be restricted even typically; we can quantify at once over all entities of all types.
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The best justication of the claim that we can quantify unrestrictedly
i. e. over absolutely everything, is that denying it appears to be self-
defeating; you have to presuppose the truth of the claim in order to deny
it. In saying that we cannot quantify over absolutely everything, a person
is himself quantifying over absolutely everything. If he is not, he is just
denying that we can quantify over some limited domain of entities, and this
is a far weaker claim.
Cartwright stresses that the claim that we can quantify over everything
does not imply that there would be a universal domain over which we can
quantify which would be a set or a class. A universal domain would have
to contain all classes (as well as whatever Urelements there might be) and
there are reasons to suspect that this would lead to paradoxes and hence
be contradictory. While standard set theories such as ZF do not allow
there to be a universal class, there yet are set theories such as Quine's NF
(presented in [Qui53c]) and a variant of it called NFU which allow there
to be a universal set, and I am quite attracted to them; nevertheless, the
possibility of unrestricted quantication does not require the truth of such
theories. If it did this would obviously put that possibility in a perilous
position; I want to argue that the possibility of unrestricted quantication
is independent of what set theories are correct, since it is a highly general
logical or semantical claim, more general than set theories.
The claim that absolute generality would imply the existence of a uni-
versal set is based on a principle that to quantify over certain objects is to
presuppose that those objects constitute a collection or a completed collec-
tion. Cartwright calls this principle in [Car94, xIV, page 7] the All-in-One
Principle. Cartwright thinks that the principle is false; of course, opponents
of unrestricted quantication often think that it is correct. Some adher-
ents of unrestricted quantication such as Alan Weir seem to accept this
principle, but this makes the defence of their position needlessly hard.
Alan Weir asks in [Wei06, page 336] whether we do not need domains
in order to achieve the goals for which the formalization of language is a
means. According to him one goal is to give a systematic account of the
meaning of important logical notions such as 'every'. He says:
We semi-formalize some mathematical English into a sen-
tence such as 'for every number x there is some number y with
x < y'. Our account of truth for generalizations entails that this
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universal generalization is true relative to an assignment  to
variables just in case for every x-variant assignment (x=) like
 except, at most, that it assigns  from the domain D to x,
the open sentence there is some number y such that x < y is
true relative to (x=). How can we give such an account unless
the denition of truth generalises to truth relative to all variant
assignments? Can we do this without domains?
Weir thinks that we can, but only by using higher-order quantication.
He makes use of an idea of George Boolos, which replaces the notion of an
interpretation function with the notion of an interpretative relation, where
interpretative relations are quantied over in the metalanguage with predi-
cate variables such as R. I think that we can do it it even without making
use of higher-order quantication. Of course I do not think that there is
anything wrong with making use of predicate variables in a semi-formalized
metalanguage or the notion of an interpretative function; these elaborate
manoeuvres just are not necessary. Ultimately, Weir thinks that even this
higher-order approach is not enough, and thinks that we have to revise logic
in accordance with Kripke's theory of truth. I nd it quite plausible that
some such revision of logic might in the end be necessary in order to handle
the paradoxes; however, I do not think that it is necessary in order to defend
the possibility of unrestricted quantication.
In fact giving a systematic account of the meaning of logical constants
like "every" without using domains is ridiculously simple. The denition of
truth does generalise to truth relative to all variant assignments, but this
does not require the use of domains or the use of higher-order logic in the
metalanguage as in Weir's theory. All we have to do is remove the reference
to domains from the truth-conditions that Weir gives. Any function from
the variables of the language to objects can be taken to be an assignment,
not just those whose values belong to some domain. This is what I will do in
most of the remaining dissertation when I give formal semantical rules. We
can then say in the case of the example that Weir gives that this universal
generalization is true relative to an assignment  to variables just in case
for every x-variant assignment (x=) like  except, at most, that it assigns
some object  to x, the open sentence there is some number y such that
x < y is true relative to (x=). Indeed, this is what Williamson does
in [Wil03, page 418], so it is strange that Weir does not see that this is the
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easiest way to do it.
Williamson has, however, a reason why he thinks that this kind of solu-
tion is not sucient; Linnebo has a similar argument in [Lin06, x6.2, page
150] which he calls the semantic argument. Williamson argues in [Wil03,
page 425] that sooner or later, the theorist will want to generalise over
all interpretations of various forms in the language. He goes on to argue
in [Wil03, page 426] that when we apply the denition of logical conse-
quence, it must be possible to interpret a predicate letter according to any
contentful predicate. Thus, whatever contentful predicate we substitute for
'F', some legitimate interpretation (say, I(F )), interprets the predicate letter
accordingly. Williamson then derives a contradiction from this assumption
by dening a verb 'R' so that for everything o, o Rs if and only if o is not an
interpretation under which P applies to o and then putting 'R' in place of
'F'. We get from this that for everything o, I(R) is an interpretation under
which P applies to o if and only if I(R) is not an interpretation under which
P applies to o, and therefore I(R) is an interpretation under which I(R)
applies to o if and only if I(R) is not an interpretation under which I(R)
applies to o.
Williamson says that this paradox is a variant of Russell's paradox, but it
employs no notion of set, class or domain. However, it seems to me that the
paradox at which Williamson arrives is instead a variant version of the old
Liar paradox, or perhaps a combination of the two paradoxes26 Williamson's
assumption that it must be possible to interpret a predicate letter according
to any contentful predicate of the meta-language violates Tarski's discovery
(expressed for example in [Tar44, pages 351,352]) that the metalanguage
must be essentially richer than the object language. Tarski tells us that if the
26In any case it is far from clear that Williamson's paradox does not employ a notion of
class, since if interpretations are taken to be objects they are usually taken to be classes;
interpretations are generally understood as classes of pairs consisting of expressions of the
object language and other entities. We can doubt whether any coherent and systematic
understanding of the notion of interpretation is possible that does not make it to be a
class or an intensional relation which has a class as its extension. We can argue that in the
case of many contentful predicates 'F' of the metalanguage, there is no class of all entities
that are F (or even an abundant property that would be the intension of the predicate)
and in this case there can be no pair of which this class would be a member, and therefore
there can be no interpretation that would contain such a pair as one of its members. This
is in fact obviously true of such predicates as 'self-identical' in a standard set theory such
as ZF and can well be true of the verb R that Williamson and Linnebo dene. This is
enough to avoid the paradox that Williamson arrives at while continuing to maintain that
we can quantify over absolutely everything.
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condition of essential richness is not satised, it can usually be shown that
an interpretation of the object language in the meta-language is possible.
However, this implies that it is possible to reconstruct in the metalanguage
the paradox of the liar. This seems to be exactly what Williamson does. In-
deed, we can derive a paradox from Williamson's assumption even without
assuming that interpretations are objects or even using the concept of inter-
pretation at all; just let 'F' be the truth predicate! We can indeed associate
a predicate with every entity of which we can speak in the metalanguage,
as we must do if quantication is to be genuinely unrestricted, but not with
every predicate of the metalanguage, for the metalanguage cannot speak of
all of its own predicates, if it is not to be semantically closed. However, this
restriction has nothing to do with a restriction to domains; quantication in
the object language can be absolutely unrestricted (as we have seen it was
in Tarski's theory) even if the expressive power of the object language is re-
stricted (as it was in Tarski's theory). Therefore this diculty has nothing
to do with unrestricted quantication, so the further complications which
Williamson introduces to his theory are quite unnecessary.
Many arguments have been given against the possibility of unrestricted,
absolutely general quantication. Rayo and Uzquiano distinguish ve pri-
mary arguments; however, it seems to me that when we consider them care-
fully, they can be reduced to three. None of them seems at all strong to me;
one of them would prove too much and would lead to a blatant absurdity,
and the premises of the remaining two are no more plausible than their con-
clusion. There is no space here to go through all the arguments carefully; I
will only sketch where their weaknesses seem to me to lie.
One argument is according to Rayo and Uzquiano in [RU06, x1.2.1, page
4] supposed to be based on the thought that certain concepts such as 'set'
or 'ordinal' are indenitely extensible. However, the indenite extensibil-
ity of concepts is surely compatible with absolute generality, for absolute
generality is about the interpretation of quantiers, while indenite exten-
sibility is connected with the interpretation of predicates, whose semantic
values concepts are. In fact we need some principle such as the All-in-One
principle in order to get from indenite extensibility to an argument against
the possibility of unrestricted quantication; Rayo and Uzquiano call the
argument based on the All-in-One Principle in [RU06, x1.2.2, page 6] a re-
lated argument, but it is really basically the same argument as the argument
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from indenite extensibility. However, Richard Cartwright has already in
my view shown that we have no reason to accept that principle, so we can
eliminate the rst two of the arguments Rayo and Uzquiano distinguish.
A third argument is supposed (see [RU06, x1.2.3, page 9]) to be an
argument from reconceptualization. This argument is supposed to be based
on ontological relativism of the kind presented by Carnap in [Car50]. I will
present arguments against this kind of relativism in Section 5.9 of this work,
to which I here refer the reader.
The fourth argument is supposed to be based on semantic indeterminacy.
Both the third and the fourth argument are based on the same basic rela-
tivistic ideas derived from Carnap, Putnam and Quine, so I rather doubt if
they can be considered genuinely separate arguments27. However, the con-
clusion of this argument is not so much that all quantication is restricted
but rather that there is no fact of the matter about whether quantication is
restricted or unrestricted28 The premises of the argument prove not only that
we cannot quantify over absolutely everything, but rather that we cannot
quantify determinately over anything at all, i. e. that we cannot quantify
at all. The extreme radicalism of the conclusion of this argument is already
by itself a reason to reject this argument. The argument is self-defeating.
Basically, if the argument were correct we could not talk meaningfully at all
27None of the arguments Rayo and Uzquiano present is said by them to be based directly
on vericationism. Yet the third and fourth arguments have a vericationist background
(as well as a structuralist background) and hence represent a remnant of logical posi-
tivism. This is shown by the fact that Rayo and Uzquiano refer to Hilary Putnam's
article [Put80] as one of the writings in which the fourth argument is set out, and in
this article Putnam explicitly says (on [Put80, page 464]) that he opts for vericationism.
Many absolutely general statements are indeed very likely to be unveriable according to
any strong kind of vericationism; we have seen that even relatively general statement are
unveriable according to very strong kinds of vericationism. It does appear impossible
that the understanding of the truth conditions of absolutely general quantication could
ever be manifested (in the strong sense implying the possibility of conclusive verication of
claims that such quantication is understood). However, we have seen that there are good
arguments against vericationism, so this is no good reason to reject absolute generality.
As we have seen, there are reasons to think that even the understanding of restricted
quantication as standardly conceived could not be manifested, and indeed these reasons
appear to indicate that the understanding of any kind of objectual guantication could
be manifested (in the strong sense) at all.
28Indeed, one of the articles to whom Ray and Uzquiano refer, Quine's [Qui68], clearly
implies that semantic indeterminacy is not incompatible with absolute generality. Quine
argued in [Qui68, pages 202-203] that we had better beware of repudiating universal
predication. Universal predication, however, implies absolutely general quantication, as
universally predicating a predicate P involves quantifying over absolutely everything and
then predicating P of these entities quantied over.
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and could not even formulate the argument itself.
The fth is an argument from sortal quantication; it says that all quan-
tication must be sortally restricted, as there must be a sortal term that
gives an identity criterion for the entities quantied over. This argument is
better than the previous one since it is not obviously self-defeating; how-
ever, it seems again to be question-begging. Michael Jubien argues rather
convincingly in [Jub96] that the demand for identity criteria is ill-conceived
with respect to any entities at all. Obviously if he is correct the argument
from sortal quantication collapses rather dramatically. However, even if we
admit that all entities must have a criterion of identity, we can hold that we
can quantify over entities that have a criterion of identity without explicitly
mentioning this criterion of identity. The idea that quantication can be
unrestricted or absolute is linked, as e.g. Timothy Williamson has argued
in [Wil06], to the idea that identity can be absolute. Many philosophers
who think all entities must have an identity criterion yet agree that identity
can be absolute and not just relative to sorts. David Wiggins, for example,
has held this kind of position in [Wig01, pages 22-24]; Wiggins distinguishes
from each other two theses, Sortal Dependency of Individuation and Rel-
ativity of Identity, and argues that the rst is correct but the second is
false. However, only the second, Relativity of Identity, would be incompati-
ble with absolutely general quantication. Therefore if either of Jubien's or
Wiggins's very dierent views are correct then the fourth argument fails. I
cannot here go deeper into the semantics of sortals or the problem of identity
criteria, but this suces to show that there are principled reasons to doubt
the validity of the fourth argument.
5.7 Explicating Quine's criterion: Dierent Kinds
of Ontological Commitment
We have seen that Quine's suggestion can be motivated historically. How-
ever, this does not suce to dissipate all problems relating to it, since the
suggestion must be claried. Quine's formulations suer from at least three
dierent kinds of obscurity or non-equivalence: it is obscure whether the cri-
terion concerns explicit or implicit commitment, it is obscure what kinds of
entities carry commitments and nally, most seriously, it is obscure whether
the whole criterion is a syntactic or a semantic criterion. Indeed, Quine's
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formulations do not even make it fully clear whether his theory is a metaon-
tological theory or a rst-level ontological theory, since some of his formula-
tions suggest that his theory would be a theory of being or existence rather
than of ontological commitment.
As Charles S. Chihara has shown in [Chi74, page 71], Quine says some-
times that his criterion is a criterion for determining what a theory presup-
poses there is, at other times that it is a criterion for determining what a
theory implies there is and at others that it is a criterion for determining
what a theory says there is. As Chihara says, these are in general dierent
things. We can say that an assertion or sentence is explicitly committed
to some entities if it says that there are such entities, but a theory or an
assertion is implicitly committed to some entities if it implies or presupposes
that there are such entities29. I will be interpreting the potentially ambigu-
ous statement that an assertion says something very strongly, so that if an
assertion says something then its explicit ontological commitments will be
immediately clear to anyone who can understand the statement; he will not
even have to perform any deductive reasoning to nd them out. I will not be
making a sharp distinction between the two kinds of implicit presupposition,
the case where an assertion implies that there are some entities and the case
where an assertion presupposes that there are some entities. The reason
for this is that while the distinction between implication and presupposition
is important for natural languages, it does not exist in most articial lan-
guages, and the discussion regarding ontological commitment usually takes
place with respect to articial languages such as the language of predicate
logic (and I think that it should take place primarily with regard to them);
however, I will in Section 5.15 address the important and dicult question
of the ontological commitments of natural language assertions, and I will
then look at this distinction. I will suggest that we can nd in Quine both a
29Howard Peacock has also stressed the importance of a distinction between explicit
and implicit ontological commitment in [Pea11]. However, Peacock does not understand
quite the same distinction with these words than I do. Peacock says in [Pea11, page 80]
that whether a fragment of language bears explicit ontological commitment depends on
the beliefs and intentions with which it is used. Peacock himself notes in [Pea11, page
85] that the property of being explicitly committing (in his sense of the words) is not a
semantic property. Peacock therefore uses the words "explicit ontological commitment"
to refer to what I will call pragmatic ontological commitment. However, I intend to use
both words to stand for varieties of semantic ontological commitment, so that neither the
explicit nor the implicit commitment carried by a sentence depends on the beliefs and
intentions with which it is used but only on the semantic rules of the language.
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criterion for explicit commitment and a criterion for implicit commitment;
however, these cannot be the same criterion. They must be distinguished
from each other more carefully than Quine himself did. I will give deni-
tions for both explicit and implicit ontological commitment. I will divide
implicit ontological commitment further into formally implicit and mate-
rially implicit ontological commitment based on whether the implication
or presupposition in question is purely formal, logical implication or some
weaker kind of implication, material or analytical implication. I will further
distinguish dierent kinds of materially implicit ontological commitment.
Quine's formulations are unclear even with regard to what it is that he
is trying to explicate. Quine is not quite consistent regarding what kind of
entities have ontological commitments. In dierent places he gives dierent
suggestions about what entities carry commitments. Quine often speaks
about people being committed to something, and this suggests what can
be called ontological commitment in a pragmatic sense. However, according
to [Qui53b, page 103] the criterion applies primarily to discourse rather than
men; according to a famous and relatively clear formulation,
entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if
some of them must be counted among the values of its variables
in order that the statements armed in the theory be true.
Sometimes semantical and pragmatical ontological commitment are distin-
guished by the use of dierent verbal forms; philosophers often speak of
people being committed to some entities but statements carrying commit-
ment to some entities. I will follow this practice most of the time; however,
it must be recognized that it is not the only legitimate way of using these
expressions. Quine and philosophers purporting to follow him also apply
the criterion to individual sentences or assertions besides full theories. It is
surely not impossible that all of these entities would have ontological com-
mitments in some sense, but it seems unlikely that so dierent entities could
have ontological commitments in exactly the same sense. Also such words
as "theory" or "assertion" can be used in dierent senses. Quine, however,
does not investigate the relationship between these concepts of ontological
commitment at any length, and we can argue that because of this he does
not avoid confusing them with each other30.
30There are also other suggested carriers of ontological commitment that Quine does not
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Theories are usually understood31 to be logically closed sets32 of state-
ments33. Not every such set, however, is plausibly called a theory; a theory
is more plausibly the logical closure of a set of statements all of which have
been asserted or believed in by some person or group of persons34. This
even consider, because his philosophy as a whole is hostile to them, such as propositions;
I will later touch upon this possibility in a later note.
31E. g. already in [Car48, x9, page 34] Carnap says that
a theory may be regarded as the class (in general transnite) of all those
sentences which are deducible from a given nite set of sentences, e. g.
physical laws.
.
32In saying this I am not committing myself to the Received View; I suppose that a
theory will have to be totally interpreted, not just partially, and I am not supposing
that it would have to be axiomatizable in extensional rst-order logic, but allow it to be
formulated in higher-order and intensional languages. Nor is it necessary to even think
that a theory would have to be axiomatizable at all; the demand of logical closure could
be formulated in fully semantical terms, so that if T is a theory and  2 T , and  j=  ,
then  2 T . A theory could also be taken to be a set of propositions; however, this would
make it easier to formulate the theory of ontological commitment, and I will here try to
carry through the harder task of formulating the theory so that even those who do not
believe in the existence of propositions could accept it.
33The demand of logical closure is probably in the end too strong; however, it is a useful
or perhaps even necessary idealisation when we begin to develop the theory of ontological
commitment. After all, scientic theories are commonly understood as logically closed in
the philosophy of science and the ontological commitments of scientic theories are surely
among the most important of ontological commitments, even if they are not the only im-
portant ones as Quine himself thought. However, the assumption of the closure of scientic
theories notoriously causes many problems in the philosophy of science (even when explic-
itly ontological questions are not addressed), and for similar reasons it causes problems
also for the theory of ontological commitment. Just as an inconsistent sentence according
to classical logic logically implies all sentences, so the assumption of logical closure leads
us to suppose that an inconsistent theory carries implicit ontological commitment to all
(possible and even impossible) kinds of entities. However, there surely appears to be a
sense in which even an inconsistent statement or theory carries implicit ontological com-
mitment to some entities but not to all entities. Nevertheless, it has proved dicult to nd
any viable alternative to the view of theories as logically closed. It is of course possible
to take theories to be just arbitrary (and naturally nite) sets of statements without any
closure at all, and my theory of ontological commitments can easily handle such a view
of theories, since in this case the set of the ontological commitments of a theory could
just be identied with the set of the explicit ontological commitments of all its sentences.
However, this view probably would individuate theories too nely, confusing a formulation
of a theory with that theory itself. It might be best to use some kind of paraconsistent
or relevant logic, and it is surely possible to dene a weaker concept of implicit ontolog-
ical commitments than the one I dene in this dissertation by using a paraconsistent or
relevant notion of logical implication instead of classical logical implication. However, I
cannot go any deeper into this problem in this dissertation.
34Often it is also demanded that it be the closure of a big set of statements; paradigmatic
examples of theories are such big theories as the Newtonian theory or the Theory of
Relativity. There are many dierent theories about how big a theory would have to
be, but none of them seem plausible to me. Strong semantic holists would say that
the minimal unit of meaning is the entire set of all statements believed in by a person or
300
suggests a connection between statements (or sentences) and theories; to
every statement and every sentence there corresponds a miniature theory,
namely its logical closure. This can be used to yield a connection between
the ontological commitments of theories and statements; a statement carries
(implicit) commitment to some entities if and only if the theory which is its
logical closure carries ontological commitment to them and a theory car-
ries ontological commitment to some entities if and only if some statement
contained in it carries (explicit) ontological commitment to them.
Ontological commitment in a pragmatic sense diers more from these
two notions than they do from each other. However, pragmatic ontological
commitment can also be understood in dierent senses. In one sense a person
can be said to be ontologically committed to some entities if some statement
he makes seriously or some theory he supports carries commitment to them
when it is interpreted in the standard way. In another sense a person can be
said to be ontologically committed to some entities if some statement which
he makes would carry commitment to them if it were interpreted as he
intends to interpret it. These notions of pragmatic ontological commitment
can diverge when a person misunderstands the language he is using. In a
third sense we can also speak of pragmatic ontological commitment carried
by conversational implicatures.
It must be noted that it follows from this denition that a person need
not always be ontologically committed in the pragmatic sense to entities to
which a statement he utters caries ontological commitment semantically, if
he does not make that utterance seriously (as is also stressed by Michaelis
Michael in [Mic08, pages 57-59]. For example, if the person is acting in a
group of persons. However, since such strong semantic holism is very implausible (as I have
already argued) we can ignore this demand (and indeed we must, since such a holism would
make it impossible to develop any semantic theory, whether of ontological commitments
or anything else). Quine himself in his latest period would have thought that only a set
of sentences that implies observation categoricals is a theory; however, this was due to his
vericationism, which I have argued we should abandon, so this does not seem to me to
be good reason to restrict theories in this way. Sometimes theories are only understood as
sets of statements concerning unobservable entities, as in the common contrast between
observational and theoretical; however, this restricted use of the word is not suitable for my
purposes here. Observation sentences themselves clearly carry ontological commitments
to observable entities, whether physical entities, mental states or sense-data. Another
common restriction of the word "theory" is to sets of statements containing synthetic
statements; however, we surely often speak about mathematical theories, which according
to many philosophical accounts consist solely of analytical statements. I will not be using
the word in this restricted sense either.
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stage play or movie, then it is not he or she, but the ctional character
he plays, who is committed to those entities. An example that is impor-
tant to the philosophy of science is that someone who interprets a scientic
theory instrumentalistically need not be ontologically committed to the en-
tities to which the theory carries ontological commitment; for instance, van
Fraasseen is not committed to the entities to which physical theories carry
ontological commitments, though he in some weak sense accepts those theo-
ries. As we have seen, Quine himself gave an instrumentalistic interpretation
to scientic theories in [Qui53e], so even though he thought that scientic
theories carried ontological commitment to physical objects and classes, he
was not at that stage of his philosophical development committed to these
entities, though there are plenty of indications that he later rejected this
instrumentalism and became so committed.
This may not be a complete division of the senses of pragmatic ontolog-
ical commitment or fully adequate even so far as it goes; however, I cannot
here go deeper into the pragmatics of ontological commitment.
Quine's famous slogan - to be is to be a value of a bound variable -
might suggest that Quine's theory would be a denition of what being itself
is. However, it is clear that if Quine's slogan were interpreted in this way,
it would be circular; according to the theory itself the indenite article "a"
already expresses being, so the notion of being would occur in the deniens
as well as the deniendum. It is rather clear that Quine did not intend his
slogan to be a denition, analysis or explication; he says in [Qui69, page
97] that it is unreasonable to ask for an explication of existence in simpler
terms. Besides, the slogan suggests that the notion of being would be a
semantical notion, which is clearly incorrect, so the slogan is defective even
if not taken as a denition.
In fact Quine's theory implies a kind of theory of being or existence, but
it is better expressed slightly dierently than the slogan would suggest. I
will suggest a new slogan that may be less misleading. Rather than saying
that to be is to be a value of a bound variable, we should say that to be is
to be something. This saying can be motivated by Quine's own words; e. g.
he says in [Qui69, page 94] that "a is" is short for "a is something".More
specically, to exist is to be identical with something. However, this slogan,
like all slogans, is yet not free from ambiguity (as the notion of"something"
can be understood either objectually or substitutionally or in other ways),
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and is no substitute for a technical theory.
The notion of something, the notion of particular quantication, must
itself be taken as a primitive; any attempt to dene it would lead to cir-
cularity. In a way then being itself must be taken as a primitive, since the
theory holds it is the same as the notion of particular quantication.
5.8 Justication of Ontological Commitments and
Pragmatism
As Quine himself emphasised in [Qui53d, page 16], his criterion of ontological
commitment is meant for the recognising of the ontological commitment of
discourse, and is separable35 from his views of how to adjudicate between
rival ontologies, i. e. of how ontological commitment is to be justied36.
Quine claims in [Qui53d, page 16] that we adopt, so far as we are reasonable,
the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw
experience can be tted and arranged.
The presupposition here that our experience is disordered and fragmen-
tary is phenomenologically quite dubious, and suggestive of an unattractive
constructivist view according to which we impose upon the world what order
there is in it, which ts badly with the scientic realism Quine adhered to in
other writings. Surely there is at least some order already given to us in our
experience and not just imposed upon it. Nevertheless, Quine's basic idea
is quite plausible, if taken in the form that we adopt the simplest theory in
which our experience can be further ordered, though even in that form far
from uncontroversial37. A philosopher could quite consistently agree with
35This claim of separability is important, as it clearly separates semantic and epistemo-
logical questions relating to ontological commitment, and so escapes the confusion between
semantic and epistemological questions that was characteristic of logical positivism. How-
ever, it does not really t well together with Quine's semantic holism, which reects the
part of Quine's philosophy still indebted to logical positivism. Semantic holism implies
that we might change our views of the ontological commitments of discourse in order to
preserve our views of how to adjudicate between rival ontologies, but by separating these
questions Quine here rejects this implication of his semantic holism.
36Jody Azzouni distinguishes in several writings between criteria for what a discourse
is committed to and criteria for what exists, devoting separate chapters for these two
themes in [Azz04]. This seems very similar to Quine's distinction; however, may not be
quite the same. Quine's criteria for adjudicating between rival ontologies are epistemic,
but as Azzouni stresses, his criteria for what exists are purely metaphysical. There are
then three kinds of criteria that might be distinguished.
37I have argued that the Eleatic principle is best understood as a principle how to
303
Quine's view of how to recognize the ontological commitments of discourse,
while rejecting his view of how to adjudicate between rival ontologies. Quine
himself recognizes that there are dierent types of simplicity which can con-
ict - e. g. the scientic and especially mathematical theories to which
Quine himself is committed are in some ways far from simple, as they pos-
tulate lots of unobservable entities - so even if his answer is acceptable as far
as it goes it is far from a complete answer. I would say rather that we adopt
the ontology which is most likely to be true on the basis of our experience.
I will come back to this question in Section 6.1 of this work.
In later articles Quine held the view that decision between rival ontolo-
gies is to be done on pragmatic criteria. E.g. in [Qui53a, page 79] he said
that our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme must
be a pragmatic standard. This is often taken to be an essential part of his
theory of ontological commitment. However, there is no mention of pragma-
tism in [Qui53d], and this view can be taken as an afterthought of Quine's
which can be separated from the main body of Quine's theory of ontological
commitment, from both of the two parts of his theory I distinguished above.
At least we have been given no reason to think that the use of simplicity
in adopting our theory would be necessarily connected to the use of a prag-
matic standard. The simplest theory consistent with our experience can yet
contain many statements which are of no practical importance.
Though Quine refers to pragmatism approvingly in many places, it is
yet not sure that he really was a pragmatist. It has been argued (e. g. by
Heikki J. Koskinen and Sami Pihlstrom in [KP06]) that Quine himself was
not clear what it means to he a pragmatist, and that he cannot be classied
as a pragmatist in any strong historical sense. Quine's pragmatism, as evi-
denced in passages such as the one I have referred to, diers in an important
way from traditional pragmatism. Quine presents it as an epistemological or
methodological principle, not a semantic one, as James's pragmatist theory
of truth (as seen in [Jam48]) and Peirce's pragmatist criterion of meaning
(as presented in [Pei78]) were. Quine's own disquotational theory of truth
diers from a pragmatic theory of truth. This makes Quine's pragmatism
more defensible than the traditional pragmatic theories (or than the verica-
adjudicate between rival ontologies. However, if is so understood, then the philosophers
holding it would not be satised with Quine's answer. The simplest conceptual scheme
into which our experience can be arranged might contain many entities without causal
powers.
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tionism I have argued Quine himself advocated in [Qui53e]). Nevertheless, I
would not be willing to subscribe to it. One big problem with Quine's prag-
matism is that if taken as a criterion for the justication of all ontological
commitments it carries the risk of circularity; in order to know the accep-
tance of what theories is useful for us, we must know the truth of at least
some theories, namely theories concerning experience, and in this case we
must already be able to justify some ontological commitments, namely com-
mitments to observable entities, whatever they are. At most a pragmatic
criterion could justify our commitments to theoretical entities.
It is sometimes suggested that Quine's espousal of pragmatist ideas some-
how makes his view anti-metaphysical. Huw Price has used this kind of
argument in many articles; e. g. he says in [Pri09, page 327]:
Quine's criticism of Carnap cannot provide vindication of tra-
ditional metaphysics, for if all issues are ultimately pragmatic,
there can't be the more-than-pragmatic issue of the kind the
metaphysician requires.
However, I will argue that there is nothing anti-metaphysical in pragmatism
as such, if the word "pragmatic" is understood at all in the sense it is
ordinarily used in philosophy. Therefore even if Quine was a pragmatist,
this would not prevent him from vindicating metaphysics.
Peirces's pragmatic criterion of meaning as presented in [Pei78] is indeed
highly similar to the vericationist criterion; such formulations as
Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible eects
in (CP5.401) (collected in [Pei92, page 132]) make this very clear (though it
is not clear whether strong formulations such as this are consistent with all
of Peirce's other opinions or whether Peirce may not have rejected such a
strong criterion at other times of his philosophical development). However,
the pragmatic criterion was generally used by pragmatists not to condemn
all metaphysics as such, as logical positivists used the vericationist crite-
rion, but rather to argue for a certain variety of metaphysics, as such his-
torians of vericationism as Misak recognize (see [Mis95, pages 118-119]).
I have already argued that even the vericationist criterion of logical pos-
itivists rather implied a certain kind of metaphysics than condemned all
metaphysics, as indeed such later philosophers as Bergmann and Dummett
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recognized; however, in the case of the pragmatists there is no need to argue
this, as they themselves recognized this from the start, unlike the logical
positivists.
Several classical pragmatists like Peirce and James engaged in extensive
metaphysical speculation and were if anything willing to indulge in what
most analytical metaphysicians would consider too far-fetched metaphysical
speculations, such as Peirce's evolutionary metaphysics (with doctrines such
as tychism, synechism and agapism) in writings such as a series of articles on
metaphysics and cosmogony in the journal Monist, including [Pei83] or the
panpsychist cosmology at least considered seriously in James's [Jam09]38.
The attitude of classical pragmatists toward metaphysics may indeed have
vacillated between more and less favourable, but it is by no means clear that
their more hostile statements would be more faithful to the true essence of
pragmatism than the more friendly ones. Many modern pragmatists are
also committed to taking metaphysics seriously, as seen for example in Sami
Pihlstrom's pragmatist metaphysics in [Pih09]. Pihlstrom argues at length
for the compatibility of pragmatism with metaphysics in [Pih09] as well as
together with Koskinen in [KP06]. William T. Myers has also argued for the
compatibility of metaphysics and pragmatism in [Mye04], opposing Charlene
Haddock Seigfried, who claimed in [Sei01] that pragmatists should get rid
of the word "metaphysics". There have indeed been pragmatists who have
been hostile to metaphysics39, but this is clearly not something that would
38Peirce often defended or presupposed panpsychism, an idealistic theory, e. g. remind-
ing us in (6.301) (see [Pei83, page 187] and [Pei92, page 361]) that all matter is really mind,
as if this was well known to the reader. James also initially inclined towards idealism; he
criticized in the second and third lecture of [Jam09] the kind of monistic idealism that
had ruled Anglo-Saxon philosophy and that Russell and Moore had also criticized, but
instead of replacing it with realism he instead argued in favour of a pluralistic idealism.
He discussed at length in the fourth lecture of [Jam09] a panpsychist theory propounded
by the German metaphysician Fechner and considered it (if made slightly more pluralistic
still) at least probable. However, James's [Jam22] instead followed the early logical posi-
tivists in defending neutral monism as the solution to the problem of the relation between
mind and matter. James talked of a world of pure experience, using the phrase coined by
Richard Avenarius. I have already argued that neutral monism is a metaphysical theory,
so both of James's theories count as denitely metaphysical. William T. Myers compares
James's metaphysics to Whitehead's process metaphysics in [Mye04]; this holds more of
James's earlier than his lattr theory.
39John Dewey was more wary of metaphysics than the other three major classical prag-
matists, but even he at times presented a metaphysics of experience, e. g. in [Dew29].
Richard Rortys views are often given as an example of pragmatism's hostility to meta-
physics. However, many philosophers have challenged Rorty's claim to represent the
pragmatist tradition. E. g. Susan Haack (who is herself in the pragmatist tradition) de-
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follow from their pragmatism as such but from principles specic to their
peculiar form of pragmatism. There is therefore no reason to think that a
metaphysician as such would require a more than pragmatic vindication of
any (metaphysical or physical) theory40. Therefore even if pragmatism were
considered an essential part of Quine's theory of ontological commitment,
this would do nothing to prevent Quine's theory from providing vindication
of metaphysics, contrary to what Price without any justication presup-
poses41.
However, while pragmatism has never been opposed to metaphysics as
such, pragmatism has indeed been generally associated with the rejection of
a realistic metaphysics and the acceptance of a non-realist metaphysics42.
Such modern pragmatist metaphysicians as Pihlstrom explicitly oppose re-
alism (or at least strong forms of realism such as metaphysical realism, but
it can be argued that weaker forms of realism such as Putnam's internal
realism are not genuinely realistic). There have indeed been philosophers
who have tried to reconcile pragmatism with realism - Peirce's version of
nies in [Haa09, chapter 9, pages 239-261] that Rorty would be a descendant of classical
pragmatists, and calls his view vulgar pragmatism.
40Nevertheless, Quine's criticism of Carnap may not suce for the vindication of meta-
physics; I will argue later in Subsection 5.9.2 of this dissertation that it will have to be
supplemented with additional considerations directed against Carnap's relativism. Also
the dierences of Carnap and Quine in their attitude to ontology did not depend essen-
tially on their views about analyticity, as Price supposes, bur rather on their dierent
theories of quantication, as I will show in the same section.
41One complication is that in one passage to which Price refers Quine is not formulating
a pragmatic idea, as Price claims, but an instrumentalist one (concerning the justica-
tion of claims about physical objects and classes). Instrumentalism is not the same as
pragmatism, but rather incompatible with at least the most famous forms of pragmatism.
An instrumentalist about a theory says that the theory is useful but not literally true.
However, a pragmatist - in the common sense of one that accepts the pragmatic theory
of truth - would say that there is no distinction between useful and literally true theories,
since according to that theory truth just is usefulness. Price seems then to confuse instru-
mentalism with pragmatism, and it is possible that the same confusion already existed in
Quine, unless Quine vacillated between the two views. However, it would make no sense to
be an instrumentalist about all possible theories, for if it makes sense to call some theories
mere instruments, other possible theories must be more than instruments. Even in his
instrumentalist mood Quine implicitly presupposed an ontology of sense-data as literally
true, so that even then he presupposed a metaphysical theory.
42Therefore Price's claim might be justied if he understood "traditional" metaphysics
so narrowly that it only covered such old realistic metaphysics as the basically realist Aris-
totelian tradition. However, that would be an unnaturally narrow use of the word; surely
such non-realistic metaphysics as post-Kantian German idealism (which already usually
had a pragmatic character as it commonly relied on the Kantian concept of practical rea-
son while denying Kant's strict division between theoretical and practical reason) would
generally be taken as instances of traditional metaphysics.
307
pramatism, pragmaticism, especially has often been seen as close to scien-
tic realism - but it is controversial how far such an attempt can succeed.
Such statements of Peirce as the above quoted formulation of the pragmatist
criterion of meaning obviously pose a diculty for such a project, though it
is possible to argue that Peirce's views changed and some of them are more
reconcilable with scientic realism than others. Quine's appeal to pragma-
tism is indeed weaker than the traditional pragmatism, as I have argued
above, being epistemological rather than semantic, so it might be compat-
ible with realism even if traditional pragmatism is not. However, if this is
not the case, a realistic metaphysician may indeed want to reject this part
of Quine's theory. Nor is there any reason why he could not do this while
retaining Quine's criterion for the ontological commitments of discourse.
5.9 Objectual and Non-objectual Quantication
The last obscurity in Quine's formulations is most crucial. When Quine says
that the use of bound variables is the criterion of ontological commitment, he
seems to suggest that the criterion is syntactic, since the notion of a bound
variable is most naturally understood as syntactic. Quine's criterion of on-
tological commitment is often called a syntactic criterion and e. g. Jody
Azzouni in [Azz04, page 50] argued for a syntactic criterion43. However,
the notion of ontological commitment is clearly on the face of it semantic
(if not pragmatical), and there are obvious reasons to doubt whether it can
be reduced to syntactic notions. There are also reasons to doubt whether
Quine himself seriously meant for the criterion to be purely syntactic, since
in other places Quine himself uses semantical notions in formulating the cri-
terion, e. g. when he says that to be assumed as an entity is to be reckoned
as the value of a variable. Indeed; but every syntactically bound variable
need not have any value. A quantier binding a variable syntactically can
be interpreted substitutionally as well as objectually. Variables bound by
43Azzouni has an argument of his own for taking the criterion to be syntactic. He
argues that Quine's criterion is supposed to apply to discourses regardless of whether
we take them as true, and to the extent that interpretation or translation of a discourse
requires agreement, a syntactic criterion suits the demand perfectly. However, I do not
see any reasons to think that interpretation would require agreement to any signicant
extent. The view that it would require it seems to derive from a semantic holism based on
vericationism such as I have already argued (along with such philosophers as Fodor and
LePore) to be absurd. Therefore the criterion can be semantic and yet apply to discourses
we take to be false.
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a substitutional quantier need not have any values; as Quine himself has
argued (in [Qui69, page 106]), we can well quantify substitutionally over
parentheses, but parentheses obviously need not have any semantical val-
ues. Substitutionally quantied variables must have substitution instances,
but this is a very dierent thing from semantical values even in the case of
variables which have both. For instance, when we write that some man is
mortal, (9x)(Man(x)^Mortal(x)), then Napoleon is a value of the quanti-
ed variable, but the name "Napoleon" or some other symbol for Napoleon
is its substitution instance. These are very dierent things; Napoleon is a
man but the name "Napoleon" or other symbol for Napoleon is not a man.
As e. g. Ruth Barcan Marcus has argued in [Mar72] and Dale Gottlieb
in [Got76], we are ontologically committed to what we quantify over only if
the quantication we use is objectual and not substitutional. Marcus and
Gottlieb hope to use this insight to escape apparent ontological commitments
by arguing that the quantication used in natural languages or sciences could
be interpreted as substitutional; however, it is separate question whether this
is possible44.
Marcus's and Gottlieb's suggested addition to Quine's criterion does not
really constitute a revision of Quine's theory but rather a clarication of it;
Quine himself often made clear (e. g. in his reply to Ruth Barcan Mar-
cus in [Qui66b, pages 180-182]) that he took quantication to be objectual.
He also made clear in [Qui69] that he did not think substitutional quan-
tication could serve as an account of being. However, such followers of
44Gottlieb tries to show that quantication over numbers is substitutional. However,
he admits in [Got76, page 643, fn. 10] that on his interpretation of arithmetical sentences
some standardly false atomic sentences may come out true, depending upon the size of
the universe. This clearly implies that he does not give the ontological commitments of
arithmetical theories which are commonly held to be true, but rather replaces the standard
arithmetical theories with new theories which have very dierent ontological commitments.
We may of course ask whether the new theory is preferable to the old one, and if it is
then we should follow its ontological commitments rather than those of the old theory.
However, showing that the new theory is better would not be simple, but would require
showing (at the very least) that it is sucient for the needs of science. Also even if such a
new theory would be sucient for the purposes it is supposed to serve, yet we could ask
whether we could not replace our existing theories of arithmetic with new ones without
changing quantication to substitutional. it might be that a theory in which quantication
remained objectual but the quantied sentences were dierent would be just as good a
replacement for old theories. Gottlieb would also have to show that this was not so in
order to show that exchanging objectual quantication for substitutional is of any use
in the philosophy of mathematics, something he certainly does not do in the article in
question.
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Quine's metaontology as Peter van Inwagen have occasionally suggested (e.
g. in [vI01, pages 32-36] and in [vI04, page 124]) that the whole notion of
substitutional quantication would be meaningless or unintelligible. In this
van Inwagen diers from Quine, who held (in [Qui66b, page 180]) that in-
terpreting quantiers as substitutional is an intelligible reinterpretation. In
this I think Quine is right and van Inwagen is wrong; while substitutional
quantication and other kinds of non-objectual quantication are arguably
less important and less fundamental than objectual quantication, they are
also meaningful. Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the quan-
tication used in natural languages is at least sometimes (though certainly
not always and probably not very often) substitutional. As Saul Kripke
says in [Kri76, page 375], attacking Davidsonian opponents of substitutional
quantication, we can combine substitutional quantication with referential
(i. e. objectual) in a single system45. Naturally we can also combine ob-
jectual quantication with other kinds of non-objectual quantication. I
will later show that doing so will help to address some of the oldest and
most bothersome, though perhaps not most profound ontological problems,
solving them or perhaps rather banishing them as pseudo-problems (a kind
of solution I do not think to work in the case of most ancient ontological
problems, most of which I think are quite genuine).
Though the restriction to objectual quantication was implicit from the
beginning in Quine's theory, someone might yet worry that this restriction
45Many other philosophers agree with Kripke that we can combine objectual and sub-
stitutional quantication into a single system. As we have already seen Dorothy Grover
in the course of developing a prosentential theory of truth in [Gro92, x22.3, page 252]
develops a language M2 in which there are both substitutional and domain-and-values
(i. e. objectual) quantiers. Grover uses also propositional quantiers and thinks that
they can always be substitutional; I have argued that she is wrong in this and that this
is a stumbling block for her whole theory of truth. However, with respect to individual
quantiers she admits both substitutional and objectual quantiers. She says, however,
something weird about their relationship in [Gro92, x2.4, page 255]; she says that
one can be dened in terms of the other, but not conversely; but neither is
"required" in giving the truth-conditions of the other. Nor is either philo-
sophically more basic.
If one concept can be dened in terms of the other but not conversely, then surely in
such cases the concept that cannot be dened in terms of the other is conceptually more
basic, according to a very common denition of conceptual basicness. Since as she agrees
substitutional quantiers can be dened in terms of objectual ones but not conversely, this
suces to make objectual quantication more basic. Of course, if objectual quantiers
were required in giving the truth-conditions of substitutional quantiers (as many other
philosophers have argued) this would make them more basic in a stronger sense; however,
this is not required to make them more basic in a weak sense.
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makes Quine's criterion of ontological commitment circular. Can objectual
quantication be distinguished from other kinds of quantication without
appealing to ontological commitment and saying that it is the kind of quan-
tication which involves ontological commitment? If it could not then the
criterion would certainly be circular; we would dene ontological commit-
ment with the aid of objectual quantication and objectual quantication
with the aid of ontological commitment. However, I will argue that there
is no real circularity. Objectual quantication can be distinguished from
substitutional by the fact that objectually quantied statements and substi-
tutionally quantied statements have dierent truth-conditions. Objectually
quantied statements have the truth-conditions that quantied statements
are given in Tarski's theory of truth, and these do not involve any appeal
to the notion of ontological commitment. The objectuality of existential
quantiers can be easily dened for standard extensional languages.
I will in what follows be using x; y; z; : : : ; x1; x2; : : : ; y1; y2; : : : as vari-
ables in the language of the rst level (the object language) and ; ; ; : : : ;
1; 2; : : : ; 1; 2; : : : as metavariables, i. e. variables of the language of
the second level (the metalanguage), except in some special cases. Such
special cases will be variables of the second level language ranging over pos-
sible worlds (w; v; u; : : : ; w1; w2; : : : ; v1; v2; : : :) and functions - such as assign-
ments - (f; g; h; : : : ; f1; f2; : : : ; g1; g2; : : :) and relations (R;S; : : : ;R1;R2; : : :)
and models M;N; : : : ;M1;M2; : : :). . .
46.
Metadenition 1 An (unrestricted) existential quantier (91x) is objec-
tual if and only if for any formula  and any assignment g, (91x) is true
with respect to g if and only if there is such an  that  is true with re-
spect to g(=x), the assignment that is otherwise the same as g except that
g(=x)(x) = .
Since universal quantiers can be dened with the aid of existential ones,
this denition naturally also determines when a universal quantier is ob-
jectual; a universal quantier is objectual i the existential quantier with
whose aid it is dened in the standard way is objectual.
46Actually the kind of quantication employed here is absolutely general unrestricted
quantication, so the "individual" variables are interpreted as variables ranging over ev-
erything, not just over some special ontological category of individuals, and thus they can
also have as values possible worlds or functions; however, specic variables will be used
when I am quantifying restrictedly over world or functions.
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The purpose of this denition may become clearer if we dene exactly
a quantier which is not objectual. The only non-objectual quantier that
is generally recognized is the substitutional quantier. In order to dene
substitutional quantiers we must, as Kripke has shown, select a class of
expressions in the object language called the substitution class; in order to
avoid circularity this class must not itself have as a member any expres-
sion containing an occurrence of the substitutional quantier to be dened.
While it is possible to take even brackets as members of the substitution
class, this would be useless, so I will suppose that all the members of the
substitution class are well-formed terms, simple or complex. An existential
quantier (92x) is substitutional and not objectual i for any formula 
and any assignment g, (92x) is true with respect to g i for some term
a, (a=x), the formula derived by replacing every free occurrence of x in 
with the term a belonging to a substitution class C, is true with respect to
the very same assignment47 g. It must be noted that as can be seen from
these denitions, there can be quantiers which are not objectual but are
not substitutional either48.
47In fact the whole relativisation to assignments or sequences is unnecessary if the lan-
guage in which we are working has only substitutional quantiers, and therefore Tarski's
most original idea, satisfaction, also turns out to be wholly useless. Therefore if substitu-
tional quantiers alone would be satisfactory for logic and general semantics, then all of
Tarski's elaborate manoeuvres in his theory of truth would be unnecessary, and we would
end up with a theory of truth very dierent from the Tarskian one. Here we see one
reason, why the viability of the whole Quine-Church theory of ontological commitment is
dependent on the viability of Tarski's theory of truth in a very radical way.
48Someone may yet see a problem here. Tarski's truth-conditions only work if the quan-
tication in the metatheory is objectual, so someone might argue that this already leads
to circularity. Of course, in order to make sure that the quantication in the metatheory
is objectual we can demand in the metatheory of this metatheory that its sentences have
the truth-conditions given in Tarski's theory of truth. However, we can reasonably doubt
that by proceeding like this we would be led to a vicious innite regress, so this is certainly
not an adequate reply to the accusation of circularity.
However, if this objection were correct, then Tarski's whole theory of truth would in-
volve an innite regress and hence be circular. Obviously the same point holds for other
logical constants; for example, Tarski's truth-conditions for disjunction only work if the
disjunction in the metalanguage is ordinary classical disjunction. It is usually supposed
by most philosophers that Tarski's whole theory is not viciously circular.
In fact we may in principle escape the apparent circularity in the denition of ontological
commitment by a slightly complicated procedure of elimination, though this procedure is of
course of no direct practical use. Let us suppose we have - as Tarski's truth-theory supposes
(though there are of course problems about what the supposition really amounts to) -
innite hierarchies of interpreted languages and theories such that the truth-conditions
of the sentences belonging to any language in a hierarchy are always given correctly by a
metatheory formulated in a metalanguage immediately above it in the hierarchy. Now if
all the quantiers in some language in some such hierarchy do not have Tarskian truth-
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However, this raises the question of what is common to all non-objectual
quantiers and more generally what is common to all objectual and sub-
stitutional quantiers - why are they all quantiers? Syntactically, on the
level of formation rules, quantiers are operators which take a variable and
a formula and form another formula, but surely this is not enough for an op-
erator to be a quantier. One might refer to inference rules common to both
kinds of quantiers, such as introduction and elimination rules. However,
since such inference rules cannot distinguish one quantier from another, as
they cannot distinguish objectual quantiers from substitutional ones, it is
doubtful if they could distinguish quantiers from other expressions. Indeed
I will argue that there are quantiers that do not satisfy the usual introduc-
tion and elimination rules but only variants of them. Surely the notion of a
quantier can be dened semantically as well as syntactically.
I suggest that the basic idea is that a non-objectual quantier is an
operator that does implicitly quantify over some entities, but not those
conditions but some more complex ones according to a correct metatheory formulated in
the language immediately above it, such as substitutional ones, then none of the quantiers
belonging to a language below this language in the hierarchy are objectual either (though
they might in some cases be equivalent to objectual ones). If some of the quantiers in a
language have Tarskian truth-conditions and others do not, then we can consider a sub-
language got by eliminating all sentences containing the quantiers whose truth-conditions
are Tarskian. In this way we can eliminate non-objectual quantiers and the remaining
quantiers are objectual and carry ontological commitment.
Of course, this solution presupposes that we have available a notion of correct inter-
pretation, and deeper problems of circularity will inevitably arise with respect to this.
Basically, the answer for such doubts seems to be that a Tarskian semantical theory is not
trying to dene concepts like objectual quantication or classical disjunction (or, if Field
is right, the reference of primitive expressions) in such a way that someone who had no
previous acquaintance with them could come to understand them. It does clarify these
concepts in the passing, but this is just a byproduct (though a very important one for
ontology, since it involves clarifying the very notion of being which is the central notion of
ontology). Such a theory must suppose that we already in some obscure way understand
these concepts, and so have what a hermeneutic theory would call preunderstanding. It is
surely intuitively very plausible that everyone who can use any natural language knows,
even if obscurely, what it is to quantify over such entities as trees or rocks and not only
what it is to quantify over linguistic expressions. What a Tarskian semantical theory is
primarily trying to do is to use this preunderstanding to dene the semantic values of com-
plex expressions - concepts like truth, ontological commitment and the satisfaction and
reference of complex expressions. Our understanding of the semantic values of expressions
belonging to the highest level language of all those we use must then always remain at the
level of a mere preunderstanding and cannot be adequately claried. Of course this ques-
tion needs further discussion, since some philosophers such as radical constructivists and
formalists will not accept the supposition that we understand even obscurely he meaning
of such expressions as the classical disjunction or objectual quantication, but the place
of such discussion is not in this dissertation, since such discussion will best take place in
works concerned with the more fundamental questions of Tarski's theory of semantics.
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which it seems to quantify over on the basis of its syntactic form. This can be
understood so that a non-objectual quantier alters systematically (but only
temporarily) the interpretation of the non-logical constants and syntactical
operations that occur in its scope49. Most especially, predication will mean
dierent things in the scope of such non-objectual quantiers than elsewhere,
because of the intimate connection between existence or quantication and
predication that I already argued for against Lambertus Marie de Rijk.
This makes non-objectual quantiers intensional operators; just as Frege
thought that expressions within the scope of an intensional operator denoted
their usual sense instead of their usual denotatum, so expressions within the
scope of a non-intensional operator denote something other than their usual
denotatum. However, this that they denote can be something other than
their sense, as e. g. in the scope of substitutional quantiers expressions
denote themselves; because of this non-objectual quantiers can be hyper-
intensional operators which create a hyperintensional context (or scope).
If quantication into intensional contexts is to be possible, it is natural to
think that there must also be quantiers that are also intensional operators,
i. e. non-objectual quantiers.
Metadenition 2 An operator (9ix) is an (unrestricted) non-objectual ex-
istential quantier if and only if there is such an interpretation J that for all
formulas  and all assignments g, (9ix) is true with respect to g if and only
if there is such an entity  that  is true with respect to the interpretation
J and the assignment g(=x) and for some formula   is true with respect
to J and the assignment g(=x) but is not true with respect to g(=x) and
every atomic formula p is true with respect to J and the assignment g(=x)
i it is true with respect to I and the assignment g(=x).
Substitutional quantication is clearly a special case of this denition;
in that case singular constants within the scope of an existential quantier
49This could also be understood in model-theoretic terms so that expressions in the
scope of a non-objectual quantier are interpreted with respect to a model even if other
expressions are not, or if the other expressions are interpreted with respect to a model,
then expressions in the scope of a non-objectual quantier are interpreted with respect to
a dierent model. However, if we want to dene an unrestricted non-objectual quantier,
then we cannot use the standard concept of a model with a domain, but must instead
relativise the meaning of formulas within the scope of the non-objectual quantier solely to
interpretations; restrictions on the range of quantication can be expressed as restrictions
on the extensions of predicates.
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denote themselves instead of the entities they usually denote (i. e. they have
what scholastics called material supposition) while a predicate term denotes
such a set of sequences of terms that a sequence of terms belongs to it if
the sequence of their usual denotata belongs to the usual denotatum of the
predicate. The novel interpretation function J interprets expressions so that
if I is the ordinary interpretation (which is part of the object language since
the object language is here supposed to be a totally interpreted language)
then if a is a singular term, then J(a) = a, and for all n-place predicate
constants R and all entities 1; : : : ; n h1; : : : ; ni 2 J(R) i 1; : : : ; n are
expressions of the object language and hI(1); : : : ; I(n)i 2 I(R). I will later
show that other important types of arguably non-objectual quantication
such as Meinongian quantication and perspectival quantication can also
be viewed as special cases of this denition, which will serve to give some
inductive support for the adequacy of the denition.
We can now dene what is common to all quantiers; an operator (9ix)
is an existential quantier if and only if there is such an interpretation J
that for all formulas  and all assignments g, (9ix) is true with respect to g
if and only if there is such an entity  belonging to the domain of the model
that  is true with respect to interpretation J and the assignment g(=x).
This criterion of objectuality can be generalized to more complex lan-
guages than the languages studied by Tarski himself. In intensional lan-
guages such as are generally studied in modern logic, the truth of sentences
is relative to some indices, such as possible worlds, times, contexts etc. An
existential quantier (9ix) in an intensional language is objectual if and only
if for any formula  and any indices i1; : : : ; in and assignment g, (9ix) is
true with respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and assignment g if and only if there
is such an  that  is true with respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and g(=x), the
assignment that is otherwise the same as g except that g(x) = .50.
50Other denitions generalise similarly. An existential quantier (9ix) in an intensional
language is substitutional if and only if for any formula  and any indices i1; : : : ; in and
assignment g, (9ix) is true with respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and assignment g if and
only if i for some term a, (a=x), the formula derived by replacing every free occurrence
of x in  with the term a, is true with respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and g. An operator
(9ix) is an (unrestricted) non-objectual existential quantier if and only if there is such
an interpretation J that for all formulas  and any indices i1; : : : ; in and all assignments
g, (9ix) is true with respect to g if and only if there is such an entity  that  is true
with respect to the interpretation J and any indices i1; : : : ; in and the assignment g(=x)
and for some formula   is true with respect to J and any indices i1; : : : ; in and the
assignment g(=x)but is not true.
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The criterion of objectuality can also be generalized to restricted quan-
tication, though this is less important from the ontological point of view,
since only unrestricted objectual quantiers carry explicit ontological com-
mitments (in the absolute sense; as we will see later, a quantier restricted
to the domain of a model carries ontological commitments relative to that
model). However, since sentences with restricted existential quantiers obvi-
ously imply sentences with unrestricted existential quantiers (since if there
is such an entity  belonging to a set D that , then there is such an entity
 that , and if there is an entity  satisfying the formula  such that ,
there is such an entity  that ), sentences with restricted objectual quanti-
ers carry very obvious implicit ontological commitments, so the denition
of objectuality also matters very much for ontology in the case of restricted
quantiers. A restricted objectual quantier does not range over all entities
but only over the entities contained in some set D or the sets satisfying some
formula . This set may depend on indices - e. g. in Kripke's version of
possible world semantics the domain of quantication varies from world to
world - and it may even depend on assignments if we are to represent en-
dophoric context-dependence as in such systems as dynamic predicate logic
- so I will use the symbol D(i1; : : : ; in; g) for the set of entities existing with
respect to the indices i1; : : : ; in and the assignment g. A restricted existen-
tial quantier (9ix) is objectual if and only if for any formula  and any
indices i1; : : : ; in and assignment g there is such a set D(i1; : : : ; in; g) that
(9ix) is true with respect to these indices i1; : : : ; in and the assignment g
if and only if there is such a  in the set D(i1; : : : ; in; g) that  is true with
respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and g(=x).
It is also easy to extend the denition to languages with several kinds
of variables such as type-theoretic languages or many-sorted languages; in
these cases the values of restricted quantiers ranging over variables of type
a (xa; ya; : : :) must belong to a set Da (which may depend on indices and
assignments so we will speak of Da(i1; : : : ; in; g)). A restricted and typed
existential quantier (9xa) is objectual if and only if for any formula  and
any indices i1; : : : ; in and assignment g there is such a set Da(ii; : : : ; in; g)
of type a that (9xa) is true with respect to these indices i1; : : : ; in and
assignment g if and only if there is such a  in the set Da(i1; : : : ; in; g) that
 is true with respect to indices i1; : : : ; in and g(=xa), the assignment that
is otherwise the same as g except that g(xa) = .
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5.9.1 An Argument for Free Predicate Logic
One reason why the distinction between objectual and non-objectual quan-
tication is important is that neglect of this distinction plays a role in the
famous debate between Quine and Carnap with respect to metaontology.
This debate is generally held to have been won by Quine. However, many
philosophers, such as Huw Price (in articles such as [Pri09] which I have
already referred to), have questioned whether Quine really had valid argu-
ments against Carnap's view and even how far Quine's and Carnap's views
were in conict. I will admit that these philosophers are in part right, as
the particular arguments used by Quine against Carnap e. g. in [Qui51]
are not always impressive, and there are similarities between Carnap's and
Quine's positions. However, I will argue that there are many unclarities and
fallacies in Carnap's arguments, and that Quine's theory provides us with
material for locating them, even if Quine himself did not wholly succeed in
doing so. Furthermore I will argue that so far as Quine's view was similar
to Carnap's it was itself incorrect.
Even great philosophers have made the error of supposing that substi-
tutional quantication would according to Quine involve ontological com-
mitment. I think that Rudolf Carnap's objections to Quine's criterion of
ontological commitment are partly based on this misunderstanding, a mis-
understanding comprehensible in view of Quine's own lack of clarity.
Carnap asked in [Car50] how the acceptance of new kinds of entities is
represented in the language. Carnap remarked explicitly that Quine was
the rst to recognise the importance of the introduction of variables as in-
dicating the acceptance of entities. Carnap thought, however, that such an
introduction of new ways of speaking does not imply any assertion of re-
ality. However, the reason for this appears to be that Carnap thought of
quantication as substitutional.
Carnap said, for example, that the statement "There are numbers." says
no more than that the new system of entities is not empty and that this
is immediately seen from the rule which states that words like "ve" are
substitutable for the new variables. Clearly only substitutionally quantied
statements are such that their truth would follow immediately from a rule of
substitution. The truth of objectually quantied sentences cannot be estab-
lished this easily! The existence of numbers did not follow just from a rule of
substitution in the logicistic systems of Frege or Russell and Whitehead nor
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does it follow from a mere rule of substitution in foundations of mathematics
based on ZF, but requires several controversial axioms, such as the Axiom
of Extensionality, Axiom Schema of Separation and the Power Set Axiom.
Quine would have agreed with Carnap that such substitutionally quantied
statements do not imply any assertion of reality; however, he would have
said (or at least should have said) that such statements do not amount to
the acceptance of new types of entities either.
What this suggests is that the logic of objectual quantication is strictly
speaking51 not standard predicate logic but free predicate logic (or at least
closer to free predicate logic than to standard predicate logic)52.
In a way Quine himself subscribed to free logic and in a way he did not.
Karel Lambert says in [Lam08, page 162] that a free logician unlike Russell
believes proper names and denite descriptions to be singular terms, but un-
like Frege does not take all of them to denote something. Quine notoriously
tended to follow Russell's view, as he did not take such expressions to be
primitive singular terms, but analysed them with the aid of quantiers like
Russell. As Lambert says in [Lam08, page 155], some of the logical systems
propounded by Quine did not contain constant singular terms at all, so free
logic is an expansion of such systems. However, the theorems containing
singular constant symbols as dened expressions at which Quine arrives are
the same as those taken as axioms in free logic, more specically negative
free logic (though not universally free logic). Surely this similarity between
Quine's logics and free logic is at least from Quine's perspective more impor-
tant than the dissimilarity; what symbols are taken as primitives is for him
a rather conventional matter, but what sentences are taken as true is not.
Carnap's logic, however, was closer to standard predicate logic than to free
logic. I will argue that this is the most important reason for the dierent
attitudes of Quine and Carnap to ontology.
Since the logic of objectual quantication is not standard predicate logic
but closer to free predicate logic, the ordinary rule of existential quantica-
tion, ! (9x)(x=a) (where x does not occur free in ), must be replaced
51If as I have argued in Section 3.1.4 of this work logical conventionalism is untenable,
then the question of whether standard or free logic is correct it not a conventional matter.
52See [Nol11] for a brief introduction to free logic. In my view the logic of both restricted
and unrestricted objectual quantication is free logic. The semantics given in introductions
to free logic like [Nol11], however, only apply to (semantically) restricted free logic, since
they presuppose that the quantier must range over some specied domain.
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with the following:
Axiom 4  ^ (9ix)(x = a) ! (9x)(x=a) (where x does not occur free in
).
There are three main kinds of free logic, negative, positive and neuter
free logic. I cannot discuss here in detail which of them is correct, though the
choice between them is important for the theory of ontological commitment.
According to negative free logic every atomic sentence implies existential
generalizations, and therefore negative free logic implies that every atomic
sentence carries ontological commitments (i. e. negative free logic contains
such axioms as (R(t1; : : : ; tn) ! (9xi)(xi = ti), where 1  i  n). This is
probably closest to Quine's own views53.
There are some other axioms common to all forms of free logic:
Axiom 5 ! (8x).
Axiom 6 (8x)(!  )! ((8x)! (8x) ).
Axiom 7 (8x), where (t=x) is an axiom.
Carnap's article appears to contain a further misinterpretation of Quine's
theory (which however is excused by unclarity on the part of Quine). The
mere introduction of new variables, or any new expressions as well-formed
expressions does not yet involve a person in ontological commitment in
Quine's view, as Carnap assumes, only the assertion of a sentence in which
such variables occur bound by an existential quantier does. The mere fact
that one uses a language in which a sentence of the form (9ix)M is well-
formed does not involve one in any ontological commitments to such entities
that M even if the quantier (9ix) is objectual. Only the assertion of the
53We must in any case have some rules which allow us to infer existentially quantied
sentences from atomic sentences, if we are to be justied in asserting existentially quanti-
ed sentences at all. One option is that these are formal rules applicable to every atomic
sentence; this option leads to negative free logic. In this case such predicates as "ctional"
or "imagined", which are syntactically atomic in natural languages, must be treated as
complex predicates in predicate logical regimentations of natural languages. Another op-
tion is that such rules are material meaning postulates applying only to atomic sentences
whose predicates are some specic predicates, often called existence-involving predicates.
Quine, of course, would not have liked this option because he was suspicious of analyticity
and hence of meaning postulates in general. I will, however, leave here open the dicult
question which of these options is better.
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sentence (9ix)M (where (9ix) is objectual) as part of one's theory - whether
as an axiom of a theorem, if the theory is axiomatized - involves one in
ontological commitments to such entities that M54. Carnap then commits
the same mistake here as we have seen Gustav Bergmann did.
5.9.2 Carnap's Relativistic Distinction between Internal and
External Questions
The error pointed above undermines also Carnap's famous arguments for a
distinction between internal and external questions. This is an important
point, since this distinction is one of the most important means used to
attack metaphysics today, so I must dwell on it for a bit.
Carnap dened these two kinds of questions with the aid of the concept
of a linguistic framework. Carnap's denitions of these concepts are obscure
in many ways, which is unusual for a philosopher like Carnap who is usually
very clear - perhaps his hatred for metaphysics clouded his reasoning. This
obscurity has infected innumerable, perhaps even most, metaontological de-
bates of current philosophy with obscurity. Carnap called a system of new55
ways of speaking, subject to rules a linguistic framework. Carnap divided
frameworks into logical and factual ones.
The rst and basic obscurity in Carnap's denition of the notion of a
framework and of the two kinds of questions is that it is not at all clear
what kind of rules Carnap meant. There are dierent kinds of rules that
might be relevant here; the rules could be understood as syntactic, semantic
or epistemic rules, and if they were syntactic rules they could be formation
rules or inference rules. A framework could contain only rules of one of these
kinds or could contain rules of several of these kinds; Carnap does not say
explicitly which, but his examples suggest that rules belonging to every one
of these kinds must be contained in at least some frameworks and that the
dierent kinds of rules cannot in most cases be separated. Many theories
Carnap had earlier held lead one to confuse these two kinds of rules - e.
g. vericationism leads one to confuse semantic and epistemic rules - so it
is likely that Carnap did confuse these dierent kinds of rules. However, I
54This dierence has already been seen by Bryan G. Norton in [Nor77].
55Carnap did use the word "new", but it is hard to see what he could mean by it here,
since he gave as an example of a framework the world of things, and he himself noted that
we have all accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Therefore
neither the thing language or the world of things are new in any obvious sense.
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will argue that we must separate these dierent kinds of rules and that all
of them cannot be viewed as constitutive of the meaning of the expressions
that are used according to them, so that people capable of using expressions
meaningfully can yet rationally question and debate the validity of some of
these rules.
Carnap mentioned rules of conrmation and disconrmation in connec-
tion with the world of things (which he considered a factual framework). He
did not explicitly say that these rules were part of the framework of things,
but if he did not think they were it is hard to see why he would have men-
tioned them. However, if vericationism is false, as I have already argued at
length its history shows it to be, then surely we can speak about material
things - make meaningful statements concerning them - without having rules
of conrmation or disconrmation, so long as we have semantic rules for ex-
pressions purportedly referring to material things. Rules of conrmation
are only needed if we want to have knowledge or justied beliefs regarding
material things. A person might be capable of speaking meaningfully about
some entities without having justied beliefs concerning them; the later is
far more dicult than the former!
Carnap also mentioned in connection with the system of natural num-
bers (a logical framework) customary deductive rules. The only concrete
example of a rule he gives are rules of substitution, which could be under-
stood as either formation rules or deductive rules. However, surely formation
rules and deductive rules alone without any kind of interpretation do not
suce to speak about anything, even about numbers. If these are the only
kind of rules Carnap considered, then he had just reverted to the position
of [Car37], whose falsity he had already recognized in [Car48]. In order to
speak about any entities, we need also semantic rules for our expressions,
such as ostensive denitions, but not rules of conrmation.
Since Carnap's theory is a relativistic theory, it will be helpful to con-
sider it in the light of relativism more generally. Panu Raatikainen has
argued in [Raa01] quite plausibly that Putnam's mereological argument for
relativism was based on a confusion between languages and theories. Other
philosophers have noticed a similar confusion in relativistic theories more
generally; e. g. Edward Pols does so in [Pol92, page 5]56. I will argue that
56Pols sees such a confusion in too many theories, claiming that the majority of English-
speaking academic philosophers are guilty of such a confusion. I do not see where he has
321
the arguments of at least Huw Price and probably Carnap himself are based
on a similar confusion (though Quine may not have always escaped such a
confusion either; Chomsky accuses him of such a confusion in [Cho69, pages
53-54]). In this case this may be a confusion that is at the root of relativism
more generally.
Huw Price defends Carnap's distinction between internal and external
questions in [Pri67]. He distinguishes six ingredients of Carnap's position.
The third of them is that frameworks are ontologically committing. Price
indeed goes further and says that the very use of concepts is ontologically
committing. Price thinks that Quine would have accepted this ingredient.
This is indeed plausibly an ingredient of Carnap' position (though Carnap
did not like the word "ontological" due to his anti-metaphysical prejudice).
However, many commentators think that a linguistic framework for Carnap
was scarcely anything more than a language (as e. g. Susan Haack suggests
in [Haa76, page 458] and as Matti Eklund says in [Ekl09]), and Carnap
does e. g. speak of the thing language and the framework of things as if
they were the same or at least inseparable. However, according to at least
most57 of Quine's formulations it is theories, not languages, that carried
ontological commitments. Therefore if this common interpretation is right
Price is wrong in saying that frameworks carry commitments and Quine
should not have admitted it.
Price has then confused languages and theories just like Raatikainen ar-
gued Putnam did, and if Price's interpretation of Carnap is so far correct,
Carnap also fell earlier prey to the same confusion. Even if it is not clear
whether Quine himself would have admitted it, yet if we follow Church's
theory of ontological commitment, it is clear that frameworks need not be
ontologically committing. As I argue that Church's theory of ontological
commitment is better than Quine's original, this would suce to refute
Price's defence of ontological relativism. At least those frameworks whose
deductive rules are those of free predicate logic do not carry any ontolog-
ical commitments. I think that this is the crucial false assumption whose
grounds for so sweeping an accusation and would not want to join in it.
57Quine's formulations in [Qui66a] may to some extent excuse Price's misunderstanding.
In this article Quine does remark in [Qui66a, page 65] that to say that to say that there is
such an entity as roundness is to say that from a context '. . . roundness. . . ' we may infer
'(9x)(: : : x : : :)'. However, Quine's formulations of his criterion in [Qui53d] imply that we
say that there is such an entity as roundness only by actually saying '(9x)(: : : x : : :)'.
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falsity completely undermines Carnap's and Price's arguments against meta-
physics.
Raatikainen says in [Raa01, footnote 22], however, that he is not assum-
ing free logic, and argues that Putnam's argument can be shown invalid even
in standard logic. It is not clear whether he would have any objections to
the use of free logic as such. It might well be that Putnam's argument can
be resisted even within standard logic, but Carnap's and Price's arguments
could not be.
Later metaontologists have modied Carnap's denitions in various ways,
usually resulting in still greater obscurity. The phrases "linguistic frame-
work" and "conceptual scheme" are often used as synonyms. I have argued
that Carnap did not make it clear whether his frameworks are languages
or theories, though they are more likely to have been languages. While
many later relativists have carried on the obscurity, many of them have
often understood a framework or scheme explicitly as a complete theory.
Quine himself used the phrase "conceptual scheme" to stand for theories,
and indeed pretty big theories (which may explain why he did not see that
Carnap's frameworks were languages, and so did not carry ontological com-
mitments). This seems to be a rather dierent conception, though this is not
sure because Carnap does not make clear just what kinds of rules a frame-
work may contain. After all, inference rules can generally be transformed
to axioms in notational reformulations of an axiomatic theory, so a system
of inference rules could be taken to correspond to a weak theory, the purely
logical theory derived from those axioms by the inference rules correspond-
ing to them. However, it seem to me a plausible interpretation of Carnap's
view that a framework in Carnap's sense need not contain any more state-
ments than these logical truths (which correspond to rules of deduction)
and possibly other analytic truths (since Carnap did not at this stage of his
development distinguish clearly between logical truths and other analytical
truths, though he was to do so soon after in [Car52]).
However, a framework or scheme in the broader sense of a theory can
contain all kinds of non-logical and even synthetic statements. Therefore if
this interpretation of Carnap is correct, the two concepts dier profoundly.
Speaking of theories as frameworks makes conceptual relativism into the
obviously absurd claim - though a claim we have seen was already implicit in
Neurath and Hempel - that we cannot speak about anything except relations
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between theories, that we cannot speak about anything non-linguistic at all.
Carnap called questions of the existence of new entities within the frame-
work internal questions. However, Carnap gave two seemingly quite dier-
ent characterizations for external questions; he said initially that internal
questions are questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of
entities as a whole, but later he said that an internal question is a question
posed prior to the acceptance of a new framework58. I will argue that a
question concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a
whole can be a question within a framework and indeed given many ways of
interpreting what a framework is has to be such. Carnap claimed later in the
same article that a question concerning the existence of a system of entities
as a whole such as "Are there numbers?" can be interpreted as either an
internal or external question, while his initial characterization implied that
it must be interpreted as an external question.
Carnap argued that such an assertion as "There are numbers." is trivial
and hence not metaphysical if taken as an internal question while if it is taken
as an external question it is not a theoretical question at all but a practical
question. One way of countering this argument would be to reject the whole
distinction between theoretical and practical questions, as the pragmatists
would have done. Even Quine seems to have hinted at such a rejection at the
end of [Qui51]. However, I will argue that we can reject Carnap's distinction
between internal and external questions even while accepting the distinction
between theoretical and practical questions.
I will show that this argument only seems plausible because Carnap runs
58Carnap said in a footnote that he has made some minor changes in the formulation
to the eect that the term "framework" is now only used for the system of linguistic
expressions and not for the system of entities in question. Carnap then acknowledged
that in the rst version of the article he had confused linguistic expressions with entities
they denote. It may be suspected that such confusions persist even in the later version
of the article, perhaps even form its foundation. This would surely explain why Carnap
does not distinguish these two characterizations of external questions, of which one speaks
of a system of entities (which are generally not linguistic) and the other of a framework,
which is now supposed to be a system of expressions. It can be suspected that the unclear
way Carnap speaks of introducing and accepting a framework is likely to embody such
a confusion. In order to start speaking and reasoning about some entities coherently we
have to use a language subject to syntactic and semantic rules, and follow those rules
consistently. However, we do not have to yet formulate any metalanguage, in which we
could speak about such a language and mention those rules, though the formulation of
such a metatheory must always be possible afterwards. If we had to formulate such a
metatheory before beginning to speak about some entities, we would have embarked on a
vicious innite regress, and could not speak about anything at all.
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together dierent notions of a framework, which contain dierent kinds of
rules or dierent rules. The basic fallacy in Carnap's argumentation results
from the fact that his notion of a framework is equivocal because as we have
shown he does not make it clear what kind of rules are contained within it
and what rules of each kind have to be contained in it. Therefore depending
on how the notion of a framework is understood, it may be either not the
case that we need accept a framework in order to talk about new entities or
it may not be the case that the acceptance of a framework would lead by
itself to the acceptance of any new system of entities and therefore would
make questions about the existence of such entities trivial.
If it is supposed to be essential to a framework that it contains the
deductive rules of standard predicate logic, then we do not need a framework
in order to speak about any entities. Indeed, we do not need any deductive
(or epistemic) rules at all to speak about any entities in the sense of making
(even if only irrationally) such statements that terms occurring in them
denote such entities if they exist. However, if talking is understood to entail
arguing, we may need them to justify the claims we make about them, since
we need to argue in order to justify claims, even if wholly hypothetical ones,
and argumentation requires deductive rules. However, even in order to argue
hypothetically concerning new entities, we do not need a framework with the
rules of standard predicate logic, for we can use the deductive rules of free
predicate logic instead. Therefore in order to have arguments relating to the
new entities it suces to use a framework in a sense in which a framework
can include only the deductive rules of free predicate logic, and no existential
claim at all taken as a claim within such a framework is trivial.
Let us examine the two options Carnap supposes the metaphysican to
have in turn.
Carnap supposes that a metaphysician cannot take metaphysical ques-
tions to be trivial and hence not internal. However, there is a problem here
even independent of the problems with Carnap's notion of a framework.
Carnap seems to be just have accepted without question Kant's view that
metaphysical truths must be synthetic, which we have shown to be based on
a misunderstanding of traditional metaphysics. However, I have already ar-
gued that a mildly deationary conception of metaphysics is possible which
takes at least many of the traditional metaphysical questions to be analyti-
cal ones and hence relatively trivial (though this would not make them any
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more trivial than mathematical questions on the traditional view of ana-
lytic philosophy) and that such a conception has many important historical
precedents.
However, perhaps more importantly, Carnap's argument does not work
even against an inationary conception of metaphysics, and this is because of
the problems with Carnap's notion of a framework. Traditional metaphysical
questions can be understood as internal questions without being taken to
be trivial relative to a framework, if the kind of framework used is weak
enough, e. g. if it contains only semantical rules or besides them only the
deductive rules of free predicate logic.
It is possible that all the new predicate terms have the empty set as
their extension and if the logic of the language to which the new expressions
are added is free predicate logic it is possible that all of the new terms are
non-denoting. Indeed, if also the logic of the metatheory is free it is even
possible that predicates not only have an empty set as their extension but
have no extension at all. The new rules themselves may lead us to sup-
pose that none of the new entities exist, producing only such statements
as :(9x)P (x), :(9x)Q(x), :(9x)(x = a),:(9x)(x = b). . . Even a (formu-
lation of a) complete theory answering every question which can be asked
within such a framework might in the case of some frameworks contain only
such negations of existential generalizations and nothing else. Also even if a
framework has to contain conrmation and disconrmation rules, such rules
can lead a person to disconrm every statement which claims that an entity
belonging to the system of entities in question exists. Therefore none of the
internal questions of existence need be trivial as Carnap claims.
So an extreme idealist who thinks that material things do not exist (but
allows the statement that they do to be meaningful) could surely, contrary
to what Carnap presupposes, accept the thing language - so long as he does
not use standard predicate logic but instead free predicate logic - and use
it without accepting the world of things. He could use it just to say of all
possible physical things that they do not exist. Indeed, such an idealist has
to use the thing language if he is to deny the existence of physical things.
Such an immaterialist could accept that whatever analytic truths are held to
hold of physical objects, e. g. "Physical objects have a location.", "Physical
objects are extended.", etc. are vacuously true though (or rather since) no
physical objects exist.
326
We have then seen that if the notion of framework is weak enough,
metaphysical questions can be taken as internal questions even without being
taken to be completely trivial. However, if the notion of framework used is
strong enough (e. g. if it contains the deductive rules of standard predicate
logic), then traditional metaphysical questions can be understood as external
questions while still being taken to be theoretical questions.
It far from transparent what Carnap means or could mean by a question
prior to the acceptance of a framework, which is one of his characterizations
for an external question. If it is supposed to be a question posed without the
acceptance of any framework, and a framework were taken to consist only of
formation rules and semantic rules used in order to form sentences, then ex-
ternal questions are of course impossible. It is obviously impossible to pose
any question without using any expressions. It is equally impossible to pose
a question regarding some purported entities without using expressions pur-
portedly denoting those entities, by either using uninterpreted expressions
or expressions denoting only other purported entities. However, there is no
reason to think that any metaphysicians would have attempted to perform
such an impossible feat.
It is indeed possible to pose questions without having any axiomatized
theory and hence without deductive rules, so it may be we do not need
the exact kind of framework Carnap conceived of. However, in order to try
to answer such a question we do need to use (though not mention) some
deductive rules, but they can be those of free predicate logic.
However, an external question could also be understood in other ways.
It could be a question asked in a metalanguage (using a dierent framework
than the framework about which we ask) about whether the expressions
contained in a framework designate anything (as already seen by Haack
in [Haa76, page 460]59. Since the aim of Carnap's article is to defend
Tarskian semantics, it follows from the very aim of the article that Car-
59Carnap's frameworks are indeed very similar to Tarski's interpreted languages, if the
rules Carnap speaks about can be understood as semantic rules, which provide interpre-
tation for the expressions in a framework; at least many commentators such as Haack
in [Haa76, page 458] presume that a framework is an interpreted language. If this is
correct we could speak about object frameworks and metaframeworks just as we speak
of object languages and metalanguages, and say that we ask questions about the object
framework within a metaframework. We can also compare dierent object frameworks
within a metaframework, and in many cases say that one framework is better than an-
other in the sense that it has fewer non-denoting terms and its terms denote more entities.
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nap has to accept that such a question is meaningful and theoretical. Such
questions are naturally relevant for metaphysics; however, they are rather
metametaphysical than metaphysical questions.
I have argued that the most important dierence between Carnap and
Quine relevant to ontology was their dierent theories of quantication.
However, it is often assumed instead that the most important dierence was
elsewhere, most often that it was in their theories of analyticity. Carnap
says that such a claim as that numbers exist (and presumably any question
within what he would call a logical framework) is analytic. Quine himself
saw in [Qui51, page 71] the basic point of contention between Carnap and
himself to lie in Carnap presupposing a distinction between analytic and
synthetic statements. This may indeed be a good reason for those who reject
the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements to also reject the
distinction between internal and external questions in the case of logical
frameworks or even Carnap's whole distinction between factual and logical
frameworks. However, I do not think Quine yet located the crucial error
in Carnap's argumentation. The rejection of a distinction between analytic
and synthetic would not do anything to undermine Carnap's distinction of
internal and external questions with respect to factual frameworks, while
the rejection of standard predicate logic does. Furthermore, even those who
accept a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements do not have
to accept the distinction between internal and external questions. They
should be dubious about using the notion of analyticity in the way Carnap
uses it here.
One reason for this can be seen by reminding ourselves of the fact that
many analytical philosophers and early logical positivists generally held that
analytic statements could not be existential. E. g. Ayer says in [Aye36a,
page 128] that to assert that an object exists is always to assert a synthetic
proposition. Because of this they could not have accepted the way Carnap
uses the notion of analyticity here though they would have seen nothing
wrong in the notion of analyticity itself (though curiously Ayer later did
accept the distinction between internal and external questions in [Aye67,
pages 49,71], perhaps not seeing its contradiction with his view of analyticity
or changing his view of analyticity).
Analytical philosophers who are not positivists do sometimes think that
existential claims could be analytic - a logicist who does not agree with
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Russell's view that logical truths are synthetic has to make this claim, as
does the theory of such modern logicists as Cocchiarella or Hale and Wright
- but they would not have think that such claims would have followed just
from a rule of substitution, but required instead less trivial axioms like the
Axiom of Comprehension or the Axiom Schema of Separation. However,
even those who accept that the claim that abstract entities such as numbers
- or the propositional functions or classes to which they are reduced - exist
is analytic would hardly hold the same of the claim that concrete entities,
such as physical objects (or things as Carnap calls them) or minds or even
sense-data, exist. It is just absurd to say that "Physical objects exist."
is an analytic sentence. It is still more absurd to say that it would be a
conventionally true sentence in any sense but that in which all sentences are
conventionally true because of the conventionality of linguistic symbolism
(which Carnap's position also implies according to some interpreters)60, and
therefore such a sentence cannot be trivial at all, no matter how interpreted.
If standard predicate logic implies that such a claim could be analytic, this
is a reason not to use standard logic in serious philosophical discussions of
semantics, and instead replace it with free predicate logic.
Since Quine was not a type-theorist, he of course did not think that the
introduction of new kinds of entities would require the use of new kinds of
variables, only of new predicates and sentences asserting them to be non-
empty; however, while this dierence is more pertinent to their dierent
views relating to metaphysics, I do not think this either really captures the
crucial dierence between Quine and Carnap in this question.
Neither Carnap nor Quine explicitly made a distinction between stan-
dard and free predicate logic or between objectual and substitutional quan-
tication in the course of their debate, and I think this is a reason why their
debate never reached any conclusion and why neither of them is completely
correct. Carnap is partly right in claiming that a nominalist could accept a
framework which contains predicate variables. A nominalist need not think
that the statement that universals exist is meaningless - while such a claim
is indeed nominalist it is only one variety of nominalism. A nominalist can
60Quine apparently sees nothing odd in the claim that such a sentence as "There are
physical objects." would be analytic; apparently since he has convinced himself that the
concept is bogus, the analyticity of any sentence is just as implausible to him as that of
any other. However, Norton sees in [Nor77, page 80] that such a claim is very odd and
problematic for Carnap himself.
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instead think that the realist's view is just false, whether analytically false
or even synthetically false. Such a nominalist can accept the use of a frame-
work whose formation rules allow the use of predicate variables bound by
objectual quantiers if the deductive rules of that framework are those of
free higher-order predicate logic instead of standard higher-order predicate
logic (or if the framework has no deductive rules at all). A nominalist can
accept such a framework since he can use it to assert a theory with such
theorems as :(9P )(9Q)(P = Q), where P and Q are predicate variables,
as such a theorem claims that there are no universals. However, contrary
to what Carnap implicitly claims and in accordance with Quine's view, a
nominalist cannot accept the use of a framework whose formation rules al-
low predicate variables as well-formed expressions, whose quantiers are
objectual and and whose deductive rules are those of standard higher-order
predicate logic, since such framework would force him to admit the truth of
the sentence (9P )(9Q)(P = Q), where (9P ) is an objectual quantier. Of
course, a nominalist could accept standard predicate logic if the quantiers
occurring in its theorems were all interpreted substitutionally.
Ironically Quine's own later thesis of ontological relativity in [Qui68] is
rather similar to Carnap's distinction between internal and external ques-
tions. This raises serious doubts about the consistency of Quine's thesis of
ontological relativity with his criterion of ontological commitment - doubts
which I unfortunately do not have room to pursue here61.
5.9.3 Ontological Commitment and the Metaphysics of Modal-
ity and the Semantics of Propositional Attitudes
If we admit the legitimacy of intensional metatheoretical notions such as pos-
sible worlds, contrary to Quine's own views, we must notice that there may
also be other varieties of quantication besides objectual and substitutional
quantication. This is important for it is one of the factors which will enable
us to to apply our theory to controversial questions in the metaphysics and
metametaphysics of modality.
The denition of objectuality in possible world semantics is just a special
61Quine's ontological relativism is closely connected with his structuralism (as presented
e. g. in [Qui08a], as his arguments for both make heavy use of proxy functions. However,
because of this it seems to me that they are both vulnerable to Newman's old argument
against structuralism in [New28]. Quine's argument for ontological relativism is also made
suspect by the use of behaviourism in it, as I have already argued.
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case of the general denition for intensional languages we have already given,
since possible worlds are just one of the indices. We just say that a quantier
(9x) is objectual if and only if for any formula , (9x) is true with respect
to a world w if and only if there is such an entity  - we may require
additionally that it is part of the domain of the world - that  satises the
formula with respect to the world w, or in a dierent notation, (9x) is true
with respect to a world w and assignment g if and only if there is such an
entity  that  is true with respect to w and g(=x). If the truth-conditions
of quantied sentences are transferred in such a straightforward way, then we
are still dealing with objectual quantication and the existentially quantied
formula carries an explicit ontological commitment. However, there are
reasons why, at least for some purposes, it is useful to employ dierent
quantiers whose truth-conditions are more complicated. In this case we
are not always dealing with objectual quantication any more, and therefore
the existentially quantied formula need not carry any explicit ontological
commitment.
In intensional logic it is usual to interpret quantiers by quantifying in
the metalanguage over individual concepts or world-lines, functions (or par-
tial functions) from possible worlds to individuals (or more generally, since
such quantication can also bind predicate variables, to entities). In this ap-
proach assignments associate individual variables with individual concepts
or world-lines, never with individuals, but the predicates are taken to typ-
ically have the values of the world-lines in the worlds, not the world-lines
themselves, in their extension62. It is not at rst sight obvious if this kind
of quantication is objectual; however, I will argue that it is not, or at least
it is not objectual quantication over individuals (if individuals are taken
as entities which are not functions or sets or properties, but are rather Ure-
lements in the set-theoretical sense). At least such quantication is not
unrestricted quantication, and this already bars it from carrying explicit
objectual commitments. However, it is not even restricted quantication re-
stricted to individuals, but at most quantication restricted to world-lines.
62More exactly, in the simplest versions of this kind of theory, (9x) is true with respect
to a world w and assignment g if and only if there is such a world-line f (some theories add
that f must belong to some set F ) that  is true with respect to w and g(f=x). However,
if  is e. g. a monadic atomic formula P (x), then P (x) is true with respect to w and g
i g(x)(w) 2 kPkw;g, not i g(x) 2 kPkg;w, as it would be if we were straightforwardly
quantifying over world-lines.
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However, it is not presented as second-order quantication over world-lines,
but as rst-order quantication over individuals. From this we can argue
further that we are not quantifying straightforwardly over world-lines any
more than over individuals, and hence are not quantifying objectually over
anything at all. This may not seem suciently justied yet, so I will add
further evidence later, relying on the commonly accepted connection be-
tween quantication and identity. First, however, I must give examples of
such non-standard interpretations of quantication.
For instance, Anil Gupta has (following and simplifying the ideas of
Aldo Bressan [Bre72]) used such quantication in his theory of common
nouns and natural kinds [Gup80]63. Independently of Gupta and Bressan,
Jaakko Hintikka and logicians inuenced by him (e. g. Ilkka Niiniluoto
in [Nii82]) have developed a logic of perception in which a peculiar variety
of this kind of quantication (a variety where world-lines are relativised to
subjects of propositional attitudes such as perception) was called perceptual
quantication. This concept was later generalised to the notion of perspec-
tival quantication so that it would apply to the logic of other propositional
attitudes besides perception, for instance to the logic of belief or the logic of
imagination. I will speak of perspectival quantication, since the dierences
between perception and other attitudes are not relevant to the questions I
ask in this work, which do not relate to the logic of propositional attitudes
or to phenomenology (to which that logic might be applied) but to general
ontology. Niiniluoto denes the general concept of world-lines as follows
in [Nii82, page 119]: If W is the clas of possible worlds, and if Dm(w) is the
class of individuals which exist in a world w 2 W , then, for ; 6= V  W , a
function f : V ! [w2WDm(w) such that f(w) 2 Dm(w) for each w 2 V is
a world-line on V .
I want to argue that this kind of quantication need not carry any explicit
ontological commitment any more than substitutional quantication. This
is no doubt a highly controversial statement. Philosophers who make use
of this kind of quantication have expressed dierent view on this question.
63When we combine the theory of Gupta with my theory, it suggests that nearly all of
the quantication employed in natural languages is not objectual, and hence that all of
the ontological commitments in natural language sentences are implicit, which may seem
highly surprising. However, Quine himself warned against naive attempts to apply his
criterion directly to natural languages, so this is not a sucient reason to reject either
theory, but just serves as an additional reason for precaution in using the criterion.
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Hintikka himself thought that this was just ordinary objectual quantica-
tion. He says in [Hin75, page 32]:
Thus no unusual sense of quantication is being assumed
here, certainly nothing remotely like that bete noire of Quine's,
substitutional quantication. Rather, what we face here are the
consequences of an objectual interpretation of quantication in
a situation where one is concerned with possible worlds.
However, other philosophers who have developed Hintikka's logic of propo-
sitional attitudes further or just studied it have held dierent opinions.
Fllesdal in [Fl69, page 178] argued that, given Quine's arguments against
quantied modal logic, Hintikka's semantics only makes sense if the values
of the variables are taken to be expressions. Following him Tuomo Aho
held (see [Aho94, pages 231-234]) that all quantiers should be interpreted
as substitutional in attitude contexts. Aho, unlike Fllesdal, even indicates
that this is in accordance with Hintikka's intentions, saying:
Already Hintikka's original model sets were dened in such a
way that the occurence of (Ex) in a model set also guaranteed
that the set contained (t) for some singular term t . . .
However, both Fllesdal's and Aho's arguments have serious problems.
I think that Quine's arguments have been refuted many times and in many
dierent ways (as they have several apparent weaknesses), even by Hintikka
himself in later articles, though nothing is ever denitely settled in philos-
ophy, so of course the debate is still going on. Fllesdal himself admits
in his article that there are several ways to avoid Quine's nihilistic conclu-
sions, most prominently [Fl69, page 183] eliminating denite descriptions
contextually (or just distinguishing between denite descriptions and log-
ically proper names - however you do it (even Kripke's way of taking all
syntactically proper names to be logically proper will get you far) - and al-
lowing substitution only of logically proper names in attitudinal contexts)64
64Of course this still leaves some similar problems concerning substitution in proposi-
tional attitude contexts, which have been discovered afterwards, such as Kripke's puzzles
about belief. However, these problems were not proposed by Quine and it can be doubted
how deeply they are analogous to Quine's problems. Anyway, I think that they are su-
ciently dissimilar that I will not have to deal with these tangled messes of muddled debate
here when asking the only tangentially related question which kinds of quantication in
propositional attitude contexts are objectual.
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Actually the solution Hintikka oers to the problems is similar to the one
Church oered which Fllesdal examines along with Hintikka's. As he says
in [Fl69, page 177], in Church's system variables take intensions as val-
ues. If Fllesdal's interpretation of Church's theory were correct, then the
quantication in Church's theory would be just a plain variety of restricted
objectual quantication. Hintikka's system is here in many ways a more
sophisticated development of Church's theory, since as we already hinted
world-lines are really intensions or individual concepts, only relativized to
subjects of propositional attitudes65. According to Fllesdal Church's sys-
tem is not really non-extensional, and because of this it avoids Quine's
problems. For the sake of consistency he should have said the same about
Hintikka's system; if Church's system is not non-extensional - note that I
am not agreeing that Fllesdal would be right - then Hintikka's is not either
and of course also avoids Quine's problems just like Church's does. Then
the quantication in Hintikka's system would be just restricted objectual
quantication as well as in Church's system. However, I will argue that in
fact neither Church's nor Hintikka's quantication is objectual in attitudinal
and other non-extensional contexts.
The problem with Aho's argument is, of course, that Hintikka's later
denitions of model sets (or model structures to use more modern termi-
nology) were not any more dened in this way so that the occurrence of
(Ex) in a model set also guaranteed that the set contained (t) for some
singular term t, and neither are the model structures Aho himself uses in
the same work where he says this. The values of variables can hardly be
both expressions and world-lines; even if models were constituted out of lin-
guistic expressions, and a world-line were just a function to linguistic terms,
yet a function whose value was a linguistic term would be dierent from
a linguistic term. However, since those early days both Hintikka and oth-
ers have used a more general kind of models, and surely in most models
world-lines are not expressions or functions to expressions. As Kripke re-
marks, substitutional quantication is unproblematic in modal contexts; if
65In other ways Hintikka's system is a simplied version of Church's theory, since where
Church's theory is a higher-order type-theoretical theory, most formulations of Hintikka's
logic of propositional attitudes are rst-order. However, Hintikka has also more com-
plex formulations where he uses independence-friendly quantiers which make his system
located between rst-order and higher-order systems, so it is very hard to accurately
characterize the relation between Hintikka's and Quine's systems in such a case.
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quantication were substitutional, then there would be no need for the very
elaborate apparatus of world-lines.
Therefore Aho's view does not seem to be defensible. However, Hin-
tikka's own view can also be doubted. While Hintikka is clearly right in
claiming that his quantication is not substitutional, he may not be right
in his further claim that it is just objectual quantifation either. It must
be admitted, however, that that question of what quantication is objectual
is in part stipulative. The distinction between objectual and substitutional
quantication was originally drawn in extensional languages, and there need
be no unique way to extend it to stronger languages, such as intensional and
especially modal languages. Nevertheless, I will argue that contrary to what
Hintikka suggests, the introduction of world-lines is not the necessary conse-
quence of an objectual interpretation of quantication in a situation where
one is concerned with possible worlds. The way I have dened objectual
quantication seems to me to be simpler. If objectuality is dened as I have
dened it, then the kinds of quantication introduced by Hintikka and his
followers are neither substitutional nor objectual.
They satisfy my denition of non-objectual quantication, Metadeni-
tion 2. If the ordinary interpretation is I, then the new interpretation in-
troduced by the perspectival quantier is such a function J that individual
constants are interpreted as their ordinary intensions, i.e. if a is an indi-
vidual constant, then J(a;w) = fhw; I(a;w)i : w 2 Wg and a predicate is
interpreted so that it takes as arguments the values of its arguments in the
world i. e. for n-place predicates R and all world-lines 1; : : : n it holds
that h1; : : : ; ni 2 J(R;w) i h(w); : : : ; n(w)i 2 I(R;w). This interpre-
tation leads to the same truth-values in all purely extensional contexts, but
yields dierent truth-values for sentences containing intensional operators
like propositional attitude ascriptions, as it allows quantication to be over
world-lines and not ordinary individuals, so that the same variable can pick
out dierent individuals from dierent worlds.
In any case, the vital question is not how to use the word "objectual".
The vital question is what kinds of quantication carry ontological com-
mitment, and we have reasons to doubt whether the kinds of quantication
introduced by Hintikka need carry ontological commitment. The answer
to this question depends on our denition of ontological commitment. Of
course, this may also contain a stipulative element, though any reasonable
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answer must also agree with the long tradition of ontological inquiry.
If we are right that perspectival quantication is not objectual, perspec-
tivally individuated objects do not really exist and there is no need for a
theory of categories to supply them with a category of their own. This is
of course no defect in the theory of perspectival quantication, but rather a
merit of it. This is not a novel conclusion either; some of Hintikka's followers
have already come to it. For example, Tuomo Aho writes in [Aho94, page
264]:
it would be possible to call these perspectival objects even
intentional objects. But, and this is a great merit of the world-
line method, the intentional objects clearly do not form a a new
category of existing individuals in the world.
However, Aho does not explicitly distinguish objectual and non-objectual
quantication so I do not think that he yet had sucient reasons for this
conclusion; Aho actually claims that all quantication in attitudinal contexts
is substitutional, and hence implicitly non-objectual, so I do not know what
criterion he could oer for deciding which objects form a category of existing
individuals and which do not. Surely the fact that perspectival objects exist
in other possible worlds is not enough to bar all of them from the category
of existing individuals, since it is clear that many perspectival world-lines
often pick out individuals from the actual world66 and so many perspectival
objects also exist in the actual world. The theory of this dissertation allows
us to given an exact reason for Aho's intuitively correct conclusion.
However, it can be argued that all statements and theories which make
use of such quantication carry implicit ontological commitments67, since
they imply statements expressible in terms of objectual quantiers68; how-
66Actually, in Hintikka's original logic every world-line picks out something from the
actual world (or the world counted as actual), namely that object which is the cause of
the perception. This is not so in Aho's development of the logic, and I think that this
constitutes a fruitful generalisation over Hintikka's logic; however, it does not suce to
give Aho the materials to construct a criterion for which objects belong to the category
of existing individuals.
67Many perspectivally quantied sentences carry implicit commitments at least in the
sense I have already dened in this section, material implicit ontological commitments.
They may also carry formal implicit ontological commitments, though this depends on
the controversial question whether logics of propositional attitudes in which perspectival
quantiers are used count as genuine formal logics, i. e. whether the relation of implication
investigated in them is genuine formal implication.
68E. g. to give a trivial example, if (9x) is the perspectival and (Ex) the objec-
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ever, such implicit commitments require extensive semantical analysis to
ferret out. Even if some weak statements or theories employing perspectival
quantication would not carry even implicit ontological commitment accord-
ing to some metatheories, yet when a person uses perspectival quantication
which is identied as such, i. e. a person uses quantied statements to which
someone correctly gives a semantics making use of individual concepts and
possibilia, then the one who gives such semantics to it would in any case be
committed to such individual concepts and possibilia, since the metatheory
he uses carries such commitments. Therefore the use of perspectival quan-
tication ultimately involves (at least in some way) even greater ontological
commitments than ordinary objectual quantication.
There is a simple test which in many cases suces to show whether quan-
tication in an intensional language is objectual or not; a quantier (8ix) is
objectual only if it satises the formula 21(8ix)(8iy)(x = y ! 21(x = y)),
where 21 is the operator of logical necessity. Any quantier whose truth-
conditions are straightforward extensions of Tarski's into an intensional lan-
guage must satisfy this formula. Neither substitutional quantication nor
perspectival quantication satisfy this condition. Substitutional quanti-
cation does not pass this test in general because substitutional quantiers
can have as substitution instances terms which are not rigid designators,
but denote dierent entities in dierent worlds. A variety of substitutional
tual quantier, (9x)(P (x) & Pa(Q(x))) implies the sentence (Ex)(P (x)), since if the
perspectival world-line picks out something which satises the formula P (x) from the
actual world, then there must exist something in the actual world which satises this
formula, and since it exists in the actual world, it must exist absolutely. Because
of this, the sentence (9x)(P (x) & Pa(Q(x))) carries implicit ontological commitment
to entities which satisfy the formula P (x). To give a less trivial example, we must
make heavy use of the possibly controversial device of extending the object language
to nd out the ontological commitments expressible in the metalanguage, as introduced
in Metadenition 8, and introduce such doubtlessly controversial machinery as higher-
order quantiers or explicit set-theoretical expressions to the enriched object language.
If we use higher-order quantiers, then the sentence (9x)(3(P (x))) implies the sentence
(EQ)(2((Ax)(Ay)(Q(x) & Q(y) ! x = y)) & 3((Ex)(Q(x) & P (x))) in any language
which contains besides the perspectival individual existential quantier (9x) the objectual
individual existential quantier (Ex) and the objectual predicate quantier (EQ) and the
objectual individual universal quantier (Ax). The implied sentence quanties explicitly
over world-lines with the aid of the predicate quantier (EQ), if we interpret predicate
terms as functions from worlds to sets of individuals, as is usually done; the condition
2((Ax)(Ay)(Q(x) & Q(y) ! x = y)) implies that the property designated by the predi-
cate variable Q relative to some assignment is only instantiated by one individual in every
world, and therefore it is a function and hence is or at least corresponds to a world-line in
the broadest sense, though of course the sentence does not say anything about what kind
of world-line it is or corresponds to.
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quantiers whose instances were exclusively rigidly designating terms would
pass the test, and such quantiers would indeed not dier signicantly from
objectual quantiers restricted to a set composed of the entities those rigid
terms designated. Even such substitutional quantiers would indeed not
be objectual, as they would not have any explicit ontological commitments,
but they would be rather obviously equivalent to objectual quantiers, since
statements in which they occur would have the same implicit ontological
commitments as statements employing objectual quantiers. However, in
order to be able to know or say that a substitutional quantier is such that
all of its instances are rigidly designating we must already be capable of
using objectual quantiers, so objectual quantiers cannot be reduced to
substitutional ones by just using a language all of whose terms are rigidly
designating.
That perspectival quantiers were not objectual was not surprising.
More surprisingly, however, it seems that the physical quantiers, which
Hintikka and his followers contrast with perceptual or perspectival ones, are
not objectual either69. We might indeed argue that physical world-lines are
rigid and hence physical quantication is equivalent to objectual; however,
doubts must be raised about the rigidity of physical quantication. Accord-
ing to Hintikka and many of his followers, world-lines can merge and split;
this means that perceptually or physically individuated entities which are
dierent with respect to one world can be the same with respect to another
world. Formally, if f and g are world-lines and w and v are worlds, it is
possible that f(w) = g(v) but f(v) 6= g(v). It follows from this that a
quantier (8ix) dened with the aid of such world-lines cannot full the
formula 21(8ix)(8iy)(x = y ! 21(x = y)) and therefore it is not objectual.
This means that we cannot speak about the absolute identity of physically
individuated objects, but only of their identity with respect to worlds. How-
ever, since existence and identity go together, as Quine saw, this implies that
where there is no absolute identity there cannot be absolute existence either
69According to Aho [Aho94, page 264]
The dierence of physical and perspectival world-lines is not the same as
that between things in themselves and phenomena.
This is indeed correct, but not because perspectivally identied objects would not be
phenomenal in the widest sense - they are - but only because physically identied objects
are also phenomenal, which is quite in accordance with the semantic Kantianism Hintikka
has professed.
338
and therefore physically or perspectivally individuated objects cannot have
any place in a rational ontology.
It must be remembered that this condition is only necessary, not su-
cient for objectual quantication; quantication over rigid world-lines (world-
lines which pick out the same individual from all possible worlds) also sat-
ises this test, so it is not always easy to nd out if we are dealing with
objectual quantication or not. However, while such quantication over
rigid world-lines does not carry any explicit ontological commitments, it yet
comes so close to doing so that the dierence does not matter for most pur-
poses, since such quantication is obviously equivalent to objectual quan-
tication in the sense that it can be very easily translated into objectual
quantication and has the same implicit ontological commitments as objec-
tual quantication.
Hintikka has actually doubted whether the notion of transworld identity
makes sense independent of a conceptual system, so he would also doubt
the intelligibility of the whole notion of objectual quantication. Other
philosophers carrying on his work have denied the intelligibility of absolute
transworld identity quite explicitly, e. g. Tero Tulenheimo in [Tul09]. This
would naturally also raise doubts about the intelligibility of any kind of abso-
lute notion of ontological commitment. Such doubts would of course (despite
the notorious antagonism between Quine's and Hintikka's philosophies) t
well together with Quine's own later theory of ontological relativity, which
might be held to support such doubts; however, such doubts threaten to
trivialise the whole theory of ontological commitment. However, the use of
the technique of perspectival world-lines does not imply this kind of rela-
tivism, and others who use it are free of such relativism. We may even argue
that since the notions of absolute identity and objectual quantication in
any case usually are used and arguably must (if we are to avoid innite
regress) be used in the metalanguage, it is just self-defeating and incoherent
to deny their meaningfulness. Let us just look at Niiniluoto's denition of
world-lines quoted above; the domains of worlds, Dm(w), for all possible
worlds w 2W , are supposed to exist before the denition of world-lines; the
denition of world-lines presupposes their existence. However, since the met-
alanguage is naturally equipped with quantiers and the identity predicate,
this implies that we can formulate such statements in the metalanguage as
(9)(9)(9w)(9v)( 2 Dm(w)^ 2 Dm(v)^w 2W ^v 2W ^w 6= v^ =
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) and intelligibly ask whether they are true. The metatheory Niiniluoto
uses does not determine whether such statements are true or not, but it does
determine that they are meaningful and determinately either true or false 70.
Since we can speak about such identities or their lack in the metalanguage,
we can also expand the object language so that we can speak of them, i.
e. so that besides physical and perspectival quantication it also includes
genuinely objectual quantication over individuals. Such statements, how-
ever, identify entities in dierent worlds prior to and independently of the
world-lines, contrary to what Hintikka and most of his followers claim. If
all such statements are false, we have an ontology of world-bound individu-
als, like those of Leibniz and Lewis. Actually, however, many of Hintikka's
statements seem to imply that at least some of such statements must be
true.
5.10 The Problem of Non-existence; an answer to
Meinongians
The possibility of employing non-objectual quantication alongside objec-
tual is vital for solving the ancient problem of non-existence famously raised
by Parmenides, namely the problem how (or even whether) we can speak
truly about that which is not. It helps us to see that we can think and
speak about what is not (for example about ctional objects) contrary to
Parmenides, but that we do not yet have to admit non-existent and even im-
possible objects into our ontology as Meinong or at least some Meinongians
thought71 to our ontologies contrary to Meinong.
70This holds at least if we assume that the logic of the metatheory is a classical logic,
i e. two-valued and without truth-value gaps, so that it validates the law of excluded
middle. Neither Hintikka nor any of his followers has ever stated that it would not be,
but Hintikka has famously appealed to a logic without excluded middle in other contexts,
e. g. in his theory of truth. Using a non-classical metatheory might help to avoid this
consequence; however, so far as I know no one has explicitly made this kind of suggestion,
nor do I think it a very promising suggestion. The motivation for using non-classical logic
in order to avoid paradoxes is entirely dierent from the motivation of using it to deny
the intelligibility of absolute existence.
71I will be using the word "object" for anything that can be quantied over whether
objectually or non-objectually, while I will be using the words "entity" and "being" for
anything that can be quantied over objectually. Therefore every entity and every being is
an object but every object need not be an entity or being. Both words, "object" and "en-
tity" are then dummy sortals (like the Greek word "o" and the Latin words "ens" or "res"
that "being" and "entity" usually translate, or German equivalents such as "seiendes" or
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The distinction between objectual and non-objectual quantication will
also help us to counter the most important counter-arguments that have
been directed at Quine's theory of ontological commitment, for example
in [Hod72]. Michael P. Hodges points out that there are cases in natural
languages where quantiers do not function in the way that Quine's criterion
requires, such as the following:
Example 4 There is something he is looking for, namely, the fountain of
youth.
This sentence does not seem to carry ontological commitment to a foun-
tain of youth. One of them most inuential recent critics of Quine's theory
of ontological commitment, Jody Azzouni uses as a central example in his
argument against Quine's view of ontological commitment72 in [Azz04, page
62] an example sentence which is concerned with quantication over ctional
objects.
Example 5 There are ctional mice that talk.
Hodges says correctly that it is not dicult to nd contexts in which
such sentences as Example 4 have a perfectly acceptable use. The same
holds for Azzouni's example.
However, this does not prove much against Quine's theory. It is enough
for a Quinean that quantiers have some widespread contexts or readings
"Entitat"). Such dummy sortals must be used to simulate unrestricted quantication in
natural languages if we are to speak about ontological questions in natural languages (as
we unfortunately yet must), since natural languages demand that quantication is at least
syntactically sortally restricted but ontological discourse requires the use of semantically
unrestricted quantiers. It does indeed sound paradoxical to say that Meinongian objects
are quantied over by means of non-objectual quantication, but this is because of the
ambiguity of the word "object". The word is used in various senses which are less general
than the one in it is used as a translation of Meinong's "Gegenstand"; for example, objects
are often (e. g. by Frege) contrasted with functions and at other times contrasted with
events. Even when the word is not used in so narrow senses, the word is often used as
synonymous with "entity", and was so used by those who coined the expression "objectual
quantication". This also suggests that the expression "objectual quantication" is not
the most appropriate, though it is convenient to us to make use of it as it has become
standardized terminology; "entitative quantication" would be better.
72While Azzouni rejects Quine's view wholly, his argument is to a large part aimed
specially at the claim that Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is trivial. I do not
wholly agree with Quine that the criterion would be as wholly trivial as he thought, so
Azzouni's examples may prove this much;: however, I will argue that they do not show
that Quine's view, with the qualications and clarications I have added to it, is correct.
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or uses where they function in the way his criterion requires, if he can
distinguish such readings or uses from those where they do not in some
systematic way. It would also be desirable and bolster the Quinean's case
if he could tell (at least roughly) how quantiers function in those other
contexts or what those other readings and uses of them are, but this is not
necessary to save the theory from counterexamples such as those of Hodges
and Azzouni.
It is suspicious that most important counter-examples concern very spe-
cic contexts, namely contexts concerned with propositional or objectual
attitudes or ctional objects, contexts that many semanticists would label
intensional. If a person looks for a fountain of youth he must believe or at
least suspect that there is a fountain of youth, so this example is concerned
with a propositional attitude, though this may not be obvious at rst sight.
We can then suggest as a rst approximation that quantiers semantically
express ontological commitments (at least with respect to one reading - and
plausibly in most of them the most natural reading - of them) in all ex-
tensional contexts (though even in such contexts they may have pragmatic
uses where they pragmatically implicate something other than ontological
commitment).
The intensional contexts mentioned are of course the contexts in which
according to Frege's famous theory of sense and reference (which Church,
whose theory of ontological commitment I am trying to develop further here,
also developed in [Chu51]) linguistic expressions have dierent references
and senses than usually, referring to or denoting what is is usually their
sense. In this case of course if Frege's theory is at least close to truth,
one would expect that sentences would also in such contexts carry dierent
ontological commitments than usually, carrying ontological commitment to
the senses of the expressions that occur in them to whose referents they
would usually carry ontological commitments. Therefore Example 5 would
carry ontological commitment to the sense of the phrase "mice that talk"
(whatever kind of entity that is - it could be taken to be a function from
possible worlds to sets of possible talking mice, as the structured meaning
of the phrase "mice that talk", or as a sui generis entity) instead of to its
referent, i. e. it would not carry ontological commitment to talking mice73.
73This might count as an instance of the fth of the six possible ontological interpre-
tations of his example Azzouni lists, the cancellation option. Azzouni objects in [Azz04,
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Frege's theory remains, of course, controversial. However, all systematic
semantic theories recognize that contexts of this kind are specially prob-
lematic, so using them as counterexamples to a theory of how any type of
expression such as quantiers generally function does not carry conviction.
Also the most prominent alternative to Frege's theory as a general semantic
theory trying to account not only for extensional but also for intensional
contexts (such as modal contexts) has been Kripke's theory of direct ref-
erence as presented in [Kri72]. However, it seems to me that at least one
of the most prominent current opponents of Quine's theory of ontological
commitment, Jody Azzouni, cannot be happy with Kripke's theory, since
Kripke treats ctional entities as existing abstract entities (as clearly stated
in [Kri11, page 63] and elaborated in [Kri13]), a claim that Azzouni nds
in [Azz04, page 72] to be repugnant to common sense74. However, if Az-
zouni's interpretation of his example sentence does not t in with either of
the two dominant systematic semantic theories (and he does not give any
systematic semantic theory of his own either or refer to a third theory) this
is surely a reason to suspect that his interpretation of his example is not
likely to be correct. Of course, this does not refute it conclusively, but then
Azzouni admits that his arguments do not establish his interpretation con-
clusively either, so I think that this suces to turn the burden of proof away
from Quine's theory.
Quine's criterion concerns primarily the quantiers of predicate logic
and of articial languages we can build from it by adding to it non-logical
page 69] to a theory according to which the contexts in some purported counterexam-
ples are opaque that anaphora would become impossible in opaque contexts. A Fregean
theory, however, need not declare that anaphora are impossible in intensional contexts,
for it can hold that an anaphor occurring in an intensional context refers to the ordinary
sense of its antecedent while an anaphor occurring in an extensional contexts refers to
the ordinary referent of its antecedent (even if the antecedent occurs in an intensional
context and therefore refers to its ordinary sense rather than its ordinary referent). E. g.
Azzouni considers in [Azz04, page 77] the following inference: John dreams about ghosts,
Sam dreams about ghosts, there is at least one thing that John and Sam dream about.
This is of course a form of the well-known puzzle of intentional identity (rst proposed by
Peter Geach in [Gea72]), which all systematic semantic theories have diculties with. A
Fregean theory could, however, since the (phonetically unrealized) anaphor implicit in the
sentence (as the end of the last sentence could be written in a more full form as "there is at
least one thing such that John and Sam dream about it") occurs in an intensional context
(within the scope of the attitude ascribing verb phrase "dream about" which forms an
intensional context) explain the conclusion of the inference so that there is at least one
sense which occurs in the contents of both John's and Sam's beliefs.
74Kripke's theory is then Meinongian in the sense Azzouni denes in which I will in a
later footnote argue Meinong's own original theory was not.
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constants, not the quantiers of natural languages. Natural language quan-
tier phrases like "there is" do often, perhaps even usually, function as the
quantiers of predicate logic do. However, in order to fully address Hodges's
objection, an adherent of Quine's criterion must give some account of those
circumstances in which natural language quantiers do function dierently.
The distinction between objectual and non-objectual quantiers I de-
velop in this work is the key to one such account; quantiers that occur in
(the most natural readings of) example sentences like Example 4 or Exam-
ple 5 are non-objectual ones, and Quine's criterion only applies to objectual
quantiers. We can say that something exists really only if it is quantied
over objectually in a true statement. However, it is desirable to develop
this reply further; it is not fully satisfactory to dismiss such quantiers as
non-objectual, but we ought to say something what kind of non-objectual
quantiers they are (though as I said I do not think that this is absolutely
necessary for a defence of Quine's criterion).
I will quickly sketch how some of these notorious problems can be solved
in my theory. I cannot go into details, and there are no doubt more dicult
versions of these problems which require a more subtle approach; especially,
this kind of approach may not be able to get rid of commitment to pos-
sibilia, though it will help us to get rid of the more clearly absurd com-
mitment to Meinongian impossible objects. In order to avoid ontological
commitment to possibilia we would have to get rid of objectual possibilistic
quantication in every theory we use; it is not enough to have all quantiers
in the object language be actualist but employ possibilist quantication in
the metatheory, as actualists commonly do when dealing with modal logic.
There certainly could have existed objects for which we do not have names,
so it is hopeless to try to analyse possibilist quantication as substitutional
quantication. However, whether possibilist quantication can be analysed
as some other kind of non-objectual (non-entitative) quantication - e. g.
analysing possibilia in terms of maximal sets of compatible properties or of
individual concepts - is a very dicult question which I cannot address in
this dissertation (and for which I have no ready answer at all).
Hodges's and Azzouni's objections are really the same as a common
objection directed by Meinongians against Quine, for example by Richard
Routley in [Rou82], even though Hodges might have been startled to nd
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out that he was expressing Meinongian ideas75. Routley objects to Quine
that most things do not exist, and Hodges's fountain of youth is of course an
example of the kind of things that according to Meinongians do not exist.
A Meinongian thinks that we can say truly that that some objects do not
exist, since it seems that such objects as the golden mountain or the square
circle or the fountain of youth do not exist. Meinong himself said in [Mei04,
x3, p. 9] (see [Mei60, page 83] for an English translation) that those who
like paradoxical modes of expression could well say that there are objects
of which it is true that there are no such objects. However, this paradoxi-
75Azzouni explicitly opposes Meinongianism. However, it is not at all clear how Az-
zouni's view would dier from Meinong's view, especially as both views are rather subtle
and can be accused of being a bit obscure. Azzouni's own characterization of Meinong's
view seems to be inaccurate, so it seems likely that Azzouni just does not recognize the
similarities between his view and Meinong's, especially as Azzouni does not include any
work by Meinong in his list of references. Azzouni does refer to works by Meinongians
such as Routley and Parsons and Deutsch, but it is of course not clear that these authors
have interpreted Meinong correctly or that Azzouni has understood them correctly. Az-
zouni says in [Azz04, page 65] that the Meinongian conclusion is that some things that
are don't exist or aren't real, and reminds philosophers in [Azz04, page 71] that ctional
objects don't exist in any sense whatsoever. However, Meinong did not think that the
object of knowledge had to be in any sense at all; see e. g. [Mei04, x3, pages 7-9], trans-
lated in [Mei60, x3, pages 81-83], where Meinong stresses that an object need not exist
or subsist, where existence and subsistence are the two senses of "Sein" i. e. "being" he
recognized. Meinong also agreed with Azzouni when Azzouni says (appealing to common
sense) in [Azz04, page 72] that ctional objects are not abstracta, since in Meinong's view
abstracta subsisted though they did not exist but ctional objects did not even subsist.
Meinong may not always be fully consistent in holding that ctional objects do not exist
in any sense, but he is surely at least as consistent and arguably even more consistent than
Azzouni in holding this. Azzouni contradicts himself blatantly in saying in [Azz04, pages
115,116] that "exists" does very often operate as a locally contrastive device without on-
tological signicance. If "exists" used contrastively applies to some ctional objects, then
such ctional objects surely exist in some sense, nameley the contrastive sense, even if
it is a sense carrying no ontological signicance. It follows from the deationary theory
of truth that Azzouni himself holds that if the word "exist" is true of, i. e. applies to,
some ctional object, then that ctional object exists. On the other hand, what Azzouni
says when he contrasts his theory with the theory of the Meinongian Routley in [Azz04,
pages 55,56] seems more to the point. Azzouni says that non-existent objects do not have
properties and that there is nothing to discover about them. Here he does seem to dier
from Meinongians. However, there is a problem here. Since Azzouni is a nominalist it
would seem that he cannot say that even existent things have properties. Nevertheless he
insists that existing things have properties even though there are no properties, and this
again sound paradoxical in the same way as Meinongian views. Does it not imply that
nonexistent properties have the property of being had by existent objects? Furthermore,
even where Azzouni's theory does seem to genuinely dier from Meinongian theories, it
is not clear that this is wholly in his favour. There seems to be a sense in which there is
something to discover about ctional objects. E.g. a person who is only vaguely famil-
iar with Sherlock Holmes can discover more things about him by reading more of Conan
Doyle's stories.
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cal statement easily appears directly contradictory if it is formalized in the
wrong way. If existence is expressed by quantiers and if both quantiers
in such a statement are taken to be the same kind of quantier, whether
objectual or not, we get the contradictory statement (9x)(:(9y)(y = x))).
This drives many Meinongians to deny that existence would be expressed by
quantiers, and instead take it as a primitive predicate. According to them,
the statement should be formalized as (9x)(:E(x)), where E is the existence
predicate. This is indeed a consistent formalization. However, the statement
can be symbolized consistently even if existence is taken to be expressed by
quantiers, so long as we use together with the objectual quantier also
a substitutional quantier (whose substitution instances include complex
terms like denite descriptions besides simple constants) or some other non-
objectual quantier. We can then formulate such a paradoxical statement
as the wholly consistent statement (92x)(:(91y)(y = x)), where (91x) is
the unrestricted objectual quantier and (92x) is a non-objectual quantier.
This solution is of course similar to a Meinongian solution in one respect;
many Meinongians would also advise that two dierent quantiers are to be
used. However, the dierence is that this statement will according to the
theory of this dissertation not carry any ontological commitments, at least
not any explicit ontological commitments (or even implicit commitments to
wholly non-existent objects), since the quantier (92x) with the broadest
scope in the statement is not objectual, so we are not committing ourselves
to a Meinongian ontology in using such a statement. However, this may not
be contradict Meinong himself, since Meinong himself stressed in [Mei04,
x2, p. 5] (see [Mei60, page 79] for an English translation) that metaphysics
(which according to him has to do with everything that exists and so comes
close to ontology in the sense in which I employ the word in this disserta-
tion) cannot take on the task of the theoretical consideration of the object
as such, from which it follows that theory of objects is dierent from meta-
physics and also from ontology if ontology is considered as either identical
with metaphysics or as a part of metaphysics in the way Wol dened it. My
solution only contradicts the views of some followers of Meinong or Meinon-
gians who have misinterpreted Meinong's philosophy or developed it in an
untenable direction76. It might be presented as an objection to this that
76Actually philosophers who describe themselves as Meinongians speak of a Meinongian
ontology less often than those who oppose Meinong's ideas, but Meinongians also do
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some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, most notably Husserl,
have associated the theory of objects with ontology (see e.g.the introduction
to the third Logical Investigation in [Hus70, page 435]), where the concept
of ontology used is the one common in phenomenological philosophy which I
described earlier, according to which ontology (the science of necessary and
a priori truths concerning possible entities) is not the same as metaphysics
but a more fundamental discipline on which metaphysics is based. However,
unlike Meinong these phenomenologists did not usually admit impossible
objects into their ontology or theory of objects even though they admit-
ted abstract objects - both tropes and universals (many of which Meinong
would also have thought to be part of the subject matter of ontology) and
perhaps even possible objects. Therefore they agreed that all objects in
the Meinongian sense, which includes impossible objects, are not a part of
the subject matter of ontology77. Therefore even a purely historical study
suggests that in any case, no matter in which of the historically motivated
ways metaphysics and ontology are thought to be related, ontology is not
a discipline concerned with Meinongian objects. This view can be further
explained and defended by arguing - contrary to many Meinongians - that
the objectual quantier is not a restricted quantier and the non-objectual
quantier is not a logically primary expression. Instead any non-objectual
quantiers can always be dened in the metalanguage by using objectual
quantiers, so that the objectual quantiers are more basic (and ultimately
there is one unrestricted objectual quantier which is the most basic of all
sometimes lapse into speaking of Meinong's theory of objects as a Meinongian ontology or
even - contrary to Meinong's own express statement - as a Meinongian metaphysics. E. g.
Parsons speaks in [Par74, page 567] of Meinong's theory of objects as an unusual ontology.
On the other hand, Routley says in [Rou82, page 152] that the ontological problem is a
problem as to what exists or has being, so the Meinongian theory of objects is not a
solution (or even part of the solution) to an ontological problem according to Routley.
77Matters are complicated by questions regarding Husserl's controversial concept of a
noema, which is supposed to be the object of an intentional act as such; e. g. the noema
of an act of perception is the perceived as such. There is much discussion about whether
noemata are objects or contents of mental acts, based of course on how such qualiers
as "as such" are to be understood. If they were taken as objects then they would be
similar to Meinong's objects, so phenomenology which is according to Husserl a material
ontology, and includes as a part noematic phenomenology, would then include a general
theory of objects, including impossible ones. However, most commentators seem to agree
that noemata are not objects, at least not in any straightforward sense. In any case, the
theory of objects which include impossible objects would still not be a part of the most
general kind of ontology, namely formal ontology, and it would not be an independent
science as Meinong claimed but just a part of phenomenology, being correlative to the
theory of noeses.
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and expresses the notion of being simpliciter).
In the simplest case the non-objectual quantier in question may even
be taken as substitutional; talk about the golden mountain may be consid-
ered as talk about the expression "the golden mountain". Here of course
the quantier presupposed in the denite description must of course be un-
derstood as objectual in order to avoid circularity, as Kripke has pointed
out; if the sentence is symbolized as (92x)(:(91y)(y = x)), then the substi-
tution instance for the variable x would have to be some denite expression
like (1z)(G(x) ^ M(x)) This implies that the sentence would be derived
from the sentence :(91y)(y = (1z)(G(z)^M(z))) and the denite descrip-
tion which has appeared in this form should be dened contextually in the
well-known way so that the whole sentence could be reduced to the form
(:(91y)((91z)(G(z) ^M(z) ^ (81u)(G(u) ^M(u)! u = z))) ^ y = z)).
However, such an unproblematic (if sometimes laborious) solution to the
problem may not always be possible, but a subtler approach may be needed.
In fact many Meinongians such as Parsons, Casta~neda and Zalta have al-
ready developed machinery for developing such a theory of non-existent
objects, which can easily be stripped of its apparent ontological commit-
ments. Most of these modern developments of Meinongian theories reduce
Meinongian impossible objects to sets of incompatible properties or to prop-
erties which cannot be instantiated. For instance, Terence Parsons develops
in [Par74] a Meinongian semantics, which is intended as a set-theoretic re-
construction of Meinong's theory. Parsons thinks that this reconstruction
will only communicate the structure of the theory of objects and help to
show its consistency, but I think that it can also be taken to communicate
the material content of Meinong's theory. We might say that Parsons gave a
model for Meinong's theory that she did not think to be its intended model
while I think that it can be taken to be its intendeed model. In Parsons's
semantics when we apparently quantify in the object language over individ-
ual objects (using individual variables) we give the truth-conditions for such
sentences by quantifying over sets of properties. Parsons thinks that such
sets of properties represent Meinongian objects but are not identical with
them; however, she admits in [Par74, page 578] that one might insist that
objects are the sets that she uses to represent them. While I do not want to
say that such sets are Meinongian objects (since I do not think that there
are any Meinongian objects) I nevertheless think that Meinongian objects
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could be reduced to such objects as logical constructions out of them.
It seems to me that in this case the kinds of quantication used in the
object language sentences and in their interpretations in the metalanguage
diverge so widely that the quantication in the object language must be
taken as non-objectual, though it is not substitutional. Such quantication
will satisfy my denition of non-objectual quantication, Metadenition 2.
The new interpretation function introduced by the non-objectual quantier
is the interpretation function that associates with a name the set of prop-
erties possessed by the referent of the name; i. e. J(t) = fP : P (I(t))g, if
I is the ordinary interpretation and t is an individual term and P is taken
as a variable in the metalanguage ranging over properties (however prop-
erties are understood in detail, whether as primitives or as sets of possible
individuals or as functions from possible worlds to sets of individuals or
even very inadequately as sets of actual individuals or whatever). It will
interpret a predicate P that a Meinongian would say refers to a nuclear
property as f : I(P ) 2 g. However, it will associate a predicate that a
Meinongian would say denotes an extranuclear property with its ordinary
interpretation. Parsons admits in [Par74, page 569] that she does not have
a criterion that would sort antecedently identied properties into nuclear
and extranuclear, so the reinterpretation of predicates may have to pro-
ceed case by case. However, predicates that a Meinongian would classify
as extranuclear would probably not be taken as atomic in any perspicuous
language, as they include such properties as existence and possibility, so
it may be possible to interpret any predicates as designating the set of all
sets of properties containing the property they would ordinarily designate.
Meinong (as interpreted by Parsons) takes monadic predication as primitive
and tries to reduce polyadic predication to monadic; even if this does not
work for all polyadic predications, it may work for those predications dealt
with in Meinong's theory. Therefore if I have been correct in arguing that
variables bound by non-objectual quantiers do not carry ontological com-
mitments, then Meinong's theory as interpreted by Parsons does not carry
ontological commitments to impossible entities (even though this may be
contrary to Parsons's own intention) but only implicit ontological commit-
ments to properties and sets of properties. While these commitments are of
course themselves highly controversial, they are yet less controversial than
commitments to impossible objects and are commitments that are quite ac-
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ceptable if realism about properties and sets is acceptable, as I argue in this
dissertation.
The same approach can in my view be applied to ctional entities or
(more accurately expressed) ctional objects such as Azzouni's counterex-
ample concerns. Weirdly enough, realism concerning ctional objects has
been very popular in recent analytical philosophy; even such famous philoso-
phers as Saul Kripke (as seen in [Kri11]) and David Kaplan have been re-
alists about ctional entities. So has one philosopher who is one of the
most famous supporters of the Quinean criterion of ontological commit-
ment, namely Peter van Inwagen; see [vI01, page 38]. There is a debate
concerning creationism; whether ctional entities are created by human be-
ings or exist independently of them as abstract objects such as numbers are
said to exist according to Platonists. However, it seems to me that if real-
ism is implausible anywhere at all, it is surely implausible with respect to
ctional entities. You can argue that ctional entities by denition are not
real, do not genuinely exist. This is Azzouni's view (in [Azz04, page 72]),
and though I disagree with his theory of ontological commitment, his intu-
itions seem to me to be right in this respect. Therefore I think that it would
be desirable for for a Quinean to nd a response to the counterexamples
that does not imply the existence of ctional objects. If ctional entities
do not exist at all in the literal sense of the word then they are not liter-
ally created (since only something which literally exists is literally created)
so creationism is false but neither are ctional entities Platonistic abstract
objects (as van Inwagen was forced to think, since he could not accept the
idea of non-objectual quantication). While the theory of abstract entities
I defend in this dissertation shares similarities with Platonism and might
even not entirely inappropriately be called Platonistic, I do not want to ex-
tend a similar approach to ctional objects. However, it is obvious that we
can quantify over ctional entities as in Azzouni's example of ctional mice.
Since my theory of ontological commitment is so similar to van Inwagen's it
is important that I show that it does not compel me to accept his views on
ctional objects (partly because unlike van Inwagen I accept the possibility
of non-objectual quantication).
Such quantication will have to be non-objectual, if we are to be anti-
realists about ctional entities, as common sense says we should be. How-
ever, it is not plausible to hold that all such quantication would be straight-
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forwardly substitutional. Azzouni has a quite good argument (in [Azz04,
pages 72,73]) why this would not be satisfactory; many characters in c-
tion are nameless. For instance, it is understood that there are many more
hobbits, dwarves and elves in Middle Earth than are named in Tolkien's
works. However, we can hold that such quantication is some kind of non-
substitutional and non-objectual quantication. In many cases, it might be
perspectival quantication, which we have already examined. However, this
will probably not work adequately in the case of inconsistent ctions, which
are a very dicult case. However, inconsistent ctions are probably a very
common case, since authors are fallible and often make mistakes. For exam-
ple, Arthur Conan Doyle apparently said both that Doctor Watson's rst
name was James and that it was John. Clearly no one can have two dier-
ent rst Christian names according to the naming system in use in western
countries so this is an inconsistency. In come cases apparent inconsistencies
can be explained away by more subtle interpretation of a piece of ction,
but there are surely many cases where this will not work.
We then have a very dicult semantic problem. However, such impos-
sible ctional objects seem similar to Meinongian impossible objects, so it
seems likely that any adequate semantic theory for statements about any
impossible objects might also be extended into a semantic theory for state-
ments about impossible ctional entities. Many Meinongian ontologists,
such as Parsons, have developed a theory of ctional entities with the aid
of Meinongian objects; however, if I have been correct in arguing that there
is no need for a Meinongian ontology in order to have a semantical theory
of impossible objects, then it should also be possible to develop a theory of
ctional entities without presupposing any Meinongian ontology. Therefore
I think that even in such cases statements quantifying over ctional entities
might be given truth-conditions by quantifying in the metalanguage over
necessarily uninstantiated properties or sets of incompatible (but possible
and perhaps even actual) properties of particulars which the ctional work
(such as a novel or short story or comic or lm etc.) or the (actual, not
ctional78 narrator of the ction is in a semantical relation to.
78In theories of ction a distinction is often made between the actual narrator or nar-
rators and the ctional narrator or narrators. E. g. in the case of the Sherlock Holmes
stories, Arthur Conan Doyle is the actual narrator while Doctor Watson is the ctional
narrator. Of course, since the ctional narrator or narrators is or are ctional and belongs
or belong to a ction (whether to the same ction he narrates or to another ction, as
in more complicated cases where we have stories within stories) he or they must also be
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5.11 Church's criterion of ontological commitment
and truth
Alonzo Church suggested in [Chu58] the correction to Quine's criterion that
since we should allow for models where variables do not have a non-empty
range it is only existential quantication, not universal, that carries onto-
logical commitment79. I think Church is right here. Even more importantly,
Church also tries to formulate his version of Quine's criterion more exactly.
The following is the formulation in [Chu58, page 1014]:
Schema 1 The assertion of (9x)M carries ontological commitment to en-
tities x such that M.
Church says that this is to be understood as a schema in which 'x' may
be replaced by any variable, 'x' may be replaced by any name of the same
variable, M may be replaced by any open sentence containing no other free
variable than 'x' and 'M ' may be replaced by any name of the same propo-
sitional form. This formulation seems to me to be a lot clearer than any of
reduced away in the metalanguage if we are to succeed in developing a non-realistic theory
of ctional entities. I am of course using the word "narrator" here in a wide sense, so that
the director or scriptwriter (or both) of a movie also count as narrators.
79Church's suggestion does carry some risk; it might be misunderstood to imply that
universally quantied statements would not be ontologically relevant. Universally quan-
tied statements, which do not carry commitment to the existence of any entities but
just deny the existence of some entities, can (so long as the universal quantier is ob-
jectual and unrestricted) be part of ontological theories as well as statements that arm
the existence of some entities. Indeed, it can even be argued that such statements are
a more crucial part of ontological theories than existentially quantied ontological state-
ments, being typically more dicult to establish and more controversial. For example,
the materialist's assertion that all entities are material, i. e. that there are no immaterial
entities, is surely an ontological assertion, though it does not carry any explicit ontological
commitments to the existence of any entities. We can indeed say that the materialist's
assertion implicitly carries commitments to the existence of material entities since it pre-
supposes that they exist, but the truly controversial part of his claim is that there are no
other entities; this is what separates him from dualists. Someone might well express this
by saying "universally quantied statements involve ontological commitments", and there
would be nothing necessarily wrong with this. However, this is not how the concept of
ontological commitment is usually employed since the work of Quine and Church, and I
think that it is best to stick to the terminology that has become standard. Even if we use
the phrase "ontological commitment" solely for commitments to the existence of entities,
we can use some other phrase such as "ontological relevance" or "ontological implication"
to refer to commitments to either the existence or the non-existence of entities. We could
divide ontological implications into explicit and implicit and into dierent kinds of implicit
ontological implications similarly to the way we in this dissertation divide the concept of
ontological commitment.
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Quine's own formulations, and far clearer than most of the formulations of
Quine's other followers (with the possible exception of Cartwright's rather
clear formulations) and quite plausible, at least if we are speaking about ex-
plicit and not about implicit commitment. Thus it is strange that it has not
gured very much in recent discussion concerning ontological commitments.
Chihara is one of the few who have noticed that Church's formulation is
clearer than Quine's formulations; however, as I will show, Chihara still
partly misinterprets Church's formulation.
Those familiar with modern formal semantics should here experience a
sense of deja vu. Church's formulation of the criterion of ontological commit-
ment sounds a lot like Tarski's criterion of material adequacy for the concept
of truth, the famous T-schema or Convention T80 (see [Tar83a] and [Tar44,
page 344]). One famous (but not completely accurate) formulation Tarski
gives for the T-schema is the following:
Schema 2 X is true if, and only if, p.
Tarski explains that this is to be understood as a schema in which 'X' is
the name of 'p'. The same principle is used both in Tarski's T-schema and
in Church's criterion of ontological commitment. In both cases we have a
schema where both an expression and its name occur but no other (expres-
sions expressing) material notions except (an expression expressing the) the
semantical notion that is to be dened occur. It is crucial for both conven-
80"Convention T" is more often used, but I think that "T-schema" is really a better
name, for "Convention T" suggests that the schema is somehow especially conventional,
but it can be argued that the schema is no more conventional than any sentence or
sentential schema is, and this is just because of the conventionality of all language, whether
natural or articial. If we choose to use the word "true" as it is actually used (or in a
signicantly similar way, even if we clarify it to make it a technical term), we cannot
consistently choose not to hold the T-schema as true. Of course, if we use the word "true"
in an articial language, then how we use it is to some extent conventional. However, the
T-schema is not just a stipulation for how a semanticist chooses to use the word "true",
but an explication of the way it and its translations have actually been used in natural
languages for a long time. Of course, explication or regimentation does always hold a
conventional element; however, it can be argued that in the case of the word "true",
the conventional element is actually lesser than in most cases of explication. We can
argue that the T-schema could actually serve not merely as an explication but even as
the foundation of an analysis in the sense of G. E. Moore of the central meaning of the
word "true" (if analysis in the Moorean sense is at all possible). Of course, it is not
meant as a description of the way the word true" is (pragmatically) used as the ordinary
language philosophers would desire; just as in any semantical analysis, we must exclude
such peripheral and possibly metaphorical uses as in expressions like "true friend", ignore
conventional implicatures etc..
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tion T and Church's formulation of the criterion of ontological commitment
that the same expression is both used and mentioned in expressing them.
I propose that we call Church's formulation of the criterion Convention C
and the C-schema (where the letter "C" comes either from "commitment"
or from "Church" in honor to Church) in analogy to Convention T and
T-schema.
Tarski's Convention T is a biconditional. Convention C as I have for-
mulated it is not a biconditional or other kind formula derived from other
formulas with the aid of propositional functions; however, it can be trans-
lated into a conditional.
Schema 3 An assertion S carries ontological commitment to entities x such
that M if S is of the form (9x)F where M is a translation of F to the
metalanguage.
This can even be transformed into an equivalence if we use the narrower
notion of explicit ontological commitment instead of the wider notion of
ontological commitment:
Schema 4 An assertion S carries explicit ontological commitment to en-
tities x such that M if and only if S is of the form (9x)F where M is a
translation of F to the metalanguage.
Famously though Tarski held that the concept of truth was not strictly
speaking applicable to natural languages, he yet illuminated it (e. g. in [Tar83a,
page 343]) for pedagogical purposes with the aid of such examples taken from
natural languages such as English and Polish as the following Example 681:
Example 6 The sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is
white.
This Tarski's most commonly known formulation of the T-schema is mis-
leading in one way. It is disquotational i. e. homophonic, which implies that
the metalanguage must be an extension of the object language. However,
81Tarski's own example may not in retrospect have been as fortunate as possible, since it
contains the mass term "snow" and there exist especially dicult problems concerning the
semantics of mass terms quite distinct from the general problems associated with truth.
Later discussion has focused more on examples like the following: The sentence "John is
a doctor" is true if and only if John is a doctor
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elsewhere Tarski makes clear that a more careful formulation of the scheme
should also take into account cases where 'X' is the name of a sentence whose
translation 'p' is; for instance, in [Tar44, page 350] he says:
The requirement in question can be somewhat modied, for
it suces to assume that the object-language can translated into
the meta-language. . .
Since sceptical doubts can be raised concerning the general intelligibility of
the notion of translation, using this notion makes Tarski's theory more con-
troversial. Also, there are wider and narrower notions of translation, so this
opens the possibility of developing a Tarskian theory in dierent directions
by using dierent notions of translation. Clearly, a notion of translation
according to which translation presupposes strict synonymy between the
translated expression and the translating expression is unnecessarily strong
for the purposes of a theory of truth, but a too loose notion that allows any
loose paraphrases to count as translations may on the other hand be too
permissive. Tarski's less than suciently careful formulation of the schema
has lent support to deationist interpretations of Tarski's theory, such as the
Disquotational Theory of Truth. Kunne has in [K03, x4.2.1page 226] called
the narrower interpretation of the T-schema the Disquotation Schema. A
wider formulation of the schema that makes use of the notion of translation
has also less trivial instances which are not disquotational or homophonic,
since in them the metalanguage is not an extension of the object language,
but the object language can be a completely dierent language, e.g.:
Example 7 The sentence "Schnee ist weiss" is true if and only if snow is
white.
Actually, the requirement can be modied further (and ought to be,
since it still sounds too deationist). Tarski's actual theory can apply also
to languages (or fragments of languages) whose sentences cannot be trans-
lated into the metalanguage, so long as these languages are semantically
open sentences and are lower in the Tarskian hierarchy of semantically open
languages than the metalanguage and have similar logical forms as the sen-
tences of the metalanguage.
Even though Quine was sceptical about whether the concept of onto-
logical commitment is applicable to natural languages - which scepticism
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Church apparently did not share - Church's formulation can like Tarski's
be illuminated, at least for purely pedagogical purposes, with the aid of ex-
amples from natural languages. When this is done the similarity becomes
even more apparent. The examples naturally have a disquotational form
just like Tarski's examples of the T-schema, though like Tarski's T-schema
the C-schema also has less trivial instances which are not disquotational.
The following is an example of an instance of Convention C, the criterion of
ontological commitment, completely parallel to Tarski's own example:
Example 8 The sentence "There is white snow" carries ontological com-
mitment to white snow.
The following example may be more illuminating since it does not contain
a mass term:
Example 9 The sentence "There are men." carries ontological commitment
to men.
We can also give examples where the metalanguage is not an expansion
of the object language, e. g. the following where the object language is
Finnish and the metalanguage English;:
Example 10 The sentence "Naisia on olemassa." carries ontological com-
mitment to women.
In fact it seems plausible that the criterion of ontological commitment is
simply an application of some more general semantical principles implying
also the Convention T and similar schemata involving other semantical con-
cepts such as denotation, satisfaction, obedience etc. For example we can
give as an example of the condition of material adequacy for the denition of
the concept of obedience a schema with the example "The person addressed
obeys the command "Shut the window" if and only if he shuts the window".
This schema would (when developed further in a precise manner) allow us to
formulate a correspondence theory of obedience. Thus we could generalise
truth-conditional semantics to other sentences besides statements, namely
to commands. Similar correspondence conditions could be formulated for
other kinds of sentences. While the notion of denotation must probably be
taken as a primitive in a Tarskian theory as Field has argued, yet we can
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give as a necessary though not sucient material condition of adequacy for
the denition of denotation the disquotational schema of which "The word
"Quine" denotes Quine" is an instance.
Of other semantical concepts besides truth, the notion of ontological
commitment is especially closely related to the concept of satisfaction, a
concept which was central in Tarski's theory of truth and almost more fun-
damental in Tarski's overall semantics theory than the concept of truth.
Today instead of satisfaction we usually speak equivalently of truth relative
to an assignment. An existentially quantied sentence (9x) is ontologically
committed to those entities which would satisfy the formula  (when x is
the only variable in )82.
It follows from the analogy between Church's criterion of ontological
commitment and Convention T that Church's criterion should be just as
convincing and indeed trivial as Convention T is usually thought to be. Of
course there have been many philosophers who have doubted the adequacy
of Tarski's theory of truth, and these will no doubt remain similarly sceptical
about the adequacy of Quine's theory of ontological commitment. However,
those that think that Tarski's theory of truth is adequate should have no
reason to doubt the adequacy of the criterion of ontological commitment
as formulated by Church either. Similarly, problems about the interpreta-
tion and philosophical implications of Tarski's theory will carry over to this
theory of ontological commitment.
5.12 The Symbolization of ontological commitment
The concept of ontological commitment is usually in the literature expressed
in natural language. However, if we are to develop a rigorous theory of
ontological commitment, we must make use of articial languages. Since the
standard language used in philosophical logic is the language of predicate
logic, usually expanded in some fashion to contain non-logical constants, to
do so we should rst ask how is the concept of ontological commitment to
82This must of course not be understood so that ontological commitment would be a
relation between a sentence and those entities which satisfy a formula. We can be ontolog-
ically committed to entities which do not exist and so though a sentence is ontologically
committed to entities which satisfy an embedded formula yet it may be that no entities
satisfy that formula. Because of this ontological commitment cannot be dened with
the aid of satisfaction at one blow, but we need a recursive or otherwise more complex
denition.
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be symbolized in languages based on the language of predicate logic.
Since as we have seen the concept of ontological commitment is a seman-
tical concept, analogous to the concept of truth, one might suspect that it
requires a sharp distinction between language and metalanguage, and that
neglecting such a distinction will lead to trouble. I will show that this is in-
deed the case; however, in order to show this, I will at rst develop what may
be called the naive theory of ontological commitment, in analogy to what
are commonly called naive set theory and naive theory of truth (though in
truth these are already rather sophisticated theories, sophisticated enough
that they are hard to learn and hard to popularize, and sophisticated enough
to lead to generate subtle contradictions, though not sophisticated enough
to escape from them). I will therefore neglect at rst the distinction between
use and mention, in order to show that this will lead to paradoxes, and then
later develop the theory of ontological commitment in a more sophisticated
manner.
One natural rst guess might be that ontological commitment should be
symbolized as an ordinary predicate. If this were correct, then a sentence
a like "Sentence S carries ontological commitment to dogs." should by sym-
bolized as (9x)(D(x) & C(S; x)). However, a short reection is enough to
convince us that this is not an adequate symbolization. A sentence such as
"There are dogs." carries ontological commitment to dogs, but it does not
carry ontological commitment to any particular dog, as the proposed symbol-
ization would do, for the sentence can be true even if any particular dog does
not exist. We need therefore a more complicated symbolization. The second
argument of the expression "ontological commitment" in natural language
is typically a plural noun phrase, e. g. in the case of this example "dogs" or
in a more complicated example "male brown dogs". Such phrases are often
translated into predicates of predicates, such as (P )(((9x)(D(x) & P (x))
or even higher order constructs in rigorous formal systems of natural lan-
guage semantics such as Montague semantics or Church's own logic of sense
and denotation. If we had to make use of this kind of treatment, then the
theory of ontological commitment would become immensely dicult. How-
ever, such higher-order formalizations are typically only an intermediate
phrase in symbolization; after symbolizing a sentence by means of such con-
structions, it is then simplied by means of such operations as -conversion
into simpler forms. Using such symbolizations would be necessary only
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if we were to seek for a way of mechanically formalizing all natural lan-
guage sentences, as is typically done in Montague semantics; Montague's
compositional semantics is one promising way of producing such mechani-
cal translations, though not the only one. While nding such mechanical
translations is naturally desirable in the long run, it would be premature
to do so in this stage of developing the theory of ontological commitment.
I think it is enough to take the second argument to be either a predicate
or an open formula (with the variable ranging over the entities of the kind
to which the sentence carries ontological commitment). Open formulas can
be converted into predicates by means of -conversion, so it suces to take
the second argument to be a predicate. The general form of statements
of ontological commitment is then C(x; s;  ) or C(s; P ) where the former
can be simplied into C(s; (x) )). This can be read as "The sentence s
carries ontological commitment to such entities x that  ." Using this kind
of symbolization, Convention C can now be stated in the following succinct
form: C((9x); (x)). We can use CE(; (x)) to symbolize "Sentence
 carries explicit ontological commitment to such entities x that . In the
case of explicit ontological commitment, Convention C can be expressed in
a stronger form as the biconditional (8P )(CE((9x); P )  P = (x))).
Clearly this implies the weaker form CE((9x); (x)), as it can be derived
from it by the reexivity of identity, Universal instantiation, the denition of
implication and Modus Ponens. Since (8P )(CE((9x); P )  P = (x)))
implies CE((9x); (x))  (x) = (x)) by universal instantiation, and
this implies (x) = (x))! CE((9x); (x)) by the denition of equiv-
alence and elimination of conjunction and since (x) = x), we can derive
CE((9x); (x)) by Modus Ponens.
While the concept of ontological commitment is intensional (as I will
explain at greater length later) we can dene with its aid an extensional
concept, the extensionalization of ontological commitment. This extensional
concept cannot replace the intensional concept, but will help us to apply ex-
tensional logic to the concept of ontological commitment in some situations.
Let us say that an entity a is among those entities to which a sentence car-
ries ontological commitment if and only if a is one of whatever entities the
sentence is committed to. Let us use CX(p; x) to symbolise that x is among
the entities to which the sentence p carries ontological commitment.
If we are allowed to use besides a semantically closed language also
359
higher-order quantication (whether objectual or not), then this concept can
be dened so that CX(p; x) def (9P )(CE(p; P ) &P (x)) & (8P )(CE(p; P )!
P (x)), where CE(p; P ) means that the sentence p carries explicit ontological
commitment to entities x such that P (x). Thus e. g. if p is the sentence
"There are men." and x is a man, then any x is among the entities to which
p carries ontological commitment i x is a man. Thus any man is among
the entities to which p carries ontological commitment, though we cannot
say that p would carry ontological commitment to him, since the sentence
would be true even if he did not exist but some other man existed. To give
a slightly dierent example, if p is the sentence "There are unicorns.", then
x is among the entities to which p carries commitment if and only if x is
an unicorn. Thus since no unicorns exist no entity is among the entities to
which p carries commitment, but p still carries commitment to some enti-
ties, namely to unicorns. It is now intuitively true that for any p of the form
(9x), y is among the entities to which  carries ontological commitment if
(y=x), i. e. CX((9x); y)  (y=x).
Clearly this intuitive truth is very close to the naive Convention C - as
close as any extensional schema can be - and closely analogous to Convention
T. However, in order to be more certain of this we can deduce it from
Convention C and the inference rule of -conversion which is common in
higher-order logics.
As the theorem to be proved, CX((9x); y)  (y=x), is an equivalence,
we can prove it by proving the implication in two directions, i. e. both
CX((9x); y) ! (y=x) and CX((9x); y)  (y=x). I will prove rst
CX((9x); y)  (y=x), as this is a bit easier to prove. To prove an im-
plication, I will suppose that its antecedent is true and prove on the basis
of this assumption that its consequent is true, and then discharge the as-
sumption by the introduction rule for implication. Let us then suppose that
CX((9x); y). By the denition of CX, replacing the deniendum by its
deniens, (9P )(CE((9x); P ) & P (x)) & (8P )(CE(9x); P )! P (x))). By
the elimination of conjunction we can derive from this (8P )(CE((9x); P ))!
P (x)). By Universal Instantiation i. e. the elimination of the universal quan-
tier we can deduce from this CE((9x); (y)(y=x)) ! (y)((y=x))(x)
by replacing the predicate variable P with the -abstract (y)((y=x)),
which is a constant predicate term and so an appropriate term to substi-
tute for it. Now CE((9x); (y)(y=x)) is an instance of the weaker form
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of Convention C (renaming systematically the bound variable y), which
was one of our premises. Applying Modens Ponens i. e. the elimina-
tion of implication to this instance of Convention C and the result we
arrived at so far (i. e. CE((9x); (y)(y=x)) ! (y)((y=x))(x)), we
can derive (y)((y=x))(x). From this we can derive by -conversion i. e.
the elimination of the -operator (y=x). From the preceding sequence
of stages of or proof, we can derive by the introduction of implication
CX((9x); y)! (y=x). To prove the implication in the other direction, we
start by assuming that (y=x). From this we get by applying -conversion
in the opposite direction (y)((y=x))(x). Now CE((9x); (y)(y=x)) is
an instance of the weaker form of Convention C (which we already proved
to follow from the stronger form), so by applying the introduction of con-
junction we get CE((9x); (y)(y=x)) & (y)((y=x))(x) and from this we
derive (9P )(CE((9x); P ) & P (y) by the introduction rule of the (higher
order) existential quantier and from this we get by the introduction of
implication ((9P )(CE((9x); P ) & P (y))  (y=x)). In order to prove
that (8P )(CE((9x); P ) ! P (x)) we have to appeal to the stronger form
of Convention C, namely (8P )(CE((9x); P )  P = (x))). Let Q be
an arbitrary property. We can derive by existential instantiation from the
stronger form of Convention C that CE((9x);Q)  Q = (x)(y=x)).
We can derive from this by the denition of equivalence CE((9x);Q) !
Q = (x)(y=x)). Let us assume that CE((9x);Q). We can now de-
rive by Modus Ponens Q = (x)(y=x)) and from this by the substitution
of variables Q = (y)(y=x)). However, since as we already proved that
(y)((y=x))(x), so by Leibniz's Law Q(x). From this we derive by the intro-
duction of implication CE((9x);Q) ! Q(x) (discharging the assumption
CE((9x);Q)) and from this by the introduction of universal quantica-
tion since Q was an arbitrary property, (8P )(CE((9x); P )! P (x)). From
this we can nally derive by the introduction of implication (discharging
the assumption that (y=x)(x)) (8P )(CE((9x); P ) ! P (x))  (y=x).
Combining this with our earlier result that ((9P )(CE((9x); P ) & P (y)) 
(y=x)) we arrive at ((9P )(CE((9x); P ) & P (x)) & (8P )(CE((9x); P )!
P (x)) (y=x) and replacing in the denition of the denition of CX the
deniens with the deniendum, we nally arrive at CX((9x); y) (y=x).
Combining this with the earlier result that CX((9x); y) ! (y=x) we get
by the denition of equivalence CX((9x); y)  (y=x). Q. E. D.
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5.12.1 A Paradox of Ontological Commitment
In his formulation Church carefully distinguishes between use and mention,
between variables and their names and between open sentences and their
names (even though his notation does not make the distinction as clear as it
could be). This almost amounts to a distinction of an object language and
a metalanguage, and can easily be generalised to such a distinction. Why
does Church think that such distinctions are needed? Are such distinctions
just pointless pedantry? No, Tarski made such distinctions in the theory of
truth to make the theory of truth rigorous or formally adequate, and most
importantly in order to prevent semantical paradoxes such as the Liar para-
dox. It seems to me that Church may have known or suspected that similar
paradoxes threaten us in the case of the notion of ontological commitment.
If this was what Church was concerned about Church was right; without
distinctions between object language and metalanguage we can easily be
led into contradiction in the case of ontological commitment exactly as in
the case of truth. We can formulate in our naive theory of ontological
commitment a paradox similar to the Paradox of the Liar; I will call it
the Paradox of Denied Ontological Commitment. Consider the following
example sentence:
Example 11 There are entities to which this sentence carries no ontological
commitment.
This sentence83 is very similar to the Liar sentence "This sentence is
not true." When we ask ourselves whether the Liar sentence is true or not,
it seems intuitively that it must be true just in case it is not true. From
this, however, it follows that if the Law of the Excluded Middle is true,
the sentence must be both true and not true, which is a contradiction.
Similarly when we ask to which entities the sentence above carries ontological
commitment, it seems intuitively - to put this very crudely and inaccurately
- that this assertion would carry ontological commitment to any entities just
in case it does not carry ontological commitment to them.
In order to derive an explicit contradiction in a rigorous way we have to
use a slightly more complicated route, making use not only of the concept
83We could of course also use the concept of pragmatical ontological commitment in
deriving a paradox; the sentence "There are entities to which I am not ontologically
committed." would do as well, except that it is not quite as simple semantically (even
though its expression is shorter).
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of ontological commitment but of a more complicated concept that can be
dened with the aid of it, namely the concept of an entity being among the
entities a sentence is ontologically committed to. We have already dened
this concept, and proved a theorem regarding it; we can easily see with the
aid of this theorem that applying this concept to Example 11 leads to an
explicit contradiction. Thus for example any man is among the entities to
which the sentence Example 11 carries ontological commitment just in case
he is not among them. If we assume that any man must either be among the
entities to which the sentence carries commitment or not be among them,
which is just an instance of the Law of the Excluded Middle, we can easily
derive an explicit contraction; any man both is and is not among the entities
to which the sentence carries commitment.
The parallel to truth is perhaps not wholly complete in this respect
since it may be that a contradiction cannot be derived from the criterion
of ontological commitment in every language which is semantically closed
in the sense that we can speak in it of the ontological commitments its
own sentences carry and which contains the standard propositional logical
connectives, but only in a suciently rich semantically closed language, a
language with higher-order quantiers or plural quantiers (which perhaps
need not be objectual, so that their addition may not have to increase the
ontological commitments made in the language). However, since very many
such languages do not lead to any contradiction without the addition of the
concept of ontological commitment84, and do lead to contradiction when
the concept is added along with its criterion, the parallel is in any case very
far-going.
I will now show how a contradiction can be explicitly derived in a lan-
guage which contains the extensionalization of the concept of ontological
commitment. As we have already proved, CX((9x); y)  (y=x). Now let
c be the sentence such that c = (9x)(:CX(c; x)). Clearly such sentences
could exist in a semantically closed language in which more familiar para-
doxes like the Liar paradox could be formulated as soon as the concept of
84Of course a language which has higher-order quantiers together with a naive, too
strong comprehension principle leads to contradiction even without the addition of any
semantical concept such as the concept of ontological commitment, but my point is that
even a language without any comprehension principle or any similar controversial prin-
ciples which does not harbour any contradictions will lead to contradictions when the
concept of the ontological commitment of its own sentences is added to it together with
intuitively obvious axioms concerning it.
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truth was introduced to it. It is quite similar to the Liar sentence l, which
is such that l = :True(l), being just a slightly more complicated instance
of an expression talking about its semantical values. Now it follows from
what we have said that CX((9x)(:CX(c; x)); y)  :CX(c; y), i. e. since
c = (9x)(:CX(c; x), CX(c; y)  :CX(c; y). This nal sentence is contra-
dictory according to classical two-valued gapless propositional logic85.
It would be disingenuous to conclude from these paradoxes that there is
something wrong with the concept of ontological commitment, unless one is
willing to say that there is also something wrong with the notion of truth,
which is surely absurd. Obviously most if not all ways suggested to prevent
the Paradox of the Liar also suce to prevent this paradox and help to make
the theory of ontological commitment formally correct. The obvious solu-
tion is of course to demand that we could not speak in any language of the
ontological commitment of its own sentences even as Tarski demands that
we cannot speak in any language of the truth of its own sentences86. Church
seems to strongly suggest this solution, though he does not explicitly argue
for it. We must then make a distinction between object language and met-
alanguage, or more generally between languages and their metalanguages.
We will then have a rst-level language which cannot speak about any onto-
logical commitments though it has such, a second-level language in which we
can speak about the ontological commitments of sentences in the rst-level
language, a third-level language in which we can speak about the ontolog-
ical commitments of sentences of the second-level language (and also the
second-order language. if we make the hierarchy of languages cumulative,
as we should in the interest of expressive power), and so on.
However, though this is the most obvious solution it is not the only one
and is not necessarily the best. Alternatively we might choose a solution like
Kripke's in [Kri75] or a solution like the revision theory of truth. In these
solutions the predicate of ontological commitment, like that of truth, would
85In order to derive an explicit contradiction we must assume that there exists some
entity y. This assumption is trivially true in standard predicate logic, but not in free
logic. However, it is obviously a true assumption; one can hardly seriously claim that
the contradiction could be avoided by assuming that nothing exists. Besides, y I might
be identical with the sentence c itself; a semantically closed language must be capable of
speaking about its own sentences, and therefore a theory formulated in it must assume
that sentences exist.
86This seems to be contrary to the claim of Devitt in [Dev84, x4.6 pages 50-53] that we
can establish ontological commitments without moving into a metalanguage discussion,
though the word "establish" that Devitt uses is rather ambiguous.
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be dened in stages, which correspond to the levels of the Tarskian hierarchy
of languages but are all stages in the denition of a single language. In a
Kripkean solution the Law of Excluded Middle is denied, and the assertion
Example 11 would turn out to be without truth-value. I will for the sake
of simplicity use the more familiar Tarskian approach in the rest of this
dissertation, but in the end I suspect some more complicated approach such
as that of Kripke will be better, as it captures better the way truth-predicates
are used in natural languages. By this I do not mean just that it describes
the way they function better (though it does that) for describing the way
natural languages actually work is not the only or even the primary task of
semantics, but also that it provides a better replacement for the inconsistent
concept of truth used in natural languages (I mean a better replacement in
the sense that we can do with it more of the jobs that inconsistent concept
tried to do while retaining consistency). Nevertheless, even a Kripkean
approach cannot entirely do away with the use of metalanguages, since such
things as that some sentences of the object language do not possess a truth-
value, cannot be said in that language itself, so it remains rmly based upon
Tarskian foundations.
5.13 A Recursive Characterisation of Explicit On-
tological Commitment
It is often stated (most prominently by Horwich) to be the main idea of
deationist theories of truth that the Convention T should be taken as an
axiom schema of the theory of truth, indeed as the only axiom schema
of such a theory, rather than just as as a material condition of adequacy
for the theory of truth. If as I argue the Convention C is analogous to
Convention T, then a deationary theory of ontological commitment should
likewise take the Convention C as an axiom schema rather than just as a
criterion of adequacy. This would result in a very simple theory of ontological
commitment, as Horwich's theory results in a very simple theory of truth.
However, just as it has been often questioned whether a theory of truth as
simple as Horwich's is adequate, it can be questioned whether such a theory
of ontological commitment would be adequate.
We have seen that a purely disquotational theory of truth would hold
that a person can apply the truth predicate only to sentences he under-
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stands. Analogously a purely disquotational theory of ontological commit-
ment would say that a person can apply a predicate of ontological commit-
ment only to sentences he himself understands, while a more inationary
theory of ontological commitment would say that a person can speak about
the ontological commitment of sentences which he cannot understand, in-
deed, even of the ontological commitment of sentences he cannot understand.
However, as we have seen even Field, who introduced the pure disquotational
theory of truth has realized that it is not adequate, so there is no point in
trying to construct a purely disquotational theory of ontological commit-
ment.
It is in fact easy to see how to develop a deationary theory of ontologi-
cal commitment. As I will show, the concept of ontological commitment can
be dened using the concept of reference (or designation). However, there
exist many deationary concepts of reference; most philosophers who are
deationists about truth are also deationists about reference, though de-
ationism about truth does not imply deationism about reference (though
the converse relationship probably holds). For example, Robert Brandom
has in [Bra84] developed an anaphoric theory of reference which would make
reference an intra-linguistic relationship, and Paul Horwich has developed a
less radical deationary theory of reference. If the concept of reference used
in my denitions were to be reinterpreted in a deationary way then my
theory of ontological commitment would be transformed into a deationary
theory.
However, this would trivialize the concept of ontological commitment and
of ontology itself completely (at least if the deationary theory in question
were radical like Brandom's). In fact, the result of this kind of procedure
would be similar to Quine's thesis of ontological relativity, which is not
surprising since Quine is a deationist. However, it is surely not necessary
to interpret the concept of reference in a deationary way and I do not want
to do so, since I want to develop ontological theories that are not completely
trivial.
Tarski's Convention T was not, however, the culmination of Tarski's
theory of truth. It was not itself a denition of truth in the sense in which
Tarski was seeking for a denition of truth but only a preliminary criterion
for the material adequacy of a denition of truth. The Convention T was
according to him something to be explained, not indeed causally (for it is not
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a historical event such as could be explained causally, but a timeless general
rule) and not directly naturalistically (for even if a naturalistic explanation
of it is in principle possible, we are far from being able to give such an
explanation today) but in terms of more fundamental semantical principles.
This is because the notions that occur in the formulation of Convention T
are not to be taken as primitive notions either. Tarski did not take the
notion that 'X' is the name of 'p', which he used in his formulation of
Convention T, as a primitive - not in the case where 'p' is a sentence - but
characterised it further by using other semantical notions such as satisfaction
and the denotation of simpler expressions. It was only in the case of the
denotation of simple individual and predicate constants that Tarski resorted
to disjunctive denition, which if Field is right amounted to leaving these
semantical notions primitive. In the case of complex expressions such as
sentences Tarski was able to give a non-disjunctive, non-trivial denition for
all semantical concepts applying to them which he used87.
If the analogy between truth and ontological commitment is valid, then
the Convention C or C-schema can also be only a condition for the material
adequacy of a theory of ontological commitment, not a complete theory of
ontological commitment in itself. Carrying the analogy further, an explicit,
non-disjunctive denition ought to be possible also in the case of ontological
commitment. We must therefore proceed further if we are to nd a fully
satisfactory theory of ontological commitment. We must explain Church's
notion of the name of a propositional form further, since we can take the
name-relation i. e. the relation of denotation as primitive only in the case
of simple individual and predicate constants, not in the case of any complex
formulas (or complex terms either, if the language has them). However,
the way ahead is not very dicult, as we have just to follow the obvious
analogies with other semantical concepts like truth and denotation. If a
basically Tarskian approach to the problem of truth is correct, as I have
already argued, then because of the analogies between the notions of truth
and ontological commitment, the notion of ontological commitment should
be dened like the notion of truth recursively by means of denotation, and
Convention C should be proved on the basis of these denitions rather than
87This is at least in part why Tarski's theory may not be deationist in any strong
sense of the word. Deationists typically think that only an implicit denition of truth
is possible, but Tarski's theory gives an explicit denition of truth (relative to particular
languages).
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just taken as an axiom schema.
One cannot indeed very naturally speak about a correspondence theory
of ontological commitment, for since we can be ontologically committed to
entities which do not and even cannot exist, ontological commitment cannot
be a matter of a straightforward correspondence between linguistic expres-
sions and entities in the world. Nevertheless, one can ask whether Quine's
or Church's theory of ontological commitment is a deationary or an ina-
tionary (or substantive or substantivalist) theory of ontological commitment,
and more importantly, whether the theory of ontological commitment should
be deationary or inationary (substantive or substantivalist).
So the denition of ontological commitment must be recursive like the
denition of truth. We must also initially relativise the notion of ontolog-
ical commitment to sequences of entities as Tarski did or equivalently to
assignments of variables as is more commonly done today. I will use the
metavariables g; h; : : : to range over assignments, i. e. functions which as-
sociate entities with variables of the object language88. Let us say that for
any term ti (including both singular terms and predicate terms) ktikg is the
semantic value of ti relative to assignment g, i. e. ktikg) =  i either
ti is a variable and g(ti) =  or ti is a constant and ti is the name of .
A sentence carries commitment to entities x such that M if and only if it
carries commitment to entities x such that M relative to all assignments g.
While Tarski's Convention T applied directly to all sentences, Church's
Convention C applies directly only to existentially quantied sentences.
Thus while Tarski's recursive denition of truth ranges over all forms of
formulae from the simpler to the more complex, our denition of ontological
commitment must range (at least at rst) only over all existentially quanti-
ed formulae. However, since existential quantication can be applied to any
formula, this dierence is smaller than might at rst appear. This implies
that the recursion must range over all formulae occurring in the scope of an
88One might object that the common use of assignments involves stronger ontological
commitments than the use of sequences, since it involves commitments to sets of sequences
(as an assignment is such a set) and not just to sequences, and that we ought to avoid
such commitments if they are not necessary. However, a Tarskian theory in any case
carries commitments to sets of sequences as the extensions of polyadic predicates, and
therefore we cannot avoid such commitments anyway if we are to develop a Tarskian
theory further rather than radically revise it. Therefore we can just as well embrace them
already by using assignments, and this is useful since this avoids some of the complications
of Tarski's original formulation of his theory by means of sequences (such as the use of
innite sequences).
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existential quantier, from the simpler to the more complex. Obviously we
must start from atomic formulae occurring in the scope of the existential
quantier.
Let ktik stand for the designation (aka denotation aka reference aka
extension) of the term ti relative to assignment g.
Preliminary Denition 1 Sentence (9x)R(t1; : : : ; tn) where the quanti-
er (9x) is objectual carries ontological commitment to such entities  that

tkt1kg(=x); : : : ; ktnkg(=x)
 2 kRkg(y=x) relative to assignment g.
We can replace the implication here with an equivalence if we restrict
ourselves to explicit ontological commitment. Let R be the name of the
relation Q or, to say this in terms not committing us to realism, 'R' be the
name of 'Q'.
Metadenition 3 A sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that Q(1; : : : ; n) where  = i for some 1  i  n rel-
ative to assignment g if and only if it is identical with such a sentence
(9x)R(t1; : : : ; tn) that the quantier (9x) is objectual and unrestricted and
kRkg = Q and 1 = kt1kg, . . . , kxk = , . . . and n = ktnkg.
It must be stressed that a sentence (9x)R(t1; : : : ; x; : : : ; tn) can carry ex-
plicit ontological commitment to such entities y that (kRkg(tkt1kg; : : : ; y; : : : ; ktnkg))
according to this denition even if the sentence is false and there are no such
entities, i. e. even if for no y (htkt1kg; : : : ; y; : : : ; ktnkgi 2 kRkg). Further-
more, it can carry that ontological commitment even if there could not any
such entities, i. e. even if (9x)R(t1; : : : ; x; : : : ; tn) is not true even with
respect to any model or any possible world. Thus, explicit ontological com-
mitment is a hyperintensional notion in the sense in which the word is used
by Creswell in [Cre75], even though we have not had to use any intensional
notions in characterizing it89.
89It might be possible to give a non-recursive characterization of explicit ontological
commitment by using notions developed in the tradition of hyperintensional logic. Two
sentences have the same explicit ontological commitments only if they are intensionally
isomorphic in the sense of the word Carnap developed in [Car47]. The recursive semantic
rules characterizing explicit ontological commitment work because they create an isomor-
phism very similar to intensional isomorphism between the expressions in the object lan-
guage and the metalanguage. More exactly, the sentence "The sentence S carries explicit
ontological commitments to such entities x that M" is true if and only if the sentences S
and (9y)M are intensionally isomorphic. However, there is a reason why the recursive def-
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The next case is that where a negative formula is in the scope of the
existential quantier.
Metadenition 4 A sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that it is not the case that M relative to assignment g if
and only if it is (identical with) such a sentence (9x): that (the quantier
(9x) is objectual and unrestricted) and the sentence (9x) carries ontological
commitment to entities  such that M relative to assignment g.
For example, let us assume that  is P (x) and kPkg denotes the set of
material beings or the property of being material. In this case  is the sen-
tence (9x):P (x) and carries ontological commitment to immaterial beings
(whether such beings exist according to the metatheory or not).
Adding explicitly that the quantier is objectual and unrestricted may
not be necessary in this case, or in any of the following cases of complex
formulas, since we are supposing that the quantier applied to the negative
formula is the same as the one applied to the negated one, and since the later
is objectual and unrestricted according to the other rules (by the recursion
which starts from the previous rule) it follows that the former must also be
objectual and unrestricted.
In the next case a conjunctive formula is in the scope of the existential
quantier.
Metadenition 5 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M and N relative to assignment g if and only if it is
(identical with) such a sentence (9x)( ^ ) that the quantier (9x) is
objectual and unrestricted and the sentence (9x) carries ontological com-
mitment to entities  such that M relative to g and sentence (9x) carries
ontological commitment to entities  such that N relative to g.
For example, the sentence "There are ying horses." carries commitment
to ying horses. Let us assume that  is the formula P (x) and  is the
inition may be preferable. In order to state this isomorphism explicitly and rigorously we
have to make use of a third-level language, in which we can compare the object language
and the metalanguage; the use of recursive rules enables us to stay lower in the hierarchy
of languages, though it necessitates lengthier formulations. While the explicit use of the
notion of intensional isomorphism is probably inevitable in the semantics of many propo-
sitional attitudes (and probably also some objectual attitudes) such as explicit belief, it
need not be so in the semantics of explicit ontological commitment.
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formula Q(x). Let us further assume that kPkg stands for the set of entities
capable of ying or the property of being capable of ying and kQkg for the
set of horses or the property of being a horse. In this case  is the sentence
(9x)(P (x) ^ Q(x)) and carries ontological commitment to ying horses
(even if they do not exist according to the metatheory).
It must be noted that the conjunctive formula may be even contradictory.
A formula such as (9x)(P (x) ^ :P (x)) carries commitment to logically im-
possible entities (e. g. if 'P' stands for men or humanity to beings which are
men yet are not men). Despite this, however, it does not carry commitment
to entities satisfying an arbitrary contradictory formula. This makes even
clearer the hyperintensional character of the theory of explicit ontological
commitment, and actually makes the theory paraconsistent.
Next follow sentences where a disjunction is in the scope of the existential
quantier.
Metadenition 6 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M or N relative to assignment g if and only if it iden-
tical with such a sentence (9x)( _ ) that the quantier (9x) is objectual
and unrestricted and the sentence (9x) carries ontological commitment to
entities  such that M relative to assignment g and sentence (9x) carries
ontological commitment to entities  such that N relative to assignment g.
For example, the sentence "There are trees or mountains." carries com-
mitment to entities which are trees or mountains, i. e. it carries commitment
to trees or mountains. If  is again P (x) and  is Q(x) and kPkg denotes
the property of being a tree and kQkg denotes the property of being a moun-
tain, then (9x)(P (x) _ Q(x)) carries ontological commitment to trees or
mountains.
While sentences with explicit ontological commitment are all quantied,
some of them may yet have more than one quantier. Because of this we
must consider quantied sentences separately. In the following g(=x) is
the assignment that is otherwise the same as g except that it associates the
variable x of the object language with the entity .
Metadenition 7 Sentence  carries ontological commitment to entities
 such that for some entity  M(=) relative to assignment g if and only
if it is identical with such a sentence (9x)(9y) that the quantier (9y) is
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objectual and unrestricted and for all entities  the sentence (9x) carries
ontological commitment to entities  such that M relative to assignment
g(=).
An example may make this clearer. If  is M(x) ^ L(x; y), then  is
(9x)(9y)(L(x; y)). If kLkg is the relation of loving, then  carries ontological
commitment to men who love some woman.
5.14 From Explicit to Implicit Ontological Com-
mitment
Though we have thus gone through all the complex sentences that can be
formed in standard logical languages, we have not yet completed our task.
This is because Church's Convention C itself is incomplete. There is one
way in which Church's formulation of the criterion of ontological commit-
ment as it stands is obviously incomplete and indeed is not even as good as
Tarski's Convention T, though it turns out that this defect can be rather
easily corrected - at least in part. Church's criterion gives only sucient,
not necessary conditions for ontological commitment. Therefore it does not
enable us to say what entities an assertion which is not of the form (9x)M
is ontologically committed to. Nor does it tell exhaustively even what an
assertion which is of this form is ontologically committed to. Even if an as-
sertion carries commitment to entities x such that M, it does not follow that
it could not carry commitment to other entities, even entities which are not
such that M90 This is easy to see with the aid of an analogy; if a man likes
strawberries it does not follow that he does not like anything else; he might
still like also blueberries, even though blueberries are not strawberries91. It
90Chihara apparently thinks that this would follow; he says in [Chi74, page 77] that
Church's criterion does not allow us to say that '(9x)(x is a set)' carries ontological com-
mitment to an entity x such that x is an abstract entity. However, Church's criterion does
allow us to say that, though it does not force us to say that. Church's formulation just
leaves open the question whether the sentence in question carries commitment to abstract
entities, which shows that Church's formulation is incomplete, but not that there would
be a positive error in it.
91The point of the analogy is that the phrases "likes" and "is ontologically committed
to" in English are similar both syntactically and semantically. Syntactically both can take
as complements a full noun phrase, but also any phrase projected by a plural or singular
noun. Semantically both are objectual attitude verbs which create an intensional context,
in which coextensive terms are not substitutable. Even if the rst star that rises in the
morning is the same as the last star that sets in the evening, one can like the rst star
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might of course be that Church intended to say that the assertion of (9x)M
carries ontological commitment to entities x such that M and to no other
entities. However, this would not be a plausible position, and charity pre-
cludes interpreting Church as maintaining it, since there is no evidence he
did so. Rather, Church just left open the question of what are the necessary
conditions of ontological commitment.
Intuitively if a statement implies or presupposes another, its ontological
commitments should include those of the one it implies. E. g. intuitively we
would surely say that the statement "There are lions and there are baboons."
would carry commitment to lions, just like the weaker statement "There are
lions." since it implies this weaker statement. Similarly the statement "The
king of France is bald." should carry commitment to a king of France since
it presupposes that there is a king of France. However, assertions that imply
or presuppose the assertion (9x)M are not themselves of that form, so this
does not follow from Church's criterion. Therefore we must reformulate the
criterion of ontological commitment so that this follows from it.
It is not hard to see in what kind of way we should modify Church's
formulation of his criterion so that it would give conditions which are not
only sucient but also necessary. The way in which this can be done can
be found already by examining the connection between the commitments
of assertions and theories which I have suggested, that the commitments of
an assertion, i. e. a statement, are those of its logical closure. It follows
from this together with Church's criterion that even if a statement is not
of the form (9x)M , yet if it implies such a statement, it also carries onto-
logical commitment to entities x such that M. Implying such a statement
is a stronger sucient condition of commitment to entities x such that M
than the one Church proposed. I suggest it is also a necessary condition for
such commitment. Therefore I suggest the following rough formulations of
ontological commitment:
Preliminary Denition 2 An assertion S which is not of the form (9ix)M
where the quantier (9ix) is objectual carries ontological commitment to en-
that rises in the morning but not like the last star that sets in the evening and similarly
one can be ontologically committed to the rst star that rises in the morning without
being ontologically committed to the last star that sets in the evening. Nevertheless, the
analogy must not be pressed too far; there are also signicant dierences. For example
while liking is the mental state of a single person, ontological commitment is based on
social conventions.
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tities  such that M if and only if it implies such an assertion N that N
carries explicit ontological commitment to entities such that M.
Preliminary Denition 3 A theory S carries ontological commitment to
entities  such that M if and only if some sentence that is contained in or
implied by it carries explicit ontological commitment to entities x such that
M.
These formulations are yet very rough for one crucial reason. I have left
it open what concept of implication is used here. Obviously material truth-
functional implication is not enough, since if it were any two true statements
would have the same ontological commitments, which is utterly absurd.
However, logical implication at least is enough for ontological commitment.
For example, the sentence (9x)(P (x) & (9x)Q(x)) is clearly committed to
entities x such that P (x) as it implies the sentence (9x)(P (x)) and is also
committed to entities x such that Q(x) as it implies the sentence (9x)(Q(x)).
To take an even more concrete example, the statement "There are men and
lions." clearly carries commitment to men since it implies the statement
"There are men" and it also carries commitment to lions since it implies the
statement "There are lions".
In fact if we only want to capture as many as possible of Quine's own
intentions, then we probably should stop at logical implication. This also
yields a concept of ontological commitment that is not wholly trivial, but
actually has some uses. Thus we would say that an assertion S carries
ontological commitment to entities x such that M if and only if S logically
implies (9x)M , i. e. S ` (9x)M . Let us call this rather narrow concept of
ontological commitment implicit formal ontological commitment.
Preliminary Denition 4 An assertion S carries implicit formal ontolog-
ical commitment to entities x such that M if and only if S j= (9x)M where
the quantier (9x) is objectual and unrestricted.
Making this fully precise involves introducing model-theoretic machinery.
Preliminary Denition 5 An assertion  carries implicit formal ontolog-
ical commitment to entities  such that M relative to assignment g if and
only if there is such a sentence  that  carries explicit ontological com-
mitment to entities  such that M relative to g and for all models M and
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assignments h  is true with respect toM and h only if  is true with respect
to M and h (i. e. j=M;h !j=M;h (9x) .
The conception of ontological commitment can also be related to syn-
tactical concepts. It would follow from this denition that an assertion 
formulated in a language which has a complete logic carries implicit ontologi-
cal commitment to entities x such that M relative to assignment g if and only
if there is such a sentence  that  follows from  according to the inference
rules of that logic, i. e.  `  and  carries explicit ontological commitment
to entities x such that M relative to g, i. e.  is of the form(9x)M . If
the language in which the assertion is formulated does not have a complete
logic, but has an incomplete logic (i. e. a logic whose theorems are all valid
but which cannot prove some valid sentences), then an assertion formulated
in that language carries implicit ontological commitment to entities x such
that M relative to assignment g if (but not only if) there is such a sentence
 that  follows from  according to the inference rules of that logic, i. e.
 `  and  carries explicit ontological commitment to entities x such that
M relative to g, i. e.  is of the form(9x)M .
There is one additional complication. While the above denition is al-
ready precise enough for most purposes it may not be wholly adequate. We
must also take into consideration the possibility that the language whose
ontological commitments we are examining may not have sucient expres-
sive resources to express explicitly the implicit commitments of statements
formulable in it, so that it will have to be extended to a richer language to
examine the ontological implications of its statements. This nal alteration
may be controversial, since it increases greatly the number of implicit formal
ontological commitments a sentence can have. This alteration reects the
intuition that the implicit formal ontological commitments of a sentence fol-
low solely from the interpretation of (the constituents of) that sentence and
general logical rules, and it is irrelevant to them how rich is the expressive
power of the rest of the total language of which the sentence is a part. There-
fore linguistic holists might not like this change (so Quine himself might not
have liked it), but it will seem intuitive to those whose semantical intuitions
are more atomistic, as the compositional (or more generally recursive or in-
ductive) intuitions at the basis of Tarski's theory of truth arguably are. Also
it may help in comparing the ontological commitments of incommensurable
theories.
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In order to avoid semantical paradoxes the languages into which the lan-
guage whose ontological commitments we are examining can be expanded
must be limited into those that are of a lower level in the Tarskian hier-
archy than the metalanguage in which we are examining the ontological
commitments of the rst object language. This has, however, the somewhat
paradoxical and unwelcome consequence that the ontological commitments
of a language would be erelative to a metalanguage; this relativity is far
weaker than the kinds of ontological relativity that many philosophers such
as the late Quine or even Chateaubriand have argued for, as it is a relativity
only with respect to a metalanguage but not with respect to any metatheory,
but still in my view unwelcome. Nevertheless, this kind of minor relativity
seems inevitable given a standard solution to the semantical paradoxes. A
better solution of the paradoxes, if available, might be capable of removing
this kind of relativity; however, I will have to accept it for now. Let us
assume that the metalanguage is of level n; then we can say the following:
Metadenition 8 An assertion  formulated in a language L carries im-
plicit formal ontological commitment to entities  such that M relative to
assignment g if and only if there is such a sentence  in a language L0 ex-
tending L (i. e. L  L0) that L0 is of a level m < n and  carries explicit
ontological commitment to entities  such that M relative to g and for all
models M = hI;Di where the interpretation function I is dened on L0 (so
that all the primitive expressions of L0 belong to its domain) and assign-
ments h  is true with respect to M and h only if  is true with respect to
M and h (i. e. j=M;h !j=M;h (9x) .
This denition of ontological commitment has many signicant and per-
haps startling implications. It can be used to show that a theory of modal
logic, that only uses modal operators and in which quantication over pos-
sible worlds is not possible, will yet carry ontological commitments to pos-
sible worlds and possible individuals, if the semantics given to the modal
operators is the usual possible worlds semantics. This follows from the
fact that the language can be extended to one in which we can quantify
over possible worlds, and all such expansions make true such sentences as
3(p) ! (9w)(In(w; p)), where In(w; p) means that p is true in w. This
does not necessitate an ascent in the Tarskian hierarchy of languages, since
such an expansion does not make it possible to speak of the sentences of the
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original language.
If we use this more complicated denition, the connection between se-
mantics and syntax stated above must be slightly modied. It follows from
this denition that even an assertion formulated in a language which has
a complete logic carries implicit ontological commitment to entities x such
that M relative to assignment g if (but not only if) there is such a sentence
S0 that S0 follows from S according to the inference rules of that logic, i. e.
S ` S0 and carries explicit ontological commitment to entities x such that
M relative to g, i. e. S0 is of the form(9x)M .
The denition of implicit formal ontological commitment may seem sim-
ilar to that of logical entailment. However, we must not lose sight of the
fact that though the denition of implicit ontological commitment makes
use of the notion of logical implication, implicit ontological commitment is
yet a material, not a formal and hence not a (in the narrow sense) logical
notion; in this it is just like the notion of material truth that Tarski de-
ned in his original theory of truth. It is essential for the denition that
we make use in the metalanguage of the constant M, which is typically a
non-logical constant. In the schema we have formulated above this constant
is indeed quantied over, so the schema seems to be in a sense formal; how-
ever, the specic instances of the schema are denitely material truths. The
schematic constant M is in the instances of the schema replaced by such
material constants as "is a man" or "is red", etc.
5.15 Ontological Commitment in Natural Languages
The formulation of the criterion for implicit formal ontological commitment
applies directly only to assertions and theories expressed in a language of
predicate logic. Therefore it does not apply directly to all assertions made
in scientic theories either, as most scientic theories, though they are ex-
pressed with the aid of a lot of mathematical symbolism, are not yet ex-
pressed solely in the language of predicate logic, and natural language ex-
pressions usually play some role in their expression. The formulation of the
criterion for implicit material commitment, on the other hand, may be di-
rectly applicable to natural languages, but discovering how it is applicable
is not very straightforward, but presupposes that a semantical theory has
been developed of them. How these criteria are to be applied in detail to
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assertions made in natural language (or vernacular, as it is sometimes called
in the literature) and to scientic theories is a question to which I now turn.
Quine himself was in many writings sceptical about the very possibil-
ity of applying the concept of ontological commitment to natural languages
in any exact way, though he applied it to them in the informal examples
he gave. This skepticism is similar to the scepticism expressed by Tarski
in [Tar83a] and [Tar44] about applying the concept of truth to natural lan-
guages in any exact way. However, after Tarski many other philosophers
and linguists such as Karl Popper, Richard Montague, Donald Davidson92,
Jaakko Hintikka etc. have quite successfully applied Tarski's theory of truth
to natural languages. As we have seen that there are deep-going parallelisms
between the theory of truth and the theory of ontological commitment, we
have therefore good reasons to except that Quine's and Church's theory of
ontological commitment can be similarly generalized and applied to natural
languages.
It is important to notice that natural language is not the same as ordinary
language. Many philosophers who talk about ontological commitments in
the vernacular, such as Jody Azzouni, seem to confuse these two concepts.
Natural language comprehends also the technical jargon of scientists and
other scholars, including the jargon of philosophers as one specic case of
it. The very phrase "ontological commitment" is not part of ordinary lan-
guage; the man in the street would usually have no idea what it means. It is,
however, an English expression and therefore a part of a natural language.
Ontologists and metaphysicians do not use ordinary language, though they
generally use natural language. Of course, older metaphysicians and on-
tologists like Aristotle or Wol who invented the very sciences did not yet
have any articial language to use. However, the language of Aristotle was
probably very dierent from the colloquial Greek of his time and Wol of
course wrote in a language, Latin, that was dead as an ordinary language
when he used it. They wrote in jargons. Jargons, of course, develop out of
ordinary languages and have many similarities to them. However, they have
also many dierences, and may be as far from ordinary languages as regi-
92Donald Davidson held that Tarski's theory was applicable to natural languages both
when he thought that it was a correspondence theory and when he no longer thought so.
The question whether and how far Tarski's theory can be applied to natural languages does
indeed appear to be logically independent of the question whether it is a correspondence
theory or not.
378
mented languages of symbolic logic are from them. Azzouni argues that no
specic locutions carry ontological commitment in ordinary language; even
if this argument were correct, it would not imply that no specic locutions
carry ontological commitment in philosophical jargon, and hence it would
not follow that there are no criteria of ontological commitment in natural
language. Azzouni claims in [Azz04, page 117] that ontological indicators
involve inextricably pragmatic indicators such as rhetorical stress. However,
such pragmatic factors surely do not suce us to express anything with the
precision any science or scholarly discipline requires, and therefore cannot
express ontological commitments with the precision a discipline requires ei-
ther. However, philosophers often make ontological claims in articles and
books, where such pragmatic indicators as stress are not usually to be had;
philosophers may make use of such pragmatic indicators when lecturing, but
they had better be able to dispense with them if they are ever to publish
anything. Azzouni claims that ordinary speakers make - both consciously
and tacitly - genuine ontological claims. I am not sure if this is correct,
especially when it comes to concious ontological claims, though I do not
want to deny it. However, it is obvious that philosophers, ontologists and
metaphysicans, make concious ontological claims, and they might make such
claims even if ordinary speakers would not make them or would make them
only tacitly. Also scholars of other disciplines might make ontological claims
even if ordinary speakers did not. In any case it is irrelevant to ask as Az-
zouni does whether ordinary uses of "there is" in English are understood by
speakers to carry ontological commitment. We should instead ask whether
uses of the Latin word "Est" were understood by Wol to carry ontological
commitment.
The question of ontological commitment can be raised with respect to
statements belonging to or theories formulated in three dierent languages.
We can ask for the ontological commitments of statements belonging to
the language of rst-order predicate logic, of statements belonging to the
language of some other logic such as higher order logic or modal logic, and
of statements belonging to a natural language such as English. It is very
important to distinguish these cases from each other.
The criterion of ontological commitment formulated by Quine is con-
cerned directly only with the ontological commitments of statements be-
longing to predicate logic. Indeed, Quine mostly only considers the commit-
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ments of statements belonging to rst-order predicate logic. However, Quine
is clear that the criterion is also relevant to the ontological commitments of
at least some statements made in other languages.
In these cases, however, it must be used indirectly; we must rst translate
the statements of other languages to statements of rst-order predicate logic
and then nd the ontological commitments of the translation. As Quine says
if we prefer another language form, for example that of combina-
tors, we can still bring our criterion of ontological form to bear in
so far as we are content to accept appropriate systematic corre-
lations between idioms of the aberrant language and the familiar
language of quantication.
93 It seems to me that what Quine says taking the language of combinators as
one example can also be applied to natural languages, even if Quine himself
had not intended such an application, especially if we consider Montague's
claim that natural languages can be treated as formal languages. Indeed,
natural languages are far closer to the language of combinators than to the
language of standard predicate logic, as natural languages have no variables
in the same sense as predicate logic94 In the case of natural languages such
a translation of their statements implies formalizing them. However, it is
93Quine considers it possible that it might happen relative to a really weird language
that we cannot make any sense of ontological commitment. He even goes so far as to
say that entity and objectuality might not be applicable to every conceptual scheme,
being provincial traits of our conceptual scheme. Here he seems to go overboard into an
unsustainable relativism.
94It has indeed often been pointed out that the pronouns and other proforms of natural
languages have some similarities to variables. Such similarities are real, and important; I
think it follows from them that the use of proforms such as pronouns in natural languages
usually expresses ontological commitment. Therefore such similarities enable us to expand
our criterion of ontological commitment. They enable us to say that if a statement con-
tains an expression which can be be referred back to with an anaphoric proform then the
statement must also be committed to entities denoted by that expression or falling into
its extension even if the statement does not contain any explicit quantier. This is vitally
important in nding out the ontological commitments of expressions in natural languages.
Nevertheless, such similarities must not be overemphasized. There are also equally crucial
dierences. Most natural languages can make a quantied statement without using any
proform, while predicate logic cannot make any quantied statement without using vari-
ables. E. g. we can just say "There is a man.", in which sentence there are no proforms,
without having to say anything like "There is something such that it is a man.", which
would be analogous to the way the sentence is expressed in the language of predicate
logic. It follows from this lack of variables that even when a natural language sentence
is committed to something, it is not always clear exactly what it is committed to. This
suggests we should be very cautious in assessing the commitments of a sentence before we
can symbolize it exactly.
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not only this that it implies. A mere formalization is not a translation, as
two statements with the same form might yet have a dierent meaning and
if neither of them is logically true they can even have dierent truth-values.
A statement of natural language can only be translated to a language of
predicate logic whose non-logical constants have a xed interpretation. Of
course, getting a formalization is big step towards a translation, since once
you have a formalization you only need a determinate correspondence be-
tween the constants of the two languages. How such an interpretation is
given or can be given is not relevant here. All that matters is that it can
be given. In his later relativistic phase Quine actually doubts if such an
interpretation can be at all be given. However, from a pragmatic point of
view which Quine often professes to follow such relativism is utterly inde-
fensible. Ultimately knowledge of logical truths would be useless unless it
could be united to a knowledge of non-logical truths. After all, as knowl-
edge of a logically true statement cannot in itself help us to bake bread or
heal disease or in short be of any use, knowledge of what is logically true is
useful only because it enables us to infer one non-logically true statement
from another, i. e. pass from knowledge of one non-logically true state-
ment to the knowledge of another non-logically true statement. However, if
statements have no xed meanings or even truth-values there surely cannot
be any knowledge of them. If the translation is adequate, then the com-
mitments of the translations are also the ontological commitments of the
original statements. More specically, so far as the translation is adequate,
so far can we say adequately what the commitments of the original state-
ment are. Whatever imperfection or uncertainty attaches to the translation,
so much imperfection uncertainty attaches also to the judgement concerning
ontological commitments attained by the means of the criterion.
If a natural language assertion is ambiguous or vague then we can say
that it is committed to some entities simpliciter only in the supervaluationist
sense, i. e. if all precise symbolizations of it are committed to them. As
the supervaluationists speak of supertruth in the case of a statement that
is true relative to all ways of making it precise, i. e. all precisications of
it, we can analogously speak of ontological supercommitment. An assertion
carries ontologically supercommitment to some entities i all precisications
of it carry ontological commitment to them95. If the formalizations of an
95Other theories of vagueness can also be applied to the question of the ontological
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assertion disagree in what they are committed to we can only say that the
assertion is committed to some entities relative to a reading of it, or that
the speaker is ontologically committed in a pragmatic sense to some entities
because of the way he intends his statement to be understood.
What Quine himself says about the ontological commitments of ordinary
languages is not wholly satisfactory. Quine says that
In a loose way we often can speak of ontological presuppo-
sitions at the level of ordinary language, but this makes sense
just so far as we have in mind some likeliest, most obvious way
of schematizing the discourse in question along quanticational
lines.
Quine gives no here reason why we should have in mind any obvious way
of formalizing the discourse, but this claim obviously follows from his fa-
mous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation which is connected with his
deationary theory of truth. Quine's claim is of course analogous to the
claim that in order to speak meaningfully about the truth-conditions of the
sentences of a natural language we would have to have in mind some obvi-
ous way of schematizing those sentences in predicate logic. This is a claim
that follows Quine's deationary theory of truth; however, a follower of an
(even weakly) inationary correspondence theory of truth can deny it and
similarly a follower of a more inationary theory of ontological commitment
can deny the the corresponding claim concerning ontological commitments.
The reference to a systematic correlation in the earlier quote seems far
more perspicuous to me. However, that a correlation is systematic surely
does not imply that it would be obvious or at all easy to nd out. All
that matters that there is some systematic way of formalizing the discourse,
no matter how dicult to nd out or how cumbersome to apply and no
matter whether anyone has yet found one. What does systematicity mean?
It means that there is a general rule enabling us to correlate any number of
expressions of one language with those of the other. I suggest that this is
the same thing as recursivity.
Of course there can be diculties about what is the best way to trans-
late or even formalize an assertion or theory expressed in a natural language.
commitments of a natural languages. If e. g. it makes sense to speak of degrees of truth,
which is highly controversial, it might also make sense to speak of degrees of ontological
commitment.
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Quine's and Church's criteria are of course not meant to solve all problems
connected with ontological commitment at once; surely no criterion that can
be expressed succinctly can do that. Despite this the criteria can be useful
in nding out the ontological commitments of a statement. Finding out how
to translate a natural language sentence into the language of predicate logic
(enriched with non-logical constants) can surely not be a wholly impossible
task, as any student taking a basic course in logic is supposed to be capa-
ble of doing it in many cases! However, all of Quine's opinions about what
formalization involves are not to be taken as part of his criterion of onto-
logical commitment. One can accept Quine's criterion while diering about
these questions. E. g. Quine thought that formalization could involve some
revision of the formalized theory, but one can consistently accept Quine's
criterion while holding that formalization should not involve any alteration
of what is formalized.
Some principles of formalization should be obvious, and are very widely
accepted. A formalization of the sentences of a natural language should
1. be recursive
2. capture as many intuitive entailments as possible and
3. be as simple as it can be consistently with the two earlier requirements.
First of all, the formalization of natural language sentences should ide-
ally be recursive, so that we can be sure that every sentence can in princi-
ple be formalized. The recursivity of natural languages follows, as is well
known, from the requirement that natural languages should be learnable.
This recursivity implies that we must strive towards a fully mechanical rule
of formalization, that does not require the possession of any linguistic intu-
itions in its applier and hence could be applied by computers as well as by
men. However, unlike what is often suggested, recursivity need not imply full
compositionality. Josh Dever has in [Dev08] distinguished two constraints
implied by compositionality; semantic closure and semantic locality. Ac-
cording to the rst only semantic information can go into determination of
the semantic value of a complex expression. According to the second only
information derived from parts of a complex expression can go into the de-
termination of the semantic value of the expression. The latter constraint
implies that the semantic rules must be context-free. Recursivity does not
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by itself imply either of these two constraints. It allows that in formalizing
a complex expression we can take into account directly its subexpressions
and not merely their semantic values, so it does not imply semantic closure.
It also allows us to take the semantic values of previous and succeeding ex-
pressions into account in determining the value of an expression, so it does
not imply semantic locality either.
However, a semantically local formalization is as such, other things being
equal, simpler than one that is not semantically local, so it may follow from
recursivity together with the third principle that we should strive towards a
semantically local formalization unless of course other things are not equal
(as they often are not).
It follows from recursivity together with simplicity that expressions with
the same syntactic form (or forms, if the expression is syntactically am-
biguous) should usually be formalized so that they end up having the same
logical forms when they occur in the same context. Perhaps the only ex-
ception is that we can give a phrasal expression like "kick the bucket" an
additional formalization on which it is formalized as an atomic predicate (in
this example the same as the one symbolizing the verb "kill") in addition to
the formalization following from its composition. However, it follows from
the requirement that natural language be learnable that there are only a
nite number of such phrasal expressions. It is not consistent with learn-
ability and recursivity that there should be a potentially innite number of
complex expressions all of which would be given formalizations separately.
Of course we can give many formalizations, representing many readings, to
a structurally ambiguous sentence. Usually many of the semantically pos-
sible readings of a sentence are of course pragmatically excluded; however,
formalization need not take such pragmatic matters into account but should
only deal with all semantically possible meanings that are determined con-
ventionally.
Secondly the formalization should should make valid inferences that are
intuitively valid, i. e. inferences that most people and the formalizer himself
would be willing to make in the course of everyday life. This leads room for
revision of ordinary practice, as the formalizer can decide not to respect a
commonly accepted practice if he himself decides not to apply it, but not
very much room.
Thirdly, we should use the simplest possible formalization that respects
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the other constraints. Simplest here means the simplest overall; the sim-
plest formalization of a single sentence might because of recursivity require
an excessively complex formalization of other sentences, and therefore have
to be rejected. Again it is not always clear what formalization is the sim-
plest; however, there are cases where it is intuitively unmistakable that one
formalization is simpler than another.
Chihara asks in [Chi68, page 38] whether (9x)(xis a winged horse) is on-
tologically committed to wings. This question is not very clear as it stands;
this curious mixture of words and symbols is not a well-formed expression
of either English or of predicate logic, so it has no ontological commitments.
It could be interpreted in various ways so that it would carry ontologi-
cal commitment, but it might receive either an interpretation according to
which it was committed to wings and one according to which it was not.
Presumably Chihara really wants to ask whether the sentence "There is a
winged horse" is committed to wings. The answer depends on how the sen-
tence should be formalized. Should it be formalized as (9x)(W (x)) or as
(9x)(H(x) & (9y)(W (y) & H(x; y)))? The very weak theory of formaliza-
tion I have suggested above suces to give a quite determinate answer to
this question.
As the phrase "winged horse" should because of recursivity and simplic-
ity be formalized in the same way in all sentences, the answer to this depends
on whether the inference from the statement "Perseus rode a winged horse"
to the statement "Pegasus rode a horse and it had wings." is intuitively
valid. However, this question should be easy to answer on the basis of the
second principle, that formalization should make intuitively valid inferences
logically valid. The crucial question is the following; if you were making in-
ferences about Greek mythology or if you believed mythology to be history
would you be willing to make the inference? If your history teacher tells
you repeatedly in class: "Perseus rode a winged horse." and asks you in an
examination "Did a horse Perseus rode have wings?", and you are eager to
pass the examination, would you answer that he did? Most people would
surely answer armatively to this question! Therefore the inference is in-
tuitively valid for them. However, the validity of this inference can surely
be most easily explained by assuming that the rst sentence has the sym-
bolization (9x)(H(x) & (9y)(W (y) & H(x; y))), where "W" symbolizes the
predicate of being a wing, the dyadic predicate "H" the predicate of having
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and the monadic predicate "H" the predicate of being a horse. Therefore
all people that answer armatively to this question should accept that this
is the correct formalization. I will suppose that the reader is among them.
This sentence, however, implies logically by standard rst order logic the
sentence (9x)(W (x)), which is committed to wings, and therefore according
to the criterion of ontological commitment I have proposed the original sen-
tence "There is a winged horse." also carries (implicit formal) ontological
commitment to wings.
Therefore the criterion should be applied to sentences after they have
been semantically analyzed. However, Chihara opposes the view that the
criterion should be applied to "fully analyzed" sentences. I agree of course
that the criterion cannot be applicable only when we have reached a com-
plete semantical analysis, since as Chihara suggests reaching such an analysis
may not be feasible. However, my conclusion does not imply that we would
not be now in position to apply the criterion but should have to await the
construction of the required semantical theory. My suggestion implies that
we should analyse the sentence as far as we can at the present time and
then apply the criterion. It is then of course always possible that when we
achieve better semantical analyses we will have to revise our assessments
of ontological commitment. We certainly have well-developed semantical
theories making use of decompositional analysis right now (e. g. Dowty's
version of Montague semantics in [Dow79], Parsons's version of event se-
mantics in [Par94], etc.) which go far below surface syntax in analysis even
if none of them is anywhere near complete. If we are to consider the onto-
logical commitments of natural languages at all usefully it must be as part
of such grand though necessarily incomplete projects in lexical semantics. It
may be that none of these theories is very certain either; however, this is as
it has to be. It cannot be demanded of an adequate criterion of ontological
commitment - or an adequate criterion of anything - that it could lead us
to wholly certain results, results that need never be revised. We would have
no criteria for anything if we made such a demand! Fallible criteria can be
quite useful.
Chihara also objects that interpreted in this way the criterion is not
in the spirit of Quine as a semantic atomism he would oppose is implicit
in it. I have already pointed out, however, that all of Quine's opinions
concerning semantics should not be taken to be a part of his criterion. If
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this interpretation of the criterion is inconsistent with Quine's semantical
holism, then so much the worse for semantical holism!
Chihara prefers an interpretation suggested by Osvaldo Chateaubriand
according to which the notion of ontological commitment should be dened
relative to a metatheory. Chateaubriand's suggestion surely ts in well with
Quine's later theory of ontological relativity, as Chihara says in [Chi74,
page 80], though it is less clear if it expresses Quine's original intention
in formulating his criterion. Even Quine's earlier theory had relativistic
tendencies, however, so it might well do so.
In any case, Chateaubriand's suggestion is not a good interpretation if we
want an interpretation of the criterion that not only respects Quine's inten-
tions but is independently defensible as an adequate criterion of ontological
commitment. It clearly expresses a radically deationary theory of ontologi-
cal commitment similar to radically deationary theories of truth (like those
of Quine himself, the later Field and Brandom), and can be argued against
in a way perfectly analogous to the way deationary theories of truth are
argued against. Relativisation of semantical notions to a metatheory leads
to their complete trivialization and to absurd anti-realism, as I have already
argued in the case of the notions of truth and denotation. Chateaubriand's
suggestion would similarly lead to the extremely absurd conclusion that a
theory can be correctly taken to be committed to anything if we are working
in a suitable metatheory, and no such statement of ontological commitment
would be more correct than another.
According to Chihara's exposition of Chateaubriand's theory in [Chi74,
page 79] S carries ontological commitment to an entity x such that F relative
to a metatheory T if and only if for some open sentence M (9x)(M) is an
assertion of S and (x)(M ! F ) is an assertion of T. Chihara suggests further
that community-wide beliefs provide us with a likely candidate for the overall
home theory relative to which we ask about the ontological commitments of
theories we specify.
This clearly leads to absurd consequences. Let us suppose that the com-
munity in question is the community of evolutionary biologists and their
overall home theory is the theory T of evolutionary biology and that they
are trying to nd out the ontological commitments of the creationist theory
S of Christian fundamentalists. Now ifM means that x is a man and F that
x is a man descended from apes, then (x)(M ! F ) is an assertion of T. If S
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is the creationist theory then it surely includes the assertion that there are
men. Thus (9x)(M) is an assertion of S. It follows from Chateaubriand's
interpretation of Quine's criterion that S carries commitment to men de-
scended from apes relative to T. Therefore evolutionary biologists would
have to conclude that creationists are committed to men descended from
apes. We can show similarly that fundamentalists should conclude that
evolutionary biologists are committed to men descended from a specially
created Adam and Eve. These conclusions are of course obviously absurd,
as creationists are only committed to men descended from Adam and Eve
and evolutionary biologists should surely see this.
Perhaps Chihara would not admit that the community of evolutionary
biologists or the community of fundamentalists are big enough that their
overall theories could function as an overall home theory. Chihara does
speak following Quine of "the whole linguistic community" so perhaps he
supposes that his theory only applies to so big communities as all speak-
ers of English or all speakers of German or even speakers of any language
translatable to English (though evolutionary biologists surely share a com-
mon technical jargon, so they might also be called a linguistic community).
However, it is not clear that there factually are any beliefs shared by so big
communities. For any belief some lunatic might be found who would quite
sincerely deny it, even including beliefs commonly taken to be analytic.
Thus this interpretation of Chihara's notion of communities would trivial-
ize Chateaubriand's criterion completely. Besides, we could assume for the
sake of argument that in the future all speakers of English would believe
in evolutionary theory and that they would ask for the commitments of a
past creationist theory no one held any more (or even a purely hypothetical
creationist theory). In this case Chihara's interpretation would denitely
predict that such future speakers of English should assume that creation-
ists were committed to men descended from apes. However, of course they
would be wrong in making such an assumption even in that case.
Chihara himself expresses in [Chi68, page 42] doubts whether such a
relativised notion of ontological commitment would have any serious use
in philosophy. Surely we ought not be satised with such a criterion; the
important question is not what Quine himself thought or would have thought
but what criterion is correct and useful. The interpretation of the criterion
I have suggested, even if it leads to open problems and uncertainty, at least
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does not lead to absurdity or complete triviality.
Nevertheless Chihara's and Chateaubriand's theory is not wholly mis-
guided, and with small modications it can be made to yield the same con-
clusions as the one I have proposed. It is not hard to see how Chateaubriand's
theory could be corrected. Its error is that any assertion of the form
(x)(M ! F ) in the metatheory can be used in seeking for ontological
commitment. Some selection between dierent kinds of assertions of the
metatheory additional to their syntactic form is necessary. Obviously in
cases where (x)(M ! F ) is a theorem of predicate logic, e. g. where M(x)
is the same as F (x) & G(x), the assertion can be used. Also if (x)(M ! F )
is a stipulative denition made explicitly by the formulator of the metathe-
ory it can be used. However, one would also like to use formulas of the
metatheory that are meaning postulates for the object language. Quine
would of course not be happy with this, but others who have advocated a
similar criterion such as Church would have no reason to object to it. It is
in any case necessary if the criterion is to be really useful.
5.16 Materially Implicit Ontological Commitments
However, restricting the implication in question to logical implication in the
narrow sense would still in my view make the criterion too strict. Some kind
of analytical entailment should in my view also be allowed. Quine himself
of course would not have allowed it, as he distrusted the notion of analyt-
icity. However, since Quine's arguments against analyticity are considered
unsound by many philosophers, this need not be a sucient reason to re-
strict the implication to logical implication. Many of us would surely be
inclined to say, at least on some occasions, that if a theory is committed
to bachelors it is committed to unmarried human beings and that if a the-
ory is committed to red objects then it is committed to coloured objects.
Also as Chihara pointed out, Quine himself would have wanted to say that
'(9x)(x is a set)' carries ontological commitment to an entity x such that x
is an abstract entity, and this requires some kind of analytical containment
between the concept of a set and the concept of an abstract entity. Let us call
such wider concepts of ontological commitment implicit material ontological
commitment. The use of this wider concept of ontological commitment need
not preclude us also from using the narrower concept; one concept is useful
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in some contexts and the other is useful in other contexts. We can make use
of both so long as we do not confuse them with each other.
The rst example I mentioned can be accommodated rather simply if we
have a good understanding of what stipulative denitions are. Denitions
are often in modern logic taken to be metalinguistic abbreviations. However,
this understanding of denition is in no way necessary, and does not corre-
spond to the way the word is used outside logic. There have been logical
systems (such as Lesniewski's systems) in which denitions have been taken
to genuinely enrich the object language syntactically by introducing new
expressions to it, though of course a denition should not enrich a language
semantically, should not increase the expressive power of a language. Thus if
L is a language with an interpretation I, then we can expand it to a language
L0 with an interpretation I 0 by means of denitions. For example in the case
of predicates denitions are of the kind Pi(t1; : : : ; tn) def p1 ^    ^ pn,
i. e. functions from the set of formulas of the language L to predicates of
the language L0 where the formulae p1; : : : ; pn are formulae of L and where
predicate Pi (the deniendum) belongs to L
0 but not to L. We then expand
I to a new interpretation I 0 so that every sequence of individuals belongs to
the extension of Pi i it satises all the formulae p1; : : : ; pn, i. e. for all terms
t1; : : : ; tn of L and all assignments g, j=I0;g Pi(t1; : : : ; tn)  j=I;g p1 ^  ^ pn.
Using this understanding of denitions we can then give the following rough
initial denitions of narrow analytical ontological commitment (where nar-
row analyticity is the kind of analyticity dened by Frege).
Metadenition 9 A sentence S carries narrow explicit analytical ontolog-
ical commitment to entities  such that M if and only if there is a sentence
S0 s. t. S0 carries explicit ontological commitment to entities  such that M
and S0 can be derived from S be repeatedly replacing denienda with their
denienses or conversely.
Metadenition 10 A sentence S carries narrow implicit analytical onto-
logical commitment to entities  such that M if and only if there is such a
sentence S0 that S0 carries formal implicit ontological commitment to en-
tities  such that M and S0 can be derived from S by repeatedly replacing
denienda with their denienses or conversely.
However, this narrow analytical commitment, whether explicit or im-
plicit, may not be the only kind of implicit ontological commitment. Many
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of us would naturally say that if a theory is committed to red objects then
it is committed to coloured objects. However, this need not hold of nar-
row analytical ontological commitment, since arguably (at least phenome-
nal) redness cannot be dened in terms of colour. Peacock draws attention
in [Pea11, page 88] to an even more gripping example: the implicit com-
mitments of a theory containing the sentences "there are some people who
are taller than some other people" should include people who are shorter
than some other people, for such people would have to exist, given that the
theory is true.
The problem of how to explicate such a notion of implicit material on-
tological commitment is very hard, and I do not have any nal solution to
oer. Perhaps the best way of dealing with such materially implicit ontolog-
ical commitments is to make use of Carnap's theory of meaning postulates
in [Car52], as amended by Kemeny in [Kem95], who replaced Carnap's state
descriptions with models. Formally we introduce a new set to the metathe-
ory, the set of meaning postulates, which I will symbolize with P. This
can be taken to be just a set of sentences; e. g. if T (x; y) symbolizes the
statement that x is taller than y, and S(x; y) the statement that x is shorter
than y, then the sentence (8x)(T (x; y)  S(y; x)) 2 P We can just take the
Metadenition 8 and restrict the quantication in it to quantication over
those models in which the meaning postulates hold, where meaning postu-
lates P hold in a model M i for all  2M and all assignments g j=M;g .
Quine himself would have disliked this idea very much because of his doubts
concerning analyticity, but this should be no argument against extending the
theory of ontological commitments beyond Quine's own thoughts in this way,
especially if Quine's argument against analyticity was based, as I argued, in
an unacceptable vericationism and led to an unacceptable semantic holism.
A rough formulation of such a theory will then be the following:
Metadenition 11 An assertion  carries broad analytic implicit ontolog-
ical commitment to entities  such that M relative to assignment g if and
only if there is such a sentence  that  carries explicit ontological com-
mitment to entities  such that M relative to g and for all models M in
which the meaning postulates P hold and for all assignments h  is true
with respect to M and h only if  is true with respect to M and h (i. e.
j=M;h !j=M;h (9x) .
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5.17 A Model-theoretical Account of Ontological
Commitment
In modern model theory the kind of absolute notion of truth which was
used in Tarski's model theory is replaced with a notion of truth relativised
to interpretations and domains. I have already been making use of such a
relativisation of truth as an auxiliary concept in dening formally implicit
ontological commitment; however, I have not yet relativised any of the no-
tions of ontological commitment which are my main subject. However, it is
of course possible to relativise the notion of ontological commitments simi-
larly to the notion of truth. We can speak of the ontological commitments
of a statement relative to an interpretation of its non-logical constants. We
can thus say that relative to a model whose interpretation function asso-
ciates the word "man" with asses, the sentence "There are men." would be
ontologically committed to asses.
In current model theory truth is in fact relativised to two factors; to the
interpretation of non-logical constants and to an individual domain. These
relativisations are to a large extent independent of each other96 and we
can consider them separately. In fact Tarski himself originally understood
models in [Tar83b, page 417] in a radically dierent way from the way the
concept of a model is usually employed in modern metamathematics. John
Etchemendy has noticed this dierence between Tarski's concept of a model
and the standard one in [Etc88]. Tarski says that a model of a class of
sentences is a sequence of objects that satises every sentential function
derived from those sentences by replacing their extra-logical concepts with
variables. Thus a model in Tarski's view only gives an interpretation to
non-logical constants; it does not provide any domain for quantication.
96They are not usually treated as wholly independent, as it is usually assumed that
the interpretation of a singular term must be a member of the domain of the model and
the interpretation of a predicate a subset of the domain. However, this assumption is
sometimes dropped in non-standard semantics, for example in some semantics for some
systems of positive free logic, where the interpretation of a term is allowed to be outside
the domain of quantication. It seems to me that we can well drop this assumption, even
if our logic is not a positive free logic; we can avoid accepting the axioms of positive free
logic by altering the truth-conditions slightly even if some interpretations are allowed to
be outside the realm of quantication (e. g. we could just degree atomic sentences the
denotations of whose terms are outside the domain to be false and so gain the axioms of
negative free logic.). If this is done, the two relativisations become wholly independent,
and ontological commitment becomes wholly independent of the domain of the model.
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It might seem that this is not a novel idea, for John Bacon has already
tried to relativise ontological commitment to models in [Bac87]. However,
Bacon does not really dene the truth of a theory (or sentence) relative to a
model as I will do; rather he denes the ontological commitments of a model
without referring to any theory, and then tries to dene the ontological
commitments of a theory by using the notion of a model as an auxiliary
concept, without relativising the ultimate deniendum into models. Bacon
says in [Bac87, page 1] that his basic explicandum is existence in a model;
Bacon symbolizes existence in a modelm as O(m). Bacon then says that the
explicatum he proposes is rst approximated as membership in the model's
domain. This is indeed a natural explicatum of that explicandum; however,
this explication is rather trivial and has little to do with the interesting
concept of the ontological commitments of theories or sentences. What
Bacon does is rather like trying to dene truth in a model but not the truth
of any sentence but truth simpliciter, which would obviously be senseless.
Bacon's explication of the ontological commitments of a theory fails in an
instructive way. According to Bacon's initial denition F s exist according
to T i F s exist in every intended model of T . According to Bacon this
means that Fs exist according to T i F \ O(m) 6=  for all m 2 Mt, and
O(T ) = fF : F s exist according to Tg. However, Bacon notes that this
denition does not allow a theory to commit us to something that in fact
doesn't exist, e. g. it does not allow a theory arming (9x)(xis a unicorn) to
commit us to unicorns. However, this means that the theory fails radically.
Bacon tries to correct this defect by relativising ontological commitment
to subjects. This is intuitively a wrong way to solve the problem; if a theory
says that there are unicorns, then this suces to say that the theory car-
ries commitment to unicorns; we do not have to know who has proposed the
theory. Bacon is here confusing the semantic concept of ontological commit-
ment with the pragmatical concept of ontological commitment. However, his
denition of personal commitment does not succeed very well even in den-
ing the pragmatic concept of ontological commitment. Bacon says in [Bac87,
page 6]:
T commits S to F s i S is committed to claim of T that : T is
true and F 2 O(T ).
This denition has a strong whi of circularity; the notion of commit-
393
ment occurs both in the deniendum and in the deniens! One might try
to defend Bacon's denition by saying that the two concepts of commit-
ment are not quite the same; the one in the deniens is a commitment to
(the truth of) a claim and the one in the deniendum commitment to the
existence of entities. Nevertheless, the two concepts are so similar to each
other that the denition does not seem to be very illuminating. Besides, it
is not very clear how the notion of commitment that occurs in the deniens
is to be understood. If it were understood so that commitment to claiming
is just the same as being disposed to claim then the denition would have
unacceptable consequences; it would imply that a theory could not commit
a person to the existence of any entities unless the person knew enough se-
mantics and model theory to be capable of making the rather complex claim
that F 2 O(T ). Perhaps the notion can be understood in some other way
so that it does not have such consequences, but Bacon does not give us any
reason to think that it can be understood so that the denition is neither
circular nor has these unacceptable consequences.
The failure of Bacon's theory can be explained by pointing out that Ba-
con's interpretation of Quine's theory is defective. However, it would be
uncharitable to say blankly that Bacon has misunderstood Quine's theory.
As I have already pointed out, many of Quine' s formulations are obscure
and inconsistent, so Bacon may indeed have captured one possible interpre-
tation of Quine's theory; however, it is an interpretation that would make
the theory a very bad theory. A better interpretation can be found. Bacon
says in [Bac87, page 2] that to be is to be the value of a bindable variable.
However, though some of Quine's formulations may suggest this, it already
trivializes the theory of ontological commitment, since it makes all theories
with the same language to have the same ontological commitments. Bacon
then commits the same mistake we have seen Bergmann and Carnap com-
mitted. It is more accurate to say that to be is to be the value of a variable
that is actually bound, and to be even more accurate we must add to be
actually bound by an objectual quantier in a true sentence. Generalizing
this to false theories, to be according to a theory T is to be the value of
a variable actually bound by an objectual quantier in a sentence that the
theory T contains or implies if the theory is true. However, even these for-
mulations are not unambiguous; no formulation in natural language is, and
the use of logical symbolism is necessary to get more accurate formulations.
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Bacons' theory can then provide no guidance in our attempt to dene
the notion of ontological commitment relative to models, but we must start
from scratch.
Before actually dening ontological commitment relative to interpre-
tations or models, we must redene objectuality and non-objectuality for
quantiers in languages in which only the logical constants have a xed in-
terpretation. I will use ktikI;g to stand for the semantic value of (singular
or predicate) term ti relative to interpretation I and assignment g. If ti is a
constant, then ktikI;g = I(ti) while if ti is a variable, then ktikI;g = g(ti).
Metadenition 12 An unrestricted existential quantier (9x) is objectual
with respect to the interpretation I i for any formula  and for any assign-
ment g, (9x) is true with respect to I and g if and only if there is such an
 that  is true with respect to I and g(=x).
Metadenition 13 An operator (9ix) is an (unrestricted) non-objectual
existential quantier with respect to the interpretation I if and only if for
all formulas  there is such an interpretation J that for all assignments g,
(9ix) is true with respect to I and g if and only if there is such an entity 
that  is true with respect to the interpretation J and the assignment g(=x)
and for some formula   is true with respect to J and the assignment
g(=x) but is not true with respect to g and every atomic formula p is true
with respect to J and the assignment g(=x) i it is true with respect to I
and the assignment g(=x).
So if (9x) is objectual, it is not necessary or even enough for the truth of
(9x) with respect to I and g that for some term a, (a=x) would be true
with respect to M and g.
We must again begin from the case where an atomic sentence is in the
scope of an existential quantier.
Metadenition 14 Sentence (9x)R(t1; : : : ; x; : : : ; tn) carries explicit onto-
logical commitment to entities  such that Q(1; : : : ; ; : : : ; n)) relative to
interpretation I and assignment g i kRkI;g = Q, kt1kI;g = 1, . . . kxk = ,
. . . and ktnkI;g = n and the quantier (9x) is objectual.
The next case is that where negative sentences are in the scope of the
existential quantier.
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Metadenition 15 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that it is not the case that M relative to interpretation I
and assignment g if and only if it is identical with a sentence (9x):p and
sentence (9x)p carries ontological commitment to entities  such that M
relative to interpretation I and assignment g.
The case of conjunction is simple.
Metadenition 16 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M and N relative to interpretation I and assignment g
if and only if it is identical with a sentence (9x)(p & q) and the sentence
(9x)p carries ontological commitment to entities  such that M relative to I
and g and the sentence (9x)q carries ontological commitment to entities 
such that N relative to I and g.
Next follow sentences where a disjunction is in the scope of the existential
quantier.
Metadenition 17 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M and N relative to interpretation I and assignment g if
and only if it is identical with a sentence (9x)(p_ q) and the sentence (9x)p
carries explicit ontological commitment to entities  such that M relative to
I and g and the sentence (9x)q carries ontological commitment to entities
 such that N relative to I and g.
Finally we must consider quantied sentences.
Metadenition 18 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that for some entity  M relative to interpretation I and
assignment g if and only if it identical with a sentence (9y)(9x)p and for
all entities  the sentence (9x)p carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M relative to interpretation I and assignment g(=y).
Next we must consider what happens when individual domains are added
to models. One might think that the relativisation to an individual domain
does not aect the notion of ontological commitment in any interesting way,
even though it aects the notion of material truth considerably, since the
entities a statement is ontologically committed to need not exist and hence
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a fortiori need not be members of the domain in any model. However,
this can also be thought of in another way, which makes the second sort
of relativisation relevant. Just because of the hyperintensional character
of the notion of explicit ontological commitment, even if some entities do
not belong to the domain of the model, we can be explicitly committed to
entities that are among them yet do belong to the domain of the model.
The concepts of ontological commitment relativised to models can be de-
ned exactly as follows below. Here ktikM;g is the semantic value of (singular
or predicate) term ti relative to model M and assignment g. If M = hI;Di
and ti is a constant, then ktikM;g = I(ti) while if ti is a variable, then
ktikM;g = g(ti)
The denition of the objectuality of quantiers in languages in which
only logical constants have a xed interpretation and all quantiers are
restricted to some domain is now an obvious modication of its denition
for languages all of whose constants have a xed interpretation.
Metadenition 19 An existential quantier (9x) is objectual with respect
to the model M = hI;Di i for any formula  and for any assignment g,
(9x) is true with respect to M and g if and only if there is such an  2 D
that  is true with respect to M and g(=x).
Metadenition 20 An operator (9ix) is a non-objectual existential quan-
tier with respect to the model M = hI;Di if and only if for all formulas
 there is such a model N that for all assignments g, (9ix) is true with
respect to M and g if and only if there is such an entity  2 D that  is
true with respect to the model N and the assignment g(=x) and for some
formula   is true with respect to N and the assignment g but is not true
with respect to M and g and every atomic formula p is true with respect
to M and the assignment g(=x) i it is true with respect to N and the
assignment g(=x).
Any quantier which is given a model-theoretic interpretation is nat-
urally a restricted quantier, a quantier restricted to the domain of the
model. Unrestricted quantiers cannot be treated in model theory. There-
fore the notion of ontological commitment relativised to models is a signi-
cantly modied notion of ontological commitment.
Thus it is not necessary or even enough for the truth of ((9x) with
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respect toM and g that for some term a, (a=x) would be true with respect
to M and g.
We must again begin from the case where an atomic sentence is in the
scope of an existential quantier.
Denition 7 A sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to en-
tities  such that Q(1; : : : ; ; : : : ; n) and  2 D relative to model M =
hI;Di and assignment g if and only if it is identical with such a sentence
(9x)R(t1; : : : ; x; : : : ; tn) that the existential quantier (9x) is objectual with
respect to the model M = hI;Di and kRkM;g = Q, kt1kM;g = 1, . . . and
ktnkM;g = n.
The next case is that where negative sentences are in the scope of the
existential quantier.
Metadenition 21 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that it is not the case that M and y 2 D relative to model
M = hI;Di and assignment g if and only if it is identical with a sentence
(9x):p and sentence (9x)p carries ontological commitment to entities  such
that M and  2 D relative to model M = hI;Di and assignment g.
Next follow sentences where a conjunction is in the scope of the objectual
existential quanter..
Metadenition 22 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M and N and  2 D relative to model M = hI;Di and
assignment g if and only if it is identical with a sentence (9x)(p & q) and
the sentence (9x)p carries ontological commitment to entities  such that
M and  2 D relative to M = hI;Di and g and the sentence (9x)q carries
ontological commitment to entities  such that N and  2 D relative to
M = hI;Di and g.
Next follow sentences where a disjunction is in the scope of the objectual
existential quantier.
Metadenition 23 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that M or N relative to model M = hI;Di and assignment g
if and only if it is identical with a sentence (9x)(p _ q) and sentence (9x)p
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carries explicit ontological commitment to entities such that M and  2 D
relative to M = hI;Di and g and the sentence (9x)q carries ontological
commitment to entities  such that N and  2 D relative to M = hI;Di
and g.
Next we must consider sentences with more than one quantier.
Metadenition 24 Sentence  carries explicit ontological commitment to
entities  such that for some entity  M(=) and  2 D relative to model
M = hI;Di and assignment g if and only if it identical with a sentence
(9y)(9x)p and for all entities  the sentence (9x)p carries explicit ontological
commitment to entities  such that M and  2 D relative to model M =
hI;Di and assignment g(=y).
Formal implicit ontological commitment can be dened with the aid of
explicit ontological commitment in a way similar to the way it was dened
before.
Metadenition 25 An assertion  in a language L carries formal implicit
ontological commitment to entities  such that M and  2 D relative to
model M = hI;Di and assignment g if and only if there is such a statement
 that  carries explicit ontological commitment to entities  such that M
relative to model M = hI;Di and assignment g and for all models M0 =
hI 0; D0i where I 0 is dened on L0 and assignments h  is true with respect to
M0 and h only if  is true with respect to M0 and h (i. e. j=M0;h !j=M0;h
 ).
Broad analytic implicit commitment can also be relativised to interpre-
tations and models. This requires that the notion of a model is altered so
that meaning postulates are taken as an element of a model; a model is
then a triple of an interpretation function, a domain and a set of meaning
postulates (which I symbolize as P).
Metadenition 26 An assertion  in a language L carries broad analytical
implicit ontological commitment to entities  such that M and  2 D relative
to model M = hI;D;Pi and assignment g if and only if there is such a
statement  that  carries explicit ontological commitment to entities  such
that M relative to model M = hI;Di and assignment g and for all models
399
M0 = hI 0; D0;P0i in which the meaning postulates P hold i. e. P0 = P and
where I 0 is dened on L0 and assignments h  is true with respect toM0 and
h only if  is true with respect to M0 and h (i. e. j=M0;h !j=M0;h  ).
We can also form analogously to the concept of logical or formal truth,
which is commonly taken to be truth relative to all models, a concept of
logical or formal ontological commitment, a concept of carrying ontologi-
cal commitment relative to all models (and not just relative to all domains
compatible with a single interpretation). We can say that a sentence carries
explicit formal ontological commitment to some entities i it carries com-
mitment to them relative to all models. We can also say that a sentence
carries logical ontological commitment to some entities i it carries implicit
formal ontological commitment to them relative to all models, i. e. i it
implies a sentence which carries explicit formal ontological commitment to
them. However, obviously very few sentences carry explicit formal ontolog-
ical commitment to anything, since such sentences would have to contain
no other constants than logical constants, since if they contain non-logical
constants their interpretation depends on the model. Therefore even the
implicit formal ontological commitment of most sentences is rather trivial,
so this is not a very useful concept.
However, there are some moderately interesting examples of explicit for-
mal ontological commitment. The sentence (9x)(9y)(9z)(x 6= y 6= z) carries
explicit formal ontological commitment to entities coexisting with at least
two other entities relative to all models, since the models in which it is true
are the same as the models in which at least three entities exist. There-
fore also any sentence which logically implies this sentence carries logical
ontological commitment to entities coexisting with at least two entities97.
97The question of the range of explicit formal commitment is connected to a dicult
and controversial question. Just as it is controversial whether sentences with higher-order
quantication are logically true, so it is controversial whether sentences with higher-order
quantication are ontologically committed to entities which the predicate variables bound
by existential quantiers occurring in them range over. If existentially quantied predi-
cate variables are also allowed to carry ontological commitment, contrary to what George
Boolos has argued in [Boo84], then the range of sentences with explicit formal ontological
commitment will expand greatly. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to treat the
question of the commitment of higher order quantication in this dissertation. I will only
note two things. First, Quine and Church themselves thought that quantied predicate
variables carried ontological commitment. Quine, of course, might have thought this only
because he thought that higher-order quantication was always reducible to rst-order
quantication; however, it is doubtful if he would have denied that such quantication
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Though we can thus form a model-theoretic conception of ontological
commitment, we must not exaggerate its importance. The model-theoretic
view of truth itself cannot replace Tarski's original theory of truth, and
similarly the model-theoretical conception of ontological commitment cannot
replace the absolute conception of ontological commitment. It is true that
model theory is in some respects more general than Tarski's original theory of
truth. However, it is not a generalisation of Tarski's original theory of truth
in the sense that Tarski's theory of absolute truth would follow from model
theory. Tarski's original theory of truth is also in some respects more general
than model theory. A theory telling what are the models which satisfy a
set of statements does not imply any theory which would tell what are the
truth-conditions of the statements contained in that set. Even if we know
that "Snow is white" is true in those models whose interpretation function
associates "snow" with some object that falls into the class with which the
interpretation function associates the word "white", this does not tell us that
it is true if and only if snow is white. Models whose interpretation function
associates "snow" with water and "white" with wet substances and in whose
universe there is water would also make the sentence true. Model theory
cannot by itself distinguish these two kinds of models and hence cannot give
the truth-conditions of any sentence in any interpreted language, whether
articial or natural. However, the knowledge of truth-conditions is what
we need if we are to use semantics for ontological purposes. Thus while
model theory can be useful if used to supplement Tarski's original theory of
truth, as it oers some extra generality, it cannot replace it. Similarly the
model-theoretical conception of ontological commitment cannot replace the
absolute conception of ontological commitment.
carried ontological commitment even if he would have rejected this reducibility thesis.
In any case, this is not the reason for Church's opinion, since Church never maintained
any such reducibility thesis. Secondly, Boolos allows that sentences with quantied predi-
cate variables have truth-conditions but does not admit that they would have ontological
commitments. This goes against the parallelism between truth-conditions and ontological
commitment I have stressed in this dissertation, which suggests that his views may not
be t together with those expressed in this dissertation. Here the intuitions of dierent
philosophers conict, and I would rather trust Quine and Church than Boolos.
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Chapter 6
What is the Problem of
Universals?
6.1 The Problem of Universals, Abduction and In-
duction
In this section of this dissertation I will apply the results of the former
sections to examining a metaontological problem, which has lately been
thematized for example in [RP00]: what is the problem of universals? I will
argue for a dierent solution from the one that has recently been popular,
a solution that represents a return to an older view.
What is the problem to which the postulation of universals or alterna-
tively of tropes (or of both in barocque ontologies like that of Barry Smith)
is a solution, and what kind of method could be used to defend an answer
to it? A very popular position, recently defended by for example Gonzalo
Rodriguez-Pereyra in [RP00] and in [RP02] and by Chris Swoyer in [Swo96,
page 247] is that the problem could only be the problem of how something
is possible and the method must hence be inference to the best explanation,
i. e. abduction in the sense in which Peirce used the word. Abduction is
often explicitly contrasted with conceptual analysis, which is held to be a
wrong way to solve the problem. In this dissertation I will give an argument
against this popular supposition, arguing that the problem is instead just a
problem of what exists, and that in order to solve its main part demonstra-
tive reasoning is enough, though abductive reasoning or some other form of
non-demonsstrative reasoning may also play a part in solving other parts of
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it.
I will concentrate mostly on Rodriguez-Pereyra's version of this suppo-
sition, since he makes the most use of it and presents it most clearly. It is
vital for his argument for his theory of universals, a version of resemblance
nominalism. Thus if he can be shown to be wrong in this claim, then most
(though perhaps not all) of his arguments for resemblance nominalism will
collapse. However, I will also examine briey what use other philosophers
have made of this claim and how they argue for it, since my ultimate aim is
to show that the assumptions common to all of them are false.
The importance of abduction has long been a matter of dispute in the
philosophy of science as well as general epistemology1 The dispute has con-
tinued in the modern philosophy of science, and though abduction is the
fashionable choice, there yet remain many champions of induction. The
metaontological view that abduction is central in metaphysics is clearly a
generalization into metaphysics of the view that it is central in sciences, so
here the problems of metaontology and philosophy of science are closely con-
nected. A naturalistic approach to metaphysics would say that the solution
to the metaontological problem would depend entirely on the solution to
the problem in the philosophy of science; however, even extreme naturalists
can dier in their views of the correct method of science and hence in their
views on the correct method in metaphysics. Even a philosopher who is
not a naturalist would have to say that the metaontological problem cannot
be solved without a thorough review of the problem in the philosophy of
science.
Some philosophers (such as van Fraassen in [VF89]) have attacked the
very existence of valid inference to the best explanation, claiming that a
theory can never be justied just by showing that it would explain some-
1Peter Achinstein has among other philosophers and historians of science (such as
Malcolm Forster in [For09]) examined the history of this dispute in such works as [Ach91].
Already John Stuart Mill and William Whewell argued in the 19th century over whether
induction or abduction was the correct method of non-demonstrative inference in the
natural sciences, Mill favouring induction (in [Mil72]) and Whewell abduction (in works
such as [WheIX]). Achinstein thinks that Mill was more correct in this dispute, and that
Newton had already favoured induction in his methodological rules. To be sure, these
old philosophers did not use such terminology as would be used by current philosophers
of science. Whewell did not use the word "abduction" but called it "induction" as did
Mill (who however, also called his method "deduction"); however, many historians of the
philosophy of science like Achinstein hold that what Whewell called induction is closer
to what we would call abduction than what we would call induction; see [Ach91, pages
28-29] for Achistein's possibly tendentious formulation of Mill's and Whewell's dispute.
403
thing. Even philosophers who defend abduction as a method hold two views
of abduction; some abductivists hold abduction to be a method of justica-
tion, but others hold it to be just a method of discovery. Sami Paavola in a
study of abduction [Paa06] makes a distinction between Harmanian abduc-
tion (abduction as a method of justifying a theory) as presented by Gilbert
H. Harman in [Har65] and Hansonian abduction (abduction as a method of
discovery) as presented by Norwood Russell Hanson in [Han58]. According
to Paavola, Peirce himself changed his views about what abduction was, at
rst claiming it to be a method of justication but later thinking it to be
just a method of discovery. The views of Rodriguez-Pereyra and Swoyer
apparently demand the validity of Harmanian abduction. Of course if ab-
duction is not a method of justication but at most of discovery, then an
ontological theory such as a solution to the problem of universals could not
be justied abductively either.
Harman himself admitted that there were unsolved problems in the the-
ory of abduction. He said in [Har65, page 89]:
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to judge
that one hypothesis is suciently better than another hypothe-
sis. Presumably such a judgment will be based on considerations
such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible,
which explains more, which is less ad hoc, and so forth. I do not
wish to deny that there is a problem about explaining the exact
nature of these considerations; I will not, however, say anything
more about this problem.
Unfortunately, though the theory of inference to the best explanation has
been defended by many philosophers after Harman, none of them has said
much about this problem either. Because of this the theory of inference to
the best explanation is at present more a sketch of a theory rather than a
fully developed theory. However, there exist theories of induction developed
in detail and rigorously on the basis of the work of such philosophers as
Carnap (for example in [Car71]), even though serious problems are known
to exist in all of them. Because of this the theory of induction seems to me
to be in a far better shape than the theory of Harmanian abduction as an
account of non-demonstrative reasoning, though no one is in a position to
say certainly which is closer to truth.
404
With van Fraassen his attack on abduction is combined with constructive
empiricism, and is a part of his attack on scientic realism, the view that
the entities postulated by scientic theories (including unobservable entities)
really exist. Such views may have caused as a reaction to them abductivism
to be popular among those philosophers of science that are in favour of sci-
entic realism. However, there is no reason why an opponent of abduction
(as a primitive method of justication) would also have to be an opponent of
scientic realism. It is quite consistent and reasonable for a scientic realist
to claim that we gain our knowledge of unobservable entities with the aid
of induction instead of abduction. Actually van Fraassen rejected induction
as well as abduction. His own preferred method of revising empirical be-
liefs was Bayesian conditionalization; however, in a Bayesian theory a priori
probabilities are allowed to be arbitrary and it is surely possible to support
beliefs regarding unobservable entities by Bayesain conditionalization if the
a priori probabilities are chosen suitably.
As Nelson Goodman showed in [Goo54], the problem of induction is con-
nected with the question of what predicates (or properties) are projectible
and why, so whether we can inductively infer the existence of unobservable
entities depends on the connection between the notions of projectibility and
observability. I will examine the concept of projectibility and its possible
ontological implications at more length later in 6.3.3; those readers who are
unfamiliar with the notion might want to skip ahead and check its descrip-
tion there. Here I will only note that in order to claim that induction can
reveal unobservable properties for us one must just hold that a predicate or
property can be projectible even if some entities belonging to its extension
are unobservable (i. e. if the predicate is weakly theoretical in the sense
I have dened before in Section 3.3). However, this is a quite plausible
claim. There may be indeed some reasons (even if not very strong ones) to
think that projectible properties must be weakly observable (as I will ar-
gue later in 6.3.3) and therefore some of their instances must be observable.
However, there is surely no good reason to think that all instances of pro-
jectible properties would have be observable, i. e. no good reason to think
that projectible properties would have to be strongly observational. Indeed,
Goodman himself held that they did not have to be, saying in [Goo66, page
330] that
the line between observation-predicates and others does not co-
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incide with the line between projectible and nonprojectible pred-
icates.
Goodman gives as an example the predicate "conducts electricity" which he
apparently thinks is projectible but not observable.
Harman claimed in [Har65, page 90] that the inference from experimen-
tal data to the theory of subatomic particles certainly does not seem to
be describable as an instance of enumerative induction. He does not make
clear what the diculty he seems to perceive is; of course it would be ex-
tremely dicult (and perhaps impossible in practice) to show in detail how
an extremely complex theory such as modern atomic theory can be justied
inductively, but of course it would also be extremely dicult (and perhaps
impossible in practice) to show in detail how it could be justied abduc-
tively, for that matter, even if it could be. However, contrary to what at
least van Fraassen if not Harman would claim, at least the unobservability of
subatomic particles does not lead to any diculty of principle in justifying
their existence inductively. If we hold along with Goodman that predicates
can be projectible even if some entities to which they apply are not observ-
able, we can easily explain in broad outline how we can arrive inductively
at the existence of unobservable entities such as subatomic particles. Let us
assume that the predicate "Q" is a monadic predicate that can be applied
to bodies of any size and R a relational predicate that can hold between
objects of all sizes; clearly there are many such predicates such as (in the
case of the monadic predicate) predicates indicating the mass or charge or
shape of bodies, and more complex predicates constructed out of these. If
all bodies we have observed that are Q have such parts x1, x2 . . . and xn
that R(x1; : : : ; xn), we can in many cases infer inductively that any body
that is Q (probably) has such parts x1, x2 . . . and xn that R(x1; : : : ; xn).
More exactly, we can make such an inference in all cases where the complex
predicate "has such parts x1, x2 . . . and xn that R(x1; : : : ; xn)" is projectible
(with respect to the predicate "Q"). Intuitively many complex predicates
like this are projectible2. If this predicate is projectible then even if some
2The greatest problem in the theory of induction is nding out what predicates (or
properties) are projectible. This problems was discovered by Goodman. Goodman's own
solution was that it was predicates that were entrenched, i. e. used already frequently in
sciences. I do not think that this is any genuine answer to the problem; no doubt most
predicates long used in sciences are projectible, since scientists tend to use projectible
predicates, as they have an intuitive sense of what predicates are projectible, but I do not
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body which is Q is a minimal observable body, so that we cannot observe
whether it has parts, we can still inductively infer that it (probably) has
parts between which the same relationship R holds. In this way we can get
inductive knowledge of bodies which are too small to observe.
Therefore I think that the worries of philosophers like van Fraassen about
the validity of Harmanian abductive reasoning must be taken seriously even
by those who are not convinced by other aspects of his philosophy such
as constructive empiricism. Nevertheless, I am not completely convinced
by this line of thought, since there are cases where it is intuitively highly
plausible to claim that abductive reasoning has led to results which are
justied (at least to some extent), even though it is rather hard to say
exactly what would make such reasoning justied in those cases. It seems
likely to me that if abduction justies some hypothesis in these cases, it is
because abduction can in such cases be reduced to induction. If we think
after Keynes and Carnap that induction can be based on probability, then
we can answer the question that Harman leaves unanswered in outline so
that an explanatory hypothesis would be better than another if it is more
probable relative to the data that are to be explained.
However, I cannot justify this view in this dissertation, so I will try not
to commit myself to it in the discussions that follow. I will instead argue
that even if inference to the best explanation is the only correct way to
solve some problems, whether in natural science or philosophy, it is not a
correct way to solve the problem of universals (at least not to solve all of
its parts), since the main part of the problem of universals is very dierent
from all those problems which it is plausible to claim have been successfully
solved by abductive reasoning. For instance, it is usually agreed that entities
whose existence is the conclusion of abductive reasoning are unobserved (like
the subatomic particles Harman referred to), but many philosophers have
claimed that universals or tropes can be observed. I will argue that the
only way to maintain the thesis that the problem of universals is solved by
think that there is any reason to think that all of them would be such, since scientists
can make mistakes in this matter. In any case the question remains what is common to
all such predicates and how this intuition works when it does. Furthermore, this answer
leads to a too conservative theory of science; in any great scientic revolution not only new
hypotheses are formed but also new concepts are formed, which are essential to such new
hypotheses, and unless some of them could be considered projectible, few new theories
could be regarded as better than old ones. Goodman's theory would stie all progress in
sciences.
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inference to the best explanation is to admit that the word "explanation" is
used here in a more general sense than in the philosophy of science. However,
in this case inference to the best explanation can no longer be contrasted
with conceptual analysis, since conceptual analysis turns out to be one form
of explanation in this very wide sense of the word, so the popular position is
in any case wrong in resisting the use of conceptual analysis in the solution
of the problem of universals.
Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that since the problem is an explanatory one
a solution to it must account for the truthmakers of certain truths; I will
argue that since the problem is not (at least not solely) an explanatory
one but (at least in part) a descriptive one a solution to it must account
for the ontological commitments of some truths also (or even instead of
truthmakers). I will then suggest a preliminary solution to this problem of
ontological commitments.
It is even contentious whether the problem of universals is an ontological
problem at all, and hence whether we are here engaging in metaontological
research at all. Many philosophers have claimed that the problem of uni-
versals is really a problem in the philosophy of language or more specically
semantics or possibly in epistemology or more generally in phenomenology.
For instance, Gregory Salmieri thinks in [Sal08] that the problem is more ac-
curately called the Problem of Concepts, and says that the problem is how
unitary thoughts that apply to a plurality of objects are to be explained
and by what standards they are to be evaluated. However, I will argue
that while there are problems in the philosophy of language and other such
elds closely related to the problem of universals, so that it would also make
sense to call one of them a problem of universals, yet there is clearly also
an ontological problem which deserves that name. Indeed this ontological
problem has historically been called the Problem of Universals rst and per-
haps also most commonly and therefore deserves that name most of all these
problems, though here it is obviously not a question of absolute correctness
but just of the appropriateness of nomenclature, so there is some room for
stipulation.
I would then say that the Problem of Concepts that Salmieri formulated
is a quite legitimate problem and is very closely connected to the Problem
of Universals, but it is yet not the same problem. Indeed, the Problem
of Concepts may even be epistemically a more fundamental problem than
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the Problem of Universals, but it is also a more extensive problem, so it
is not reasonable to try to solve it entirely before solving the Problem of
Universals. It is not the same and it is a more extensive problem because
a complete answer to the Problem of Universals might leave open many
parts of a complete answer to the Problem of Concepts. An ontologist
is only interested in an epistemological or semantical problem such as the
Problem of Concepts so far as it aects ontological questions. This means
that in this case he is only interested in nding out what entities we have
to suppose there are in order to account for the application of concepts to
the plurality of objects. However, answering that problem need not give a
complete explanation of how concepts apply to a plurality of objects.
6.2 A Problem of Explanation or of Description?
According to many ontologists such as those I have already mentioned uni-
versals (or tropes or both) should be posited (if they should be posited at
all) to explain various phenomena, such as how general terms can apply to
dierent individuals or even how dierent individuals can be of the same
kind or have the same property. That the problem would be of this kind
was already suggested by Armstrong in [Arm78, x4 vii, page 14] when he
said
The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically
dierent particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all
be of the same type.
However, with Armstrong this was just an incidental remark, and as I will
show later in 6.4.1, there are also in Armstrong suggestions of a dierent
theory. Many recent ontologists, e. g. Rodriguez-Pereyra in [RP00] and
Chris Swoyer in [Swo96, page 247], make this claim central to their theory
and draw strong conclusions from it. Even philosophers to whose thinking
it does not really t (as will show later) have adopted this formulation of
the problem, for example Rosenkrantz in [Ros93, page 72]
Rodriquez-Pereyra claims in [RP00] that the problem of universals is
the problem of showing how numerically dierent particulars can
have the same properties.
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Rodriguez-Pereyra refers to Nozick [Noz81, pages 8-9], according to whom
many philosophical problems have the form: how is a certain thing pos-
sible given (or supposing) certain other things? According to Rodriguez-
Pereyra [RP02, x1.1, page 19] the problem of universals is also of this form,
which is seen most clearly in Armstrong's formulations of the problem.
It is not at rst sight clear just what such a question as what a philosoph-
ical problem is amounts to. Any such question can be understood either as
a purely descriptive, historical question of how the problem has in fact been
formulated or as a partly normative question of how it should be formulated.
I want to argue that the problem is in part historical and in part normative.
There is no point in calling a problem a problem of universals unless it has
some connection with the historical problem; however, this might leave a lot
of leeway about how to formulate the problem, especially if the historical
formulations turn out to be ambiguous or if dierent historical formulations
turn out not to be equivalent with each other, since in such a case we will
have to ask which reading or formulation is more important and fruitful.
However, I will argue that there are reasons to doubt both the historical
accuracy of Rodriguez-Pereyra's view as a description of how the problem
has in fact been formulated and (of course more importantly) the fruitful-
ness of this view as a normative prescription of how the problem should be
formulated. I will discuss the reasons for these two doubts in this order.
6.3 The Problem historically considered
I admit that Armstrong's formulation, which I have already quoted, does in-
deed clearly indicate that the problem would be of the form of the problems
Nozick refers to. However, the problem is that almost no formulation of the
problem other than those of Armstrong or those inuenced by Armstrong
makes the problem seem similar to Nozick's problems. This creates a serious
problem with Rodriguez-Pereyra's claims about the nature of the problem
of universals. He claims that the problem he is dealing with is very old -
according to him it has been discussed at length for many centuries and
(see [RP02, page 1]) was already discussed by Plato. However, despite this
Rodriguez-Pereyra bases his claim about the nature of the problem on for-
mulations all of which are all rather recent, given by modern philosophers,
especially on the formulation given by Armstrong, who certainly was not
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a contemporary of Plato and did not live centuries ago. It might be that
their formulations are not general enough to capture what is common to
all who have treated the problem through the centuries, but at most only
what is common to (most of) those that have treated the problem lately. In
that case it might be that they do not capture the problem itself in its full
generality but only a subproblem of it on which attention has been focused
in modern times. If we look at the historical evidence, we see that this is
indeed the case. It appears that Rodriguez-Pereyra has confused a centuries
old problem with a problem which is not quite thirty years old!
6.3.1 Porphyry's Formulation of the Problem of Universals
The problem of universals was famously rst posed by the Neoplatonist
philosopher Porphyry in an introduction to Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry
formulated the problem in this work but did not himself oer a solution,
at least not in that same work; he had, however, another commentary on
Categories, this one in dialogue form and there are other works of Porphyry
where more constructive treatments to the problem have been located3.
Porphyry was probably the rst Neoplatonic philosopher who main-
tained the controversial claim (accepted by most later Neoplatonists) that
Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines were compatible. It is gener-
ally agreed by modern commentators (with some exceptions, of course) that
this view was historically implausible; Aristotle surely seems to be arguing
ercely against Plato, though it is not easy to formulate exactly in termi-
nology understandable to modern philosophers what the dierence in their
theories was. If then Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics can retrospectively
be viewed as answers to the problem of universals, then it is no wonder
that Porphyry had a problem, as he was trying to reconcile incompatible
views. It is not wholly clear what Porphyry's own solution to the problem
3There is much controversy concerning what the subject matter of Categories is,
whether it concerns metaphysics or semantics or even syntax. Some commentators such
as Walter E. Wehrle in [Weh00] or Lloyd P. Gerson in [Ger] have argued that Categories
was a work on semantics, not metaphysics, and this view might be used to argue that
since Porphyry formulated the Problem of Universals in an introduction to this work
(and himself held it to be a work that concerned semantics) the Problem of Universals
is not a genuinely metaphysical problem at all. However, since Porphyry after formulat-
ing the problem of universals explicitly excluded it from further, deeper consideration in
that work, this rather provides evidence that even if the Categories were concerned with
semantics (which is very controversial), the problem he formulated is not a semantical
one.
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of universals was. It is likely that he had a solution. Some modern com-
mentators contemptuously assume that he did not give a a solution in the
work because he did not have one, and he did not have one because he in
some way misunderstood Aristotle (though given that modern commenta-
tors disagree even more about the interpretation of Aristotle than ancient
ones, many of them must misunderstand Aristotle very badly, so modern
historians of philosophy are scarcely in any position to be contemptuous of
Porphyry). However, Porphyry did not present the problem of universals as
something that would puzzle him but as something whose discussion had to
be passed by in the specic work in question since it was in his view too deep
for elementary students, who were its target audience. However, it is likely
that as he was trying to reconcile the incompatible metaphysical views of
Plato and Aristotle, he distorted both of them, so that even if he had a the-
ory, his theory diered from both of their theories (if they had any theories
at all with respect to this problem of universals), even though he himself
maintained that it was identical with both of them. Naturally the likelihood
that the product of such an attempted reconciliation was incoherent (even
if the theories he tried to reconcile were coherent, which is itself unlikely)
or at least unnecessarily complex and convoluted, is of course very great.
Of course this does not prove conclusively that it was incoherent; we would
need to study his works at length to be certain of this. However, this makes
it antecedently unlikely that we would gain any great light on the question
from such deeper study of his works, so I will not consider his opinions more
thoroughly here.
The problem passed into Medieval scholastic philosophy because of the
late Roman philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius's translation
of Porphyry's work. Boethius apparently (e. g. according to [Twe84]) pro-
posed a solution that he derived from the Aristotelian commentator Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias. This solution inuenced later philosophers both in the
Muslim world (e. g. Ibn Sina (980-1037), called Avicenna in the west) and
such famous western medieval philosophers as the most famous scholastic
philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, both through Avicenna and through Boethius's
western successors. It became the standard solution to the problem. It is
a solution that is usually called Moderate Realism; however, it is so very
moderate a form of realism that it is highly doubtful whether it is genuinely
realistic at all. Even worse, it is also extremely obscure so that dierent
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modern commentators on it disagree about what it really means and it can
with good reason be questioned whether it is at all a coherent solution.
This theory is so very extraordinarily subtle that it is impossible to suc-
cinctly and satisfactorily summarize the theory in any generally acceptable
way. However, I will try by saying that it very roughly says that the genera
and species (or common natures) are universal in the mind but particulars
in the sensible objects and are neither universal nor particular in themselves.
The real objective foundation of universality lies according to it in the sim-
ilar natures of the members of the same class. This theory is in my opinion
not realistic at all, but so far as any intelligible sense can be made of it, it is a
combination of concept nominalism and trope nominalism and resemblance
nominalism4.
The theories of earlier philosophers like Plato or Aristotle or the Stoics
can retrospectively be considered as answers to the problem of universals.
However, there are serious problems that are not usually seen about how to
4It may be true that as Salmieri says in [Sal10, page 16]
this is the position that until quite recently was held by the overwhelming
majority of people who called themselves moderate realists. In particular
it was the position of the neo-Scholastics from whom we have inherited the
term.
I am not sure that we have inherited the term "universal" from the neo-Scholastics rather
than by other ways from medieval and directly from ancient philosophy. In any case,
that the adherents of this position call it realistic does nothing to show that it would be
genuinely realistic, any more than e. g. the fact that Berkeley called his immaterialism
commonsensical did anything to show that it would have been genuinely commonsensical.
In fact while the position of Alexander was yet extremely ambiguous the position of the
neo-Scholastics to whom Salmieri refers - e. g. Maurice de Wulf in [dW52] - was quite
unambiguously not realistic. Salmieri expresses this view in [Sal10, page 16] so that all
particulars falling under a universal are composed of two components, of which one is
identical to a corresponding component in others, but this identity need not be numer-
ical identity but can be qualitative identity. Here Salmieri understands by qualitative
identity (which most modern philosophers would not call identity at all) the relationship
between two things whereby there is no dierence between them except in number. Qual-
itative identity seems to be the same as exact resemblance and the qualitatively identical
components seem exactly what trope theorists call tropes, so this view collapses into a
combination of trope nominalism and resemblance nominalism (with some concept nomi-
nalism on top of it according to other places of Salmieri's article) instead of being any kind
of realism at all. Salmieri very surprisingly denies that Aristotle would be a realist even
in this attenuated sense. A similar position with regard to other entities would generally
not be called realistic with regard to those entities, so it is singularly inappropriate to call
such a position with regard to universals realistic. We would not, for example, usually
call a phenomenalistic theory according to which physical objects have unity only in our
minds but have a real objective foundation in the relations between (classes of) sense-data
(which according to the theory exist independently of being sensed) realist with respect
to physical objects.
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do so. It is usually claimed in histories of philosophy that Plato and Aristotle
proposed opposing answers to the problem; Plato an extreme form of real-
ism, universalia ante rem, according to which universals existed separately
from particulars and were independent of them and Aristotle a moderate
form of realism, universalia in re, according to which universals existed in
particulars (whatever this separation and lack of separation exactly mean).
However, this is by no means as clear as it is often supposed to be; there
is no agreement among historians of ancient philosophy whether Aristotle
was a moderate realist or not a realist at all. It is unquestionable that Aris-
totle's philosophy was realistic with respect to many questions (at least he
was realistic about biological organisms and the heavenly bodies, though
less so about such physical objects as rocks) but it is far from clear that
he was realistic about universals. Gregory Salmieri argues in [Sal10] that
in fact it was Eudoxus of Cnidus of the early group of followers of Plato
called the Old Academy that proposed a theory of moderate realism, of uni-
versalia in re, as an alternative to Plato's extreme realism. It would then
be the little-known, almost forgotten Eudoxus that is the true originator of
the kind of moderate realism today defended by ontologists like Armstrong,
not Aristotle. According to Salmieri Aristotle attacked this moderate re-
alism as well as Plato's original theory, and Aristotle's own theory was far
more anti-realistic or deationary concerning universals, in fact a form of
conceptualism.
However, the standard story can be questioned even more radically; it
may not be just that Aristotle proposed a dierent answer to the problem of
universals than supercial popular histories of philosophy commonly claim
but that he proposed no answer at all. Plato and Aristotle certainly did not
propose such competing theories explicitly, since they were not explicitly
aware of the problem. Plato may not have had any concept of universals;
as we will later see, it was probably Aristotle who rst coined that concept.
Aristotle argues against the view that universals are substances, and seems
to take this to be Plato's position (as did many later Aristotelians), but as
e. g. Lloyd P. Gerson shows in [Ger], it is far from clear that Plato did
this, especially as it is unlikely that Plato already possessed either Aristo-
tle's concept of a universal or any of Aristotle's concepts of a substance.
Plato nowhere says that the forms are predicated of sensible particulars,
and it is unclear if the participation that he speaks of can be identied as
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metaphysical predication i. e. instantiation or exemplication. Aristotle
had the concept of a universal, which he may have invented himself, but
it is not clear that he ever asked himself any question similar to the one
Porphyry asked. He may have given an implicit answer to that question,
but commentators have diculty agreeing on what it might be. It may even
be that the disagreement results from asking a question with no answer.
For example, Riin Sirkel claims in [Sir10, page iii] that Aristotle's positive
remarks about universals remain neutral with regard to their ontological
status. Paradoxical as it may sound, it might even be that Plato's and
Aristotle's metaphysical theories are irrelevant to the problem of universals.
However, more likely they do have some relevance to it (and Sirkel also in
the end nds out an implicit position about the ontological status of uni-
versals in Aristotle), but nding out what kind of relevance they have is
harder than is commonly thought5. However, happily solving this historical
question is not very important since solving it would not be likely to help us
much in nding a solution to the problem of universals that would satisfy
us rationally.
Though the problem was then implicitly addressed already by Plato and
Aristotle, it was Porphyry who rst explicitly thematized the problem. As
5One of the most important reasons to think that Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas
and Aristotle's hylomorphic metaphysics are relevant to the problem of universals is that
one of the Greek words translated as "form" (besides o, morphee) is o&, eidos, the
same word that Porphyry uses and that is translated as "species" in his formulation of
the problem of universals. A problem, however, is whether the word is used in the same
sense or in dierent but equivalent senses or on the contrary in non-equivalent senses
when speaking of forms and speaking of species. Is there indeed any reason to use two
words in translating Aristotle's eidos, both "form" and "species", or could one of these
be discarded entirely? Could we for instance say that according to Aristotle a composite
sensible substance is composed of species and matter? Commentators on Aristotle do
not seem to often notice this question and just suppose without any justication that the
Greek word has two meanings, perhaps just because this is how it has been traditionally
done. Owens notes in [Owe63, page 159] that commentators such as Hermann Bonitz have
noted that for Aristotle these two meanings (one of the four causes and the subdivision of
a genus) somehow coincide. If they coincide why cannot they just be identied? However,
the fact that Aristotle seems to say in Metaphysics that forms are primary substances
(1037a21-1037b7) and also that universals are not substances (1038b34-1039a2) suggests
that at least in Aristotle forms cannot be the same thing as species or even coincide
with them, since Aristotle clearly assumes that species are universals. Of course, these
statements might come from dierent periods of Aristotle's development as commentators
like Werner Jaeger would think, and in this case forms could after all be the same as species
according to Aristotle at some time in his development, so the historical question of the
relevance of Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics of forms to the problem of universals is
very dicult indeed.
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Rodriguez-Pereyra says that he speaks about the traditional problem of
universals he should be speaking about the problem Porphyry formulated6.
However, when we look closely at Porphyry's text, we see that when
Porphyry posed the problem, he did not formulate it as a problem of how
something can be the case, but as a problem of whether something is the
case. Porphyry asks (see [War75]7)
1 whether genera or species exist in themselves or reside in mere
concepts alone;
2 whether if they exist they are corporeal or incorporeal and
3 whether they exist apart or in sense objects and in dependence
6Rodriguez-Pereyra also identies the problem he is trying to explicate as the problem
of the One over Many. However, it is doubful whether any such problem is a traditional
problem; no problem with such a name has been discussed for many centuries as Rodriguez-
Pereyra claims the problem of universals has been. Such a problem is only mentioned
(perhaps rst by Devitt in his criticism of Armstrong in [DS87, 14.2]) in recent literature
dealing with the problem of universals, and is thus a recently coined problem, perhaps
indeed a problem rst discovered by Armstrong and named by Devitt. In older discussions
of the problem of universals and recent commentaries on them philosophers usually speak
about the One over Many argument: see for example [Fin80]. This meant originally an
argument apparently used by Plato for the existence of ideas corresponding to all general
terms (a view that can be viewed as a crude predecessor of promiscuous realism). This
argument has (like a lot of arguments in the history of ancient philosophy) a rather
complicated history; our knowledge of it comes to us at third hand. The argument was
attacked by Aristotle in his lost work Peri Ideon which ancient commentators on Aristotle
referred to. Aristotle identied the argument as such (according to the commentators)
and there is some controversy over whether Plato really had such an argument or if he had
it whether its conclusion was that ideas corresponded to every general term. However,
the phrase has also been used to refer to more modern arguments for the existence of
universals - in a sense of the word in which universals are not quite the same thing as
Plato's ideas - which have some signicant similarities to Plato's argument as formulated
by Aristotle. As these are arguments for the existence of something - ideas or universals -
they presuppose a problem that is a problem of whether something exists, not a problem
of how something can be the case. A one over many principle is also often mentioned; it
is a principle used in a one over many argument. However, naturally once you have an
argument that something exists, there emerges the problem of whether that argument is
valid and if not what is wrong with it, i. e. how the apparent validity of the argument can
be explained, and that seems to be the One over Many problem Devitt talks about. It is
thus really a subproblem of the traditional problem of universals, in the sense that solving
it will help to solve the traditional problem but is not in itself sucient and perhaps not
even necessary for solving the traditional problem.
7According to another translation in [Sor04, 5(f), page 157] Porphyry asks
a whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone,
b whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals and
c whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in con-
nection with them.
These two translations do not seem to dier in any philosophically signicant way.
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on them.
Thus a problem of how something can be the case is not the same problem
with which the medieval philosophers struggled and whose discussion has
continued until the present day. Nor does the problem as Porphyry formu-
lated it have at all the form of Nozick's problems; it is not a problem of
explaining anything at all.
However, nding that it is not an explanatory problem does not yet
make clear exactly what the positive character of Porphyry's problem is.
The formulations of all three questions can be interpreted in dierent ways.
Even if we consider only the rst and most fundamental of them, we nd
room for ambiguity. What does Porphyry's contrast between existing in
themselves and residing in concepts really come to?
For something to reside in mere concepts could mean that it does not
really exist but is only thought of, like imaginary entities such as ctional
characters, or it could mean that it actually exists but is somehow mind-
dependent.
E. g. if there are individual accidents of the human mind that depend on
the human mind with rigid existential dependence, as Aristotelians famously
thought, then these accidents are mind-dependent without being imaginary,
and many medieval nominalists or conceptualists identied universals with
such accidents of the mind, such accidents as would be called concepts. A
more subtle version of such a theory would not identify universals with any-
thing, but would take them to be logical constructions out of such individual
accidents of the mind.
However, a nominalist could also think that universals are imaginary, just
like unicorns or witches are usually thought to be, i. e. in phenomenological
terms be purely intentional objects having only intentional inexistence (or in
Roman Ingarden's terminology existentially heteronomous objects)8. One
way of developing such a theory would be to propose a ctionalist theory of
discourse concerning universals. The ontological status of universals would
8This corresponds also to Jody Azzouni unusually strong notion of ontologically de-
pendent objects (as explained in [Azz04, page 96]); entities which would be ontologically
dependent in a sense of the word more commonly used by ontologists, such as Aristotelian
accidents, would not be ontologically dependent in Azzouni's sense. Azzouni thinks that
entities which are values of variables bound by an objectual quantier could still be on-
tologically dependent in this strong sense; however, I have already given arguments for
the contrary view that any objects which are values of a variable bound by an objectual
quantier must already be ontologically independent in Azzouni's sense of the word.
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then be similar to that of such particulars as Donald Duck9.
There may also be other ways to understand Porphyry's contrast, though
I cannot think of any even prima facie plausible ones.
Happily this question does not matter much. The problem of universals
can be understood as dispute between realism and anti-realism with respect
to certain specic purported entities, namely universals. A genuine realism
concerning universals, like genuine realism concerning any entities, requires
both that they exist and are independent of the human mind and language10,
so if we are to make a decision between realism and nominalism we must
ask both questions. Also it is obviously pointless to ask whether something
is mind-dependent or language-dependent or independent of mind and lan-
guage if we do not know whether it exists at all; thus the rst question must
be whether there are universals at all. An eliminativist reist physicalist
might hold that there would not be universals even in a non-realistic sense.
A historical perspective is thus useful, though we must not tie the concept
of universals dogmatically to any historical theory of universals if it is to be
a concept that is to be of any relevance to present day discussions. I must
stress that the purpose of this dissertation is not to be a part of history
9These two kinds of theories have both in fact been held by nominalists throughout
the ages. As expounded for example in [Rea77, page 15], William of Ockham changed his
mind from the latter of these theories to the former. At rst he thought (inuenced by
Henry of Harclay) that a universal was a ctum, having merely objective being (by which
the scholastic meant something almost opposite to what the term would mean today,
namely the same as the intentional inexistence of the phenomenologists). However, later
(under the inuence of Water Chatton) he thought that universals existed subjectively, as
qualities of the mind or mental acts. A translation of a passage where William debates the
relative merits of these two nominalistic theories can be found in [Spa94, pages 218-230]
10Porphyry did not explicitly consider the possible theory that universals might be
dependent on language, since he thought as most ancient philosophers had done that
linguistic entities reected mental acts (spoken words were symbols of aections or im-
pressions of the soul as Aristotle says at the very beginning of De Interpretatione 16a4-5),
and therefore if universals were to be reduced to general terms they would be further
reduced to the general concepts of which such terms were mere symbols. However, the
theory that universals depend on language (which is called nominalism in a strong sense,
Armstrong's predicate nominalism) was apparently already suggested in the Middle Ages
by Roscelin, who is said to have said that a universal is an emission of sound (atus vocis),
though it is not sure if this was an accurate description of his position. In any case it never
became popular during medieval times, while conceptualistic theories (which can be called
nominalistic in a weaker sense) which held universals to be in some sense mind-dependent
became most popular in later scholasticism. However, nominalism in the strong sense has
become a popular position in recent philosophy so it cannot be left out of account. In
any case mentalistic and linguistic subjectivism are in many ways parallel and come up
in later philosophy when the question of realism is asked with respect to any domain of
purported entities, so they are best treated together.
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of philosophy but an original, systematic discussion of metaontological and
ontological questions. As an auxiliary for such systematic discussion I am
here considering the way the problem of a universal has been formulated
in early history rather than arguments that have then been given for or
against any solution to it. These arguments are often based on outdated
premises such as outdated natural science (physics, biology etc.) and logical
and theological assumptions that many philosophers do not take seriously
today. For example, as we can see in [Spa94, page 119] Ockham argues
against realism about universals by claiming that there cannot be universals
since
It is proper to the divine essence alone that without any division
or multiplication it is really in several distinct supposita.
Many other medieval philosophers argued similarly that if there were univer-
sals they would in some way trespass on divine prerogatives. Such arguments
are unlikely to impress atheists, agnostics or deists such as many if not most
modern philosophers are; e. g. a modern defender of universals such as
Armstrong would be unlikely to be impressed by the claim that universals
would poach on divine prerogatives, as he is an atheist. Also since this
argument of Ockham appeals to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, it is not
likely to impress even theists if they are not Christians11. Not that even
Christians would have to endorse this kind of argument; many Christian
philosophers such as Wolterstor and Plantinga would say that the assump-
tion that there are universals and even that they are independent of God
is quite compatible with their Christianity, though of course there are also
modern theist philosophers who think that the assumption is not compati-
ble with Christianity. Of course, similarly unimpressive arguments were also
presented in favour of universals in medieval times; e. g. Roscelin's form
of nominalism was argued to imply tritheism and so be inconsistent with
monotheism. Medieval philosophers also tended to suppose that if some-
thing is shown to have been Aristotle's view, it was thereby shown to be
true unless it contradicted the Bible or the Church Fathers, and therefore
they confused the question of what is the correct solution to the problem of
11There are of course theistic arguments against strong realism about universals that
do not depend on trinitarian doctrine; e. g. it is often claimed that strong realism
leads to pantheism, but the arguments for this seem to be based on the Noe-Platonistic
identication of God with Being, and should be attractive only to Neo-platonists
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universals with the question of what Aristotle thought was the correct solu-
tion to the problem of universals; modern philosophers (with the exception
of Catholic philosophers whose intellectual honesty is often open to doubt)
have less respect for the authority of Aristotle12.
It is, indeed, desirable to broaden the problem slightly from the one
Porphyry originally formulated. This becomes obvious once we consider
the interpretation of the words Porphyry uses further. What does Porphyry
mean with the vitally important words "species" and "genus"? These words
have been used in dierent ways throughout the history of philosophy, so
nding out how they are used in a particular instance is necessary for the
avoidance of misunderstanding.
Fortunately Porphyry gives some explanation for his terminology. Por-
phyry says later in [War75, pages 29,30] that the word "genus" has three
senses, but discussion among philosophers concerns one according to which
a genus is that predicated essentially of many things which dier in species.
Similarly Porphyry says in [War75, pages 35] that the word "species" has
many senses but the important sense is one in which a species is predicated
essentially of many things which dier in number. These explanations of
what genus and species are are not denitions, since as the translator ex-
plains, Aristotelians thought these concepts could not be dened (though
this was because of a particularly narrow theory of denition, according
to which all denition proceed by means of genus and dierentia, and this
kind of theory of denition is denitely outdated, so this should not make
us lose hope of dening them). The explanations would indeed be obvi-
ously circular if they were denitions, as they determine genus with the
12Semantical holists might deny that a problem can be formulated independently of
evidence considered as relevant to it. However, such holism is obviously implausible. A
Darwinist and a creationist consider the same problem concerning the origin of species and
provide dierent and incompatible answers for it, even though they consider dierent kinds
of evidence relevant, a creationist thinking biblical authority relevant and the Darwinist
thinking it irrelevant. Similarly the modern philosopher and the medieval philosopher are
considering the same question even though they dier with regard to what evidence they
consider to be relevant. The problem of universals indeed diers from the question with
regard to the problem of species in the respect that while the Biblical authority seems to
favour the creationist answer strongly, it would not favour any answer to the problem of
universals much more than another, as Biblical evidence could in the Middle ages with
some plausibility be given both for and against the existence of universals. Generally,
however, realism about universals seems to have been rejected for religious reasons, as the
existence of universals seemed in some way to infringe on God's prerogatives (which is of
course the exact opposite of the view commonly found in popular histories of philosophy,
which commonly claim that realism was supported for religious reasons).
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aid of species and species with the aid of genus. Thus they leave the no-
tions of genus and species rather obscure. They make clear, however, that
Porphyry understands both species and genus as entities predicated essen-
tially of something else. Thus the problem of universals would according to
Porphyry only concern entities predicated essentially of many entities, like
the substance universals, not accidentally predicated universals like redness.
The essentialness of predication implies that the entities predicated of some-
thing are predicated of it necessarily, i. e. are predicated of it if it exists at
all, but it also implies even more; it appears that genus and species are also
sortal properties, so that they provide a principle of individuation for the
entities of which they are predicated.
6.3.2 What are Universals?
Here it is useful to delve into the history of the word "universal" used in
the very name of the problem of universals. While Porphyry does not speak
of universals at all in his formulation of the problem, yet the species and
genera of which he speaks had already been called universals by Aristotle,
who was one of Porphyry's authorities. Aristotle had actually before Por-
phyry given a denition for the concept of a universal that he probably
introduced into philosophical terminology. This denition was such that it
apparently also included entities accidentally predicated of something (and
entities which do not provide a principle of individuation). Aristotle gave in
his De Interpretatione 7, 17a the famous denition13 (I use here the Ackrill
13Similar denitions have also been given independently of Aristotle and even indepen-
dently of Greek inuence. A similar denition was given in Indian philosophy by the
Nyaya-Vaises.ika philosophers; who were more realistic than most Indian philosophers.
According to Kisor Chakrabarti in [Cha75], the Nyaya-Vaises.ika philosophers dened a
universal (samanya or jati) as
an entity that is eternal and inseparably inherent in many entities.
Inherence may probably be understood as the same thing as predication in a non-linguistic
sense; even when the word "inherence" is used in discussions of Aristotle's thoughts it
is very close to the notion of predication, whether of universals or individual accidents
or forms. If this inherence is the same as predication, then while the Nyaya-Vaises.ika
denition is clearly stronger than Aristotle's (adding additional fetures such as eternity
to the denition of a universal) yet any entity that satises the NyayaVaises.ika denition
would also satisfy Aristotle's denition. This surprising similarity provides strong evidence
against relativistic theories that would claim that the problem of universals would only be
meaningful in a Western framework. The Nyaya-Vaises.ika philosophers (or at lest some
of them) defended a quite robust version of realism. This realistic theory may have been
more a product of Vaises.ika philosophers (who concentrated on ontology) than of the
Nyaya philosophers (who concentrated on logic). Most other Indian schools of philosophy,
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translation [Ack36]):
I call universal (o oo, to katholou) that which is by its
nature predicated (o, kategoretai) of a number of
things
Aristotle apparently used the term "predication" so that it did not apply
only to a relation between linguistic expressions of Greek or other natural
languages, their singular terms and predicates, or a relation between linguis-
tic predicates and things in the world, but also to a relation between entities
in the world none of whose terms is a linguistic expression.
Nominalistic philosophers of course have tried to interpret Aristotle so
that he would always mean with "predication" a linguistic relation (or a re-
lation between mental concepts or a relation between mental concepts and
entities). This is not a mere trivial terminological matter, as it might at rst
sight seem, but this interpretation of Aristotle's terminology already leads
to a nominalistic interpretation of Aristotle's whole philosophical doctrine.
However, the arguments of such nominalists often implied in their premises
the truth of nominalism as an ontological theory, since they argued that
Aristotle should be interpreted in this way because they thought that Aris-
totle's true view had to be reasonable and that this interpretation was the
only way to make what Aristotle said reasonable, i. e. to conrm to what
they considered was the truth. The question of whether "predication" can
stand for a non-linguistic relation is itself a part of the problem of universals,
and a fair formulation of the problem should not presuppose an answer to
it; realists hold that it can while most nominalists hold that it can not14
however, argued against this kind of realism (and of course those that were the most
popular of them among Indian intellectuals, such as Advaita Vedanta were opposed to
almost any kind of realism, e. g. realism concerning material bodies or even any kind of
multiplicity at all.).
14Some modern philosophers have dened the word "universal" in a way dierent from
the way Aristotle dened it. E. g. Rodriguez-Pereyra seems to presuppose in [RP02,
x1, page 1] that something is a universal only if it can be wholly located in dierent
places at the same time. He even calls this an Aristotelian characterization of a universal!
However, in another place, in [RP02, x12.3, page 203], he says more in accordance with the
traditional denition that "is a universal" can be dened as "is instantiated by something".
Thus he apparently contradicts himself. Probably he presupposes that the two denitions
are equivalent, so their dierence does not matter; however, it has been often argued that
they are not (for an argument see [Wol70, pages 231-233]). It may indeed be granted that
since more than a few philosophers have used the word "universal" in this way, the word
may by now have a sense in which it stands just for an entity which can be wholly located
in dierent places at the same time. However, it is important not to confuse this sense of
the word with its traditional sense, or one will commit the fallacy of equivocation.
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Frank Lewis is one of the modern interpreters of Aristotle who holds that
predication in Aristotle was at least in some cases wholly non-linguistic and
clearly explains this position; he says in [Lew91b, page 4]
Our dominant notion of predication today is exclusively linguis-
tic, so that both the subject and what is predicted of it are in-
variably linguistic items - a grammatical subject and predicate.
For Aristotle, by contrast, the subject is an item in the ontol-
ogy and not a linguistic item, and more often than not what is
predicated is not linguistic either; it is not a predicate, but a
predicable.
Lewis calls Aristotle's notion of predication metaphysical predication. How-
ever, there are also exactly opposite views. Lloyd P. Gerson says in [Ger,
page 4] that
Predication is without exception assumed by Aristotle to be an
extra-ontological category of activity.
This disagreement is, I think, the most fundamental disagreement that there
exists with regard to the interpretation of Aristotle's theory; it aects both
our interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics and our interpretation of his
logic and our understanding of the relation between the two. Clearly, either
Lewis or Gerson must be wrong, and this threatens to invalidate almost
everything that one of them says about Aristotle's theory.
In fact it is not sure that Aristotle was consistent or clear in this matter.
Jonathan Barnes says in [Bar07, page 120-121] the following:
Most of the numerous passage in which Aristotle discusses
or alludes to subjects and predicates oer no clear answer one
way or another to the question 'What sort of item is a predi-
cate?'. (you wouldn't expect the texts to do so.) Several texts
quite plainly indicate that Aristotle took objects, and not sig-
nicant expressions to be predicates and subjects. Several texts
quite plainly indicate that Aristotle took signicant expressions,
and not objects, to be subjects and predicates. That is to say,
Aristotle was muddled or inconsistent when he thought about
the status of predicates or rather (what comes in the end to the
same thing), Aristotle probably never thought very long about
the status of the things.
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Jonathan Barnes does not link his discussion of predication systematically
to the problem of universals (though he occasionally alludes to it), but since
as we have shown the notion of predication is crucial to the denition of
universals and the formulation of the problem of universals, what he says
implies that Aristotle was also muddled or inconsistent in his view of the
ontological status of universals.
However, even if Aristotle in some places took predicates to be expres-
sions and in other places took predicate to be objects, this does not show
conclusively that he was muddled or inconsistent. Aristotle may have used
the word "predicate" just as he used the word "being", in analogous senses,
so that the dierent ways in which he used the word would be instances of
core-dependent homonymy; indeed, that the notion of being according to
our modern view is in one sense predication makes this quite likely. Ob-
viously metaphysical predication can be dened with the aid of linguistic
predication and denotation and conversely linguistic predication can be de-
ned with the aid of metaphysical predication and denotation, so either can
be taken to be he focal meaning of the term "predication". In any case, even
if Aristotle did not consciously use the notion of predication in this way, it
seems most likely to me that he should have done this, i. e. that this way of
developing his theory makes best sense of all of the places where Aristotle
uses the notion of predication. However, if Aristotle's theory is understood
in this way, then in any case he would or should have taken the notion of
metaphysical predication to be intelligible (contrary to what Gerson thinks),
and this implies that the problem of universals makes sense in his framework
even if he did not formulate it explicitly himself.
In any case many realist philosophers in the Middle Ages, like William of
Champeaux15 and Walter Burley, took Aristotle's relation of predication to
15William of Champeaux may be one of those philosophers whom the history of phi-
losophy has treated most unfairly. He is remembered only as the opponent of the famous
nominalist Peter Abelard. William of Champeaux's view is mostly known only from the
attacks of his opponent, who naturally makes it sound silly. William of Champeaux's
realist theory was very similar to the kind of realist theories that are today presented by
Neo-Aristotelian philosophers like Loux or Lowe, far more similar than any of the theories
of more famous medieval thinkers like Aquinas, who as I have argued in an earlier foot-
note were not realists at all but held a position similar to a combination of trope theory
and concept nominalism. One would think that this makes it historically signicant and
would inspire people to study it closely. However, this is not the case. While some of his
writings have survived, they have not been edited much less translated into modern lan-
guages. Really, however, Abelard's arguments are not all that impressive, at least against
the realism of William, as they seem to be based on a deliberate misreading of William's
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be a non-linguistic relation (see for example [Spa96, page 144]). Therefore
the word "predication" acquired such meaning then, if it did not have such
a meaning before. If you remember Carnap's distinction between semantical
concepts and absolute concepts and his theory of their correspondence, then
instantiation is the absolute concept corresponding to the semantical concept
of predication.
Here, however, we must note a complication. Even if Aristotle is inter-
preted so that what is predicated in his theory is not always a linguistic
item (nor a mental concept either, as older nominalists i. e. conceptualists
would say), which seems a highly probable interpretation, this does not yet
by any means imply that he would have been a realist about universals.
What is predicated metaphysically could yet always be a trope instead of
a universal, in which case all the universals would be linguistic predicates
(and so themselves metaphysically tokens and particulars)16. Nevertheless,
if Aristotle were (in my view very implausibly) interpreted so that what
is predicated of something in his theory is always linguistic or mental, then
theory. William also defended a theory of individuation by accidents which is not implied
his realism. Realism makes it necessary to raise the problem of individuation, but can be
combined with other solutions to the problem than William presented. Even if Abelard's
arguments refuted Williams's theory of individuation, they would be ineective against
William's realism. Most of the modern Neo-Aristotelians like Loux would reject a theory
of accidental individuation such as William presented, but would accept a realism similar
to Williams's. However, other modern philosophers would accept a theory of individuation
similar to Williams's.
16It is just as controversial whether Aristotle thought there were tropes as whether he
thought there were universals independent of human minds. Individual accidents have
traditionally been ascribed to Aristotle on the basis of passages such as Categories 1a23-
28 and these are very much like what are today called tropes. This interpretation was
among others rst presented in modern history of philosophy by J. R. Jones in [Jon49].
However, it has been challenged by many, famously by G. E. L. Owen in [Owe65]. Owen
thought that Aristotle's ontology contained only universals, and what had been thought to
be individual accidents were just highly specic universals. Likewise there is controversy
about the interpretation of Aristotle's substantial forms; according to some interpretations
they are particulars and seem then very like tropes; however, other interpreters view them
as universals. There have been interpreters who think that Aristotle's ontology contained
both tropes and universals (e. g. Barry Smith who was inspired by this interpretation of
Aristotle to develop his own baroque ontology or Michael Loux in [Lou91]), those like Owen
who thought that it contained only universals, those that think it contains only tropes
(which seems to have been the standard interpretation in the later Middle Ages), and
those that think it contained neither. It can also be held that Aristotle at dierent stages
of his development held dierent theories; for instance, Michael Frede seems to suggest
in [Fre87, page 50] plausibly enough that Aristotle's ontology in Categories contained both
tropes and universals (kinds), but his later ontology in Metaphysics contained only tropes
besides concrete particulars. It is fair to say that not the slightest agreement with respect
to the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology exists.
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this would exclude a realistic interpretation of his theory of universals. Even
when we leave historical considerations behind, we must say that the accep-
tance of metaphysical predication is necessary but not sucient for realism
concerning universals.
Aristotle's notion of predication, when applied to a relation between
non-linguistic entities, seems to me to be essentially the same as the notion
expressed by the more modern words "instantiation" and "exemplication".
There are two dierences, however. One dierence is that Aristotle always
thought of a property being predicated of a single individual or linguistically
of the predication of a one-place predicate of one term; modern theories of
predication include the predication of a relation of many arguments (or their
sequence) or linguistically the predication of a many-place predicate of many
terms. While Aristotle's notion of predication is thus in one way narrower
than the modern notions, in another it is wider, as it includes identity and
the relation of property inclusion as a special case. In modern terms Aris-
totle's ontological predication is the disjunction of monadic instantiation,
inclusion and identity, since neither Aristotelian nor indeed later ancient or
medieval logic clearly distinguished these three relations; any entity would
be predicated of itself according to them and higher genera would be pred-
icated of lower genera. Later Lesniewski's ontology followed Aristotelian
logic in this respect. E. g. according to the Aristotelian theory in saying
that Socrates is Socrates the word "Socrates" is predicated of itself in the
linguistic sense of predication and the human being Socrates is predicated
of Socrates, i. e. of itself, in the non-linguistic, metaphysical sense of predi-
cation.
The philosophers like Frege and Russell who rst distinguished instan-
tiation and identity thought that the word "be" in natural languages was
lexically ambiguous. This thesis has often been criticized recently. Much
use has been made in this criticism of Charles C. Kahn's discussion of the
verb "be" in ancient Greek, as summarized in [Kah86]. This kind of argu-
mentation seems often to confuse the question of what the semantics of the
verb "be" (in either Greek or English) really is and the question of what the
ancient Greek philosophers thought it was. Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knu-
uttila argue in [KH86, page x] that many philosophers and classicists have
been reluctant to claim in so many words that the greatest Greek philoso-
phers did not operate with the Frege-Russell distinction, since this would
426
amount to accusing them of a logical howler. Hintikka and Knuuttila seem
to share this reluctance since they welcome the possibility that to acknowl-
edge that Plato or Aristotle lacked the distinction is not to accuse them of
any mistake. It shows in my view an unbecoming kind of authoritarianism
in philosophers and classicists that they would be reluctant to admit that
Plato or Aristotle might have made some logical mistakes. All scientists
who create a discipline (as Aristotle practically created logic) make errors
that are corrected in the later development of the discipline if the disci-
pline is fortunate enough to progress after them; admitting that Aristotle
made some serious mistakes does not take anything away from his incredible
achievement in creating systematic logic. Claiming that Aristotle commit-
ted no howlers is close to to the obscurantist claim that he perfected logic
(as Kant thought) and that there was no need for modern logic. I admit
of course that there are alternative logical treatments of the verb "be", and
that the question of which of them is correct is far from settled; Hintikka's
game-theoretical semantics might in the end provide evidence against the
Frege-Russell thesis, as he argues. However, this is a question of systematic,
synchronic semantics and historical studies such as Kahn's are not of any
great relevance to it. Most particularly, even if it can be shown that Aristo-
tle never distinguished between being as existence and being as predication
and being as identity (which is quite possible, for though there is some ap-
parent evidence against this, it is rather obscure) this does not even provide
any good evidence that the Greek verb  (einai) was not ambiguous
between such concepts, and naturally still less evidence that corresponding
expressions in modern languages such as the English word "be" or the Ger-
man word "sein" or the Finnish word "olla" would not be ambiguous in this
way. While I am therefore not impressed by the criticisms, I do not have
to assume that the word "be" is lexically ambiguous, since the meaning of
the word can be understood to be the disjunction of instantiation and iden-
tity. However, I do have to assume that there are two very dierent cases of
predication that it is useful to distinguish in logic and ontology even if not
in natural language.
Of course, I am now leaving open whether there is any such non-linguistic
relation corresponding to linguistic predication; if there is not it follows from
my denition that there are no universals, so I am not presupposing the
solution of any substantive ontological question here. I will try to prove
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that there is such a relation in a later subsection of this dissertation.
There is also another possibility that must be taken into account; there
might be many relations corresponding to linguistic predication. In this
case the concept of universal would be ambiguous. In fact there are many
relations associated with linguistic predication. However, at least one of
these relations is such that it does not give rise to any non-trivial concept
of a universal. When a predicative statement is true there exist an en-
tity and a universal predicated of it or instantiated by it, but according
to those philosophers who accept the truthmaker axiom, if the universal
is not a component of the entity there exists also a fact or a trope whose
existence requires that the universal is predicated of the entity. Therefore
a relation would also hold between the entity and the fact or trope which
implies the existence of the entity and the universal. Some philosophers,
especially trope theorists such as G. F. Stout call the relation between the
trope and the entity of which something is predicated in the sense I have
used the word predication. E.g. if a man is happy, then while we may
say that the universal happiness is predicated of him, we may also say that
the fact or trope, his being happy, is predicated of him. There is also a
third relation that is sometimes called predication, a relation between the
fact or trope and the universal whose existence the existence of the fact
also implies. Some philosophers would say that the universal happiness is
predicated of the fact or trope John being happy or John's happiness. It
is important to notice that these three kinds of ontological predication are
entirely dierent, even though they may be denable with the aid of each
other. While many philosophers use dierent expressions for the three kinds
of ontological relations associates with linguistic predication, there is un-
fortunately no standardized terminology. Nevertheless the distinction has
been made. E. g. when an entity is predicated of another in the rst sense
Brian Ellis says (see [Ell01, 1.3] that it is instantiated in it but when it
is predicated of another entity in the third sense Ellis says that it is in-
stantiated by it. Sometimes e. g. in Neo-Aristotelian ontologies such as
Jonathan E. Lowe's [Low06, page 18] ontological predication in the rst
sense is called instantiation and ontological predication in the second sense
(a relation between particulars which Lowe calls objects and tropes which
he calls modes) is called characterization and ontological predication in the
third sense is called exemplication. Other philosophers, however, use these
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expressions interchangeably or even in opposite senses (ontological termi-
nology is very unsettled and confused!). I will use them interchangeably in
this dissertation.
It is clear that the second ontological predication relation is not one such
that the same entity could by it be predicated of many subjects. John's being
happy cannot be predicated of any other man in the second sense. If Mike
is also happy, then the universal happiness is predicated in the rst sense of
Mike as well as of John, but the fact, John's being happy, is not predicated
of Mike in the second sense. Thus the second concept of predication does
not give rise to any non-trivial concept of a universal. If it were the only
non-linguistic relation associated with linguistic predication, then obviously
there would not be universals. However, that this relation does not give
rise to a concept of universal that could be satised does not of course
exclude the possibility that there might be also another relation associated
with linguistic predication, a relation between universals and entities that
are connected with them; in the next section of this dissertation I will try
to show that there is such a relation. In fact if there is such a relation
there are many such relations. It would not conduce to clarity to call all
of them by the same word, however, so I will as a matter of stipulation
call only predication in the rst sense, the relation that (if it exists at all,
which is yet to be proved) holds between happiness and John when John
is happy, and not between happiness and John being happy, nor between
John's happiness and John, instantiation.
There is one way in which the concept of instantiation used by realists
about universals can be distinguished from the trope-theoretical concept of
predication without assuming the truth of either trope theory or realism.
According to the realist a word such as "happy" denotes the universal hap-
piness in all sentences where it occurs, in all endophoric contexts. However,
the trope theorist cannot say that the word denotes any trope independently
of context, but only dependently on a context. The trope theorist has to say
that in the context of the sentence "John is happy." the word "happy" de-
notes John's happiness while in the context of the sentence "Mary is happy."
it denotes a dierent trope, Mary's happiness. Thus it seems that the con-
cept of instantiation can be claried by characterizing instantiation as the
relation that is an objective correlate of linguistic predication and is such
that the linguistic arguments and predicate denote the relata of this relation
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independently of context.
It might be thought that if they are to satisfy Aristotle's denition,
universals are those entities that are instantiated by many entities, and
many philosophers have drawn this conclusion. However, it is important to
see that this is not correct. Since as we have seen the Aristotelian conception
of non-linguistic predication is the disjunction of instantiation and identity,
even an entity that is instantiated by just one other entity (if there is any
such entity, such as individual essences are claimed to be by many modern
ontologists) is predicated of many entities in Aristotle's sense, because it
is predicated of two entities. It is not only predicated of the entity that
instantiates it but also of itself, for since as it is identical with itself it is
also predicated of itself in the Aristotelian sense of the word "predication"17.
Therefore once we distinguish instantiation/exemplication and identity, as
a competent modern philosopher is bound to do, it is natural and almost
17This can be conrmed by considering one of Aristotle's examples later in De Inter-
pretatione. Aristotle says (21a):
Of things predicated separately, some can be predicated in combination,
others cannot . . . Further, if Socrates is a man and is Socrates he will be a
man Socrates. . .
Aristotle is here giving examples of things predicated both separately and in combination,
and Socrates and man are one of his examples. Thus Aristotle says that man and Socrates
are predicated both separately and in combination of Socrates, i. e. man is predicated
of Socrates and Socrates is predicated of Socrates and the man Socrates is predicated of
Socrates. It follows from this that Socrates is predicated of Socrates. Surely Socrates is
not an exception, but Aristotle presupposes that every particular is predicated of itself.
This might, indeed, seem to contradict what Aristotle says in Categories (2a10), where
he says that primary substances (such as Socrates) are not said () of any subject,
as being said of and predication may seem to be the same. We cannot assume as me-
dieval philosophers did that Aristotle's doctrines in De Interpretatione and in Categories
are consistent with each other, so if there was a contradiction here this would not be
fatal to my interpretation of what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. However, there
in fact need be no contradiction here between the two works. Aristotle apparently has
two dierent concepts expressed by the two words, being predicated (o, kat-
egoretai) and being said of (,legetai), even though they are often translated by
the same word, "predicate" being often carelessly used also as an alternative translation
of (,legetai), though this is usually translated by "say". The concept of being
said of a subject used in Categories is not the same as the concept of predication used in
De Interpretatione (and also occasionally mentioned in Categories) but a subconcept of
it. In the terminology of modern logic, o stands for a reexive relation while
 (at lest in combination with the words  oo, kath hypokeimenou,
"of a subject") stands for an irreexive one, at least as Aristotle uses the words in the
two works mentioned or at the very least as he uses them in the places in them referred
to. Even if Aristotle does not always keep the two terms carefully apart, yet we can dis-
tinguish the two concepts. Aristotle's denition of universals, that has been the basis of
the historical discussion of universals, is in any case based on the wider concept Aristotle
uses in De Interpretatione which takes identity to be a subspecies of predication.
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inevitable to dene the concept of a universal so that it applies to anything
that is instantiated, whether by one entity or many entities, so long as the
instantiation relation or predicate appealed to in the denition itself is of
such a kind that it could connect an entity to many universals18.
Of course it is not necessary to use the word in this way; one could
also restrict the word "universal" so that it applied only to those entities
that are instantiated by many entities and coin some new word, such as
Wolterstor's [Wol70, page 65] "predicable entity", for what I call univer-
sals. However, the word "predicable entity" could be misleading as it could
be taken to refer to a linguistic expression. This could be remedied by
modifying it to "ontically predicable entity" or "metaphysically predicable
entity". However, as it is in any case inconveniently long as a name for a
concept I will need to use frequently, I choose rather to extend the meaning
of the word "universal". Obviously neither choice of words is right or wrong
but this is a matter of arbitrary decision; however, it is clearly both the
most convenient decision and the one that accords best with the historical
tradition once this is understood rightly.
Universals must not be dened as those entities instantiated by partic-
ulars, since this would arbitrarily exclude the possibility of universals in-
stantiated by other universals, higher-order universals, but as those entities
instantiated by some entities, not matter what entities.
Furthermore, if it is accidental for some properties which entities in-
stantiate it or if it is instantiated at all, then it is natural to extend the
denotation of the word "universal" even further to apply to any entity that
could be instantiated, since a term expressing an ontological category should
apply to any entity to which applies necessarily. This denition leaves of
course open whether there actually are uninstantiated universals19.
18This conclusion can be independently conrmed by what Porphyry in [Por92, page
68] says of species, which are of course by Aristotelians taken to be a kind of universals.
Porphyry says that it does not hold in general that a species is predicated of several
things diering in number, and gives as a counterexample the bird species phoenix, of
which it was thought there was at a single time only one specimen. This example may
seem funny to modern philosophers, that do not usually believe in phoenixes; however,
the logical point remains valid, even if the example must be taken as ctional and not
factual. However, this point is not as strong as the previous one; the species phoenix can
according to the myth be instantiated by dierent particulars at dierent times, while an
individual essence would always have to be instantiated by the same entity.
19Paul Vincent Spade translates [Spa96, page 145] the passage "I call universal that
which is naturally apt to be predicated of several things". This translation would seem
to suggest that even according to Aristotle's denition a universal need not be actually
431
Instantiation is often taken to be an asymmetrical relation, and it has
been thought that it must be asymmetrical for this denition of universals
to dene an interesting notion. I am not assuming that it is asymmetrical,
however. This would make self-instantiation impossible, but it seems intu-
itively to be possible; e. g. it seems natural to say that the property of being
a property is a property and is therefore instantiated by itself. Considera-
tions relating to paradoxes might of course make us to retract this intuition,
but there are solutions to the paradoxes that allow us to hold fast to it. In
any case, it is enough for the denition to dene an interesting concept that
the relation of instantiation be non-symmetrical. I. e. it need not hold by
denition for every entity that whatever it instantiated it is also instantiated
by (though of course for all we know at this point in our investigation this
might hold).
The concept of a particular has been usually understood as the opposite
to that of a universal. Particulars can thus be dened simply as entities that
are not universals, i. e. that could not be instantiated by any entity. Of
course this denition also leaves open whether there are any particulars; for
all we can say at this point in our investigation, it could be that all entities
were universals (or if there were no relation of instantiation it could even be
that there were no universals and no particulars either; both notions might
fail to apply to anything).
Porphyry himself later in Isagoge makes a distinction between predica-
tions which are said of only one thing and others said of many things. Por-
phyry tells that the rst group includes besides genera and species also dier-
ences, properties (here the word is used very dierently from the way mod-
ern philosophers commonly use it) and common accidents (o
o!&). All these are traditionally called predicables20.
predicated of anything, only be apt to be predicated of them, though of course Aristotle
did think all universals were actually predicated of something in the ontological sense of
predication.
20The notion of a predicable comes originally from Aristotle's Topics. Porphyry's list
of predicables, however, is dierent from Aristotle's original one, since it includes species
as predicables while Aristotle had denitions in their place. Many commentators treat
Porphyry's divergence from Aristotle as a major error, but I cannot see any reason for
this. Etymologically both the notion of category and the notion of predicable come from
the same source, as both notions signify things predicated in dierent ways of something,
so they are easy to confuse, especially as "accident" is both a name for a predicable and
a common name for all categories other than substances. Scholastic philosophers called
categories predicaments to distinguish them from predicables.
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Common accidents21 are predicated accidentally, while dierences and
properties apparently are predicated necessarily of whatever they are pred-
icates and dier from genera and species in some other way (apparently in
not carrying a principle of individuation, whatever this means). Obviously
all the same questions Porphyry asked of species and genera can also be
asked of these predicables, of dierences, properties and common accidents,
though Porphyry did not do so. We can ask whether common accidents are
real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, whether as real they are bodies
or incorporeals and whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their
reality in connection with them. It seems best to include all questions like
these in the problem of universals even in its traditional form, since surely
the problem of universals should be a problem that concerns all universals,
not just some subset of them.
Later discussion has in any case commonly concerned also entities pred-
icated accidentally of something else. Indeed, Armstrong would in [Arm97,
x3.9, page 44] only give the name of universals to such properties that when
they are truly predicated of a particular the resulting truth is a contin-
gent one; he calls other properties third-class properties. Thus the proper-
ties Armstrong would call universals are clearly properties predicated non-
essentially of something. They are thus like Porphyry's common accidents
(or more exactly Porphyry's separable common accidents), while Armstrong
would call Porphyry's species, genera, dierences and properties alike third-
class properties (if he allowed them to exist at all). Thus the entities the
problem of universals would concern according to Armstrong and those it
would concern according to mediaevals are mutually exclusive. We could
then argue, as Markku Keinanen does in [Kei05, page 102] that there are
two distinct problems of universals, which he calls the problem of kind uni-
versals and the problem of universals.
However, these two problems are nevertheless not wholly dissimilar; what
is common to both is that they both concern entities which are metaphys-
ically predicated of something22. Many modern philosophers would follow
21or at least some of them, with the possible exception of what Porphyry calls insepa-
rable accidents, if the distinction between separable and inseparable accidents applies to
common and not only to individual accidents, that is
22It is also interesting to note that extending the problem of universals to entities ac-
cidentally predicated of other entities than themselves is necessary if Plato's theory is to
be held to be an answer to the problem of universals (which seems natural, though as
I have pointed out in a earlier footnote it is not yet wholly certain that this should be
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Porphyry in calling essential properties universals, so it does not seem good
to follow Armstrong in restricting the discussion to non-essential i. e. acci-
dental properties. To encompass both the medieval and modern discussion
it seems to me best to formulate the problem of universals so that it concerns
whether anything predicated of anything (in a non-linguistic sense) exists
at all. If the answer to this question is negative then neither species and
genera in Porphyry's sense nor universals in Armstrong's sense exist, so this
is the most fundamental question; if the answer is positive then we can ask
further whether essentially predicated or accidentally predicated entities or
both exist.
As Spade shows in [Spa94, page x], universals were also dened as what
is common (oo, koinon) to many things, where the way in which they
are common was made precise at length in many ways. This use was intro-
duced into medieval philosophy in Roman Neoplatonist Boethius's second
commentary on Aristotle's De Interpetatione, where Boethius used an ear-
lier commentary on the same work by the Greek Neoplatonist Porphyry.
For example, Porphyry and Boethius specied that it did not mean being
common in the way a horse or a slave could be common to two brothers
or a public bath was common. A universal was according to Porphyry's
denition (see [Spa95, page 42] and [Por92, page 42]) common in the sense
in which that is called common which, as a whole, comes undividedly into
the use of many simultaneously. Because of this, S. Albert Kivinen has
in [Kiv99] called the theory that there are universals ontic communism - to
be clearly distinguished from political communism, of course!
Another useful way of using the concept of universals would of course
be to make this notion of common entities precise by dening universals as
those entities that are constituents of spatio-temporally separated entities.
Many, perhaps most modern ontologists that use the notion of universals
follow this course. While this notion is in my view quite coherent, it is
done). Plato did not yet make a distinction between accidental and essential predication
central to his philosophy; as both Loux and Lewis emphasize, this distinction or at least its
centrality was an innovation of Aristotle's (though later Platonists picked it up). Many
modern commentators have held that Plato saw all Ideas as predicated accidentally of
(participated accidentally in by) sensible particulars; probably the only essential predi-
cation in Plato's theory was the idea's self-predication (if Plato indeed held ideas to be
predicated of themselves, which has also been denied) or predication whose subject is a
soul. Many of Plato's examples of Ideas appear to be accidental properties or entities
possessing accidental properties.
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less general than the notion I have dened (as Wolterstor shows clearly
in [Wol70, chapter 10]). Therefore it is less suited to be a basic concept of
ontology. Besides if we used it we would exclude some theories that have
generally been viewed as answers to the problem of universals from being
relevant to the problem; we would have to say that transcendent realism
(such as has often been ascribed to Plato and the Neoplatonists) would not
be a form of realism concerning universals, as they take universals to be
entities outside spatio-temporal particulars, which seems unnatural23. It
seems to me better to use a snappy and well-known term like "universal"
rather than a clumsy expression like "ontically predicable entity" for a basic
ontological concept. While the way I use the term "universal" may be a
minority use, yet as we have seen it has at least as long a history behind it
as the more common use, and other important philosophers of today such
as Wolterstor, Loux and Bealer have also used the term similarly to the
way I use it, so I am not just arbitrarily deviating from established linguistic
conventions. There is no single right way to use a technical term; one must
just choose for reasons of convenience which of the current usages to adopt.
There is a third way in which universals are commonly dened, namely
be reference to their relations to space-time. This can be done in two very
dierent ways. Immanent realists often take universals to be entities that
could be simultaneously present in a single spatial location, while particulars
would be entities that could only be present in a single place at once. This
denition of universals may take its origin from the second medieval idea
of a common entity. Transcendent realists, however, often dene universals
as entities that are not located in space and time at all and particulars as
entities that are located in space and time, or as entities that are located
in space or in time. This distinction is often marked also by use of the
terms abstract entities and concrete entities (though the terms "abstract"
and "concrete" are also often used by trope theorists in a very dierent sense
to stand for dependent and independent entities).
23Gustav Bermann claimed that Husserl was a nominalist on the basis of this denition,
and such an ontologist as J. P. Moreland in [Mor89] has seriously discussed on the basis
of Bergmann's claim whether Husserl was a nominalist. This results from accepting this
narrow denition of universals. However, it seems clear to me that Husserl was a realist
about universals if anyone, whether or not he was a transcendent or immanent realist
(which is indeed a dicult question).
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In most cases the immanent realist variant of this denition leads to the
same results as the rst denition of universals. However, as many philoso-
phers such as both Wolterstor and Rosenkrantz notice, there appear to
be possible examples of entities which would be universals by this deni-
tion but not by the rst one. It has often been thought that there could
be disembodied spirits, which were nowhere. Such spirits would be neither
universals nor particulars by this denition. However, including spirits and
universals in one category would make that category rather heterogeneous.
Surely it is more natural to classify such spirits as particulars.
6.3.3 Dierent Kinds of Purported Universals
Abundant and Sparse Universals
Rodriguez-Pereyra also argues that the problem of universals is about the
properties which David Lewis in [Lew86, page 59] calls sparse or natural
properties, not about all abundant properties.
Lewis says:
Sometimes we conceive of properties as abundant, sometimes
as sparse. The abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as grue-
somely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you
please. They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve
things up every which way . . . The sparse properties are another
story. Sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they
carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specic,
the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscella-
neous, there are only just enough of them to characterize things
completely and without redundancy.
While Porphyry and the medievals of course did not possess Lewis's dis-
tinction between sparse and abundant properties, it is likely that Porphyry
and the medievals did intend the problem to concern only such properties as
Lewis would classify as sparse. However, it seems to me that abundant prop-
erties also satisfy Aristotle's denition of a universal (as it is most naturally
understood), as they too are predicated of many things24. We can surely ask
24Compare what Gail Fine says in [Fin80, page 210] of koina, i. e. common entities:
koina are what Aristotle elsewhere calls "universals" (katholou)
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many of the same questions about abundant properties as we can ask about
sparse ones; we can ask whether in the rst place there are any such and
if there are, are they independent of the human mind and language; Lewis
himself thought that the answer to both questions was positive but many
philosophers would disagree. Also most philosophers who identify them-
selves as nominalists would not be satised with the statement that there
are no sparse properties but there are abundant properties; they would think
that this claim is incompatible with their nominalism and amounts to a form
of realism, and thus understand realism as a weaker claim that Rodriguez-
Pereyra does25. Thirdly the question whether or not abundant properties
exist is in any case a genuine ontological question, which ought to be ad-
dressed in ontology, whether in connection with the problem of universals
or separately. However, many though not all of the arguments for or against
the existence of non-natural properties are very similar to, perhaps even of
the same form as, those for or against the existence of natural ones, so it
is useful to discuss them together and for this cause join them into a single
problem. Indeed, I will argue that there are reasons to think that arguments
and what he says in [Fin80, page 210]:
Aristotle believes that the OMA shows that there are koina. He also believes
that it allows that negations may be predicated. Hence he appears to be
committed to there being koina of negations.
Thus if Aristotle is committed to there being koina of negations, and if koina are the same
as universals, then Aristotle is committed to universals of negations, i. e. negative univer-
sals. As such negative universals would in modern philosophical terminology be abundant,
not sparse, properties, it follows that Aristotle should in the interest of consistency call
such non-sparse properties universals, though he might be unwilling to do so. It must
be noted that though Fine points out this puzzle in Aristotle's view, she would probably
not herself be willing to accept the conclusion that there are negative universals, as she
follows Armstrong in favouring a sparse realism. However, she does not point out any way
to avoid the conclusion, and therefore she unwillingly provides evidence for promiscuous
realism.
25If the question regarding the existence of abundant properties would not be a solution
to the problem of universals, and the assumption that there are abundant properties and
they are independent of the human mind and language would not amount to a form of
realism, we could introduce a new form of nominalism alongside the classical ones distin-
guished by Armstrong; abundant property nominalism! This form of nominalism would
reduce apparent talk about sparse properties (which would be universals) into talk about
abudant properties (which would not be universals) and so get rid of apparent universals.
Indeed, if I came to believe that it was correct to use terminology in this way, then I would
consider abundant property nominalism a highly plausible form of nominalism, and would
likely become an adherent of this theory and renounce my allegiance to realism. However,
if the idea of abundant property nominalism sounds funny or even absurd to you, this is
surely a reason to consider the theory that there are abundant properties as a form of
realism concerning universals.
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for the existence of sparse properties must use a premise stating that there
are abundant properties and so go through abundant properties. Fourthly
there are some serious (even if not obviously insuperable) problems with the
notion of a sparse property.
Lewis suggests many dierent criteria in the above quotation. It is prob-
lematic how they are supposed to be related. They can surely not be as-
sumed to be equivalent unless some very strong assumptions are taken for
granted. Nor is it even obvious that putting all of them together yields a
coherent concept of a property.
Also some of the criteria are slightly obscure. The expression "carve
at the joints" is obviously metaphorical so it is not very helpful. Besides,
it raises a question a radical promiscuous realist may well pose (in equally
metaphorical terms) - what if there are no joints in nature? In that case an
objective division of properties into sparse and abundant would be impossi-
ble.
The more literal criteria also pull in dierent directions. Especially, I
see no reason why the properties sharing of which makes for qualitative
similarity would have to be highly specic and such that there are just
enough of them to characterize things completely and without redundancy.
It seems to me clear that if two properties make for qualitative similarity and
are compatible then their conjunction also makes for qualitative similarity;
however, this already means introducing redundancy, for whatever can be
characterized with the aid of the conjunction of the two properties can also
be characterized with the aid of the two properties themselves.
More worryingly the criterion that the sparse properties are maximally
specic is unclear and ts badly with the rest of Lewis's non-metaphorical
criteria. It is not clear how specic sparse properties would have to be; if it
is taken literally that they must be maximally specic, then every individual
has just one sparse property, the conjunction of all its intrinsic and quali-
tative properties. These kinds of conjunctive properties are sparse indeed,
but this is surely not what Lewis intended. They are not likely to satisfy
the criterion that there are just enough of them to characterize things com-
pletely and without redundancy. It must also be noted that this conception
of properties would surely be no more natural than the conception of abun-
dant properties. We surely do not ever quantify over that kind of properties
in everyday speech! Rather, it seems Lewis merely means that no sparse
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property is a subproperty of another sparse property. However, if maxi-
mal specicity is understood in this way, then many dierent concepts of
properties that require the properties that satisfy them to be intrinsic and
qualitative may satisfy the criterion.
Lewis probably does not intend to give a reductive denition of sparsity.
Rather, the criteria are only intended to give a guide to readers' intuitions,
helping them to pick out a primitive, intuitively most obvious concept of a
sparse property. However, it is by no means obvious that there is only a
single intuitively most natural concept of properties satisfying the criteria.
We must take into account the possibility that philosophers who say they
are discussing sparse properties vacillate between dierent non-equivalent
conceptions of properties without realizing it. Looking at how other philoso-
phers than Lewis characterize sparse properties will make this possibility a
near certainty.
In my view the best reason for supposing that there are important
sparse kinds of properties is found in Goodman's new riddle of induction
(see [Goo54]). Goodman saw that predicates had to be divided into those
that are projectible and those that are not. A predicate "P" is projectible
(with respect to a predicate "Q") if from the fact that it has been observed
to be applicable to all individuals that are Q we have observed we can induc-
tively infer that it is applicable to all individuals that are Q. Goodman gave
as a famous example of a predicate that is not projectible "grue", dening
this so that it applies to all things examined before t just in case they are
green but to other things just in case they are blue (here t is some arbitrarily
chosen time). Though as a nominalist Goodman himself did not do so, many
philosophers have since generalised the distinction into a distinction between
properties besides predicates, a distinction between those properties that are
projectible and those that are not. A property P is projectible (with respect
to a property Q) if from the fact that all individuals of kind Q have been
observed to be of kind P we can inductively infer that all individuals of kind
Q are also (probably) of kind P.
Carnap tried to solve Goodman's riddle in [Car71, pages 72-76] by sup-
posing that primitive projectible attributes (i. e. as Carnap uses the word
"attribute" properties and relations) are qualitative attributes. In Carnap's
terminology they must be descriptional (as contrasted with locational); Car-
nap himself used the word "qualitative" in a narrower sense than is usual in
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the present literature so that it stood only for properties that were neither
spatial nor temporal (e. g. shapes and durations would not be qualitative
in Carnap's sense, though they would often be called qualitative). Qualita-
tive properties are usually understood as properties that make no reference
to any specic particular26. Carnap denes his locational attributes so that
they serve to specify the absolute, not only the relative, location of an object
or event in space and time, and that they serve to identify an object or event.
A primitive attribute is descriptional i it is not locational. A possible ob-
scurity in Carnap's theory is what it means that an attribute is primitive
and what reason Carnap has to think there are primitive attributes. In
any case according to Carnap primitive attributes must be chosen so that
they can be grouped in families. A non-primitive attribute is presumably
projectible if it can be dened solely in terms of descriptional attributes.
The two characterizations coincide if we have a relational theory of space
and time; if we have a substantivalist theory of space and time Carnap's
characterization is more general.
It seems to me that Carnap was clearly right in claiming that all pro-
jectible properties are qualitative. Obviously grueness is not qualitative; it
is formed from the primitive attribute of being examined before t which is
locational in Carnap's sense. However, some philosophers have presented
examples that seem to show that the converse need not hold, that is, that
some qualitative properties need not be projectible. I will leave open the
question of whether this is so or not.
It must be noted that not all projectible properties need full Lewis's
criteria for sparse properties, since at least some relational properties seem to
be projectible, and thus all projectible properties need not be intrinsic. For
instance, if all mouses have been observed to be smaller than elephants, we
can inductively infer that all mouses are smaller than elephants. Therefore
being smaller than an elephant seems to be a projectible property. Beings
smaller than an elephant, however, is apparently a relational, not an intrinsic
property, though it is a qualitative/descriptional relational property, since it
involves reference only to elephants as a kind, not to any specic elephant.
However, though the distinction between projectible properties and other
26Both concepts of qualitative properties are of course narrower than the sense of the
word "qualitative" in which qualitative properties are contrasted with structural ones.
Neither qualitative properties in Carnap's sense nor locational properties are structural,
i.e. invariant under all isomorphisms
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properties cannot be conventional, it is not clear that it has ontological
signicance. The distinction is obviously primarily an epistemological dis-
tinction, as it is formulated in epistemic terms; a projectible property is
distinguished from other properties by the way in which it can be used in
inductive inference. While an ontologically important distinction might of
course underlie and explain this epistemological distinction, no one has so
far as I can see given any good reasons that this would be so. It may well
be so that properties are not projectible or not-projectible in themselves,
but only relative to the cognitive faculties of a person. We cannot decide
arbitrarily which properties to project, as one choice leads to justied and
another to unjustied beliefs, but the reason for this may be as much in our
own nature as in the nature of properties themselves. It may be that dier-
ent properties would be projectible to dierent kinds of intelligent creatures.
It might be for instance that a property is projectible only if its instantia-
tion can be directly observed in some cases. We can perceive immediately
that something is green without perceiving it to be grue, and perceive im-
mediately that something is blue without perceiving it to be grue but we
certainly cannot immediately perceive it to be grue without perceiving it
to be green or perceiving it to be blue. This might explain the epistemic
asymmetry between greenness and grueness. If this is the right explanation
then if dierent kinds of creatures can perceive dierent properties imme-
diately then dierent properties would be projectible for them. In this case
the distinction between projectible properties and other properties would
not have ontological signicance.
Another criterion for distinguishing sparse properties is that sparse prop-
erties are those that are mentioned in laws of nature, or are denoted (or are
some kind of semantic value of) basic terms of basic scientic theories. Let
us call this kind of properties nomological properties. It is usually supposed
that projectible properties are the the same as those that occur in laws of
nature. However, I do not see any good reasons for accepting this supposi-
tion, and in fact there are reasons for being very suspicious of it. We can
surely make low-level inductive generalizations that involve properties that
need not be mentioned in laws of nature. All general conclusions arrived
at inductively need not be laws of nature, but there can also be accidental
generalizations whose truth depends on the initial conditions of the universe
and not only on laws.
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Indeed, I cannot see why occurring in a natural law would be a criterion
that would pick out any very interesting conception of property. There is a
reason to be very suspicious of the whole notion of a nomological property.
It is generally accepted that the same scientic theory can have dierent
equivalent formulations and that the same natural law can be expressed
in many dierent but equivalent ways. Because of this it is usually held
in the philosophy of science that scientic theories (all scientic theories,
and thus also basic ones) are deductively closed in the sense that all logical
consequences of the statement contained in a theory are also contained in
the theory. There are indeed reasons to be suspicious of full deductive
closure (under standard logic) but it is scarcely dubitable that some kind
of deductive closure, even if limited, is essential to a scientic theory. Thus
dierent systems of axioms can dene the very same theory. It seems to me
that if this is so then since basic concepts or terms are analogous to axioms,
scientic theories would also have to be denitionally closed; that is, every
concept denable in terms of those occurring in a formulation of a theory
would also occur in that theory. Two formulations of a theory with dierent
basic concepts or basic terms would dene the very same theory. However,
if this so then occurring in a basic scientic theory cannot be a criterion that
could distinguish sparse properties from abundant ones in any way similar
to the way ontologists usually distinguish them.
If scientic theories are denitionally closed then the disjunction of two
nomological properties is also a nomological property; thus disjunctive prop-
erties would be sparse, though nearly every philosopher who draws the dis-
tinction thinks them to be abundant, not sparse. Likewise the conjunction
of two nomological properties would also be a nomological property and the
negation of a nomological property would also be a nomological property.
Likewise the property of being self-identical can be dened with the aid of
identity, and surely every non-trivial theory must contain the concept of
identity, and thus if theories are denitionally closed the property of be-
ing self-identical must be mentioned in every theory. However, self-identity
would be held by every philosopher who uses the term to be an abundant
and not a sparse property. On the other hand if one rejects the denitional
closure of theories then it becomes a problem how dierent formulations of
the same theory are to be identied. If we reject denitional closure we
should reject also deductive closure. This would require a completely new
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theory of individuation for scientic theories and in essence a quite new phi-
losophy of science. It may not be impossible to construct such a theory, but
I think we should be sceptical until someone succeeds in doing so.
Thus nomological properties are not very good candidates for sparse
properties. Projectible properties are better ones, since they at least cannot
be denitionally closed; however, they may be subjective in a way that
nomological properties are not and this may rob them of their ontological
signicance.
Armstrong himself makes distinctions which may be analogous to that
between abundant and sparse properties in his later work when he distin-
guishes in [Arm97, page 44] between rst class, second class and third class
properties and relations. According to him second class properties are dis-
tinguished from third class properties by the fact that when truly predicated
of a particular, the resultant truth is a contingent one.
However, Armstrong does not make wholly clear what distinguishes the
rst class properties which he calls universals from the second class ones27.
Armstrong says that second-class properties require second-class states of
aairs and that second-class states of aairs supervene on rst-class states
of aairs, which have rst-class properties as their constituents. Armstrong
also argues that the second class and third class properties and relations
are no addition of being to the rst class properties; nevertheless they ex-
ist and must be formally distinguished from the rst class properties and
relations. Apparently Armstrong then thinks that rst-class properties are
those properties that are constituents of fundamental states of aairs where
the sense of fundamentalness in question is one that can be dened with
the aid of the concept of supervenience. This would imply that rst-class
states of aairs would not supervene on anything that does not supervene
on them but second-class states of aairs do; Armstrong does not explicitly
say this, but I do not see how Armstrong's characterization of rst-class
states of aairs could pick out a unique class of states of aairs nor thus
how rst-class properties could pick out a unique class of properties unless
we assume that this is what he means.
However, in this case if fundamentalism is false, then all states of aairs
27Schaer has already pointed out in [Sch04, page 96] that there is a tension in Arm-
strong's conception of universals i. e. rst-class properties and relations as he sometimes
seems to think of them as only fundamental properties and sometimes seems to use a
broader conception.
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may be second class states of aairs and hence all properties may be second
class properties! It may be that for every state of aairs there is a state of
aairs on which it supervenes but which does not supervene on it. Armstrong
does not take this possibility into account; he considers the possibility that
every property might supervene on other properties, but not the possibility
that this might also happen for states of aairs.
Armstrong restricts the term "universals" to his rst class properties. It
is of course a matter of stipulation how such technical terms as "universals"
are to be understood; however, this terminological choice is by no means the
only natural one, and can even be viewed as misleading. We saw that uni-
versals are historically often understood as those entities that are predicated
of many entities and that it is natural (once we distinguish instantiation and
identity, as a modern philosopher is bound to do) to extend the meaning of
the word so that it applies to anything that could be instantiated, whether
by one entity or many entities. Many of the abundant properties that are not
also sparse properties, the second and third class properties, are of course
instantiated as well as sparse ones, and many of the abundant properties are
instantiated by many entities as well. For instance, since many individuals
are identical with themselves, many individuals instantiate the property of
being self-identical. As Spade shows, universals were also dened as what
is common to many things, where the way in which they are common was
made precise at length in ways I cannot here go into. This does not lead us
as readily to think of universals as abundant, but I do not think even this
this denition of universals is incompatible with regarding them as abun-
dant properties and relations. It is of course true that in the Greek and
scholastic discussion of universals the attention was nearly always focused
on universals that were in some very strong though never clearly specied
sense natural, though this did not follow from the denitions Aristotle and
many of the scholastics gave, so the terminological choice is not determined
uniquely even on purely historical grounds.
However, I will in this dissertation stipulate that I use the word in the
broader sense as a common name for abundant properties and abundant
relations. This broader sense seems more useful to me, as it is likely that
there are no rst-class properties and hence no universals in Armstrong's
sense, but in that case there may still be universals in the sense I use the
word. In that likely case the word "universal" as used by Armstrong will
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not denote anything and will be thus rather useless, but as used by me it
will even in that case denote something.
This distinction between abundant and sparse properties seems very use-
ful to me, at least as a preliminary distinction, though adopting it does of
course not imply that we should adopt Lewis's highly controversial theory
of what abundant properties are (nor of course his theory of what sparse
properties are either). Lewis thinks that abundant and sparse properties
are exclusive categories, though some abundant properties, natural ones, can
correspond to sparse ones. It seems simpler to me to take sparse properties
to be a subcategory of abundant ones and identify sparse properties with
natural properties. Lewis thinks that abundant properties and relations
must be analysed as sets of possible individuals, while he is willing to accept
(in [Lew86, page 63]) sparse properties and relations as primitives. Indeed, I
suspect Lewis has to take sparse relations to be primitive. Lewis uses mereo-
logical and spatio-temporal relations to dene worlds. Lewis, however, tries
to reduce abundant relations to classes of their possible instances. However,
trying to apply this method to mereological and spatio-temporal relations
would apparently be circular. Therefore Lewis must take at least these re-
lations as primitive. Lewis also has to take sets as a primitive in order for
his reduction of abundant universals to get o the ground.
Lewis, however, pejoratively calls theories that take abundant properties
as primitive and try to analyse modalities with their aid "magical ersatzism".
However, Lewis provides no reason why one conception of properties could
be taken as a primitive while the second would have to be analysed! Lewis
writes [Lew86, page 189]:
'Property', and the rest, are names associated in the rst
instance with roles in our thought. It is a rm commitment of
common sense that there are some entities or other that play the
roles and deserve the names, but our practical mastery of uses
of the names does not prove that we have much notion what
manner of entities those are.
Cannot the same be said of sets and spatio-temporal and mereological re-
lations? Are not they too associated in the rst instance with roles in our
thought? Why would we have any more notion of what they are than we
have of what properties are? Cannot a theorist that takes properties as prim-
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itive complain that Lewis does not explain what sets and spatio-temporal
and mereological relations are? Indeed, van Inwagen has already posed just
this objection to Lewis's argument. Are not spatio-temporal relations and
mereological relations and sets taken as primitive just as much (and just
as little) magical as abundant properties taken as primitives? Indeed, sets
seem to be in a worse position than properties in one respect; it is not a rm
commitment of common sense that there are any entities that play the role
of sets and deserve the names. That there are sets may be a commitment of
highly developed mathematics and science but not of common sense. That
science is committed to them is of course a reason to believe in them, but ar-
guably not as strong as the reason we have in believing in properties. To be
sure, the properties that common sense is committed to are primarily those
close to sparse properties; however, they are surely not all quite sparse in
Lewis's sense; e. g. people have always quantied over such properties as
families and professions, and these are surely not intrinsic, as sparse proper-
ties would have to be, but clearly relational; e. g. two people belong to the
same family if they have the same ancestor or one of them is an ancestor
(or mother or father) of the other.
Later in [Lew91a] Lewis admitted that sets are a problem for him. He
proposed that the subset relation could be understood as the mereological
part-whole relation; however, this leaves the relation between a singleton
set and its sole member unanalysed, and Lewis admits that he comes to an
impasse here. He nds the notion of a singleton profoundly mysterious, yet
cannot bring himself to abandon standard set theory because of this. He toys
with the idea of eliminating sets. He draws on results by Burgess and Hazen
according to which (see [Lew91a, pages viii, 121] we can get get rid of sets
supposing that there are innitely many atoms and not too much atomless
gunk. These are of course quite unjustied suppositions. In the end Lewis
himself did not nd this satisfactory either. Yet he never considered taking
the notions of instantiation and abundant properties as primitive as a way
out.
It may be argued that it is surely better to have less than more unanal-
ysed entities. This is true. However, we need not have more unanalysed
entities even if we hold abundant properties to be primitive entities, for it
can also be suggested that we can reduce sets to abundant properties.
In any case for all these reasons it seems to me that it is useful to
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formulate the problem of universals more generally so that it concerns both
kinds of properties28.
Are Sets and Classes Universals?
It is controversial whether the problem of universals also concerns sets and
classes. The terms "realism" and "nominalism" are used in very dierent
and sometimes even quite opposite senses. A striking example of the pre-
vailing terminological chaos can be seen in comparing the theories and ter-
minology of Nelson Goodman and Armstrong. Goodman in his early theory
in the Structure of Appearance dened the terms so that apparently accord-
ing to him a theory is nominalistic if according to it there are no classes,
even if it allows that there are properties. Goodman's own theory which he
called nominalistic is like this, since according to it [Goo51, page 156] though
there were no classes there were qualia, properties of experiences (only ex-
periences, since Goodman was a phenomenalist though a tentative one) like
colors and sounds (though shapes and sizes were not qualia), that were ac-
tually components of several particulars, of several experiences. Goodman
explicitly says [Goo51, page 158] that
the whole quale appears in every concretum in which it appears
at all
Goodman does say that a nominalistic theory does not allow classes or other
non-individuals, but it is not clear what entities other than classes would
28There is a further reason for the more general formulation. Rodriguez-Pereyra just
states in [RP02, x1.1, page 20] that the resemblance which accompanies sparse properties
is ontological and objective. However, other philosophers may deny this objectivity - as
Rodriguez-Pereyra admits that Goodman denies it - and if so may question whether the
distinction between sparse and abundant properties is at all objective. Such a philosopher
would then have to think that the problem of universals as Rodriguez-Pereyra formu-
lates it is not a legitimate problem, but many ontologists would surely think that such a
philosopher would oer a solution to the problem of universals rather than rejecting it.
Surely Goodman is usually considered to oer a solution - namely a nominalistic one - to
the problem rather than rejecting it as illegitimate. A philosopher may even reject the
objectivity of this distinction without rejecting the objectivity of the distinction between
particulars and properties of both kinds. Such a view would be a form of promiscuous
realism concerning universals, and I myself am attracted to it. It is not good for the for-
mulation of a philosophical problem to have such strong and controversial presuppositions
as the presupposition that the distinction between sparse and abundant properties would
be objective. If a philosopher thinks that the distinction is objective he must try to argue
for this claim.
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be non-individuals according to Goodman. Goodman distinguishes indi-
viduals and particulars, but what this distinction amounts to is not clear
to me, nor has it been clear to most other philosophers, other than that
classes are not individuals and properties are not particulars according to
him29. Of course later Goodman has become suspicious even of properties
while he drifted from phenomenalism to a totally subjectivist theory where
men are supposed to be world-makers. For the early Goodman (see [Goo51,
page 107]) realism was not the opposite of nominalism but of particularism,
but Goodman's particularism is what Armstrong would call nominalism.
Thus Goodman's nominalistic theory was also what Armstrong would call
realistic, while Armstrong's realistic theory of properties and relations is
compatible with what Goodman called nominalism (though Goodman could
not have accepted Armstrong's states of aairs for the same reason because
of which he thought could not accept classes, namely that their existence is
incompatible with extensional mereology.). On the other hand e. g. the the-
ory the late Quine sometimes supported in his more realistic moods, which
allows classes but not intensional entities like properties, would according to
Armstrong be nominalistic but not according to Goodman, who would call
it Platonistic. As I use the term Quine's theory, Goodman's early theory
and Armstrong's theory are all realistic in the minimal sense, though all are
in my view too close to nominalism as all allow too few dierent kinds of
universals to really work.
If we look at how the founders of mathematical logic originally infor-
mally explained30 the meaning of the membership sign, we see that they
29The word "individual" is very ambiguous. Dierent philosophers use it very dierently.
The great diculty with this word is that many of the senses given to it dene a coherent
and interesting concept only given some substantive and controversial assumptions. One
of the most common senses is that given in Principia Mathematica [WR63, page xix],
according to which
An "individual" is anything that can be the subject of an atomic proposition.
Unfortunately, this notion denes an interesting concept only in a type-theoretical frame-
work like that of Principia Mathematica. In a type-free higher-order logic anything, any
entity, can be the subject of an atomic proposition, so this notion is completely trivial in
a theory based on such a logic. The sense of "individual" that seems most useful to me is
that in which it is synonymous with "particular" in the most common and useful sense of
that word and is contrasted with the notion of a universal. A particular or individual in
this sense is anything that can only occur in the subject position of an atomic proposition.
30It is well known that the axioms of set theory cannot by themselves determine the
meaning of set-theoretic expressions. Opponents of set-theoretic realism have often (e. g
in [Fie98]) used this fact to argue that set-theory does not have a determinate meaning.
However, we can instead argue from this fact that such informal explanations as the ones
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connected it with predication. Whitehead and Russell explicated the mem-
bership predicate 2 in Principia Mathematica [WR63, page 25] as follows:
"x 2 " may be read as "x is an ". Thus "x 2 man" will mean
"x is a man" and so on.
In this they were following Giuseppe Peano, who said31 in [Pea89, page x]:
Signum 2 signicat est. Ita a 2 b legitur a est quoddam b. . .
Both Peano and Russell and Whitehead then thought32 that set-theoretic
membership was a kind of predication, and it follows from this that sets
(with the possible exception of the empty set, which can probably anyway
be treated as ctional) according to them satisfy Aristole's denition of
universals.
There is an additional reason to take membership to be predication,
which does not depend only on informal explanations. It is commonly as-
sumed in extensional semantics (as we have seen in discussing Tarski's the-
ory) that an atomic sentence is true if the sequence of the interpretations
of its terms belongs to the set that is the extension of its predicate (i. e.
in symbols using the kind of notation I have been using in other parts of
this work, P (t) is true i ktkg 2 kPkg, where ktkg is the interpretation of
the term t relative to the assignment g and kPkg is the interpretation of
the predicate P relative to g). However, making this assumption amounts
to treating set-theoretical membership as metaphysical predication, if set-
I cite below play an essential role in determining the meaning of such expressions, making
the meaning of set-theoretic expressions at least more determinate than the axioms alone
could do, whether or not it can become fully determinate. I have argued that we can
see that some observable properties are predicated of some observable particulars, so we
understand what predication is, and telling that membership is predication helps us to
understand a bit better what it is and so what sets are.
31This is translated in [vH77, page 89] as follows:
The sign 2 means is. Thus a 2 b is read a is a b . . .
32It must be admitted that all founders of mathematical logic and set theory did not
explain membership in this way; e. g. Cantor, Dedekind and Zermelo did not do so.
This does weaken the force of my argument, but not remove it entirely. I also prompts
concerns whether they were operating with the same notion of class at all as Peano, Russell
and Whitehead. However, it would seem rather implausible that their concept of classes
was a dierent one. At least, it cannot be said that Whitehead and Russell would have
intentionally distorted the concept of membership because of their logicism, well as their
explanation ts with logicism, since they were just following Peano in their explanation
of what membership was, and Peano was not a logicist.
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theoretical membership is taken as a non-linguistic notion, as a realist con-
cerning sets would do. If this practice of semanticists is taken at face value,
then we must take the membership relation as metaphysical predication and
classes therefore count as universals in the traditional Aristotelian sense.
These appear to me to be good reasons to take classes to be universals.
Therefore an ontological view which is realistic about classes also counts as
realism concerning universals aka universalism. Therefore the ontological
view Armstrong (in [Arm78, pages 28-43]) and others call class nominalism
is in my view better described as a form of realism, set realism or class real-
ism33. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think it is only a very inadequate
form of realism. The kind of universals to which common sense seems to
commit us, such as properties and relations in intension, do not satisfy any
axiom of extensionality as classes do, so common sense seems to be com-
mitted to other universals than classes, or at least classes composed only of
actual entities34.
6.4 The Problem of Universals systematically con-
sidered
We have so far seen only that understanding the problem of universals as a
request for an explanation does not lead to a good description of how the
problem has historically been treated. Showing that the modern view of the
problem is not historically correct does not, however, decide whether it is
correct as a normative prescription. It would of course be possible for those
who think that the problem of universals is a problem about explanation to
give up the claim that they are dealing with a centuries old problem and
confess frankly that they use the words "problem of universals" to denote a
33Armstrong himself considered whether the theory he called class nominalism would
rather be a realistic theory, as it was an objectivistic theory. However, the reason I have
for calling it a form of realism is not just that it is objectivistic, but that at least one
common concept of classes satises the original Aristotelian denition of a universal.
34For instance, a shirt can change its colour even though other shirts remain the same
colour, but if a shirt belongs to a set of shirts it continues to belong to it so long as
it continues to exist and all the other shirts that are members of the set continue to
exist. It might be possible to deal with such an example with the aid of sets alone if one
subscribes to a B-theory of time, but such a dodge is not possible in the case of modal and
counterfactual statements. A shirt that does not change its colour could change it and
continue to exist even though other shirts did not change their colour, but a shirt could
not fail to belong to the set of actual entities it belongs to if the other shirts continue to
exist
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problem that Armstrong discovered a little less than thirty years ago. We
must now ask if this would be a wise choice to make.
Of course, if there were something wrong with the problem as originally
formulated - for instance if it was based on a false or questionable presuppo-
sition like the famous question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" - then
it would be not only possible but necessary to replace it with a dierent,
genuine problem. However, those philosophers who formulate the problem
as a problem of explaining something do not typically attempt to show that
there is anything wrong with the original problem, and indeed their theories
typically imply an answer to the original problem. In fact Porphyry did a
surprisingly good job in formulating the problem so that he minimized the
presuppositions he made35.
However, this does not yet settle the normative question. Even if the
traditional problem of Porphyry is a genuine problem, it could still be that
the modern problem is in some way a better subject for investigation. I
must now ask if this is so or not.
I will now argue that understanding the problem of universals as a re-
quest for an explanation does not lead to any good prescription of how the
problem should be treated either. I will do this in two stages. I will rst
rebut arguments given by Rodriguez-Pereyra and Sowyer that purport to
show that the problem must be an abductive one. I will then show that the
problem formulated by Armstrong is narrower than the traditional problem,
and leaves out vitally important questions that must be addressed in an ad-
equate treatment of the philosophical questions relating to universals. After
this I will go further and suggest that there are reasons to think that the
problem introduced by Armstrong may actually be a pseudo-problem, while
there are no such reasons to think that Porphyry's original problem would
35There may be some unjustied presuppositions in Porphyry's formulation, and if so
we must get rid of them. Porphyry seem to assume that either all universals are corporeal
or none are, and similarly that either all of them exist apart from sense objects or all of
them exist in sense objects. It might of course be that some universals were corporeal and
some not, and that some existed apart from sense objects while others did not. Similarly
Porphyry supposes that if universals exist in sense objects then they are dependent on
them. This may also, depending on how the words "in" (""), and "dependent" are
understood, be an unjustied presupposition. If the word "in" is taken to indicate con-
stituency, then Porphyry presupposes that if universals are constituents of particulars,
they must also be dependent on them. There is no reason to believe this, since many
constituents of complex entities are not dependent on the wholes whose constituents they
are.
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be a pseudo-problem. These reasons may not be conclusive, but even if
Armstrong's problem were a genuine problem, the rst part of my argument
suces to show that it is not tted to replace the traditional problem.
No doubt many philosophical problems indeed have the form Nozick indi-
cates. However, Nozick does not claim that all philosophical problems would
have to be of this form, and we have seen that the problem of universals as it
has been traditionally understood is not of this form. If some philosophers
think that there are certain entities and other philosophers think there are
no such entities36, this also already creates a philosophical problem: which
of these two groups of philosophers are right? Are there such entities? This
ontological question is of course in practice inseparably connected to the
epistemological question: are there any good reasons to think there are such
entities? Of course if it turns out that there really are no good reasons
to think there are entities of those kinds, then there arises a new problem:
why did it falsely seem to some philosophers as if there were such entities?
Likewise if it turns out that there are those entities, then we must try to
answer how can it be that most philosophers do not see it, especially if the
evidence for their existences is rather obvious, as many realists would claim
it is. However, before embarking on investigating this kind of problem it
must be shown that there indeed is no good reason to think that there are
those entities, else one will be begging the most important questions of all!
Also, neither of these is likely to be a very serious problem; history shows
us that human beings are incredibly adept at missing the obvious, as well
as at seeing things that are not there!
Chris Swoyer suggests in [Swo96, page 248] that many philosophers who
view their ontological arguments as demonstrative do so because they are
in the grip of the demonstrative ideal, according to which
philosophy should proceed from utterly secure premises, by de-
ductively valid steps, to utterly secure conclusions.
36There are of course innumerable examples of such problems; indeed, there are no
entities that all philosophers would agree do exist. Phenomenalists think that there are no
physical objects but only sensations or sense-data, while physicalists think there are only
physical objects but no sensations or sense-data and dualists think there are both physical
objects and sensations; more modern anti-realists think there are no unobservable objects
like electrons while scientic realists think there are unobservable objects like electrons
and extreme scientic realists think that there are only such objects; endurantists think
there are three-dimensional objects but no four-dimensional ones while perdurantists think
there are four-dimensional objects but no three-dimensional ones; theists think there is a
God while atheists think there is not; and so on and so on.
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I agree with Swoyer that this would be an untenable ideal. However, one
who thinks that an ontological argument is demonstrative need not believe in
this kind of ideal. A demonstrative argument could only lead to a conclusion
that would be utterly secure if we could be certain that its premises are
true and that the rules of inference used are valid. However, neither is
the case when it comes to ontological arguments or indeed any deductive
arguments whatever. Both the premises of an ontological argument and the
rules of inference used in it are typically controversial. Swoyer says that we
can rarely nd demonstrative arguments for or against philosophical views.
This is not at all correct37. I would say that we quite commonly nd such
arguments; however, this does not help to bring agreement or certainty, since
the opponents of a view usually then deny the truth of the premises of the
argument or sometimes, though more rarely, the validity of the logical rule
used in the argument38. Often even the person proposing the argument can
be brought to doubt the truth of the premises or the validity of the logical
rule39. Even if the premises seem to be just matters of common sense, one
can always argue that they are expressed misleadingly.
Of course it can be an argument for a proposed solution to the prob-
lem of universals that the solution would if true explain many things other
proposed solutions do not explain. Thus explanatory considerations are far
from irrelevant to the problem of universals, though they do not constitute
the whole story. However, we must not confuse a question with the evidence
37Swoyer is quite correct in pointing out that many arguments in metaphysics which
have been conceived as demonstrative, such as the argument from design, would be far
more plausible if understood as abductive arguments. However, there is no reason why
this would have to hold of all ontological arguments, and I argue that it does not hold
of most arguments for the existence of universals, which become circular if understood as
abductive but may well be formally correct if understood as deductive.
38People with radically dierent ontologies cannot even agree with regard to which
rules of inference are valid, much less which premises are true. As I will show later in this
dissertation, it makes a dierence to the validity of many arguments for the existence of
universals whether one uses a higher-order logic or a rst-order predicate logic, as well as
whether one uses a standard predicate logic or a free predicate logic.
39Of course abductive arguments are no better in this respect. Opponents can deny
the truth of the explanandum (if the explanandum is a sentence) or the existence of
the explanandum (if the explanandum is a fact or some other entity) just as well as the
truth of the premises of a demonstrative argument. When it comes to the validity of
abductive inference matters are even worse; there is not even any precise theory, much
less agreement, about what abductive arguments are good abductive arguments, i. e.
what are abductively valid rules of inference (in the extended sense in which the word
"valid" can be used here). So demonstrative arguments, though far from utterly certain,
are on the whole a bit closer to being certain than abductive ones.
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for its possible answers, or we are guilty of the vericationist fallacy. It seems
to me that quite many ontologists who have taken the problem of universals
to be a problem of explaining something have been guilty of this fallacy. Of
course, if the explanatory power of a solution to the problem were the only
possible evidence for its correctness, this distinction might not be of much
importance. However, I will show that the explanatory power of a solution
need not be the only evidence there is for the correctness of that solution.
Indeed, I will argue that at least when it comes to the rst of the ques-
tions Porphyry asked, the explanatory power of a theory is not even relevant,
since appealing to it would involve vicious circularity. However, I will not
deny that when it comes to the other questions Porphyry asked, the remain-
ing parts of the traditional problem of universals, explanatory power may
be relevant. Of course the two additional questions Porphyry asks are not
the only questions that an ontologist must ask if he concludes that there are
universals, nor would they probably be thought to be the most important
questions by a modern ontologist. Many other questions will be raised such
as e. g. what universals there are and how many universals there are. If
abductive reasoning is ever valid, contra van Fraassen et all, then it is prob-
ably a correct method to use in solving such questions, which constitute the
remaining part of the problem of universals as it appears in contemporary
discussion as a whole. In any case some kind of non-demonstrative reason-
ing, whether abductive or inductive, will be needed to solve at least some
of these remaining questions. However, I will in the rest of this dissertation
argue that such explanatory considerations are not relevant when it comes
to the rst, most fundamental part of the problem of universals, the question
whether there are any.
6.4.1 Explanation, Description and Perception
Before explaining any data we need to describe them, as we can only judge if
a proposed explanation is a good explanation by comparing the proposed ex-
planans with the explanandum and seeing that the proposed explanans does
explain the explanandum satisfactorily40. It can be argued plausibly that
40Dierent theories of explanation give dierent criteria for when a proposed explana-
tion is a satisfactory explanation. E. g. a deductive-nomological theory demands (very
roughly) that the explanandum imply the explanans, a unicationist theory that it unify
the explanantia, a counterfactual theory that there be a true counterfactual in which the
negation of the explanans is the antecedent and the negation of the explanandum the
454
we already need to posit universals or tropes or classes in order to correctly
describe any data we have41. The solution of the Problem of Universals
involves not only what we must postulate to explain some phenomena but
more fundamentally what we must assume in order to describe these phe-
nomena properly, i. e. it brings with it problems concerning what is it that
is given to us in experience.
The universalist and the trope theorist and the class nominalist and the
extreme nominalist often dier not only in what they think is needed to
explain some data. They dier already in how they would describe any
data that are to be explained; indeed, their biggest and most important
dierences are over this question42. Most extreme nominalists, of course,
think we only perceive concrete individuals. However, many universalists
(e. g. Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann) think that we also
directly perceive universals. For example in [Ber57, page 332], Bergmann
says:
I am directly acquainted with such things as, e. g., sensa and
some of the characters they exemplify.
consequent, and so on. I do not have to take any position here with regard to the ques-
tion which of these theories of explanation is the correct one. In any case we cannot say
whether any of these desiderata holds if we are not capable of describing what is to be
explained, of telling what the explanandum is.
41According to standard theories of explanation (see e. g. (R4) in [HO48, x3]), the
explanans consists of true sentences. If we think there are facts, we can also alternatively
take the explanans to consist of the facts which such sentences correspond to either in
the sense that the sentences denote these facts or in the sense that these facts make such
sentences true. However, if our description of what our data are is incorrect, then the
description is not a true sentence but a false one and there is no fact corresponding to it,
and thus neither it nor any fact corresponding to it can be a constituent in a satisfactory
explanation.
42Rodriguez-Pereyra admits that philosophers are not clear about what a solution to the
problem of universals should explain. However, he does not see that if the problem were
indeed an explanatory problem, then if dierent philosophers had dierent explananda,
they would be dealing with dierent problems, not one common problem as Rodriguez-
Pereyra presupposes. Probably he thinks that though philosophers are not clear about
what the problem is, they yet have confusedly in mind the same problem, and that a
problem about how to explain something, though their unsuccessful attempts to explicate
it result in dierent problems. However, he presents no evidence for such a claim. It seems
to me that the most the philosophers addressing the problem share is a common question
about what there is; they do not share any common belief that could serve as a common
explanandum. Indeed, it could even be questioned whether they have a common question
in mind, since dierent philosophers have dierent concepts of universals; however, I have
already suggested that we can nd a common concept of a universal which is contained in
all the more specic concepts of universals, and if this is correct then we can indeed nd
also a common question presupposed by more specic questions.
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These characters are of course universals and the exemplication here spoken
of is the same thing as predication in Aristotle's denition of universals, if
that is taken to be metaphysical predication i. e. a relation between non-
linguistic entities. Also many students of Bergmann argued in favour of the
same view, e. g. Edwin B. Allaire in [All63].
Unfortunately, the value of the testimony of Bergman and his students
is lessened by the fact that their view was they were yet inuenced by
vericationism and their view was motivated by their belief that we would
have to be acquainted with any ontological simples in order to know at
all that they existed43. Another student of Bergmann, Herbert Hochberg
attacked their view in [Hoc65].
Hochberg held that the existence of entities such as universals and bare
particulars is known on dialectical grounds, i. e. by means of inference;
unfortunately, he did not make it fully clear whether such inference is sup-
posed to be demonstrative or non-demonstrative, and if the later whether
inductive or abductive. However, I think his words suggest a demonstrative
inference; he speaks of an ontology providing a satisfactory basis for the
analysis of ontological problems. Therefore his view does not support the
view of such philosophers as Rodriguez-Pereyra and Swoyer that universals
or tropes would have to be known by means of abduction.
In any case, the reasons Hochberg gave against Bergmann's and Allaire's
view are not very convincing. Hochberg said in [Hoc65, page 124] that some
may believe that what is presented (which meant in his terminology the same
as what we are acquainted with) must be independent or distinguishable.
This apparently meant for him that it must be capable of being presented
separately, and he held that we could not be presented with universals with-
out being presented with particulars or conversely, and this was a reason to
think we were not presented with them at all. However, I see no reason to
think that what we are acquainted with should have to be capable of being
presented separately.
This view that we can be directly aware of universals can take two forms.
43Allaire distinguished two uses of the word "know" in [All63, page 6]. In one use to
know something is to be acquainted with it and in the second use of the word to know
something means to recognize it. Allaire held that we know universals in both senses of
the word, while we know bare particulars only in the rst sense of the word. Curiously,
Allaire entirely forgot the sense of the word in which to know something is to know it by
description. Did he mean to implicitly deny that the word had such a sense?
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It can be understood so that we are acquainted with universals with some
sort of non-sensory, intellectual intuition. This seems to have been the view
of Plato (and Platonists) with regard to his Forms (if they can be understood
as universals). This may have been the view of Husserl and other phenome-
nologists in their famous doctrine of eidetic intuition (Wesensschau). Such
a special kind of intuition has understandably been regarded with suspicion,
though even such great logicians and mathematicians as Kurt Godel have
spoken on behalf of it (e. g. in [G81] Godel defended a phenomenological
method in mathematics). Nevertheless an appeal to such an intuition might
furnish a rather weak argument for the existence of universals if it were the
only reason to believe in them.
However, the view that we are directly aware of universals has also been
held in the form that we perceive universals with our senses, in the same way
in which we perceive sensible particulars. This view may be quite ancient
and have multicultural respectability. Chakrabarti argues in [Cha75, page
367] that already the ancient Indian Nyaya-Vaises.ika philosophers held that
most universals are known through sense perception. Whether this is correct
or not, which I am not qualied to determine, most recent realist ontologists
who have thought that we can perceive universals have in any case held
such a form of the view. Grossmann has perhaps stressed this view most
in [Gro90] as part of an overarching project to combine empiricism with
realism (what he calls his fourth way)44. Grossmann says in [Gro90, page
131]:
Perception acquaints us not only with individual things, but also
with properties. It acquaints us not only with spatio-temporal
entities, but also non-spatial and atemporal things. The senses
44There is a very widespread view that empiricism is somehow incompatible with realism
concerning universals. E. g. Carnap said in [Car50] that
Empiricists are in general suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract
entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc.
However, though widespread, the view lacks any rational ground. It seems to me that there
is no reason why abstract entities would present any special problem for any empiricism
moderate enough to be compatible with any kind of realism, even realism concerning
sensible particulars. Of course, at least most forms of Carnap's empiricism were so strong
that they were not compatible with realism even regarding concrete particulars. Carnap
tried to reconcile empiricism with the use of abstract entities with the aid of his ontological
relativism; however, I have already argued that this relativism does not work. Philosophers
such as Bergmann, Grossmann, Fales and Armstrong present a far better way of reconciling
empiricism with realism.
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are a window through which we see not only the realm of be-
coming, but also the realm of being. The senses put us in touch
not only with changing things, but also with timeless universals.
Grossmann is far from the last to try to combine a strong form of em-
piricism with a strong form of realism concerning universals. Evan Fales
is a later representative of this view in [Fal90]; see [Fal90, pages 168-170]
for a summary of his view. Fales's form of realism is stronger than that of
Armstrong and like that of Grossmann, since he admits that it is a form of
Platonism; according to him [Fal90, page 190] universals are not in them-
selves in space and time. Fales's empiricism, however, is rather too strong in
my view, amounting (as he admits) to a form of neo-vericationism, which
I argue against in Section 5.2.1 of this dissertation.
While Russell and Bergmann had held that we can only be directly
aware of the characteristics of sense-data (aka sensa aka sense-contents),
Grossmann held that we also can be directly aware of the characteristics
of physical bodies. This seems to be the most common form in which the
view that we are directly aware of universals is held by philosophers today.
However, it is not unanimous, but Fales has returned to the older view of
Russell and Bergmann that we are only directly aware of the properties
of sense-data, as the only particulars of which we are immediately aware
are also in his view just sense-data (see e. g. [Fal90, page 258]). I will
not discuss in this work the question whether the properties we perceive
are physical properties or properties of sense-data (or of mental acts); in
order to support my view that realism concerning universals can be justied
without abduction it is enough to argue that we are directly aware of some
universals.
Grossmann also thought that we can sensorily perceive other abstract
(in the sense of non-spatiotemporal) entities such as classes and numbers
(which he did not identify with universals or reduce to universals as I would
be inclined to do). Of course Grossmann's claim may be more plausible with
respect to such obviously sensory properties as shapes and colours than with
respect to such more abstract entities as numbers45.
45It is not clear that Grossmann's attempt to combine empiricism with realism succeeds
fully. Even if we can perceive universals and their relations, and even if we can perceive
such highly abstract universals or other abstract objects as numbers and classes, we cannot
perceive transnite numbers or classes. Grossmann's theory implies that we could perceive
transnite numbers or classes only if we perceived that there are innitely many entities
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The view that we perceive universals with our senses is often, as in Gross-
mann, part of the view that we perceive facts or states of aairs. According
to this combined view we perceive a state of aairs consisting of particu-
lars and universals and we perceive it as consisting of them. In a way even
Armstrong agrees with this view, though there is caveat to be made. Arm-
strong subscribes to a propositional theory of perception in [Arm97, x7.11,
page 96]. This propositional theory of perception contrasts with the view
of many epistemological coherentists and other opponents of foundational-
ism that perception cannot justify any beliefs because it is not propositional
(so suggesting that Armstrong's theory is a foundationalist or foundheren-
tist one). E. g. Donald Davidson said when defending a coherentist theory
in [Dav86, page 311] that the relation between a sensation (which David-
son does not distinguish from a perception) and a belief cannot be logical,
since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. Davidson's
argument might not work even if we admitted his premise that percep-
tions are not propositional, since as Susan Haack points out in criticizing
Davidson's theory in [Haa09, page 112], justication is not purely a logical
matter. However, the premise that perceptions are not propositional can
also be questioned (even though Haack seems to accept it), and Armstrong
denies it (without referring to Davidson). A propositional theory of percep-
tion suggests that perceptions are propositional attitudes and therefore their
contents can be in a logical relation to perceptions, contrary to Davidson's
view46 Perception has also been viewed as propositional by philosophers
of some kind: however, it is rather obvious that we cannot perceive such a thing. This is
indeed not wholly uncontroversial; there have been philosophers who seem to have denied
this; e. g. Leibniz seems to have held that we have subconscious perceptions of all the
innite number of monads there are. However, most philosophers today nd this quite
implausible, and in any case if such perceptions are subconscious, it is not clear if they
could yield conscious knowledge of mathematical axioms. So Grossmann's theory still
leaves it quite obscure how we can know that such mathematical axioms as the axiom of
innity are true. The problem that mathematical knowledge has traditionally presented for
empiricists may therefore not be solved even by Grossmann's variant of empiricism; even
if we assume that we can perceive universals with our senses, we might still need a non-
sensual kind of intuition in order to know that axioms such as the axiom of innity is true,
if this cannot be explained as a result of induction. However, I think that Grossmann's
view that we can perceive universals is independent of his empiricism and is very plausible
whatever view we hold of his empiricist theory and at least suces to justify some kind
of realism concerning universals.
46In [Arm61, pages 105-106] Armstrong held that perceptions can be analysed with the
aid of the notion of belief - that perception is the acquiring of an inclination to believe in
particular facts about the physical world by means of our sense - which of course implies
that they have propositional contents. However, it is quite possible to hold a proposi-
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not primarily motivated by epistemological or metaphysical motives, as by
many philosophical logicians - as Ilkka Niiniluoto says in [Nii82, page 116],
Jaakko Hintikka and his followers treat perception as a propositional atti-
tude. This surely serves to conrm the propositional theory of perception.
In fact Armstrong holds that the objects of beliefs are states of aairs or
facts, not propositions, so the name "propositional theory of perception" is
a bit misleading. One might think that this would give rise to the same
problem about how perceptions justify beliefs as Davidson has. However,
for each state of aairs there of course corresponds a proposition according
to Armstrong's theory, the strongest proposition it makes true, so there can
be a logical relation between that proposition and the contents of the belief
states it justies.
However, there is one important caveat to be made in ascribing to Arm-
strong the view that universals are perceived. In Armstrong's view the states
of aairs we perceive do not contain as constituents genuine universals (as
Grossmann thought) but what he calls second-class properties and relations
(which many ontologists would following David Lewis call abundant prop-
erties and relations together with Armstrong's third-class properties and
universals), which in his view supervene upon genuine universals (which
Lewis would call sparse properties and relations). It naturally follows from
this that the states of aairs that are perceived are also second-class states
of aairs.
However, these results come about because Armstrong's conception of a
universal and a state of aairs is very narrow (though not in a precise way);
other ontologists would call these second-class properties and relations uni-
versals, since they clearly are not tropes but many of them are instantiated
by many particulars. It is surely more plausible that if there is an objec-
tional theory of perception without holding perception to be analysable with the aid of
beliefs, and many other philosophers have done so. Many philosophers, following the lead
of Gareth Evans in [Eva82, page 227], including perhaps most prominently Christopher
Peacocke in [Pea01], have recently argued that perception has a non-conceptual content -
a view that is indeed far older, and can be viewed as a resurrection of the old Aristotelian
view. Though non-conceptual, an experience can yet according to Peacocke (see [Pea01,
page 241]) represent things or events or places or times as having certain properties or
standing in certain relations, which makes it propositional in the sense that Davidson
and other coherentists deny. Evans stressed that although the subject's judgements are
based upon his experience, his judgements are not about the experience. Haack, however,
seems to (be forced to) assume that the perceptual judgement would have to be about the
experience.
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tive distinction between sparse or rst class and abundant or second and
third class properties and relations, then only the latter can be perceived,
while the former have to be inferred inductively or abductively (just as any
fundamental particles or fundamental physical events would have to be). If
Grossmann thought that sparse properties and relations could themselves be
perceived, as many of his statements suggest, then his view is less plausible
than Armstrong's.
In any case, though Armstrong may not always be consistent in this,
he yet claims explicitly that these second-class properties and relations re-
ally exist. He says in [Arm97, x3.9, page 45] that while the second-class
properties are not properties additional to the rst class properties, yet
it is to be emphasized that this does not make the second-class
properties unreal. They are real and cannot be talked away.
This is already a substantial and an extremely controversial ontological
claim. Extreme nominalists and most trope theorists would deny that such
second-class properties and relations exist and that they can be perceived. It
seems to me that the crucial, primary disagreement between Armstrong and
many other ontologists such as extreme nominalists or eliminative trope the-
orists is whether these second-class properties and relations exist and can be
perceived47, or whether it is rather quasi-tropes that are perceived (as Camp-
bell would say). I would say that agreeing that these second-class properties
and relations exist would already constitute a partial solution to the problem
of universals; it already commits Armstrong to realism about entities which
47Opponents of realism about universals have seldom addressed this question. One
interesting recent attempt to criticize the view that states of aairs can be perceived is
Mark Textor's [Tex09]. Textor perspicuously draws attention to the phenomenological
questions and questions concerning the logical analysis of perceptual statements that I
hold are crucial in solving the basic part of the problem of universals. However, Textor
commits a serious mistake already in the title of his article. He purports to criticize
Armstrong's theory among others yet he contrasts particulars with states of aairs and
asks whether particulars or states of aairs are given in perception, clearly presupposing
that the two disjuncts are incompatible. However, according to Armstrong (see [Arm97,
x8.4, pages 126-127]), states of aairs are particulars (though they contain universals as
their constituents), so the only answer Armstrong could give to Textor's question would be
"Yes." I do not think that this is the kind of answer that Textor would have anticipated!
Textor's criticism might (though there are also other problems with it that I cannot
deal with here) work against a theory that took states of aairs to be such as Chisholm or
Plantinga think and held that these states of aairs would be objects of sensory perception;
however, it is not clear whether any philosopher has held such a view, so this criticism
may well be directed at a pure straw man. Perhaps it might be more eective against
Grossmann's theory than Armstrong's, but I am not sure even about this.
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are not particulars. Also since Armstrong holds that we can directly per-
ceive these second class properties surely no abductive argument is needed in
order to come to the belief that they exist48. I am willing to admit that the
inference from second-class properties and relations to the sparse universals
upon which they supervene may be abductive; it is plausible in any case
(though not obvious) that it is non-demonstrative. Whether it is a good or
valid (in the extended sense in which a non-demonstrative argument may be
valid) argument is a dierent question that I cannot address here. However,
there is little point in arguing over whether this non-demonstrative argu-
ment from the second-class properties and relations to sparse universals is
valid if there is no agreement about whether these second-class properties
and relations exist and so no agreement about whether the premises of that
non-demonstrative argument would be true. Therefore the question of the
validity of that inference is a question of lesser importance.
This view ts well with a causal theory of perception if it is combined
with the highly popular theory of causation according to which facts or states
of aairs are the members of the causal relation (in the most fundamental
sense of the word "causal"). Most of its adherents do naturally hold some
kind of causal theory of perception. Grossmann and Fales indeed reject
attempts to reduce perception to causation. Grossmann says in [Gro90,
page 250]:
When you see that there are two apples on the table in front
of you, your mental act of seeing stands in a unique, noncausal,
relationship to a certain fact.
Fales similarly says in [Fal90, page 259] that as far as meaning goes, the
essential feature of perception is intentionality and the fact that it involves
48It is not clear that Armstrong would agree with this view. He thinks that the par-
ticularity of particulars is part of the content of perception, but nevertheless, he stresses
that he does not claim that questions of individuation can be settled by a propositional
theory of perception plus perfunctory phenomenological inspection. One might infer that
he would then have to hold that analogously the question of the existence of second class
properties is not to be settled by perfunctory phenomenological inspection either, but it
is not clear what his justication for this would be. What about careful phenomenolog-
ical inspection? At the very least even if we are only weak foundationalists, if second
class properties and thin particulars are part of the content of perception, this should
give prima facie justication to the claim that they exist, and not just show that it is not
obvious that they do not, which is all that Armstrong claims it does. For an interesting
correspondence between Armstrong and Grossmann that brings out their dierences in
metaontology see [CT09].
462
some kind of sensouous consciousness. However, also Grossmann admits
in [Gro90, pager 240] that if one perceives, in the literal sense, a certain
fact, then that fact must play a causal role in one's perceiving it. Fales
also says in [Fal90, page 259] that when one perceives something which
is not a sense-datum, it is is necessary that the object perceived stand in
some suitable causal relation to the act of perceiving it. Even Grossmann
and Fales then admit that there is an intimate link between perception and
causation, even if it is not sucient for a reduction of the former to the
latter. Armstrong, however, might be in favour of a reductive causal theory
of perception.
However, the view that we perceive universals with our senses can also
be combined with dierent theories of individuation (and perception). A
philosopher might also hold that particulars are complexes of universals and
that in perceiving such a complex we often perceive some of the universals
of which it consists (but do not perceive the particularity of particulars as
Armstrong thinks). This view had already been held before Grossmann,
for example by the neo-realist William Pepperell Montague (do not confuse
him with the more famous Richard Montague) in [Mon25]. Montague says
in [Mon25, page 77]:
Both rationalists and empiricists commit the same error, for
they regard the originally given elements in experience as partic-
ulars and nothing but particulars, and as lacking anything that
can be called universality. . . . Experience is indeed originally of
particulars, that is, of objects that are presented at particular
times and places. But each of these experienced objects has a
universal nature which is as indefeasibly its inclusive property
as is its unique position in space and time its exclusive property.
In other words, the given elements of experience are complexes
of universals, each complex being associated with a particular
position in the space and time series. It is this latter factor of
position which constitutes particularity and makes each individ-
ual numerically dierent from every other individual. To form
the concept of a universal, it is, as we have already seen, not nec-
essary for the mind to manufacture or create anything dierent
from what is given, but only to abstract the attention from the
particular position of the given complex and concentrate it upon
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some one or more of its qualitative or non-positional elements.
Montague's view diers from Grossmann's as Montague is committed to
a kind of bundle theory of particulars, which Grossmann opposes, since
Grossmann favours a theory of bare particulars as individuating principles.
I think that a bundle theory is in fact better, so Montague seems to me
to be more correct in this respect49; however, what ontological position we
take with regard to this highly dicult and advanced matter does not aect
the more basic epistemological point that universals can be perceived when
they are ingredients of particulars.
Many trope theorists on the other hand think we do not perceive uni-
versals, but perceive tropes directly50; e. g. Kevin Mulligan, Barry Smith
and Peter Simons give in [MSS84, x4, page 304] as a general defence for
the existence of moments (which is their word for tropes) that they can be
objects of perception and John Bacon goes so far in [Bac95, page 4] as to
argue that tropes are epistemically prior to both universals and concrete
particulars.
This makes both universals (in the sense of the word that contains
second-class and third-class properties and relations) and tropes very dif-
ferent from such entities as electrons or black holes, which are paradigmatic
examples of entities whose existence is inferred abductively; everyone who
agrees that there is any clear distinction between observable and unobserv-
able entities thinks that electrons and black holes are unobservable, while
as we saw many philosophers think that universals or tropes are observable
and indeed frequently observed. Some entities whose existence is plausibly
inferred abductively are indeed observable according to most conceptions
49There are of course well-known diculties with bundle theories, and with the kind
of theory Montague sketches in particular. Montague seems to be saying that experi-
enced objects are individuated by their spatio-temporal positions; however, this raises
the question of what these positions are ontologically and how they are individuated. If
such positions are taken to be particulars in accordance with an absolutist conception of
space-time, then it can be argued that Montague's theory just pushes back the question
of the individuation of particulars.
50Interestingly at least some pragmatists seem to agree (at least at some times) with
this view. Though Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, had apparently argued against all
kinds of foundationalism in [Pei68], Williams James supported in his radical empiricist
period in [Jam22, page 42] a form of empiricist foundationalism according to which some
relations, namely relations between experiences (understood by James in a neutral monist
sense as in themselves neither mental nor physical), are themselves experienced. Since
James holds in the same work (in [Jam22, page 41]) that universals are mere abstractions,
this seems to imply that these experienced relations are tropes (though James does not
give any clear or explicit statement of his view with regard to the problem of universals).
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of observability, such as the planets Mercury or Pluto, whose existence was
rst postulated to explain perturbances in the orbits of other planets. How-
ever, even in their case it is uncontroversial that they either are in fact
unobserved or at leastwere unobserved when they were rst postulated on
the basis of abduction. In this they dier from (abundant) universals and
(quasi-)tropes, which according to many philosophers who postulate them
have always been quite commonly observed.
Any argument for their existence would then not be an abductive or
inductive non-demonstrative argument but a demonstrative argument that
only tries to draw attention to what anyone already implicitly knows. That
the arguments for the existence of universals or tropes must be like this has
already been seen by many philosophers, e. g. by Nicholas Wolterstor
in [Wol70, page xiii]. Wolterstor indeed holds that all ontology is descrip-
tive; while I would agree that ontology is primarily descriptive, I would not
go so far as to deny that it can sometimes be explanatory in a non-trivial
sense, if the word is used as broadly as it is often used today.
At least a direct realist about material objects (like Grossmann or Arm-
strong or Pols) would say that we do not need any abductive argument to
show us that there are material objects. In their view we might indeed need
an abductive argument to show of some material objects that they exist,
e. g. of electrons, but not to show us that there are some other material
objects, e. g. stones or trees. A philosopher who thinks that we are directly
aware only of sense-data (like Russell, Bergmann or Fales) might say that
the existence of all material objects is inferred abductively to explain our
sensations or sense-data (unless he is a phenomenalist or neutral monist, in
which case he requires no abductive or inductively inference, since he thinks
he can construct material objects logically out of sense-data). However, he
could not then say that we need to infer our sensations and sense-data ab-
ductively from anything else. Similarly if the universalists or trope theorists
mentioned above are correct, then we do not need any abductive argument
to show that there are universals (or at least second-class properties and
relations) or (quasi-)tropes either.
At best such an argument could then strengthen the justication of an
already justied belief. However, even this would require that the explanan-
dum serving as the premise of the abductive argument would be independent
of the belief that it would further justify; if it is not so, then such an argu-
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ment is wholly circular, just like postulating that there are material objects
in order to explain the existence of material objects would be. I will argue
later in this dissertation that at least most abductive arguments that have
been presented for the existence of either universals or tropes are circular in
exactly this way. Therefore before trying to nd any abductive argument for
a solution to the problem of universals one should examine whether these
philosophers who think that universals or second-class properties and rela-
tions or tropes or both can be perceived directly are correct. Nor is this an
easy task; rather solving it will form the major part of an argument for any
solution for the problem of universals.
Rodriguez-Pereyra fails to do this. He argues in [RP02, x12. 6, page
210] that the decisive superiority of resemblance nominalism over universal-
ism and trope theories consists in its following Russell's supreme maxim of
scientic philosophizing (as expressed for example in [Rus18c, page 155]):
Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted
for inferred entities
, or as Rodriguez-Pereyra reformulates this, to avoid postulating ad hoc en-
tities. By the ad hoc ontology of a theory Rodriguez-Pereyra understands
those entities postulated by the theory the only or main reason to believe in
which is that they contribute to the explanation of some phenomenon. I am
not at all sure that Russell's maxim is a correct maxim; it is a predecessor of
logical positivism's vericationism51 and has generally been used to support
anti-realistic theories, and today many philosophers, especially most scien-
tic realists, would deny the correctness of the maxim52. However, even if it
51Russell's maxim must be sharply distinguished from Russell's earlier Principle of Ac-
quaintance, which as I showed was far weaker than vericationism. The Principle of
Acquaintance does not imply the maxim; it does not in the least dissuade us from in-
ferring the existence of entities with which we are not acquainted, as we can have have
knowledge by description of them. The principle said nothing about whether we can infer
that some entities exist, since it did not concern propositional knowledge at all but only
knowledge of things, and inference is a method of reaching propositional knowledge. The
principle and the maxim come from two dierent stages in Russell's philosophical devel-
opment, and Russell's adoption of the maxim led to a big change in his ontological views,
away from dualism to neutral monism. This remark is useful, as some philosophers do
not keep the principle and the maxim apart clearly enough; for example, Misak seems
to confuse them in [Mis95, page 44]. By conating the principle and the maxim, Misak
produces an excessively positivistic image of Russell's philosophy.
52The maxim led Russell into phenomenalism and neutral realism since he thought that
we were directly aware only of sense-data. A direct realist might avoid this consequence,
and admit that some physical objects, namely observable, macroscopic ones, are known
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were valid, I do not think it can be legitimately used to support resemblance
nominalism in the way Rodriguez-Pereyra uses it.
It seems at rst sight that the very point of Russell's maxim is to deny
the legitimacy of all abductive (and inductive) inference, and if this is so
then it is hardly consistent to use the maxim and yet hold that the problem
of universals should be solved by abductive inference, as Rodriguez-Pereyra
does. If you completely avoid postulating ad hoc entities, then you are
not using abductive inference. Indeed if the problem of universals were an
explanatory problem, then someone consistently following Russell's maxim
might have to declare the whole problem a pseudo-problem. In fact it can
be argued that Rodriguez-Pereyra does violate the maxim in postulating
possibilia and in postulating classes as primitives, so he does use abduc-
tive inference. He would say that he does not postulate possibilia only to
solve the problem of universals, but primarily to provide truth-conditions
for modal discourse. Similarly he would say that he postulates classes pri-
marily to account for mathematics. It is not clear that Russell would have
thought that this was legitimate either; surely Russell's maxim is not meant
to apply only to the problem of universals but to any problem, including the
problem of accounting for modal discourse and the problem of accounting
for mathematics53.
However, the maxim is better interpreted as not rejecting abductive and
inductive inference completely but just as seeking to minimize their use.
There are signicant dierences between Russell's maxim and early veri-
to exist directly and are thus not ad hoc objects. However, it is not clear if even a direct
realist can avoid the maxim having the consequence that theoretical objects like electrons
are ad hoc objects and thus must be rejected. The only way to do this is to extend
the concept of perception or observation so that we can be said to perceive or observe
electrons. However, one can argue that this leads to the destruction of any dierence
between perception and belief and thus the maxim is only reconciled with realism by
being completely trivialized and losing all importance.
53In fact the solution of the problem of universals cannot be separated from the solution
of these other problems, and could not be separated from them even if the problem of
universals were an explanatory problem. In order to respond to an extreme nominalist who
denies the existence of classes as well as that of intensional universals or to a universalist
who denies the existence of classes but believes in intensional universals Rodriguez-Pereyra
would have to appeal to facts involving modal discourse and mathematics, which his
opponent would of course try to interpret in his own way. To solve such controversies
we must surely ask which ontological theory can give the overall best solution to the
whole complex of issues involving the problem of universals, the interpretation of modal
discourse and the interpretation of mathematics. It is no good if one theory can give a
better account of one set of data if this forces it to give a worse account of other, equally
important data.
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cationism. Russell's maxim is a heuristic or methodological maxim, not
a semantical claim about signicance54. Russell said that inferred entities
should be avoided and replaced with constructions whenever possible, but
unlike early logical positivists, he did not suppose that it would be always
possible. Nor did Russell assert, like van Fraassen, that whenever a purport-
edly inferred entity could not be constructed out of entities with which we
were acquainted, we would have to suspend judgement about its existence
(though he was tempted to do so). Indeed, Russell's maxim must be inter-
preted in this way if it is to be even compatible with others of Russell's own
views. Russell explicitly states himself in [Rus18c, page 157-158] that he
is allows inferred entities of two kinds, the sense-data of other people and
unsensed sensibilia, out of which he constructed physical objects or sub-
stitutes for them. Therefore Russell might have come to see the positing
of possible particulars as no more problematic. Russell says that inferred
entities should be similar to those which are given and Rodriguez-Pereyra
argues that the introduction of possibilia involves a less radical departure
from an ontology entirely populated by actual concrete particulars than the
introduction of universals or tropes, because possibilia are according to him
of a kind with actual concrete particulars. Presumably Rodriguez-Pereyra
thinks that possibilia are this respect analogous to unsensed sensibilia, which
Russell supposed to be of a kind of with sensed sensibilia i. e. sense-data,
so that their introduction involved a lesser departure from an ontology en-
tirely populated by sense-data that the introduction of physical objects as
primitive entities. Rodriguez-Pereyra can quite reasonably argue that be-
cause of this what he does violates the spirit of Russell's maxim less than
universalists and trope theorists do.
However, I will show that it is questionable whether he really violates
the spirit of the maxim less than his competitors - he may in fact violate it
more than universalists or trope theorists. First of all, it is not clear what
Rodriguez-Pereyra would say about classes. They are surely not of a kind
54Richardson seems then to be radically wrong when he claims in [Ric90, page 7] that
Hence, the supreme maxim subserves an ontological and analytic fact: enti-
ties we are acquainted with are all the entities there are
This is not quite clearly formulated, but Richardson seems to be saying that according to
Russell it is an analytic truth that the entities we are acquainted with are all the entities
there are. If this is what Richardson meant, he is completely wrong; Russell did not even
think that this is a truth, and if it was it would surely according to him be a synthetic
truth.
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with concrete particulars. His postulating of classes as primitives can thus
surely not be considered as analogous to Russell's postulation of unsensed
sensibilia, and it seems it is thus in any case in agrant contradiction with
Russell's maxim. It does not help much to say that the introduction of
classes is done for reasons independent of the problem of universals; if vi-
olating Russell's maxim agrantly is acceptable in solving other problems,
why would the problem of universals be an exception? Russell himself tried
at a time to reduce classes to propositional functions, which he then held to
be universals, but Rodriguez-Pereyra as a nominalist naturally cannot do
this. The only way Rodriguez-Pereyra could escape this problem would be
to maintain that we are directly aware of classes. I am not sure if he would
be willing to do this, though it is not at all an absurd position, but many
competent philosophers (e. g. Reinhardt Grossmann and Penelope Maddy
in [Mad80] have held it, although in dierent forms55.
Secondly, Rodriguez-Pereyra assumes that universals or tropes would be
inferred entities, so that assuming either of them would be a disadvantage
for universalism and trope theory. However, if Grossmann or Bergmann are
right, then universals are perceived and hence we are directly aware of them
and hence they are not inferred entities in Russell's sense. In fact Russell
himself thought (at least in many phases of his ever-changing views) that
we are acquainted with universals56, so they would not be ad hoc entities in
his view. On the other hand if Bacon or Mulligan, Simons and Smith are
right then tropes are not inferred entities in Russell's sense either.
Thus universalism and trope theory need not have any bigger ad hoc on-
tology than resemblance nominalism if these philosophers are right. There-
fore Rodriguez-Pereyra must show that they are wrong if he is to be justied
for claiming that resemblance nominalism is the superior theory because of
55Maddy held that only concrete entities can be perceived and that classes are concrete
while Grossmann held (see [Gro90, pages 240-245]) that classes are not concrete (i.e.
spatio-temporal) but that abstract entities can be perceived if they are ingredients of
concrete entities.
56E. g. Russell says in [Rus12b, page 158]:
It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals
as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc. i. e. with qualities which
are experienced in sense data.
Russell continues by saying that we are also acquainted with relations. Most obviously
there are relations between dierent parts of a complex sense-datum, but there are also
higher-order relations between universals themselves. Indeed, Russell tries to found a
priori knowledge in knowledge of relations between universals.
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best avoiding ad hoc ontology. He does indeed attempt this in the case of
tropes, but not in the case of universals57
Even in the case of tropes his argument is not very strong. Rodriguez-
Pereyra says that the fact that we perceive tropes is an independent reason
to believe in tropes only if it is clear that we perceive tropes. Surely this
is not correct; if it is not clear whether we perceive tropes, then all that
follows from this is that it is not clear whether our perceiving tropes is
an independent reason to believe in tropes and thus that it is not clear
whether tropes are ad hoc entities. In such a situation it is not clear that
any theory would be superior to another because it avoids postulating ad
hoc entities either. Rodriguez-Pereyra tries in [RP02, x4.12, pages 93-95]
just to show that the argument of Mulligan, Simons and Smith for the con-
clusion that we perceive tropes is not valid. Even if the argument for this
were correct, it would not amount to showing that resemblance nominalists
postulate less ad hoc entities than trope theorists do. Trope theorists like
Bacon and Campbell who think that tropes are not only ontologically, but
also epistemologically primary entities can quite consistently hold that con-
crete particulars are inferred entities in Russell's sense, entities postulated
to explain the similarities and regularities we observe among tropes. They
can thus hold that in accepting concrete particulars as ontologically basic
it is resemblance nominalists who are violating Russell's maxim. If it is not
clear whether we perceive tropes, it is not clear whether we perceive concrete
individuals either. Just as Rodriguez-Pereyra tries to explain away appar-
ent perception of tropes, so trope theorists can try to explain away apparent
acquaintance with concrete individuals. They might argue that even if we in
some loose sense perceive concrete individuals, yet such perception contains
inference as its part and is not direct awareness of its objects, so the objects
of such perception are inferred objects in Russell's sense (as Russell himself
thought was the case when it came to the perception of physical objects,
since according to him we were directly aware only of sense-data and not
57He does indeed say in [RP02, page 93] that he agrees with Mulligan et all that it would
be counterintuitive to say that we see things as exemplifying certain universals. However,
this scarcely amounts to an argument; it is all too easy to settle any controversial question
by just insisting that all theories except one's own are counterintuitive. Of course, it
might turn out that no genuine argument can be found, so that philosophers with dierent
intuitions just cannot ever come to a rational agreement. However we should not accept
this defeatist conclusion before exerting the utmost eort to nd some way to rational
agreement.
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of perceived physical objects). Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that a sign of uni-
versals and tropes being a part of ad hoc ontology is that all parties to the
dispute agree that concrete particulars exist, even those that, like bundle
theories, reduce them to other entities, but not all parties accept universals
or tropes. However, it is not clear that all parties to the dispute would
accept that concrete particulars exist. Keith Campbell's claims in [Cam90]
seem to me to imply that there really exist only tropes, though Campbell
is rather coy in saying this explicitly. Campbell holds that only tropes are
ontologically basic, and holds further that only basic tropes really exist;
even non-basic tropes or quasi-tropes like the colour of an object, are ac-
cording to [Cam90, x6.11] just well-founded appearances58. Surely concrete
particulars, being also derived from basic tropes (and in the case of ordinary
particulars indeed only through the quasi-tropes) must then in Campbell's
system with a still better reason be mere well-founded appearances. Thus
Campbell implies that concrete objects do not really exist but only appear
to exist. It is no doubt the case that the existence of concrete particulars is
less controversial than that of tropes, but this is surely irrelevant. Russell's
maxim does not mean that we should accept only entities which most peo-
ple agree to exist, but that we should accept only entities we are acquainted
with. We can be acquainted with entities whose existence most people deny
because of confusion, and entities that most or even all people agree to ex-
ist can be entities believed in only because they help to explain something.
Russell himself thought that entities like physical objects which most people
would agree to exist are inferred entities, while more controversial entities
like sense-data and the universals they instantiate were not inferred entities,
and used to maxim to reject the rst and accept the latter.
More importantly from a purely metaontological point of view, however,
in discussing at all the question of whether we perceive tropes, Rodriguez-
58The position of these quasi-tropes in Campbell's system is similar to that of the second
class and third class properties and relations in Armstrong's system; both philosophers
are somewhat equivocal about the ontological status of the respective entities in question.
However, Armstrong never goes so far as to say that the second class properties and
relations are mere appearances, even well-founded appearances, and implicitly denies this
possibility in [Arm97, x3.9, page 45]; Campbell is then a more strictly fundamentalist
and eliminativist philosopher than Armstrong (or other trope theorists such as Bacon).
This may, indeed, constitute a big problem for Campbell when he tries to explain how we
come to know that there are tropes; the argument will presumably be non-demonstrative,
abductive or inductive, but neither inductive nor abductive arguments can validly lead to
denying the existence of entities asserted to exist in the premises of these arguments.
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Pereyra is discussing a question that is not a question of how to explain
something but a question of what there is to be explained, and so is going
outside what he considers to be the problem of universals. Thus he shows
that his denition of the problem is too narrow for even him to follow in
practice. However, his denition forces him to consider as only an incidental
question what is really one of the most fundamental sub-problems of the
problem of universals, the point from which really rigorous research should
start59.
Of course, those who argue that the existence of universals or tropes is
already implicit in what anyone knows do not claim that ordinary people
would explicitly know that there are universals or tropes or classes, but they
think that it will come as a surprise to them, as a character in Moliere's play
learned with surprise that he had been speaking prose all his life.
The question whether we perceive universals can of course be formu-
lated in what Carnap called the "formal mode", if someone yet thinks that
this is required to make the question clear. Using semantic ascent and the
results of other sections of this dissertation we arrive at the following for-
mulation: Do protocol sentences i e. observation sentences or the sentences
of the metatheory in which the weakly observational terms which are the
only non-logical terms which occur in the protocol sentences are interpreted
include or logically imply sentences in which objectual existential quanti-
59Rodriguez-Pereyra says in [RP02, x4.12, page 95] that since Resenblance Nominalism
is a metaphysical theory, no account of perception is required in his book. However, this
is incorrect; since Rodriguez-Pereyra appeals to Russell's maxim, this would require him
to develop a theory of perception he does not develop. The very point of Russell's maxim
is just to make the solution of ontological questions dependent on the prior development
of a detailed epistemological theory of perception, for without having a fully developed
theory of perception we have no way of knowing which entities are inferred and which are
not. In the absence of such a full theory there is no way to resolve the dispute between
Rodriguez-Pereyra and Mulligan et al with regard to whether tropes are ad hoc entities
or not. What Russell himself does in the works Rodriguez-Pereyra refers to is to develop
a theory of perception and then draw ontological conclusions from it. Anyone who wants
to honestly follow Russell's maxim must do the same, though he can of course come to
very dierent epistemological conclusions from those Russell himself came to. It may be
argued that it is unintuitive that epistemology would be in this way prior to ontology, and
I have some sympathy with this view. The argument based on ontological commitments
which I will suggest for the existence of universals, though not abductive, will not depend
on fundamental epistemological considerations either, but starts just from statements
which most people would agree to be true, whether on the basis of abductive or inductive
inference or on the basis of acquaintance, and tries to show that these statements imply
the existence of universal. However, if one wants to hold consistently that epistemology
of perception is not methodologically prior to ontology then he must deny the validity of
Russell's maxim.
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ers bind predicate variables or other variables that can be substituted for
terms symbolizing predicate terms of natural languages? When Carl Hempel
said in [Hem65, pages 102-103] that an observation sentence might be con-
strued as a sentence which asserts or denies that a specic object or group
of objects, of macroscopic size, has a particular observable characteristic, he
implied that the answer to such question is armative and that we perceive
properties, whether universals or tropes. Hempel might not have even no-
ticed the important ontological commitments he incurs, so this may not be
his considered view; however, this makes his testimony all the more impor-
tant, as it shows that the assumption that we can observe universals is a
very natural one to make, even inadvertently. In Hempel's view the proper-
ties we perceive are those of physical objects, since he held that observation
sentences belong to what Carnap has called the thing-language, and men-
tions that the phenomenalistic approach has many problems which he could
not discuss at that place. However, Carnap also spoke of observable prop-
erties at the very beginning of [Car56, page 38], yet he held in [Car56, page
40] that it may suce to use only individual variables in the observation
language. While Carnap then speaks against the view the universals can
be perceived, his support for that view obviously lacks conviction, as can
be seen from the use of the auxiliary verb "may", which here clearly stands
for epistemic possibility (and Carnap did not address at all the question
whether individual variables suce also in the metalanguage of the observa-
tion language). I will argue later that an adequate observation language has
to use either predicate variables or set variables or other variables ranging
over other entities than particulars, for the very simple reason that we do
not have and cannot have names for all phenomenal properties. We may, for
instance, want to say that two physical objects or sense-data have the exact
same hue or shade of colour, but we do not have names for all hues or shades
of colour and cannot have them, quite independently of whether colours are
taken to be properties o sense-data or physical objects. If this is correct,
it implies further that the predicate "universal" (if understood as referring
to abundant rather than sparse universals) is itself a higher-order observa-
tional predicate (more exactly, if we use the distinction between weakly and
strongly observational predicates I dened earlier, a weakly observational
predicate). The property of being an abundant universal (if there is one) is
then an observable property, more exactly a weakly observable property.
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Scientic Explanation and the Problem of Universals
So far I have shown that the problem of universals is not solely about expla-
nation; now I will argue that it is probably not at all about explanation, at
least not of the same kind of explanation as ordinary scientic explanation.
I will show there are reasons to suspect that the whole problem introduced
by Armstrong is a pseudo-problem since the kind of explanation he seeks
for would be a pseudo-explanation. However, I will not be arguing that all
explanatory problems that have been claimed to be identical with the prob-
lem of universals would be pseudo-problems. For instance, the Problem of
Concepts that Gergory Salmieri formulated is probably a genuinely explana-
tory problem and is probably not a pseudo-problem; however, it is yet not
identical with the Problem of Universals (though it is a closely connected
problem) and is not even an ontological problem at all.
If the solution of the problem were of the same kind as an ordinary
scientic explanation, then we would except that all or at least most of
the proposed solutions should full the criteria commonly demanded of a
satisfactory scientic explanation. It is very strange that of all the many
philosophers that have claimed that the problem of universals is an explana-
tory problem comparable to problems of explanation in science, almost none
has tried to compare the treatment of the problem in any detail with the
general theories of explanation proposed in philosophy of science. This sug-
gests that their claim that the problem is concerned with explanation is a
hollow claim. I cannot in this dissertation compare the theories of scientic
explanation in any ultimately sucient detail either. That would obviously
be a tremendous task, since there are so many theories of scientic explana-
tion and most are highly complex60; however, I try to at least get the task
of comparison to a good start and show that the prospects for the metaon-
tological claim that the problem of universals is an explanatory problem are
not promising. I will argue that if a solution to the problem of universals, at
least to its most basic part, were an ordinary scientic explanation, it would
not full the criteria demanded of a satisfactory scientic explanation and
would be a bad explanation.
Of course most theories of explanation are not about explaining how
something can be the case but about explaining why something is the case.
60For a good recent overview of such theories see [Woo03].
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Perhaps then we should not except them to apply to explanations of the
kind Rodriguez-Pereyra and Swoyer refer to. However, in this case we may
not have any clear idea what an explanation of how something can be the
case would involve. While scientic explanation of why something is the
case has been studied at length, no agreement has emerged and every the-
ory has diculties. However, at least there are detailed theories. There
are not even theories (at least not many systematic ones as in the case of
why-explanations) about what it would be to explain how something is pos-
sible. Also, probably all examples of abductive inference outside ontology
are inferences to the best explanation of why something is the case. This
raises doubts whether the kind of reasoning supposed to be used in ontology
can be abductive in the same sense as abductive reasoning outside ontology.
It is commonly held that the explanandum should not imply the ex-
planans logically or analytically. This is indeed often only presupposed and
not stated explicitly, as it is taken to be obvious; however, one of the classical
philosophers of science, Ernst Nagel, has stated it explicitly. Nagel's theory
of explanation is a version of the Deductive-Nomological Model of expla-
nation, as most famously presented in [HO48]. According to this model of
explanation an explanation is an argument in which the explanans consists
of premises which imply the explanandum (or, as Nagel calls it, the explican-
dum61.). This theory of explanation has been often attacked recently, and
I would myself agree that it needs some modication if not outright rejec-
tion. However, though the critics object to many features of the Deductive-
Nomological Model, I do not think that they object to this extremely intu-
itive idea that the explanandum should not imply the explanans62. Nagel
lists in [Nag61, page 34] criteria of a satisfactory explanation63; one of them
61Nagel uses the word "explicandum" so that it is synonymous with the today more
usually employed word "explanandum"; he does not mean the object of explication in
Carnap's more famous sense, which is closer to conceptual analysis than to scientic
explanation.
62Other theories of scientic explanation typically t the problem of universals even
worse. E. g. the Causal Mechanical Model of explanation says that the explanans and
explanandum are or describe events which are connected by a continuous causal process.
This theory of explanation at least does not t any proposed solution to the problem of
universals. It is not a general theory of explanation, but only a theory of the explanation
of events; however the explanandum of the problem of universals is conceived by those
who think it to be an explanatory problem, it is surely not an event. That many things
share a common property is surely not always an event, but is often something permanent
or even timeless.
63Nagel is talking about the explanation of laws, which does not quite t the kind of
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is that
the premises, taken singly or conjointly, do not follow logically
from the explicandum.
Nagel says also in [Nag61, page 38] that
we expect the explanatory premises in a satisfactory explanation
to assert something more than what is asserted by the explican-
dum.
Nagel uses here a broad concept of logical consequence that includes analyt-
ical64 entailments, as can be seen from the fact that he gives as an example
of a pseudo-explanation that does not satisfy this requirement the explana-
tion in Moliere's famous play of the fact that opium induces sleep with the
dictum that opium possesses a dormitive virtue65.
explanation Swoyer or Rodriguez-Pereyra talk about, as the targets of explanation they
oer are or at least at rst sight seem to be existential generalizations. However, it is
clearly not the analysis of individual events (or singular cases) they are talking about,
and singular cases and laws are the only kinds of explananda usually given for scientic
explanation, so this just strengthens the evidence for the claim that the explanation they
talk about cannot be a kind of ordinary scientic explanation or even at all similar to it.
64Nagel's criteria thus presuppose a distinction between analytical and non-analytical
statements. Some may therefore object that they should be rejected because Quine has
in their view shown this distinction to be untenable. I would not agree that Quine has
shown anything like that, but this dissertation is not a place where I could defend such a
claim. However, my main point would hold even if Quineans were right in rejecting the
distinction between analytical and other truths. Surely the thesis of Rodriguez-Pereyra,
Swoyer and others which I am arguing against also presupposes such a distinction. The
notions of analytical truth and conceptual analysis are surely connected; conceptual anal-
ysis is practice which when successful arrives at analytical truths and analytical truths are
truths which are in principle reachable by means of conceptual analysis alone. Thus if no
distinction could be made between analytical and non-analytical statements, then surely
no distinction could be made between conceptual analysis and other activities such as
explanation either, such as the contrast they make presupposes. Thus their claim will fail
to be interestingly true in any case; either there is no such dividing line between analysis
and explanation as they think or the problem of universals falls on a dierent side of the
line than they think.
65Nagel's example is also commonly used to support quite dubious ontological theses,
which we must distinguish from his correct thesis concerning explanation. Many philoso-
phers would conclude from the example that dispositions like dormitive virtues cannot be
used to explain anything genuinely. They would even infer from this that there is no need
to postulate them in our ontology at all, though this inference is fallacious since even if
dispositions would not be needed to explain anything they might yet be needed to describe
something correctly. However, I do not think the example gives any kind of support even
to the claim that dispositions could not be used to explain anything genuinely. We must
make clear that the same fact can be a genuine explanans for one explanandum but only
a pseudo-explanans for another explanandum. The existence of a disposition like a dormi-
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Even if we have doubts whether Nagel's criterion is a good general cri-
terion of a satisfactory explanation, it is quite compelling when it is applied
to explanations that are supposed to serve as the basis of an abductive ar-
gument. The main feature which is supposed to distinguish abductive as
well as inductive arguments from deductive i. e. demonstrative ones is just
that in an abductive or inductive argument the premises can be true while
the conclusion is false, while in a deductive argument they cannot. As the
premise of an ostensibly abductive argument is the explanandum, then if
the explanandum implied the conclusion analytically, the premise could not
be true without the conclusion being so, and thus the argument would after
all be a deductive one. Thus it is vitally important that an explanation that
is to serve as the basis of an abductive argument should satisfy Nagel's cri-
terion for a satisfactory explanation. However, I will argue that none of the
usual proposed solutions to the problem of universals do satisfy Nagel's cri-
terion for a satisfactory explanation and thus they are not after all reached
abductively but instead deductively.
There are strong reasons to fear that many realistic solutions to the
problem of universals do not satisfy Nagel's criterion. For example, Gary
Rosenkrantz says in [Ros93, page 72] that
A standard argument in favor of realism posits the existence of
a property in order to explain why several particulars are of the
same kind.
However, if this were truly the problem, then there are reasons to sus-
pect that the explanans supposed to be oered by universalists such as
Rosenkrantz, that there are universals such as kinds and properties, seems
tive virtue cannot indeed be used to explain genuinely (even together with other factors)
why opium causes sleep, since such an explanandum already implies that opium possesses
such a disposition. This is probably because the concepts of disposition and causation
are not independent, but there is a connection between them, though it is controversial
whether this is because causation is to be reduced to dispositions or conversely. However,
the existence of a disposition like a dormitive virtue can be a part of a genuine explanation
of why someone falls asleep, since this explanandum does not imply anything about dispo-
sitions. Suppose that someone who does not know anything about the eects of opium or
milk sees a person who has taken opium mixed with milk fall asleep and wonders why this
happened. It can be informative to explain to him that this was because opium possesses
a dormitive virtue, since he can infer thence that the the person fell asleep at least in part
because of the opium, and exclude the possibility that it was because of the milk alone.
Thus we may not infer from Nagel's example anything concerning the ontological status
of dispositions, but we can infer from it much concerning which kinds of explanations are
genuine and which are not.
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to be identical with the explanandum, being just the same thing expressed
more technically with the coined technical term "universal". Kinds are af-
ter all - depending on how you use the word - most naturally interpreted as
either the same thing as universals or some subclass of them such as Por-
phryry's species and genera are. Even if the word is interpreted in the later
way Rosenkrantz produces just a classication, not a genuine explanation.
This would be like trying to explain the existence of electrons with the aid of
the existence of material objects, which would be surely circular. Thus the
Universalist's explanation seems quite analogous to explaining why opium
includes sleep by saying it has a dormitive virtue66. The argument oered
by Rosenkrantz could be made genuinely abductive by supposing that the
kind is a second-class property in Armstrong's sense and the property is a
rst-class property, i. e. a universal in Armstrong's narrow sense. However,
if what Rosankrantz says is interpreted in this way, then the opponents of
realism would not accept the premise that several particulars are of the same
kind, as they would not agree even that any second-class properties exist,
so the argument would in any case be ineective or even question-begging
against them. We would need rst a dierent argument to establish that
several particulars share the same second-class property, and this argument
could not be abductive.
Perhaps then it is no wonder that Rodriquez-Pereyra comes to a non-
realistic solution; the only way to explain something like the explanandum he
proposes non-trivially is to explain it away. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra's
Resemblance Mominalism does not satisfy the criteria of a satisfactory sci-
entic explanation either.
First of all, we have a powerful argument that the Resemblance Nominal-
ist's explanans for a particular statement is also entailed by its explanandum.
Rodriquez-Pereyra's explanandum is that several things share a property,
and as we saw he understands this so that the property in question is a
66We may doubt whether a realist theory can satisfy Nagel's desideratum even if the
explanandum is supposed to be how general terms can apply to dierent individuals.
General terms are most naturally understood as types, and types are universals, so here
also the explanandum seems to imply the existence of universals, which was supposed to
be the explanans. Perhaps if the explanandum could be reformulated in terms of tokens
of terms alone this problem could be escaped. However, it is already a substantive issue
whether such a reformulation is possible, and solving this problem may already require
solving the whole problem of universals, so that nothing would remain to be explained if
this could be done.
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sparse property. Rodriguez-Pereyra borrows his concept of a sparse prop-
erty from David Lewis and sparse properties are introduced and so implicitly
dened by Lewis in [Lew86, page 59] as properties whose possession makes
for qualitative similarity. Since "qualitative similarity" as Lewis uses it here
is surely a synonym for "resemblance" as Rodriguez-Pereyra uses it, it fol-
lows from the very denition of sparse properties by mere deductive inference
that if several things sharse a sparse property, then these things resemble
all things with that property, which was supposed to be the explanans. It
follows from that denition just as it follows from the denition of dormi-
tive virtue that substance with such a virtue cause people to fall asleep,
so Nagel would surely regard the explanation Rodriguez-Pereyra oers as a
pseudo-explanation.
We can show this more technically, as this may make it more certain for
those capable of following an argument conducted in symbolic logic. It fol-
lows from Lewis's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's implicit denition of sparse prop-
erties that (8P )(Sparse(P ) ! (8x)(8y)(P (x) & P (y) ! Resemble(x; y))),
and thus the truth of this implication belongs to the data Rodriguez-Pereyra
starts out with. Therefore the data is (in the simplest case where there
are two things sharing the sparse property) of the form (9P )((9x)(x =
a) & (9y)(y = b) & P (a) & P (b) & Sparse(P )) & (8P )(Sparse(P ) !
(8x)(8y)(P (x) & P (y)! Resemble(x; y))). Thus his inference has the form
(9P )(9x)(9y)(P (x) & P (y)
& Sparse(P )) & (8P )(Sparse(P ) ! (8x)(8y)(P (x) & P (y) ! R(x; y))) `
(9x)(9y)(R(x; y). This inference is surely deductively valid, and thus no
abduction is needed to pass from the premise to the conclusion. Thus while
the Resemblance Nominalist's explanation may not be like explaining why
opium induces sleep by saying it has a dormitive virtue, it is like explaining
conversely why opium has a dormitive virtue by saying that it induces sleep,
which is not any better. Here the explanans does not assert any more than
the explanandum either, but only makes clearer the way we use words.
Even worse, Rodriguez-Pereyra's ontological theory as a whole seems
at least at rst glance to actually contradict the explanandum. Since the
explanandum resemblance nominalism oers is not logically incompatible
with those universalism and trope theories are supposed to oer, Rodriguez-
Pereyra must make and does make the additional claim that there are no
universals or tropes so that his theory might be a genuine alternative to
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universalism. However, if the explanadum is that many things share the
same property and the theory of resemblance nominalism, says there are no
properties, as there are neither universals or tropes, then the explanandum
and the theory explaining it surely contradict each other.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, however, sees that this counterargument might be
raised and tries to answer it. Let us see if he succeeds in this. He says
in [RP02, pages 15-16]:
I use the word "property" in expressions like "the rose has
the property of being red " or "dierent particulars share the
same properties" without committing myself to the existence of
any entities over and above roses and particulars in general.
However, it is not evident whether Rodriguez-Pereyra can use the word like
this if he uses it at all in the way it is commonly used in English. In order
to see whether he can use the word like this while remaining true to the
semantic rules of English he would have to give a conceptual analysis of his
proposed explanandum, something he refuses to do. It can be argued that
it follows from the very fact that languages like English are learnable and
hence have a recursive semantics that he cannot do so without using not
only the word "property" but also the words "the" and "same" dierently
than they are usually used. However, if Rodriguez-Pereyra uses the words
in an unusual way and another philosopher like Rosenkrantz uses them as
they are usually used in describing his explanandum, then though the two
philosophers use the same words in describing their explanandum, they re-
ally have dierent explananda. In this case if their problems are explana-
tory problems then since they have a dierent explanans they are dierent
problems and the philosophers are just talking past each other. However,
Rodriguez-Pereyra and Rosenkrantz still disagree with each other, since they
oer incompatible solutions to the original problem formulated by Porphyry.
In fact the position of at least some Universalists, including Rosenrantz,
is actually more sustainable than that of Rodriguez-Pereyra. First of all,
though neither Rodriguez-Pereyra and Rosenkrantz reach their theory by
reasoning abductively from their data as they claim, yet Rosenkrantz's the-
ory seems far better since at least there is no reason to think that it would
contradict the data it starts from. Secondly Rosenkrantz tells us more about
what kind of explanation he is oering than Rodriguez-Pereyra does, and it
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turns out that Rosenkrantz's concept of explanation is clearly far broader
than the usual concept of scientic explanation. Rosenkrantz says in [Ros93,
pages 73,74] that in an explanation of the sort he is oering the explanans
provides a philosophical analysis of the explanandum and that in an anal-
ysis the analysans and the analysandum are necessarily equivalent and the
analysans provides a certain kind of explanation of the analysandum. If
then in this kind of explanation the explanandum is equivalent with the
explanans then the explanans certainly follows from the explanandum, so
Rosenkrantz almost explicitly acknowledges that the kind of explanation he
is oering is not informative. However, Rosenkrantz also says that the infer-
ence he is using is inference to the best explanation, but this seems highly
misleading, for if in the sort of explanation he uses the explanandum and
explanans are logically equivalent, then surely the explanans is the only pos-
sible explanation, not just the best of many possible explanations, as any
explananda inconsistent with the explanans would also be inconsistent with
the explanandum67. Swoyer, however, explicitly denies that the explanation
would be the only possible explanation.
The view Rosenkrantz is proposing is, then, in reality closer to the view
I am here proposing than the view of Swoyer I am here opposing, though
Rosenkrantz's view is expressed a bit misleadingly. The kind of philosophical
explanation Rosenkrantz seeks is explanation only in a completely dierent
sense of the word "explanation" than scientic explanation in Nagel's sense.
Thus Rosenkrantz cannot really be blamed because the kind of explanation
he proposes does not satisfy Nagel's criterion for a satisfactory explanation.
Swoyer, however, clearly does consider the kind of explanation he is oering
to be a kind of scientic explanation, and hence the fact that it does not
satisfy Nagel's criterion clearly counts against it. It is not quite clear which of
these two camps Rodriguez-Pereyra belongs to. While he admits conceptual
analysis as a kind of explanation, he yet contrasts the kind of explanation
67Some reconciliation between these two conceptions of ontological explanation can,
however, be found if we distinguish two conceptions of possibility, logical and epistemic
possibility. An explanation such as Rosenkrantz seeks has to be the only logically possible
explanation of its explanandum, but it might still be that there are many epistemically
possible explanations, if something that is logically impossible may yet be epistemically
possible, since we do not always know what is and what is not logically possible. In any
case explanation in Rosenkrantz's sense obviously cannot be contrasted with conceptual
analysis as a competing methodology as e. g. Swoyer does, so using the word "explanation"
in the way Rosenkrantz does is rather misleading as it is more commonly used as Swoyer
does, so that conceptual analysis could not be a form of inference to the best explanation.
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he thinks the problem of universals demands with conceptual analysis. This
would seem to indicate that the kind of explanation he seeks must according
to him be similar to scientic explanation, unless there is to be a third kind
of basically dierent explanation besides scientic explanation and the kind
of philosophical explanation which consists in conceptual analysis; however,
Rodriguez-Pereyra does not make very clear what he thinks the relationship
between scientic explanation and the kind of philosophical explanation he
is trying to provide to be.
Even if Rodriguez-Pereyra thinks that the explanation in question is
something quite dierent from ordinary scientic explanation, he may be
in trouble. It can be questioned whether Rodriguez-Pereyra can really for-
mulate the problem of universals as a problem of explaining how something
is the case in Nozick's sense convincingly. If the problem is of this kind,
then the existence of universals would have what he calls apparent exclud-
ers. He suggests that this excluder is just the numerical dierence among
particulars. He admits that some may feel that there does not seem to be
any incompatibility, of any sort, between a and b being the same in kind
and being numerically dierent. I must confess that I belong to those that
feel that there is no incompatiblity, at least any that could mislead any
careful thinker for a second. Rodriguez-Pereyra, however, says that there
is an apparent incompatibility between being the same and being dierent,
and distinguishing between numerical dierence and qualitative dierence
is already a way of accounting for it. Would Rodriguez-Pereyra then say
that there is also an apparent incompatibility e. g. between two men having
the same father and being dierent men, which must be accounted for by
distinguishing between let us say paternal identity and numerical identity?
Really no one except a philosopher motivated by some kind of monistic
agenda would be inclined to confuse identity with having the same colour
or shape any more than anyone except a sophistical philosopher would be
inclined to confuse identity with having the same father.
I have so far examined only two possible answers to the problem of uni-
versals, though these are from the opposite ends of the spectrum of the
oered solutions and so form a rather representative sample. In order to
fully support my conclusion I would have to go through them all in detail,
but that is clearly impossible here. However, though I cannot here go into
all the details, it seems to me that if the Problem of Universals is not only
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supposed to an explanatory problem but its explanandum is thought to be
what Armstrong and Rodriguez-Pereyra think it to be, then all proposed
solutions to the problem of universals that are at all credible make the sup-
posed explanandum entail the supposed explanans and are hence viciously
circular pseudo-explanations by Nagel's criterion. The only solutions that
do not do this are those where the proposed explanans does not explain the
explanandum at all. E. g. predicate nominalism (or at least a simplistic form
of it) is clearly a solution of this kind. That many things have a negative
electric charge does not entail (as the deductive-nomological model of expla-
nation would demand) that the predicate "have a negative electric charge"
applies to them, as the predicate could have been used so that it applied to
things with a positive charge instead or nto used at all. Nor is it true that
if the predicate "have a negative electric charge" would not be applied to
them they would not have a negative charge as the counterfactual theory
of explanation would demand. The same holds of concept nominalism (or
at least a simplistic form of it); even if there had been no sentient beings
and hence no concepts in the universe, there would yet have been things
that had a negative charge. Summing up, all proposed explanations to
Armstrong's explanatory problem are either pseudo-explanations or wholly
non-explanatory, which suggests very strongly that the whole problem is a
pseudo-problem.
We cannot conclude from this that all attempts to portray the problem
of universals as an explanatory problem would lead to it being a pseudo-
problem. For instance, Salmieri's Problem of Concepts does not seem to
be pseudo-problem; at least some answers to it seem to give quite genuine
explanations. If the universalist explains why unitary thoughts apply to a
plurality of objects by the hypothesis that the plurality of objects possess
a common property and that the mind is rst related to that property and
then through it to the plurality, this seems to be genuine explanation. The
explanandum (that unitary thoughts apply to a plurality of objects) does not
seem to imply the explanans (that there is a property and the mind is in some
way related to it). This conclusion must be qualied a bit; the explanandum
is a bit obscure, as it is not wholly clear what it means for a thought to be
unitary so this is not wholly certain; someone could claim that a thought
being logically unitary implies that it is related to a property, though this
might not be plausible. However, the formulation could probably be only
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slightly modied so that the obscurity is eliminated but Salmieri's intent is
preserved; the explanandum can just be that a thought applies to a plurality
of objects. Similarly the explanatory problem cold be formulated in a more
linguistic way so that the explanandum is that linguistic predicates apply
to several objects; this might not be a pseudo-problem either. Nevertheless,
the historical argumentation I have already given in Section 6.3 suces to
show that these explanatory problems are not the same as the traditional
Problem of Universals, though they are closely related problems.
6.5 A Problem of Truthmakers or of Ontological
Commitments?
6.5.1 The A question and B question
Following Campbell [Cam90, x2.2, page 29], Rodriguez-Pereyra distinguishes
two questions concerning universals which in his view may not have parallel
answers. We can take one single red object and ask of it: what is it about
this thing in virtue of which it red? Campbell and Rodriguez-Pereyra call
this the A question. Secondly we can ask about two red things what is it
about these two things in virtue of which they both are red. They call it
the B question (note that this distinction has nothing to do with the famous
distinction between A-theory and B-theory of time). Thus the A question
concerns statements of the form "a is F" while the B question concerns
statements of the form "a is F and b is F". Following Oliver [Oli96, page
49], Rodriguez-Pereyra divides these questions still further into six questions
which in their view Armstrong fails to distinguish. We can ask for an account
of statements of the following forms:
Example 12 a and b have a common property
Example 13 a and b are both F
Example 14 a and b have a common property, F
Example 15 a has a property
Example 16 a is F
Example 17 a has the property F
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Oliver and Rodriguez-Pereyra notice that Armstrong took statements of
the form "a is F and b is F" and "a and b have a common property, F" to
be equivalent, like statements of the forms "a is F" and "a has the property
F", as have many other philosophers. It is surely intuitive that at least
some equivalences of this kind are correct, though as we will see desperate
nominalists have even resorted to denying this.
Oliver and Rodriguez-Pereyra point out that all of these questions can
ask either for the truthmaker, the ontological commitments or the concep-
tual analysis of the content of the statements in question. Rodriguez-Pereyra
then argues that if the Problem of Universals is the problem of giving an ac-
count of how the facts expressed by the statements are possible, then the sort
of account cannot be about the ontological commitment of the statements.
This is clearly true, as an impossible statement might yet have ontological
commitments. However, they think that the account can be about their
truthmakers, since if we show that a thing has a truthmaker we show that
it is true and therefore it must also be possible.
I have some serious reservations about this conclusion. First of all, I
have some doubts concerning truthmaker theory as such. Do statements
(which word I use here as a proxy for whatever entities are truthbearers) in
general have truthbearers? Applying the notion of truthbearers in ontology
demands that some principle such as the truthmaker axiom, according to
which for all statements (of some kind) there is an entity that makes them
true, is correct. I have already argued in Subsection 4.2.4 that there are good
reasons to doubt whether the truthmaker axiom, at least in its standard
form, is true at all. I have argued that philosophical problems concerning
truth can be solved on the basis of Tarski's theory of truth (if it is suitably
generalized) and that this theory does not require (even in a generalized
form) the postulation of any truthmakers.
However, even if the truthmaker axiom were correct, there are reasons
to doubt whether the problem of universals concerns the truthmakers of
some statements, so my opposition to the claim of Rodriguez-Pereyra does
not depend solely on my theory of truth. Showing that a statement has a
truthmaker does indeed show that it is possible (though this is surely not
the only way to show that it is possible). It might perhaps even show why
it is possible. However, it far from clear that it shows how it is possible.
Could we not know that something is possible without knowing how it is
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possible? However, this just stresses that it is not at all clear what it would
be to explain how something is possible, in which case it cannot be ruled
out that nding out the ontological commitments of a truth might be also
involved (among other things) in showing how it is possible68. However,
the existence of a truthmaker does not prove even the possibility of truth
other than in a circular way if the existence of the truthmaker is inferred
only from the truth which is supposed to be the explanandum, as would be
done in a typical abductive argument. If we are to have a non-circular proof
we have to have independent evidence for the existence of a truthmaker, if
we are to justify the possibility of the explanandum. However, if we have
such independent evidence, we are not dealing with an inference to the best
explanation at all, at least not if such inference is supposed to be a primitive
form of inference!69.
However, even if this conclusion were correct, it would not prove that
the traditional problem of universals concerns truthmakers, since as we have
68I would suggest very tentatively that showing how something is possible requires
nding out the truth-conditions (both necessary and sucient) of the statement whose
possible truth we are asking for and then showing that they can be fullled. If truth-
makers play any role in this, it is because the existence-conditions of a truthmaker are
sucient truth-conditions of the statement, so that the possible existence of any possible
truth-maker of the statement implies the possible truth of the statement. However, if we
are trying to explain just how something is possible and not how it is actual, then possible
truthmakers are just as good as the actual truthmakers; we need not know what is actual
in order to know what is possible. Giving the truth-conditions of the statement is in a
(perhaps rather weak) sense a conceptual analysis of the statement. It also involves nding
out the ontological commitments of the statement, since the existence of the entities the
statement is ontologically committed to is among its necessary conditions and thus belongs
to its truth-conditions.
69It is interesting that though Rodriguez-Pereyra refers to Nozick as support for his
view, Nozick has not drawn the same consequences from his view as Rodriguez-Pereyra
does. Nozick tries famously (in [Noz81, pages 172-176], in the same book Rodriguez-
Pereyra refers to) to explain how knowledge is possible. However, he does not do this
by giving the truthmakers of statements concerning knowledge, as we should except if
Rodriguez-Pereyra's treatment of universals were correct and the problem of universals
were really of the same form as the question how knowledge is possible. Rather, Nozick
gives to knowledge four conditions which are supposed to be both necessary and jointly
sucient and then tries to show that these conditions can in come cases be satised. Thus
part of what he does in order to explain how knowledge is possible can be considered as
giving a paraphrase for statements concerning knowledge, or even giving a conceptual
analysis of knowledge. This diers from Rodriguez-Pereyra who thinks a paraphrase need
not be given for statements concerning properties in order to explain how the having of
common properties is possible. Nozick's conditions have been very much discussed in the
epistemological literature, and the presupposition has always been that if the conditions
can be shown not to be adequate paraphrases then Nozick's theory of knowledge has been
shown to wrong. Thus Nozick does not really give much support to Rodriguez-Pereyra.
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seen the traditional problem of universals is not a problem of giving an ac-
count of how some fact is possible. Rather the traditional problem is (in
its basic part) whether there are universals, and thus if we have some fact
which serves as our evidence it is relevant to the traditional problem only it
implies or makes probable the existence of universals. In the rst case, if the
evidence implies the existence of universals then it (or its verbal or propo-
sitional formulation) carries ontological commitment to universals. Even in
the latter case the concept of ontological commtiment comes into play, since
then the evidence must make probable a statement which carries ontolog-
ical commitment to universals. We come then to the conclusion(already
famously defended by Peter van Inwagen in [vI04]) that the sort of account
required is primarily about the ontological commitments of the statements
rather than about their truthmakers70.
The account can, however, also be about the conceptual analysis of the
statements. I have argued earlier that conceptual analysis i. e. meaning
analysis should nd out the truth-conditions of statements (instead of ver-
ication conditions or indication relations), since meaning either consists
in truth-conditions or determines them. I have also argued the ontological
commitments of a statement are among its truth-conditions. It may then
70Oliver argues in [Oli96, x21] that if Armstrong is interpreted so that he asks for the
ontological commitments of the statements in question, his a posteriori realism leads him
to trouble. If the argument Armstrong uses is interpreted so that it is based on the
ontological commitments of the sentences in question, then a similar argument would lead
to the existence of such universals as the relation of instantiation and virtues. One would
have to deduce from the truth of the sentence "John has all the virtues of his father."
(when understood as presupposing that John's father has virtues) that there are virtues,
However, Armstrong thinks that an a posteriori realist cannot establish the existence of
virtues as easily as this. This seems to me to be a perfectly valid argument ad hominem
against Armstrong. However, the problems do not really arise because Armstrong is an
a posteriori realist but just because Armstrong is a sparse realist. A promiscuous realist
avoids the problems, as he can easily accept the existence of virtues (at least if he is a
realist about ethics). Even a promiscuous realist can be an a posteriori realist and think
that we know the existence of universals only by means of experience. In order to be an
a posteriori realist he just has to think that it is only by experience that we know that
any such sentence as "John has all the virtues of his father" is true. This indeed seems
to me to be a plausible view. Surely an a posteriori realist does not have to deny that
we can deduce one statement with ontological commitments from another statement with
stronger ontological commitments! Surely it is enough for him that the ultimate basis of
our knowledge of what exists is empirical. Whether even a promiscuous realist can accept
the existence of the instantiation relation is another matter, as this poses the danger of
Bradley's regress and (what is far more serious) even of Russell's paradox. However, I will
argue below that while some instances of quantication over universals are indispensable
for our inferential practice, others can be avoided, if we make use of free predicate logic.
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(at lest in some cases) be by means of conceptual analysis that we nd out
the ontological commitments of the statement.
In fact the problem of universals would not be at all an ontological
problem if it were a problem about truthmakers. According to Rodriguez-
Pereyra in [RP02, page 18], all solutions to the problem of universals make
claims about what exists, and that is why it is an ontological problem.
However, surely making claims about what exists is not enough to make a
theory an ontological theory nor the problem to which it is a solution an
ontological problem. Many theories that are not ontological make claims
about what exists. A physical theory may claim that there are electrons, or
a biological theory may claim there are cats, but this does not turn physics or
biology into ontology, does not make them parts of philosophy, though it does
make physics and biology relevant to ontology. An ontological theory should
concern only the most general kinds of questions with regard to what exists.
Rodriguez-Pereyra says in [RP02, page 223] that Resemblance Nominalism
and Class Nominalism have the same ontologies. However, if they have the
same ontologies, and yet are dierent theories, then surely the problem to
which they oer dierent answers cannot be an ontological problem71! The
problem of what are the truthmakers of some truths is not an ontological but
a semantical problem. It does have implications for ontology and cannot thus
be sharply separated from it, but this is just because statements about the
existence of truthmakers have existential commitments just like statements
of physics and biology.
Rodriguez-Pereyra then argues further that according to standard truth-
maker theory whatever entities make statements of the form 16 true make
also statements of the form 13 true and whatever entities make such state-
ments true make also statements of the form 12 true, since whatever makes
a logically stronger statement true makes also are logical weaker statements,
i. e. al statements implied by it true. Therefore according to Rodriguez-
71Thus the dierent kinds of nominalism are not always dierent ontological theories,
as is usually thought, but many of them (such as predicate nominalism and concept
nominalism) are just dierent ways of justifying a single ontological theory (at least if the
concept nominalist admits that there are (token) predicates though he does not employ
them in explaining universals away, as a concept nominalist surely usually does). However,
clearly some dierences between dierent kinds of nominalism, such as the dierence
between a class nominalism which holds that there are classes though not intensional
properties and an extreme or thoroughgoing nominalism which holds that there are neither
classes nor properties, are properly ontological.
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Pereyra the fundamental problem is to give the truthmakers of a statement
of the form 16, e. g. what is it about a single thing that makes it red.
Thus the fundamental problem is according to him the A question, not the
B question. Thus in his view the One Over Many Problem dissolves into
the Many over One problem, the problem of how the same thing can be of
dierent types.
Again I agree that the argument is valid but deny one of its premises,
against which I have already argued. Since as I have argued it is the on-
tological commitments of the statements which are relevant to the prob-
lem of universals, not their truthmakers, we must ask how the ontological
commitments of the two kinds of statements are related and not how their
truthmakers are related. As Oliver already pointed out, the relation of the
ontological commitments of the two kinds of statements to each other is
the converse of the relation of their truthmakers72. The ontological com-
mitments of the weaker statements are also the ontological commitments of
the stronger statements. Whatever entities the statement "a and b have a
common property" is committed to the statement "a and b are both F" is
committed to if the rst statement truly follows from the second and simi-
larly whatever entities the statement "a has a property" is committed to the
statement "a is F is" is also committed to. Thus we must primarily try to
nd out what are the ontological commitments of statements of the form 12
and thus the fundamental problem is the B question.
At rst glance statements of the form 12 seem to be straightforward ex-
istential quantications over properties that are universals, and they would
hence by Quine's and Church's criteria of ontological commitment carry
ontological commitment to universals. However, nominalists have argued
72Even this statement is somewhat controversial. Ross P. Cameron has argued
in [Cam08] that the ontological commitments of a theory are just those things that must
exist to make true the sentences of the theory. If Cameron were correct, then asking for the
ontological commitments and asking for the truthmakers of the six statements would be
the same thing. Ontological commitments and truthmakers can only be contrasted in the
way Rodriguez-Pereyra and Oliver contrast them if we assume some theory of ontological
commitments like Quine's. Cameron proposed his theory as part of a solution to van Inwa-
gen's Special Composition Question, an ontological question separate from the Problem of
Universals. However, it can also be applied to the Problem of Universals. If so applied it
leads to pretty much the same conclusion as Rodriguez-Pereyra's metaontological theory,
that the A question is fundamental. However, there are reasons not to accept Cameron's
view; Jonathan Schaer has presented many of them in [Sch08b]. Any formulation of
the truthmaker principle makes use of quantication, so why should quantication have
ontological commitments only as a part of a truthmaker principle, and never elsewhere?
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that the syntactic form of such sentences systematically misleads us so that
they are not really existentially quantied sentences, so we must study such
claims.
Of course while this is what we must ultimately do, this may not be the
best point to start from. After all, the statement "a and b have a common
property." seems to imply quite trivially the existence of universals, so we
might be accused of begging the question if we just assumed it to be true.
Can one indeed argue at all rationally that the statement is true but there
are not universals? This seems hard, as it seems obvious that the state-
ment quanties over properties, which are common to two individuals and
hence are universals. However, according to Quine's criterion of ontological
commitment, as expressed in [Qui53d], we are ontologically committed to
entities we quantify over. Alonzo Church suggested in [Chu58] the modi-
cation to this denition that we are only committed to what we quantify
over existentially. However, universals are quantied over existentially in
the statement, so it seems clear that the statement is ontologically commit-
ted to universals. One (very implausible) way for the nominalist to escape
this conclusion would be to argue that the phrase "have a common prop-
erty" is here used like "kick the bucket", where saying that "John kicked the
bucket." does not really quantify over buckets as as its syntactic composition
would lead us to except and hence does not carry ontological commitment
to buckets. I will later show that this kind of interpretation is not at all
plausible.
6.5.2 Higher-order and First-order Notation in Theories of
Predication
A major reason, perhaps the only reason, we have to think that statements
of the form "a and b have a common property" are true is that we think they
are implied by statements of the form "a and b are both F" and that these
are again implied by statements of the form "a is F" and "b is F". It would
surely be absurd to claim that no statement of the latter form would ever
be true, as this would imply that no atomic statement that could express
empirical knowledge about the world would ever be true. Thus the only
thing that a nominalist can with any show of reason doubt is whether the
implication holds. As this can be questioned, we must ask whether the
equivalence between "a and b are both F" and "a and b have a common
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property, F" really holds as it surely seems to, as some philosophers have
denied it. This equivalence seems perfectly analogous to the equivalence
between "a is both F and G" and "the particular a is F and is G".
Symbolically the rst equivalence is between F (a) & F (b) and (9P )(P =
F & P (a) & P (b)) if we use higher-order notation. Using such notation
is necessary if we are to use the predication operation of predicate logic to
express the same as predication expresses in natural languages, since natural
languages are inescapably higher-order in their syntax, having for example
such expressions as adverbs, which turn a predicate (an adjective or verb) to
another predicate and are thus second-order functors which can be dened
with the aid of second-order predicates which are predicated of rst-order
predicates.
However, as the interpretation of any syntactic operations dened with
the aid of formation rules is conventional, it is not necessary to use the
same syntactic operation with the same interpretation in all languages, so
we can just as well introduce into the language of rst-order predicate logic a
special predicate to express the predication operation of natural languages.
George Bealer has shown in [Bea82, page 84] how a formula of a higher order
language can always be translated into a formula of a rst order language.
This rst order language is of course richer than the standard system usu-
ally known as the language of rst order logic, but it is rst-order in the
exact syntactic sense that no variable occurs in predicate position. Bealer's
logic, P1, has a special predicate representing the instantiation or predica-
tion relation. Bealer uses a special predicate, , standing for the relation
of predication. ht1; : : : tnix means that the relation x is predicated of the
entities t1; : : : ; tn. This predicate diers form the membership predicate as
it does not full the axiom of extensionality. Bealer suggests in [Bea82, page
258] that if we adapted anadic logic such as was developed in [Gra76] where
predicates need not have a xed adicity this could be written more simply as
t1 : : : tnx. I suggest that we can also write this in usual prec notation as
(t1; : : : ; tn; x) or (ht1; : : : ; tni ; x). Bealer also uses an abstraction opera-
tor; [A]v1;:::;vn means the relation that holds between objects v1; : : : ; vn just
in case A if n > 1, the property of being such that A if n = 1 and the propo-
sition that A if n = 0. Bealer calls properties, propositions and relations
together PRPs, and I will occasionally use this convenient terminology.
Bealer follows the tradition of Aristotelianism and of Lesniewski in that
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this relation comprehends both instantiation and identity. Therefore ab
means that b is said of a and covers also the case where a and b are identical.
I will, however, depart from Bealer in that I will distinguish these two kinds
of predication from each other from the beginning, as is more usually done. I
will use  to stand only for the instantiation relation, not for identity. Thus
ht1; : : : tnix means that the relation x holds between the entities t1; : : : ; tn.
However, Bealer's translation method can be used despite this change. I will
show as an example how this is done in the case of second order logic.
Thus we can also express the rst ostensible equivalence between natu-
ral language sentences using rst-order notation as an equivalence between
(a; f) & (b; f) and (9x)(x = f & (a; x) & (b; x)), when (x; s)
means that s is predicated of x, i. e. x that is instantiated by s Sim-
ilarly symbolically the second equivalence is between F (a) & G(a) and
(9x)(x = a & F (x) & G(x)) or between (a; f) & (a; g) and (9x)(x =
a & (x; f) & (x; g)). We must ask whether there are any reasons to
doubt this analogy.
In fact there might be such reasons. One reason to doubt the rst equiv-
alence as it is expressed in higher-order notation might be doubt about
higher-order logic. However, all doubts one might have about higher-order
logic are not relevant here in discussing the problem of universals. One
might doubt whether the equivalence between F (a) & F (b) and (9P )(P =
F & P (a) & P (b)), i. e. F (a) & F (b)  (9P )(P = F & P (a) & P (b)), is a
logical truth. The question of what truths are logical and what not is not
an easy one, and has been much discussed without much agreement being
reached (for a good treatment of the topic see [Mac00]).
While I nd it quite plausible that the equivalence is a logical truth, this
dicult question is fortunately not relevant here. It is enough in order to
argue for the existence of universals that this equivalence and the material
implication F (a) & F (b) ! (9P )(P = F & P (a) & P (b)) which it implies
by the denition of equivalence are truths, whether logical or non-logical
truths. E. g. one could take them to be truths of a property theory or set
theory that is non-logical but is an indispensable foundation of mathematics
and so strongly justied, and this would be enough to support realism about
universals. After all if the material implication is true at all then we can infer
(9P )(P = F & P (a) & P (b)) from the material implication and F (a) & F (b)
with the aid of modus ponens alone, and modus ponens belongs already to
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propositional logic, not to any kind of predicate logic, whether higher-order
or rst-order. In order to be at all relevant here doubts about higher-order
logic must be radical, so that one doubts whether the material implication
above is a truth at all; this requires some very radical position, such as doubt
whether any statement containing higher-order quantication can be true
or indeed whether higher-order quantication is at all meaningful.
However, if the equivalence and implication can also be expressed in rst-
order notation, as (a; f) & (b; f)  (9x)(x = f & (a; x) & (b; x)) and
(a; f) & (b; f)! (9x)(x = f & (a; x) & (b; x)), as I think, then even
this kind of doubt about higher-order logic is not important for the problem
of universals. This material implication is surely true in standard rst-order
logic.
However, there may be a deeper cause for doubt. Though both of the
equivalences above always hold in standard predicate logic, they do not hold
universally in free logic (at least not in positive free logic), since in it either
of the terms a and f may be non-denoting, but hold only for some formulas
in free logic. Such equivalences are according to free logic true not in virtue
of the form common to all of them but in virtue of their content or of some
form which is the form of only some of them. Thus a philosopher who thinks
that free logic is the correct predicate logic could argue that the implication
holds only in the case of the inference to the existence of particulars but
not in the case of the inference to the existence of universals. However, we
must see if he can consistently hold this while admitting that the kinds of
inference that he would use in the course of his ordinary life are valid, for
if he cannot then he cannot consistently deny the inference to the existence
of universals to be valid.
Thus we must consider whether any such equivalences are correct. Quine
has argued that the only way to show that statements with some ontological
commitments are true is pragmatically, by showing that such statements are
in some way useful. This may mean that they are useful in science or (here
I may depart from Quine) in ordinary life. This also holds of equivalences
that imply sentences with such commitments together with other, already
accepted sentences. However, an equivalence can be useful only because it
allows us to infer a useful sentence from another useful sentence. Thus our
task comes down to considering whether any equivalences of the form we
have considered above play an important role in our inferential practices.
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This is of course a big task which I cannot carry very far here; however,
in the rest of this dissertation I will give some initial arguments for the
conclusion that many of them do. If any such equivalence holds between
an indispensable or very useful sentence of the form 13 and a sentence of
the form 12 which quanties explicitly over universals, then we must give
a positive answer to the most fundamental question concerning universals,
whether there are any. In the last section of this dissertation I will give a
preliminary argument for the conclusion that some such equivalences hold
and therefore there are universals.
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Chapter 7
A Preliminary Argument for
the Existence of Universals
Many sentences of natural languages such as Example 18 below are true.
What they express is the case, and is often known to be case. Indeed, if our
epistemology is directly realistic, i. e. allows us to have direct knowledge
about material particulars, then it is certainly also plausible that we can
directly see that two shirts are of the same colour.
Example 18 These shirts are the same colour.
Example 19 The rst shirt is blue.
Example 20 Blue is a colour.
Example 21 The second shirt is blue.
The rst sentence is obviously similar to the following.
Example 22 John and Mike love the same woman.
This kind of sentence is usually formalized as follows:
Formalization 1 (9x)(W (x) & L(j; x) & L(m;x) & (8y)(Wy & L(j; y)!
y = x) & (8y)(Wy & L(m; y)! y = x)).
It is a natural assumption that the sentence about the shirts must be
formalized analogously, as quantifying over colours. This assumption is so
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natural that surely anyone who suggests a dierent kind of formalization
- such as taking the "having the same colour" to be a simple primitive
expression - has the burden of proof. He must say why we cannot similarly
take "loving the same woman" to be primitive, so that Example 22 would
not involve commitment to women either.
This assumption can also explain why the statement expressed by the
fourth sentence about the shirts follows from those expressed by the three
earlier sentences. If "having the same colour" were a primitive then the cor-
rectness of the inference would be wholly mysterious. Here the assumption
of the existence of universals will play an explanatory role, though this is
only explanation in the general sense in which a mathematical axiom can
explain something. Also the suggestion that "having the same colour" is
a primitive would make the inference non-logical, but the inference plainly
appears to be logical just like the sentence about love in whatever sense
natural language inferences can be logically valid.
Nor would such a suggestion of primitiveness easily if at all t in with
any kind of compositional or even minimally recursive theory of semantics.
It would amount to treating the phrase "have the same colour" as similar to
phrasal expressions like "kick the bucket". Not only is this clearly unintuitive
(and staggeringly uneconomical), but it would lead to insuperable problems
with the learnability of languages. Clearly there are innitely many phrases
that exhibit similar inference patterns; e. g. "have the same pale colour",
"have the same small size", "have the same many-angled outline", "have
the same size bigger than 3 cubic meters", etc.1 A language in which all
such phrases were primitive would have innitely many lexical primitives
and could not be learnable.
If the sentence is to be formalized as quantifying over colours there are
two ways to do this, the higher order approach and the rst order approach.
The following formula is its formalization in higher order notation. In
the formula below C(F ) means intuitively that F is a colour.
Formalization 2 (9F )(F (s1) & F (s2) & C(F ) & (8G)(C(G) & G(s1) !
G = F ) & (8G)(C(G) & G(s2)! G = F )).
1Thus expressions like "have the same colour" are productive in a sense in which phrasal
expressions like "kick the bucket" are not; an expression like "kick the yellow bucket
of Farmer Ted" does not have a conventional use in which it would indicate anything
concerning dying, but has only a reading in which it quanties over buckets.
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The following is the rst order formalization of the same sentence. In the
formula below C(x) means intuitively that x is a colour and (s; x) means
that x is instantiated by s.
Formalization 3 (9x)(C(x) & (s1; x) & (s2; x) & (8y)(C(y) & (s1; y)!
y = x) & (8y)(C(y) & (s2; y)! y = x)).
In these formulas, however, we are quantifying both existentially and
universally over colours. Colours are properties. Therefore we are quantify-
ing existentially over properties. According to the formulas the properties
we are quantifying over are instantiated by (or predicated of in the ontolog-
ical sense of predication) two distinct particulars. However, properties that
are instantiated by or predicated two distinct particulars are by denition
universals according to the traditional denition we have already quoted.
Therefore we are quantifying existentially over universals in the sense I (and
many other philosophers) use the word.
Here a dogmatic Quinean might have an objection. I am here making use
of the notion of what entities are universals by the very denition of the word
"universal". Quine was of course famously suspicious about this notion of a
denition. He asked in [Qui53e, page 21] "Who dened it thus, and when?"
This may be often be a dicult question to answer, though this is hardly
sucient evidence to think that it has not been dened by some persons,
whether explicitly or implicitly. However, in this case it can be given a
clear answer. As I have already shown, Aristotle originally dened it in this
way. I have also shown that other, newer philosophers such as Wolterstor
and Loux have followed them in dening universals in essentially this way,
sometimes with minor dierences, and could show the same of many more.
On could of course quibble about whether "universal" is a correct translation
of "katholou" or "universale", but it is a historical fact that it has commonly
been translated in this way and this has helped to constitute the meaning
of the word "universal" as it is is used in present ontological discussion (and
the English word has actually obviously developed even phonologically out
of the Latin word). How the words are used in ordinary Greek, Latin and
English or by the practitioners of other scholarly disciplines (such as e. g.
linguistics which has a rather dierent use for the word) is wholly beside
the point, especially since the Greek form of the word word katholou was
rst coined by philosophers, probably by Aristotle himself, and originated
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within philosophy, and the corresponding words in later languages derived
from this. Likewise one might ask whether De Interpretatione from which
the notion ultimately derives was really written by Aristotle or some of his
disciples, but again this small uncertainty certainly does not matter. In fact
a philosopher could just dene the word "universal" stipulatively so that
an entity is an universal if it is or could be instantiated by many entities,
and even Quine admits that there is no problem with meaning entailments
generated by such stipulations. However, if every philosopher just did this
then it would not be known whether dierent philosophers who spoke of
universals were dealing with the same question. Therefore reference to the
history of the notion of a universal is useful though not necessary.
However, according to Quine's and Church's criteria of ontological com-
mitment we are ontologically committed to entities we quantify over exis-
tentially, if the quantication in question is objectual. The kind of onto-
logical commitment to universals in question here follows from the example
sentences by the denition of universals and is therefore is what I have ear-
lier called narrow analytical ontological commitment (and dened in 9 and
in 10).
Is the quantication here objectual? I do not have space here to discuss
this question in sucient detail, which is a large part of the reason why
this argument for the existence of universals is only preliminary. However,
we can note that the quantication in these examples does not appear to
be any of the most common kinds of non-objectual quantication. As I
have already argued, we do not have names for (all shades of) colours, so
the quantication here cannot be understood as substitutional quantica-
tion. Nor do the sentences constitute any intensional context, which suggests
that the quantication is not perspectival or any of the other kinds of non-
objectual quantication I have discussed in Section 5.10 which may occur in
intensional contexts without implying corresponding objectually quantied
statements. Therefore it seems to me that if a nominalist wants to escape
this argument by claiming that the quantication used in such examples is
not objectual, the burden of proof falls upon him: he must tell us what kind
of quantication is in question.
Therefore if the quantication in such sentences as Example 18 is objec-
tual, as it seems to be, we are committed to the existence of universals if
we ever use such sentences and hold them to be true. However, it is surely
498
absurd to deny the truth of such sentences. Moreover, using such sentences
is necessary if we are to use such forms of inference as the inference from
Example 18 and Example 19 to Example 21 above. Making use of such
inferences, however, is surely essential to our practical life, so denying them
is unacceptable for pragmatical reasons2. It would be rather awkward, for
example, if your wife or mother asked you to buy her three shirts of the
same colour and you had to answer her that you cannot do that, as you are
a nominalist and do not believe in colours! Thus I conclude that we have at
least very good prima facie reasons to believe in the existence of universals.
It must be noted that though the example was given using shirts, and
so we presupposed the existence of shirts, it can also be given in a way
that even philosophers that absurdly deny the existence of shirts cannot
evade. We could start from a sentence like "These sense-data are the same
colour." Thus the argument should be inescapable even to phenomenalists.
I have argued for (weak and feeble) foundationalism, according to which
there must be observation statements, and the examples I have given conrm
that universals must be quantied over in some such statements, no matter
whether such statements concern physical entities or sense-data or mental
entities.
We could of course also start from such statements as "These elementary
particles are the same size.". Thus the argument should be inescapable even
to the kind of extreme physicalists who think that only elementary particles
exist. However, such examples would in my view be less epistemologically
secure, so they would make the existence of universals less certain.
It must also be noted that though the example given above proved the
existence of properties in the narrow sense, entities like colours, a perfectly
similar argument (though one whose premises are epistemologically less se-
2Someone might object that it is only the universally quantied part of the sentences
that is useful, and that the existentially quantied part is redundant. However, if we
admit that the transition from the universally quantied sentence "Whatever colour this
shirt has that shirt has." to the unquantied sentence "If this shirt is blue then that shirt
is blue." preserves truth, we must also admit that the transition from the unquantied
sentence "This shirt is blue." to the existentially quantied one "This shirt has a property."
also preserves truth. As we have already seen, if an ostensible singular term can be bound
by an universal quantier it can also be bound by an existential quantier and must thus
be a genuine singular term. Surely if a transition from (8x)(!  ) to (a=x)!  (a=x)
preserves truth then a transition from (a=x) to 9x)(x = a & ) also preserves truth. This
holds even in free logic, since there the correctness of the rst inference already presupposes
the truth of the sentence (9x)(x = a)!
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cure) can be constructed also for other universals, which not all would be
willing to call properties (though many modern philosophers call them also
properties, and I mostly follow this usage in this dissertation), namely nat-
ural kinds or species or substance-universals; just consider the following
sentences and the inference from the rst two to the third:
Example 23 This animal and that animal are of the same species.
Example 24 This animal is a tiger.
Example 25 That animal is a tiger.
Similar proofs can of course be given for the existence of relations. E. g.
we can say that an object a is as far from object b as object c is from d, and
here apparently the same spatial relation is said to hold between a and b as
between c and d. Such statements seem to be needful if we are to develop
any kind of scientic geometry and thus if we are to develop any kind of
physics. Thus quantication over relations is as important as quantication
over properties.
Similar proofs can also be given for the existence of mathematical objects
such as numbers. This can be seen from examples such as the following:
Example 26 As many men live in Chicago as in New York.
Example 27 Nine hundred men live in Chicago.
Example 28 Nine hundred men live in New York.
We should again explain how the third example sentence follows from
the two preceding ones. The most obvious formalizations of these sentences
that help to explain this are the following higher-order ones (where NN(F )
means that F is a natural number):
Formalization 4 (9F )(NN(F ) & F ((x)(M(x) & L(x; c))) & F ((x)(M(x) & L(x; n))) &
(8F )(NN(F )! (F ((x)( M(x) & L(x; c)))  F ((x)(M(x) & L(x; n)])).
Formalization 5 9((x)(M(x) & L(x; c))).
Formalization 6 9((x)(M(x) & L(x; n))).
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These higher-order formalizations can again be replaced with slightly
more complex rst-order ones:
Formalization 7 (9x)(NN(x) & [M(y) & L(y; c)]yx & [M(y) & L(y; n)]yx) &
(8x)(NN(x)! ([M(y) & L(y; c)]yx  [M(y) & L(y; n)]yx)).
Formalization 8 [M(y) & L(y; c)]y9).
Formalization 9 [M(y) & L(y; n)]y9).
This example seems to me a very good example of the simplest possible
way mathematical concepts are used in everyday discourse. It is surely plau-
sible that the way they are used in sciences like physics is a generalization
of this. A crucial problem in the philosophy of mathematics is how math-
ematics is applicable to physical objects. There are many senses in which
applicability here has been understood. We can distinguish a semantic prob-
lem of applicability and an epistemic problem of applicability. The semantic
problem is what are the truth-conditions of statements that combine talk
about numbers with talk about non-mathematical objets such as physical
objects. The epistemic problem is how we know which such statements are
true. I have here suggested how the semantic problem of the applicability
of mathematics is to be solved, though of course this will not solve the epis-
temic problem. The example above gives a rst indication of how a theory
of universals can explain such application in the semantic sense. As we can-
not know all the men living in New York personally, we can only refer to
them with the aid of such properties of theirs as 'being a man living in New
York'. These are typically clearly relational properties, but such properties
do not dier essentially from ostensibly intrinsic properties such as shapes
or colours. Mathematical entities are primarily related in discourse to such
properties of physical objects and only indirectly to their instances. The
relation between mathematical entities and properties of physical objects is
just instantiation, the very same relation that holds between physical objects
and such rst-order universals as shapes or colours.
The epistemological problems concerning mathematical objects like num-
bers and pure sets, such as have famously been pointed out by Paul Benac-
erraf e. g. in [Ben64], must be admitted to be more dicult than those
concerning other universals. These problems are especially hard for an em-
piricist. I have argued at length that our knowledge of sensible qualities like
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colours or shapes is straightforwardly empirical; we perceive them with our
senses, just as we do sensible particulars. Physical properties like charges
or masses on the other hand can just like unobservable particulars such as
electrons be known inductively or abductively. These examples should then
be unproblematic even for an atomistic empiricist. However, it is not quite
clear whether mathematical objects can be known in either of these ways.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that they cannot be known in any of these ways,
either3.
I have argued that there is prima facie evidence in favour of the exis-
tence of universals. This does not of course prove conclusively that there
are universals. I ought then to argue that such evidence is not defeated; e.
g. I should show that the attempts of nominalists to show that the quanti-
cation used in such examples as I have used is not objectual do not succeed.
3One way to argue that they can be is of course the theory of Quine that statements
concerning such objects are justied holistically. However, there may also be an atomistic
explanation of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects. Penelope Maddy argued
in [Mad80] that it is possible to acquire perceptual beliefs about such mathematical objects
as sets, in other words to perceive them. Maddy thought that sets are not universals but
individuals or particulars - a view I have argued against in Section 6.3.3 of this work - but
views about how we acquire knowledge about sets are separable from views about their
ontological position. That we perceive sets may at rst sight seem implausible. However,
it is not wholly clear what it would take for us to perceive sets. Let us remember that
(as I argued in Section 6.4.1 of this work) the claim that we perceive some entities can by
semantic ascent be transformed into the equivalent claim that these entities are mentioned
(in such a way that we can quantify over them) in some observation statements or their
existence is implied by such statements. Logic of perception (as presented e. g. in [Nii82])
seems to conrm this. According to it we perceive that there are some entities if and
only if it is true in all worlds consistent with our perceptions that there are such entities.
It seems extremely plausible that quantiers ranging over mathematical entities can and
must be used in describing our experience. E. g. we can say that a person sees that there
are more than ten trees in front of him (or more than ten sense-data in his visual eld),
but he cannot say exactly how many. In order to symbolize this ascription of perception
it must be understood so that the person sees that there is such a number m which is
bigger than ten that there are m trees, in symbols (where Sap means that a sees that p),
Sa((9m)(N(m) ^ m > 10 ^ m((x)(Tx))) or Sa((9m)(mn ^ m > 10 ^ [Tx]xm)).
This implies Sa((9x)(N(x)) or Sa((9x)(xn)), i. e. that a sees that there is a number.
Maddy's examples of perceived sets are all impure sets; she uses such examples as sets
of eggs. The numbers that can be used in the description of what we experience are of
course nite numbers. However, if we can gain knowledge of some mathematical entities
by observation, then (as Maddy also remarks) the prospects of extending that knowledge
to other mathematical entities such as pure sets or transnite numbers by induction or
abduction do not seem to be too dark. However, if this strategy does not work, I do not
see that we have any alternative but to hold with the earlier logicists that the existence
of mathematical objects is an analytic truth (and hence that existential truths can be
analytic). Just rejecting the existence of mathematical objects is not an option because
of their indispensibility to our theories.
502
Unfortunately, there is not enough space left in his work to do this, so it
must be the subject of a future work. If my argument so far has been cor-
rect, then I think I have already shifted the burden of proof to nominalists
who want to deny the existence of universals; they should nd out if there
are any defects in the kind of analyses I have given or the argument based
on them, as well as whether there exists evidence that would undermine the
evidence I have presented. Since the main aim of my work was to nd out
what methods to use in exploring ontological problems, and especially the
problem of universals, this aim is already fullled; I have shown what kind
of evidence ought to be given for realism concerning universals, and it must
be left a further question, whether this kind of evidence is sucient and how
much of it there is and how good it is.
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